笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第12部分
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matter。
And this indifference does not only extend to matters as
to which the understanding has no knowledge； but also in
general to all those which are not apprehended with perfect
clearness at the moment when the will is deliberating upon
them： for； however probable are the conjectures which render
me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything； the simple
knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not
certain and indubitable reasons； suffices to occasion me to
judge the contrary。 Of this I have had great experience of
late when I set aside as false all that I had formerly held to
be absolutely true； for the sole reason that I remarked that
it might in some measure be doubted。
But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing
when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and
distinctness； it is plain that I act rightly and am not
deceived。 But if I determine to deny or affirm； I no longer
make use as I should of my free will； and if I affirm what is
not true； it is evident that I deceive myself； even though I
judge according to truth； this es about only by chance； and
I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom； for the
light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the
understanding should always precede the determination of the
will。 And it is in the misuse of the free will that the
privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error
is met with。 Privation； I say； is found in the act； in so far
as it proceeds from me； but it is not found in the faculty
which I have received from God； nor even in the act in so far
as it depends on Him。
For I have certainly no cause to plain that God has
not given me an intelligence which is more powerful； or a
natural light which is stronger than that which I have
received from Him； since it is proper to the finite
understanding not to prehend a multitude of things； and it
is proper to a created understanding to be finite； on the
contrary； I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes
me nothing and who has given me all the perfections I possess；
and I should be far from charging Him with injustice； and with
having deprived me of； or wrongfully withheld from me； these
perfections which He has not bestowed upon me。
I have further no reason to plain that He has given me
a will more ample than my understanding； for since the will
consists only of one single element； and is so to speak
indivisible； it appears that its nature is such that nothing
can be abstracted from it ＇without destroying it＇； and
certainly the more prehensive it is found to be； the more
reason I have to render gratitude to the giver。
And； finally； I must also not plain that God concurs
with me in forming the acts of the will； that is the judgment
in which I go astray； because these acts are entirely true and
good； inasmuch as they depend on God； and in a certain sense
more perfection accrues to my nature from the fact that I can
form them； than if I could not do so。 As to the privation in
which alone the formal reason of error or sin consists； it has
no need of any concurrence from God； since it is not a thing
＇or an existence＇； and since it is not related to God as to a
cause； but should be termed merely a negation ＇according to
the significance given to these words in the Schools＇。 For in
fact it is not an imperfection in God that He has given me the
liberty to give or withhold my assent from certain things as
to which He has not placed a clear and distinct knowledge in
my understanding； but it is without doubt an imperfection in
me not to make a good use of my freedom； and to give my
judgment readily on matters which I only understand obscurely。
I nevertheless perceive that God could easily have created me
so that I never should err； although I still remained free；
and endowed with a limited knowledge； viz。 by giving to my
understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of all things
as to which I should ever have to deliberate； or simply by His
engraving deeply in my memory the resolution never to form a
judgment on anything without having a clear and distinct
understanding of it； so that I could never forget it。 And it
is easy for me to understand that； in so far as I consider
myself alone； and as if there were only myself in the world； I
should have been much more perfect than I am； if God had
created me so that I could never err。 Nevertheless I cannot
deny that in some sense it is a greater perfection in the
whole universe that certain parts should not be exempt from
error as others are than that all parts should be exactly
similar。 And I have no right to plain if God； having
placed me in the world； has not called upon me to play a part
that excels all others in distinction and perfection。
And further I have reason to be glad on the ground that
if He has not given me the power of never going astray by the
first means pointed out above； which depends on a clear and
evident knowledge of all the things regarding which I can
deliberate； He has at least left within my power the other
means； which is firmly to adhere to the resolution never to
give judgment on matters whose truth is not clearly known to
me； for although I notice a certain weakness in my nature in
that I cannot continually concentrate my mind on one single
thought； I can yet； by attentive and frequently repeated
meditation； impress it so forcibly on my memory that I shall
never fail to recollect it whenever I have need of it； and
thus acquire the habit of never going astray。
And inasmuch as it is in this that the greatest and
principal perfection of man consists； it seems to me that I
have not gained little by this day's Meditation； since I have
discovered the source of falsity and error。 And certainly
there can be no other source than that which I have explained；
for as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of my
knowledge that it forms no judgment except on matters which
are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the
understanding； I can never be deceived； for every clear and
distinct conception20 is without doubt something； and hence
cannot derive its origin from what is nought； but must of
necessity have God as its author￥God； I say； who being
supremely perfect； cannot be the cause of any error； and
consequently we must conclude that such a conception ＇or such
a judgment＇ is true。 Nor have I only learned to…day what I
should avoid in order that I may not err； but also how I
should act in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth； for
without doubt I shall arrive at this end if I devote my
attention sufficiently to those things which I perfectly
understand； and if I separate from these that which I only
understand confusedly and with obscurity。 To these I shall
henceforth diligently give heed。
Meditation V。
Of the essence of material things； and； again； of God； that He
exists。
Many other matters respecting the attributes of God and
my own nature or mind remain for consideration； but I shall
possibly on another occasion resume the investigation of
these。 Now （after first noting what must be done or avoided；
in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth） my principal
task is to endeavour to emerge from the state of doubt into
which I have these last days fallen； and to see whether
nothing certain can be known regarding material things。
But before examining whether any such objects as I
conceive exist outside of me； I must consider the ideas of
them in so far as they are in my thought； and see which of
them are distinct and which confused。
In the first place； I am able distinctly to imagine that
quantity which philosophers monly call continuous； or the
extension in length； breadth； or depth； that is in this
quantity； or rather in the object to which it is attributed。
Further； I can number in it many different parts； and
attribute to each of its parts many sorts of size； figure；
situation and local movement； and； finally； I can assign to
each of these movements all degrees of duration。
And not only do I know these things with distinctness
when I consider them in general； but； likewise ＇however little
I apply my attention to the matter＇； I discover an infinitude
of particulars respecting numbers； figures； movements； and
other such things； whose truth is so manifest； and so well
accords with my nature； that when I begin to discover them； it
seems to me that I learn nothing new； or recollect what I
formerly knew￥that is to say； that I for the first time
perceive things which were already present to my mind；
although I had not as yet applied my mind to them。
And what I here find to be most important is that I
discover in myself an infinitude of ideas of certain things
which cannot be esteemed as pure negations； although they may
possibly have no existence outside of my thought； and which
are not framed by me； although it is within my power either to
think or not to think them； but which possess natures which
are true and immutable。 For example； when I imagine a
triangle； although there may nowhere in the world be such a
figure outside my thought； or ever have been； there is
nevertheless in this figure a certain determinate nature；
form； or essence； which is immutable and eternal； which I have
not invented； and which in no wise depends on my mind； as
appears from the fact that diverse properties of that triangle
can be demonstrated； viz。 that its three angles are equal to
two right angles； that the greatest side is subtended by the
greatest angle； and the like； which now； whether I wish it or
do not wish it； I recognise very clearly as pertaining to it；
although I never thought of the matter at all when I imagined
a triangle for the first time； and which therefore cannot be
said to have been invented by me。
Nor does the objection hold good that possibly this idea
of a triangle has reached my mind through the medium of my
senses； since I have sometimes seen bodies triangular in
shape； because I can form in my mind an infinitude of other
figures regarding which we
