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governed　in　two　different　ways：　either　by　a　prince；　with　a　body　of

servants；　who　assist　him　to　govern　the　kingdom　as　ministers　by　his

favour　and　permission；　or　by　a　prince　and　barons；　who　hold　that　dignity

by　antiquity　of　blood　and　not　by　the　grace　of　the　prince。　Such　barons

have　states　and　their　own　subjects；　who　recognize　them　as　lords　and　hold

them　in　natural　affection。　Those　states　that　are　governed　by　a　prince

and　his　servants　hold　their　prince　in　more　consideration；　because　in　all

the　country　there　is　no　one　who　is　recognized　as　superior　to　him；　and　if

they　yield　obedience　to　another　they　do　it　as　to　a　minister　and

official；　and　they　do　not　bear　him　any　particular　affection。



The　examples　of　these　two　governments　in　our　time　are　the　Turk　and　the

King　of　France。　The　entire　monarchy　of　the　Turk　is　governed　by　one　lord；

the　others　are　his　servants；　and；　dividing　his　kingdom　into　sanjaks；　he

sends　there　different　administrators；　and　shifts　and　changes　them　as　he

chooses。　But　the　King　of　France　is　placed　in　the　midst　of　an　ancient

body　of　lords；　acknowledged　by　their　own　subjects；　and　beloved　by　them；

they　have　their　own　prerogatives；　nor　can　the　king　take　these　away

except　at　his　peril。　Therefore；　he　who　considers　both　of　these　states

will　recognize　great　difficulties　in　seizing　the　state　of　the　Turk；　but；

once　it　is　conquered；　great　ease　in　holding　it。　The　causes　of　the

difficulties　in　seizing　the　kingdom　of　the　Turk　are　that　the　usurper

cannot　be　called　in　by　the　princes　of　the　kingdom；　nor　can　he　hope　to　be

assisted　in　his　designs　by　the　revolt　of　those　whom　the　lord　has　around

him。　This　arises　from　the　reasons　given　above；　for　his　ministers；　being

all　slaves　and　bondmen；　can　only　be　corrupted　with　great　difficulty；　and

one　can　expect　little　advantage　from　them　when　they　have　been　corrupted；

as　they　cannot　carry　the　people　with　them；　for　the　reasons　assigned。

Hence；　he　who　attacks　the　Turk　must　bear　in　mind　that　he　will　find　him

united；　and　he　will　have　to　rely　more　on　his　own　strength　than　on　the

revolt　of　others；　but；　if　once　the　Turk　has　been　conquered；　and　routed

in　the　field　in　such　a　way　that　he　cannot　replace　his　armies；　there　is

nothing　to　fear　but　the　family　of　the　prince；　and；　this　being

exterminated；　there　remains　no　one　to　fear；　the　others　having　no　credit

with　the　people；　and　as　the　conqueror　did　not　rely　on　them　before　his

victory；　so　he　ought　not　to　fear　them　after　it。



The　contrary　happens　in　kingdoms　governed　like　that　of　France；　because

one　can　easily　enter　there　by　gaining　over　some　baron　of　the　kingdom；

for　one　always　finds　malcontents　and　such　as　desire　a　change。　Such　men；

for　the　reasons　given；　can　open　the　way　into　the　state　and　render　the

victory　easy；　but　if　you　wish　to　hold　it　afterwards；　you　meet　with

infinite　difficulties；　both　from　those　who　have　assisted　you　and　from

those　you　have　crushed。　Nor　is　it　enough　for　you　to　have　exterminated

the　family　of　the　prince；　because　the　lords　that　remain　make　themselves

the　heads　of　fresh　movements　against　you；　and　as　you　are　unable　either

to　satisfy　or　exterminate　them；　that　state　is　lost　whenever　time　brings

the　opportunity。



Now　if　you　will　consider　what　was　the　nature　of　the　government　of

Darius；　you　will　find　it　similar　to　the　kingdom　of　the　Turk；　and

therefore　it　was　only　necessary　for　Alexander；　first　to　overthrow　him　in

the　field；　and　then　to　take　the　country　from　him。　After　which　victory；

Darius　being　killed；　the　state　remained　secure　to　Alexander；　for　the

above　reasons。　And　if　his　successors　had　been　united　they　would　have

enjoyed　it　securely　and　at　their　ease；　for　there　were　no　tumults　raised

in　the　kingdom　except　those　they　provoked　themselves。



But　it　is　impossible　to　hold　with　such　tranquillity　states　constituted

like　that　of　France。　Hence　arose　those　frequent　rebellions　against　the

Romans　in　Spain；　France；　and　Greece；　owing　to　the　many　principalities

there　were　in　these　states；　of　which；　as　long　as　the　memory　of　them

endured；　the　Romans　always　held　an　insecure　possession；　but　with　the

power　and　long　continuance　of　the　empire　the　memory　of　them　passed　away；

and　the　Romans　then　became　secure　possessors。　And　when　fighting

afterwards　amongst　themselves；　each　one　was　able　to　attach　to　himself

his　own　parts　of　the　country；　according　to　the　authority　he　had　assumed

there；　and　the　family　of　the　former　lord　being　exterminated；　none　other

than　the　Romans　were　acknowledged。



When　these　things　are　remembered　no　one　will　marvel　at　the　ease　with

which　Alexander　held　the　Empire　of　Asia；　or　at　the　difficulties　which

others　have　had　to　keep　an　acquisition；　such　as　Pyrrhus　and　many　more；

this　is　not　occasioned　by　the　little　or　abundance　of　ability　in　the

conqueror；　but　by　the　want　of　uniformity　in　the　subject　state。



CHAPTER　V



CONCERNING　THE　WAY　TO　GOVERN　CITIES　OR　PRINCIPALITIES　WHICH　LIVED　UNDER

THEIR　OWN　LAWS　BEFORE　THEY　WERE　ANNEXED



WHENEVER　those　states　which　have　been　acquired　as　stated　have　been

accustomed　to　live　under　their　own　laws　and　in　freedom；　there　are　three

courses　for　those　who　wish　to　hold　them：　the　first　is　to　ruin　them；　the

next　is　to　reside　there　in　person；　the　third　is　to　permit　them　to　live

under　their　own　laws；　drawing　a　tribute；　and　establishing　within　it　an

oligarchy　which　will　keep　it　friendly　to　you。　Because　such　a　government；

being　created　by　the　prince；　knows　that　it　cannot　stand　without　his

friendship　and　interest；　and　does　its　utmost　to　support　him；　and

therefore　he　who　would　keep　a　city　accustomed　to　freedom　will　hold　it

more　easily　by　the　means　of　its　own　citizens　than　in　any　other　way。



There　are；　for　example；　the　Spartans　and　the　Romans。　The　Spartans　held

Athens　and　Thebes；　establishing　there　an　oligarchy；　nevertheless　they

lost　them。　The　Romans；　in　order　to　hold　Capua；　Carthage；　and　Numantia；

dismantled　them；　and　did　not　lose　them。　They　wished　to　hold　Greece　as

the　Spartans　held　it；　making　it　free　and　permitting　its　laws；　and　did

not　succeed。　So　to　hold　it　they　were　pelled　to　dismantle　many　cities

in　the　country；　for　in　truth　there　is　no　safe　way　to　retain　them

otherwise　than　by　ruining　them。　And　he　who　bees　master　of　a　city

accustomed　to　freedom　and　does　not　destroy　it；　may　expect　to　be

destroyed　by　it；　for　in　rebellion　it　has　always　the　watch…word　of

liberty　and　its　ancient　privileges　as　a　rallying　point；　which　neither

time　nor　benefits　will　ever　cause　it　to　forget。　And　what　ever　you　may　do

or　provide　against；　they　never　forget　that　name　or　their　privileges

unless　they　are　disunited　or　dispersed　but　at　every　chance　they

immediately　rally　to　them；　as　Pisa　after　the　hundred　years　she　had　been

held　in　bondage　by　the　Florentines。



But　when　cities　or　countries　are　accustomed　to　live　under　a　prince；　and

his　family　is　exterminated；　they；　being　on　the　one　hand　accustomed　to

obey　and　on　the　other　hand　not　having　the　old　prince；　cannot　agree　in

making　one　from　amongst　themselves；　and　they　do　not　know　how　to　govern

themselves。　For　this　reason　they　are　very　slow　to　take　up　arms；　and　a

prince　can　gain　them　to　himself　and　secure　them　much　more　easily。　But　in

republics　there　is　more　vitality；　greater　hatred；　and　more　desire　for

vengeance；　which　will　never　permit　them　to　allow　the　memory　of　their

former　liberty　to　rest；　so　that　the　safest　way　is　to　destroy　them　or　to

reside　there。



CHAPTER　VI



CONCERNING　NEW　PRINCIPALITIES　WHICH　ARE　ACQUIRED　BY　ONE'S　OWN　ARMS　AND

ABILITY



LET　no　one　be　surprised　if；　in　speaking　of　entirely　new　principalities

as　I　shall　do；　I　adduce　the　highest　examples　both　of　prince　and　of

state；　because　men；　walking　almost　always　in　paths　beaten　by　others；　and

following　by　imitation　their　deeds；　are　yet　unable　to　keep　entirely　to

the　ways　of　others　or　attain　to　the　power　of　those　they　imitate。　A　wise

man　ought　always　to　follow　the　paths　beaten　by　great　men；　and　to　imitate

those　who　have　been　supreme；　so　that　if　his　ability　does　not　equal

theirs；　at　least　it　will　savour　of　it。　Let　him　act　like　the　clever

archers　who；　designing　to　hit　the　mark　which　yet　appears　too　far

distant；　and　knowing　the　limits　to　which　the　strength　of　their　bow

attains；　take　aim　much　higher　than　the　mark；　not　to　reach　by　their

strength　or　arrow　to　so　great　a　height；　but　to　be　able　with　the　aid　of

so　high　an　aim　to　hit　the　mark　they　wish　to　reach。



I　say；　therefore；　that　in　entirely　new　principalities；　where　there　is　a

new　prince；　more　or　less　difficulty　is　found　in　keeping　them；

accordingly　as　there　is　more　or　less　ability　in　him　who　has　acquired　the

state。　Now；　as　the　fact　of　being　a　prince　from　a　private　station

presupposes　either　ability　or　fortune；　it　is　clear　that　one　or　other　of

these　two　things　will　mitigate　in　some　degree　many　difficulties。

Nevertheless；　he　who　has　relied　least　on　fortune　is　established　the

strongest。　Further；　it　facilitates　matters　when　the　prince；　having　no

other　state；　is　pelled　to　reside　there　in　person。



But　to　e　to　those　who；　by　their　own　ability　and　not　through　fortune；

have　risen　to　be　princes；　I　say　that　Moses；　Cyrus；　Romulus；　Theseus；　and

such　like　are　the　most　excellent　examples。　And　although　one　may　not

discuss　Moses；　he　having　been　a　mere　executor　of　the　will　of　God；　yet　he

ought　to　be　admired；　if　only　for　that　favour　which　made　him　worthy　to

speak　with　God。　But　in　considering　Cyrus　and　others　who　have　acquired　or

founded　kingdoms；　all　will　be　found　admirable；　and　if　their　particular

deeds　and　conduct　shall　be　considered；　they　will　not　be　found　inferior

to　those　of　Moses；　although　he　had　so　great　a　preceptor。　And　in

examining　their　actions　and　lives　one　cannot　see　that　they　owed　anything

to　fortune　beyond　opportunity；　which　brought　them　the　material　to　mould

into　the　form　which　seemed　best　to　them。　Without　that　opportunity　their

powers　of　mind　would　have　been　extinguished；　and　without　those　powers

the　opportunity　would　have　e　in　vain。



It