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necessity　pels　him；　as　is　said　above；　because　if　he　conquers　you　are

at　his　discretion；　and　princes　ought　to　avoid　as　much　as　possible　being

at　the　discretion　of　any　one。　The　Venetians　joined　with　France　against

the　Duke　of　Milan；　and　this　alliance；　which　caused　their　ruin；　could

have　been　avoided。　But　when　it　cannot　be　avoided；　as　happened　to　the

Florentines　when　the　Pope　and　Spain　sent　armies　to　attack　Lombardy；　then

in　such　a　case；　for　the　above　reasons；　the　prince　ought　to　favour　one　of

the　parties。



Never　let　any　Government　imagine　that　it　can　choose　perfectly　safe

courses；　rather　let　it　expect　to　have　to　take　very　doubtful　ones；

because　it　is　found　in　ordinary　affairs　that　one　never　seeks　to　avoid

one　trouble　without　running　into　another；　but　prudence　consists　in

knowing　how　to　distinguish　the　character　of　troubles；　and　for　choice　to

take　the　lesser　evil。



A　prince　ought　also　to　show　himself　a　patron　of　ability；　and　to　honour

the　proficient　in　every　art。　At　the　same　time　he　should　encourage　his

citizens　to　practise　their　callings　peaceably；　both　in　merce　and

agriculture；　and　in　every　other　following；　so　that　the　one　should　not　be

deterred　from　improving　his　possessions　for　fear　lest　they　be　taken　away

from　him　or　another　from　opening　up　trade　for　fear　of　taxes；　but　the

prince　ought　to　offer　rewards　to　whoever　wishes　to　do　these　things　and

designs　in　any　way　to　honour　his　city　or　state。



Further；　he　ought　to　entertain　the　people　with　festivals　and　spectacles

at　convenient　seasons　of　the　year；　and　as　every　city　is　divided　into

guilds　or　into　societies；　he　ought　to　hold　such　bodies　in　esteem；　and

associate　with　them　sometimes；　and　show　himself　an　example　of　courtesy

and　liberality；　nevertheless；　always　maintaining　the　majesty　of　his

rank；　for　this　he　must　never　consent　to　abate　in　anything。



CHAPTER　XXII



CONCERNING　THE　SECRETARIES　OF　PRINCES



THE　choice　of　servants　is　of　no　little　importance　to　a　prince；　and　they

are　good　or　not　according　to　the　discrimination　of　the　prince。　And　the

first　opinion　which　one　forms　of　a　prince；　and　of　his　understanding；　is

by　observing　the　men　he　has　around　him；　and　when　they　are　capable　and

faithful　he　may　always　be　considered　wise；　because　he　has　known　how　to

recognize　the　capable　and　to　keep　them　faithful。　But　when　they　are

otherwise　one　cannot　form　a　good　opinion　of　him；　for　the　prime　error

which　he　made　was　in　choosing　them。



There　were　none　who　knew　Messer　Antonio　da　Venafro　as　the　servant　of

Pandolfo　Petrucci；　Prince　of　Siena；　who　would　not　consider　Pandolfo　to

be　a　very　clever　man　in　having　Venafro　for　his　servant。　Because　there

are　three　classes　of　intellects：　one　which　prehends　by　itself；

another　which　appreciates　what　others　prehend；　and　a　third　which

neither　prehends　by　itself　nor　by　the　showing　of　others；　the　first　is

the　most　excellent；　the　second　is　good；　the　third　is　useless。　Therefore；

it　follows　necessarily　that；　if　Pandolfo　was　not　in　the　first　rank；　he

was　in　the　second；　for　whenever　one　has　judgment　to　know　good　or　bad

when　it　is　said　and　done；　although　he　himself　may　not　have　the

initiative；　yet　he　can　recognize　the　good　and　the　bad　in　his　servant；

and　the　one　he　can　praise　and　the　other　correct；　thus　the　servant　cannot

hope　to　deceive　him；　and　is　kept　honest。



But　to　enable　a　prince　to　form　an　opinion　of　his　servant　there　is　one

test　which　never　falls；　when　you　see　the　servant　thinking　more　of　his

own　interests　than　of　yours；　and　seeking　inwardly　his　own　profit　in

everything；　such　a　man　will　never　make　a　good　servant；　nor　will　you　ever

be　able　to　trust　him；　because　he　who　has　the　state　of　another　in　his

hands　ought　never　to　think　of　himself；　but　always　of　his　prince；　and

never　pay　any　attention　to　matters　in　which　the　prince　is　not　concerned。



On　the　other　to　keep　his　servant　honest　the　prince　ought　to　study　him；

honouring　him；　enriching　him；　doing　him　kindnesses；　sharing　with　him　the

honours　and　cares；　and　at　the　same　time　let　him　see　that　he　cannot　stand

alone；　so　that　many　honours　not　make　him　desire　more；　many　riches　make

him　wish　for　more；　and　that　many　cares　may　make　him　dread　changes。　When；

therefore；　servants；　and　princes　towards　servants；　are　thus　disposed；

they　can　trust　each　other；　but　when　it　is　otherwise；　the　end　will　always

be　disastrous　for　either　one　or　the　other。



CHAPTER　XXIII



HOW　FLATTERERS　SHOULD　BE　AVOIDED



I　DO　NOT　wish　to　leave　out　an　important　branch　of　this　subject；　for　it

is　a　danger　from　which　princes　are　with　difficulty　preserved；　unless

they　are　very　careful　and　discriminating。　It　is　that　of　flatterers；　of

whom　courts　arc　full；　because　men　are　so　self…placent　in　their　own

affairs；　and　in　a　way　so　deceived　in　them；　that　they　are　preserved　with

difficulty　from　this　pest；　and　if　they　wish　to　defend　themselves　they

run　the　danger　of　falling　into　contempt。　Because　there　is　no　other　way

of　guarding　oneself　from　flatterers　except　letting　men　understand　that

to　tell　you　the　truth　does　not　offend　you；　but　when　every　one　may　tell

you　the　truth；　respect　for　you　abates。



Therefore　a　wise　prince　ought　to　hold　a　third　course　by　choosing　the

wise　men　in　his　state；　and　giving　to　them　only　the　liberty　of　speaking

the　truth　to　him；　and　then　only　of　those　things　of　which　he　inquires；

and　of　none　others；　but　he　ought　to　question　them　upon　everything；　and

listen　to　their　opinions；　and　afterwards　form　his　own　conclusions。　With

these　councillors；　separately　and　collectively；　he　ought　to　carry

himself　in　such　a　way　that　each　of　them　should　know　that；　the　more

freely　he　shall　speak；　the　more　he　shall　be　preferred；　outside　of　these；

he　should　listen　to　no　one；　pursue　the　thing　resolved　on；　and　be

steadfast　in　his　resolutions。　He　who　does　otherwise　is　either　overthrown

by　flatterers；　or　is　so　often　changed　by　varying　opinions　that　he　falls

into　contempt。



I　wish　on　this　subject　to　adduce　a　modern　example。　Fra　Luca；　the　man　of

affairs　to　Maximilian；　the　present　emperor；　speaking　of　his　majesty；

said：　He　consulted　with　no　one；　yet　never　got　his　own　way　in　anything。

This　arose　because　of　his　following　a　practice　the　opposite　to　the

above；　for　the　emperor　is　a　secretive　man　　he　does　not　municate　his

designs　to　any　one；　nor　does　he　receive　opinions　on　them。　But　as　in

carrying　them　into　effect　they　bee　revealed　and　known；　they　are　at

once　obstructed　by　those　men　whom　he　has　around　him；　and　he；　being

pliant；　is　diverted　from　them。　Hence　it　follows　that　those　things　he

does　one　day　he　undoes　the　next；　and　no　one　ever　understands　what　he

wishes　or　intends　to　do；　and　no　one　can　rely　on　his　resolutions。



A　prince；　therefore；　ought　always　to　take　counsel；　but　only　when　he

wishes　and　not　when　others　wish；　he　ought　rather　to　discourage　every　one

from　offering　advice　unless　he　asks　it；　but；　however；　he　ought　to　be　a

constant　inquirer；　and　afterwards　a　patient　listener　concerning　the

things　of　which　he　inquired；　also；　on　learning　that　any　one；　on　any

consideration；　has　not　told　him　the　truth；　he　should　let　his　anger　be

felt。



And　if　there　are　some　who　think　that　a　prince　who　conveys　an　impression

of　his　wisdom　is　not　so　through　his　own　ability；　but　through　the　good

advisers　that　he　has　around　him；　beyond　doubt　they　are　deceived；　because

this　is　an　axiom　which　never　fails：　that　a　prince　who　is　not　wise

himself　will　never　take　good　advice；　unless　by　chance　he　has　yielded　his

affairs　entirely　to　one　person　who　happens　to　be　a　very　prudent　man。　In

this　case　indeed　he　may　be　well　governed；　but　it　would　not　be　for　long；

because　such　a　governor　would　in　a　short　time　take　away　his　state　from

him。



But　if　a　prince　who　is　not　experienced　should　take　counsel　from　more

than　one　he　will　never　get　united　counsels；　nor　will　he　know　how　to

unite　them。　Each　of　the　counsellors　will　think　of　his　own　interests；　and

the　prince　will　not　know　how　to　control　them　or　to　see　through　them。　And

they　are　not　to　be　found　otherwise；　because　men　will　always　prove　untrue

to　you　unless　they　are　kept　honest　by　constraint。　Therefore　it　must　be

inferred　that　good　counsels；　whencesoever　they　e；　are　born　of　the

wisdom　of　the　prince；　and　not　the　wisdom　of　the　prince　from　good

counsels。



CHAPTER　XXIV



THE　PRINCES　OF　ITALY　HAVE　LOST　THEIR　STATES



THE　previous　suggestions；　carefully　observed；　will　enable　a　new　prince

to　appear　well　established；　and　render　him　at　once　more　secure　and　fixed

in　the　state　than　if　he　had　been　long　seated　there。　For　the　actions　of　a

new　prince　are　more　narrowly　observed　than　those　of　an　hereditary　one；

and　when　they　are　seen　to　be　able　they　gain　more　men　and　bind　far

tighter　than　ancient　blood；　because　men　are　attracted　more　by　the

present　than　by　the　past；　and　when　they　find　the　present　good　they　enjoy

it　and　seek　no　further；　they　will　also　make　the　utmost　defence　for　a

prince　if　he　fails　them　not　in　other　things。　Thus　it　will　be　a　double

glory　to　him　to　have　established　a　new　principality；　and　adorned　and

strengthened　it　with　good　laws；　good　arms；　good　allies；　and　with　a　good

example；　so　will　it　be　a　double　disgrace　to　him　who；　born　a　prince；

shall　lose　his　state　by　want　of　wisdom。



And　if　those　seigniors　are　considered　who　have　lost　their　states　in

Italy　in　our　times；　such　as　the　King　of　Naples；　the　Duke　of　Milan；　and

others；　there　will　be　found　in　them；　firstly；　one　mon　defect　in

regard　to　arms　from　the　causes　which　have　been　discussed　at　length；　in

the　next　place；　some　one　of　them　will　be　seen；　either　to　have　had　the

people　hostile；　or　if　he　has　had　the　people　friendly；　he　has　not　known

how　to　secure　the　nobles。　In　the　absence　of　these　defects　states　that

have　power　enough　to　keep　an　army　in　the　field　cannot　be　lost。



Philip　of　Macedon；　not　the　father　of　Alexander　the　Great；　but　he　who　was

conquered　by　Titus　Quintius；　had　not　much　territory　pared　to　the

greatness　of　the　Romans　and　of　Greece　who　at