笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第6部分

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sometimes　indeed　despite　his　will；　and　who　perceives　many
likewise；　as　by　the　intervention　of　the　bodily　organs？　　Is
there　nothing　in　all　this　which　is　as　true　as　it　is　certain
that　I　exist；　even　though　I　should　always　sleep　and　though　　he
who　has　given　me　being　employed　all　his　ingenuity　in　deceiving
me？　　Is　there　likewise　any　one　of　these　attributes　which　can
be　distinguished　from　my　thought；　or　which　might　be　said　to　be
separated　from　myself？　　For　it　is　so　evident　of　itself　that　it
is　I　who　doubts；　who　understands；　and　who　desires；　that　there
is　no　reason　here　to　add　anything　to　explain　it。　　And　I　have
certainly　the　power　of　imagining　likewise；　for　although　it　may
happen　（as　I　formerly　supposed）　that　none　of　the　things　which
I　imagine　are　true；　nevertheless　this　power　of　imagining　does
not　cease　to　be　really　in　use；　and　it　forms　part　of　my
thought。　　Finally；　I　am　the　same　who　feels；　that　is　to　say；
who　perceives　certain　things；　as　by　the　organs　of　sense；　since
it　truth　I　see　light；　I　hear　noise；　I　feel　heat。　　But　it　will
be　said　that　these　phenomena　are　false　and　that　I　am　dreaming。
Let　it　be　so；　still　it　is　at　least　quite　certain　that　it　seems
to　me　that　I　see　light；　that　I　hear　noise　and　that　I　feel
heat。　　That　cannot　be　false；　properly　speaking　it　is　what　is
in　me　called　feeling；11　and　used　in　this　precise　sense　that　is
no　other　thing　than　thinking。
　　　　　From　this　time　I　begin　to　know　what　I　am　with　a　little
more　clearness　and　distinction　than　before；　but　nevertheless
it　still　seems　to　me；　and　I　cannot　prevent　myself　from
thinking；　that　corporeal　things；　whose　images　are　framed　by
thought；　which　are　tested　by　the　senses；　are　much　more
distinctly　known　than　that　obscure　part　of　me　which　does　not
e　under　the　imagination。　　Although　really　it　is　very
strange　to　say　that　I　know　and　understand　more　distinctly
these　things　whose　existence　seems　to　me　dubious；　which　are
unknown　to　me；　and　which　do　not　belong　to　me；　than　others　of
the　truth　of　which　I　am　convinced；　which　are　known　to　me　and
which　pertain　to　my　real　nature；　in　a　word；　than　myself。　　But
I　see　clearly　how　the　case　stands：　　my　mind　loves　to　wander；
and　cannot　yet　suffer　itself　to　be　retained　within　the　just
limits　of　truth。　　Very　good；　let　us　once　more　give　it　the
freest　rein；　so　that；　when　afterwards　we　seize　the　proper
occasion　for　pulling　up；　it　may　the　more　easily　be　regulated
and　controlled。
　　　　　Let　us　begin　by　considering　the　monest　matters；　those
which　we　believe　to　be　the　most　distinctly　prehended；　to
wit；　the　bodies　which　we　touch　and　see；　not　indeed　bodies　in
general；　for　these　general　ideas　are　usually　a　little　more
confused；　but　let　us　consider　one　body　in　particular。　　Let　us
take；　for　example；　this　piece　of　wax：　　it　has　been　taken　quite
freshly　from　the　hive；　and　it　has　not　yet　lost　the　sweetness
of　the　honey　which　it　contains；　it　still　retains　somewhat　of
the　odour　of　the　flowers　from　which　it　has　been　culled；　its
colour；　its　figure；　its　size　are　apparent；　it　is　hard；　cold；
easily　handled；　and　if　you　strike　it　with　the　finger；　it　will
emit　a　sound。　　Finally　all　the　things　which　are　requisite　to
cause　us　distinctly　to　recognise　a　body；　are　met　with　in　it。
But　notice　that　while　I　speak　and　approach　the　fire　what
remained　of　the　taste　is　exhaled；　the　smell　evaporates；　the
colour　alters；　the　figure　is　destroyed；　the　size　increases；　it
bees　liquid；　it　heats；　scarcely　can　one　handle　it；　and　when
one　strikes　it；　now　sound　is　emitted。　　Does　the　same　wax
remain　after　this　change？　　We　must　confess　that　it　remains；
none　would　judge　otherwise。　　What　then　did　I　know　so
distinctly　in　this　piece　of　wax？　　It　could　certainly　be
nothing　of　all　that　the　senses　brought　to　my　notice；　since　all
these　things　which　fall　under　taste；　smell；　sight；　touch；　and
hearing；　are　found　to　be　changed；　and　yet　the　same　wax
remains。
　　　　　Perhaps　it　was　what　I　now　think；　viz。　that　this　wax　was
not　that　sweetness　of　honey；　nor　that　agreeable　scent　of
flowers；　nor　that　particular　whiteness；　nor　that　figure；　nor
that　sound；　but　simply　a　body　which　a　little　while　before
appeared　tome　as　perceptible　under　these　forms；　and　which　is
now　perceptible　under　others。　　But　what；　precisely；　is　it　that
I　imagine　when　I　form　such　conceptions？　　Let　us　attentively
consider　this；　and；　abstracting　from　all　that　does　not　belong
to　the　wax；　let　us　see　what　remains。　　Certainly　nothing
remains　excepting　a　certain　extended　thing　which　is　flexible
and　movable。　　But　what　is　the　meaning　of　flexible　and　movable？
Is　it　not　that　I　imagine　that　this　piece　of　wax　being　round　is
capable　of　being　square　and　of　passing　from　a　square　to　a
triangular　figure？　　No；　certainly　it　is　not　that；　since　I
imagine　it　admits　of　an　infinitude　of　similar　changes；　and　I
nevertheless　do　not　know　how　to　pass　the　infinitude　by　my
imagination；　and　consequently　this　conception　which　I　have　of
the　wax　is　not　brought　about　by　the　faculty　of　imagination。
What　now　is　this　extension？　　Is　it　not　also　unknown？　　For　it
bees　greater　when　the　wax　is　melted；　greater　when　it　is
boiled；　and　greater　still　when　the　heat　increases；　and　I
should　not　conceive　＇clearly＇　according　to　truth　what　wax　is；
if　I　did　not　think　that　even　this　piece　that　we　are
considering　is　capable　of　receiving　more　variations　in
extension　than　I　have　ever　imagined。　　We　must　then　grant　that
I　could　not　even　understand　through　the　imagination　what　this
piece　of　wax　is；　and　that　it　is　my　mind12　alone　which
perceives　it。　　I　say　this　piece　of　wax　in　particular；　for　as
to　wax　in　general　it　is　yet　clearer。　　But　what　is　this　piece
of　wax　which　cannot　be　understood　excepting　by　the
＇understanding　or＇　mind？　　It　is　certainly　the　same　that　I　see；
touch；　imagine；　and　finally　it　is　the　same　which　I　have　always
believed　it　to　be　from　the　beginning。　　But　what　must
particularly　be　observed　is　that　its　perception　is　neither　an
act　of　vision；　nor　of　touch；　nor　of　imagination；　and　has　never
been　such　although　it　may　have　appeared　formerly　to　be　so；　but
only　an　intuition13　of　the　mind；　which　may　be　imperfect　and
confused　as　it　was　formerly；　or　clear　and　distinct　as　it　is　at
present；　according　as　my　attention　is　more　or　less　directed　to
the　elements　which　are　found　in　it；　and　of　which　it　is
posed。
　　　　　Yet　in　the　meantime　I　am　greatly　astonished　when　I
consider　＇the　great　feebleness　of　mind＇　and　its　proneness　to
fall　＇insensibly＇　into　error；　for　although　without　giving
expression　to　my　thought　I　consider　all　this　in　my　own　mind；
words　often　impede　me　and　I　am　almost　deceived　by　the　terms　of
ordinary　language。　　For　we　say　that　we　see　the　same　wax；　if　it
is　present；　and　not　that　we　simply　judge　that　it　is　the　same
from　its　having　the　same　colour　and　figure。　　From　this　I
should　conclude　that　I　knew　the　wax　by　means　of　vision　and　not
simply　by　the　intuition　of　the　mind；　unless　by　chance　I
remember　that；　when　looking　from　a　window　and　saying　I　see　men
who　pass　in　the　street；　I　really　do　not　see　them；　but　infer
that　what　I　see　is　men；　just　as　I　say　that　I　see　wax。　　And　yet
what　do　I　see　from　the　window　but　hats　and　coats　which　may
cover　automatic　machines？　　Yet　I　judge　these　to　be　men。　　And
similarly　solely　by　the　faculty　of　judgment　which　rests　in　my
mind；　I　prehend　that　which　I　believed　I　saw　with　my　eyes。
　　　　　A　man　who　makes　it　his　aim　to　raise　his　knowledge　above
the　mon　should　be　ashamed　to　derive　the　occasion　for
doubting　from　the　forms　of　speech　invented　by　the　vulgar；　I
prefer　to　pass　on　and　consider　whether　I　had　a　more　evident
and　perfect　conception　of　what　the　wax　was　when　I　first
perceived　it；　and　when　I　believed　I　knew　it　by　means　of　the
external　senses　or　at　least　by　the　mon　sense14　as　it　is
called；　that　is　to　say　by　the　imaginative　faculty；　or　whether
my　present　conception　is　clearer　now　that　I　have　most
carefully　examined　what　it　is；　and　in　what　way　it　can　be
known。　　It　would　certainly　be　absurd　to　doubt　as　to　this。　　For
what　was　there　in　this　first　perception　which　was　distinct？
What　was　there　which　might　not　as　well　have　been　perceived　by
any　of　the　animals？　　But　when　I　distinguish　the　wax　from　its
external　forms；　and　when；　just　as　if　I　had　taken　from　it　its
vestments；　I　consider　it　quite　naked；　it　is　certain　that
although　some　error　may　still　be　found　in　my　judgment；　I　can
nevertheless　not　perceive　it　thus　without　a　human　mind。
　　　　　But　finally　what　shall　I　say　of　this　mind；　that　is；　of
myself；　for　up　to　this　point　I　do　not　admit　in　myself　anything
but　mind？　　What　then；　I　who　seem　to　perceive　this　piece　of　wax
so　distinctly；　do　I　not　know　myself；　not　only　with　much　more
truth　and　certainty；　but　also　with　much　more　distinctness　and
clearness？　　For　if　I　judge　that　the　wax　is　or　exists　from　the
fact　that　I　see　it；　it　certainly　follows　much　more　clearly
that　I　am　or　that　I　exist　myself　from　the　fact　that　I　see　it。
For　it　may　be　that　what　I　see　is　not　really　wax；　it　may　also
be　that　I　do　not　possess　eyes　with　which　to　see　anything；　but
it　cannot　be　that　when　I　see；　or　（for　I　no　longer　take　account
of　the　distinction）　when　I　think　I　see；　that　I　myself　who
think　am　nought。　　So　if　I　judge　that　the　wax　exists　from　the
fact　that　I　touch　it；　the　same　thing　will　follow；　to　wit；　that
I　am；　and　if　I　judge　that　my　imagination；　or　some　other　cause；
whatever　it　is；　persuades　me　that　the　wax　exists；　I　shall
still　conclude　the　same。　　And　what　I　have　here　remarked　of　wax
may　be　applied　to　all　other　things　which　are　external　to　me
＇and　which　are　met　with　outside　of　me＇。　　And　further；　if　the
＇notion　or＇　perception　of　wax　has　seemed　to　me　clearer　and
more　distinct；　not　only　after　the　sight　or　the　touch；　but　also
after　many　other　causes　have　rendered　it　quite　manifest　to　me；
with　how　much　more　＇evidence＇　and　distinctness　must　it　be　said
that　I　now　know　myself；　since　all　the　reasons　which　contribute
to　the　knowledge　of　wax；　or　any　other　body　whatever；　are　yet
better　proofs　of　the　nature　of　my　mind！　　And　there　are　so　many
other　things　in　the　mind　itself　which　may　contribute　to　the
elucidation　of　its　nature；　that　those　which　depend　on　body
such　as　these　just　mentioned；　hardly　merit　being　taken　into
account。
　　　　　But　finally　here　I　am；　having　insensibly　reverted　to　the