笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第14部分

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constituted　by　nature　that　I　can　easily　deceive　myself　even　in
those　matters　which　I　believe　myself　to　apprehend　with　the
greatest　evidence　and　certainty；　especially　when　I　recollect
that　I　have　frequently　judged　matters　to　be　true　and　certain
which　other　reasons　have　afterwards　impelled　me　to　judge　to　be
altogether　false。
　　　　　But　after　I　have　recognised　that　there　is　a　God￥because
at　the　same　time　I　have　also　recognised　that　all　things　depend
upon　Him；　and　that　He　is　not　a　deceiver；　and　from　that　have
inferred　that　what　I　perceive　clearly　and　distinctly　cannot
fail　to　be　true￥although　I　no　longer　pay　attention　to　the
reasons　for　which　I　have　judged　this　to　be　true；　provided　that
I　recollect　having　clearly　and　distinctly　perceived　it　no
contrary　reason　can　be　brought　forward　which　could　ever　cause
me　to　doubt　of　its　truth；　and　thus　I　have　a　true　and　certain
knowledge　of　it。　　And　this　same　knowledge　extends　likewise　to
all　other　things　which　I　recollect　having　formerly
demonstrated；　such　as　the　truths　of　geometry　and　the　like；　for
what　can　be　alleged　against　them　to　cause　me　to　place　them　in
doubt？　　Will　it　be　said　that　my　nature　is　such　as　to　cause　me
to　be　frequently　deceived？　　But　I　already　know　that　I　cannot
be　deceived　in　the　judgment　whose　grounds　I　know　clearly。
Will　it　be　said　that　I　formerly　held　many　things　to　be　true
and　certain　which　I　have　afterwards　recognised　to　be　false？
But　I　had　not　had　any　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　of　these
things；　and　not　as　yet　knowing　the　rule　whereby　I　assure
myself　of　the　truth；　I　had　been　impelled　to　give　my　assent
from　reasons　which　I　have　since　recognised　to　be　less　strong
than　I　had　at　the　time　imagined　them　to　be。　　What　further
objection　can　then　be　raised？　　That　possibly　I　am　dreaming　（an
objection　I　myself　made　a　little　while　ago）；　or　that　all　the
thoughts　which　I　now　have　are　no　more　true　than　the　phantasies
of　my　dreams？　　But　even　though　I　slept　the　case　would　be　the
same；　for　all　that　is　clearly　present　to　my　mind　is　absolutely
true。
　　　　　And　so　I　very　clearly　recognise　that　the　certainty　and
truth　of　all　knowledge　depends　alone　on　the　knowledge　of　the
true　God；　in　so　much　that；　before　I　knew　Him；　I　could　not　have
a　perfect　knowledge　of　any　other　thing。　　And　now　that　I　know
Him　I　have　the　means　of　acquiring　a　perfect　knowledge　of　an
infinitude　of　things；　not　only　of　those　which　relate　to　God
Himself　and　other　intellectual　matters；　but　also　of　those
which　pertain　to　corporeal　nature　in　so　far　as　it　is　the
object　of　pure　mathematics　＇which　have　no　concern　with　whether
it　exists　or　not＇。
　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　VI。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　Of　the　Existence　of　Material　Things；　and　of　the　real
　　　　　　　　distinction　between　the　Soul　and　Body　of　Man。

　　　　　Nothing　further　now　remains　but　to　inquire　whether
material　things　exist。　　And　certainly　I　at　least　know　that
these　may　exist　in　so　far　as　they　are　considered　as　the
objects　of　pure　mathematics；　since　in　this　aspect　I　perceive
them　clearly　and　distinctly。　　For　there　is　no　doubt　that　God
possesses　the　power　to　produce　everything　that　I　am　capable　of
perceiving　with　distinctness；　and　I　have　never　deemed　that
anything　was　impossible　for　Him；　unless　I　found　a
contradiction　in　attempting　to　conceive　it　clearly。　　Further；
the　faculty　of　imagination　which　I　possess；　and　of　which；
experience　tells　me；　I　make　use　when　I　apply　myself　to　the
consideration　of　material　things；　is　capable　of　persuading　me
of　their　existence；　for　when　I　attentively　consider　what
imagination　is；　I　find　that　it　is　nothing　but　a　certain
application　of　the　faculty　of　knowledge　to　the　body　which　is
immediately　present　to　it；　and　which　therefore　exists。
　　　　　And　to　render　this　quite　clear；　I　remark　in　the　first
place　the　difference　that　exists　between　the　imagination　and
pure　intellection　＇or　conception23＇。　　For　example；　when　I
imagine　a　triangle；　I　do　not　conceive　it　only　as　a　figure
prehended　by　three　lines；　but　I　also　apprehend24　these
three　lines　as　present　by　the　power　and　inward　vision　of　my
mind；25　and　this　is　what　I　call　imagining。　　But　if　I　desire　to
think　of　a　chiliagon；　I　certainly　conceive　truly　that　it　is　a
figure　posed　of　a　thousand　sides；　just　as　easily　as　I
conceive　of　a　triangle　that　it　is　a　figure　of　three　sides
only；　but　I　cannot　in　any　way　imagine　the　thousand　sides　of　a
chiliagon　＇as　I　do　the　three　sides　of　a　triangle＇；　nor　do　I；
so　to　speak；　regard　them　as　present　＇with　the　eyes　of　my
mind＇。　　And　although　in　accordance　with　the　habit　I　have
formed　of　always　employing　the　aid　of　my　imagination　when　I
think　of　corporeal　things；　it　may　happen　that　in　imagining　a
chiliagon　I　confusedly　represent　to　myself　some　figure；　yet　it
is　very　evident　that　this　figure　is　not　a　chiliagon；　since　it
in　no　way　differs　from　that　which　I　represent　to　myself　when　I
think　of　a　myriagon　or　any　other　many…sided　figure；　nor　does
it　serve　my　purpose　in　discovering　the　properties　which　go　to
form　the　distinction　between　a　chiliagon　and　other　polygons。
But　if　the　question　turns　upon　a　pentagon；　it　is　quite　true
that　I　can　conceive　its　figure　as　well　as　that　of　a　chiliagon
without　the　help　of　my　imagination；　but　I　can　also　imagine　it
by　applying　the　attention　of　my　mind　to　each　of　its　five
sides；　and　at　the　same　time　to　the　space　which　they　enclose。
And　thus　I　clearly　recognise　that　I　have　need　of　a　particular
effort　of　mind　in　order　to　effect　the　act　of　imagination；　such
as　I　do　not　require　in　order　to　understand；　and　this
particular　effort　of　mind　clearly　manifests　the　difference
which　exists　between　imagination　and　pure　intellection。26
　　　　　I　remark　besides　that　this　power　of　imagination　which　is
in　one；　inasmuch　as　it　differs　from　the　power　of
understanding；　is　in　no　wise　a　necessary　element　in　my　nature；
or　in　＇my　essence；　that　is　to　say；　in＇　the　essence　of　my　mind；
for　although　I　did　not　possess　it　I　should　doubtless　ever
remain　the　same　as　I　now　am；　from　which　it　appears　that　we
might　conclude　that　it　depends　on　something　which　differs　from
me。　　And　I　easily　conceive　that　if　some　body　exists　with　which
my　mind　is　conjoined　and　united　in　such　a　way　that　it　can
apply　itself　to　consider　it　when　it　pleases；　it　may　be　that　by
this　means　it　can　imagine　corporeal　objects；　so　that　this　mode
of　thinking　differs　from　pure　intellection　only　inasmuch　as
mind　in　its　intellectual　activity　in　some　manner　turns　on
itself；　and　considers　some　of　the　ideas　which　it　possesses　in
itself；　while　in　imagining　it　turns　towards　the　body；　and
there　beholds　in　it　something　conformable　to　the　idea　which　it
has　either　conceived　of　itself　or　perceived　by　the　senses。　　I
easily　understand；　I　say；　that　the　imagination　could　be　thus
constituted　if　it　is　true　that　body　exists；　and　because　I　can
discover　no　other　convenient　mode　of　explaining　it；　I
conjecture　with　probability　that　body　does　exist；　but　this　is
only　with　probability；　and　although　I　examine　all　things　with
care；　I　nevertheless　do　not　find　that　from　this　distinct　idea
of　corporeal　nature；　which　I　have　in　my　imagination；　I　can
derive　any　argument　from　which　there　will　necessarily　be
deduced　the　existence　of　body。
　　　　　But　I　am　in　the　habit　of　imagining　many　other　things
besides　this　corporeal　nature　which　is　the　object　of　pure
mathematics；　to　wit；　the　colours；　sounds；　scents；　pain；　and
other　such　things；　although　less　distinctly。　　And　inasmuch　as
I　perceive　these　things　much　better　through　the　senses；　by　the
medium　of　which；　and　by　the　memory；　they　seem　to　have　reached
my　imagination；　I　believe　that；　in　order　to　examine　them　more
conveniently；　it　is　right　that　I　should　at　the　same　time
investigate　the　nature　of　sense　perception；　and　that　I　should
see　if　from　the　ideas　which　I　apprehend　by　this　mode　of
thought；　which　I　call　feeling；　I　cannot　derive　some　certain
proof　of　the　existence　of　corporeal　objects。
　　　　　And　first　of　all　I　shall　recall　to　my　memory　those
matters　which　I　hitherto　held　to　be　true；　as　having　perceived
them　through　the　senses；　and　the　foundations　on　which　my
belief　has　rested；　in　the　next　place　I　shall　examine　the
reasons　which　have　since　obliged　me　to　place　them　in　doubt；　in
the　last　place　I　shall　consider　which　of　them　I　must　now
believe。
　　　　　First　of　all；　then；　I　perceived　that　I　had　a　head；　hands；
feet；　and　all　other　members　of　which　this　body￥which　I
considered　as　a　part；　or　possibly　even　as　the　whole；　of
myself￥is　posed。　　Further　I　was　sensible　that　this　body　was
placed　amidst　many　others；　from　which　it　was　capable　of　being
affected　in　many　different　ways；　beneficial　and　hurtful；　and　I
remarked　that　a　certain　feeling　of　pleasure　acpanied　those
that　were　beneficial；　and　pain　those　which　were　harmful。　　And
in　addition　to　this　pleasure　and　pain；　I　also　experienced
hunger；　thirst；　and　other　similar　appetites；　as　also　certain
corporeal　inclinations　towards　joy；　sadness；　anger；　and　other
similar　passions。　　And　outside　myself；　in　addition　to
extension；　figure；　and　motions　of　bodies；　I　remarked　in　them
hardness；　heat；　and　all　other　tactice　qualities；　and；　further；
light　and　colour；　and　scents　and　sounds；　the　variety　of　which
gave　me　the　means　of　distinguishing　the　sky；　the　earth；　the
sea；　and　generally　all　the　other　bodies；　one　from　the　other。
And　certainly；　considering　the　ideas　of　all　these　qualities
which　presented　themselves　to　my　mind；　and　which　alone　I
perceived　properly　or　immediately；　it　was　not　without　reason
that　I　believed　myself　to　perceive　objects　quite　different
from　my　thought；　to　wit；　bodies　from　which　those　ideas
proceeded；　for　I　found　by　experience　that　these　ideas
presented　themselves　to　me　without　my　consent　being　requisite；
so　that　I　could　not　perceive　any　object；　however　desirous　I
might　be；　unless　it　were　present　to　the　organs　of　sense；　and
it　was　not　in　my　power　not　to　perceive　it；　when　it　was
present。　　And　because　the　ideas　which　I　received　through　the
senses　were　much　more　lively；　more　clear；　and　even；　in　their
own　way；　more　distinct　than　any　of　those　which　I　could　of
myself　frame　in　meditation；　or　than　those　I　found　impressed　on
my　memory；　it　appeared　as　though　they　could　not　have　proceeded
from　my　mind；　so　t