the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第112部分

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recognize　the　fact　that；　according　to　the　principles　of　this　Critique；
if　we　consider　not　what　is；　but　what　ought　to　be　the　case；　there　can
be　really　no　polemic　of　pure　reason。　For　how　can　two　persons　dispute
about　a　thing；　the　reality　of　which　neither　can　present　in　actual　or
even　in　possible　experience？　Each　adopts　the　plan　of　meditating　on　his
idea　for　the　purpose　of　drawing　from　the　idea；　if　he　can；　what　is　more
than　the　idea；　that　is；　the　reality　of　the　object　which　it
indicates。　How　shall　they　settle　the　dispute；　since　neither　is　able　to
make　his　assertions　directly　prehensible　and　certain；　but　must
restrict　himself　to　attacking　and　confuting　those　of　his　opponent？　All
statements　enounced　by　pure　reason　transcend　the　conditions　of
possible　experience；　beyond　the　sphere　of　which　we　can　discover　no
criterion　of　truth；　while　they　are　at　the　same　time　framed　in
accordance　with　the　laws　of　the　understanding；　which　are　applicable
only　to　experience；　and　thus　it　is　the　fate　of　all　such　speculative
discussions　that　while　the　one　party　attacks　the　weaker　side　of　his
opponent；　he　infallibly　lays　open　his　own　weaknesses。
　　The　critique　of　pure　reason　may　be　regarded　as　the　highest
tribunal　for　all　speculative　disputes；　for　it　is　not　involved　in　these
disputes；　which　have　an　immediate　relation　to　certain　objects　and
not　to　the　laws　of　the　mind；　but　is　instituted　for　the　purpose　of
determining　the　rights　and　limits　of　reason。
　　Without　the　control　of　criticism；　reason　is；　as　it　were；　in　a
state　of　nature；　and　can　only　establish　its　claims　and　assertions　by
war。　Criticism；　on　the　contrary；　deciding　all　questions　according　to
the　fundamental　laws　of　its　own　institution；　secures　to　us　the　peace
of　law　and　order；　and　enables　us　to　discuss　all　differences　in　the
more　tranquil　manner　of　a　legal　process。　In　the　former　case；
disputes　are　ended　by　victory；　which　both　sides　may　claim　and　which　is
followed　by　a　hollow　armistice；　in　the　latter；　by　a　sentence；　which；
as　it　strikes　at　the　root　of　all　speculative　differences；　ensures　to
all　concerned　a　lasting　peace。　The　endless　disputes　of　a　dogmatizing
reason　pel　us　to　look　for　some　mode　of　arriving　at　a　settled
decision　by　a　critical　investigation　of　reason　itself；　just　as
Hobbes　maintains　that　the　state　of　nature　is　a　state　of　injustice
and　violence；　and　that　we　must　leave　it　and　submit　ourselves　to　the
constraint　of　law；　which　indeed　limits　individual　freedom；　but　only
that　it　may　consist　with　the　freedom　of　others　and　with　the　mon
good　of　all。
　　This　freedom　will；　among　other　things；　permit　of　our　openly
stating　the　difficulties　and　doubts　which　we　are　ourselves　unable　to
solve；　without　being　decried　on　that　account　as　turbulent　and
dangerous　citizens。　This　privilege　forms　part　of　the　native　rights
of　human　reason；　which　recognizes　no　other　judge　than　the　universal
reason　of　humanity；　and　as　this　reason　is　the　source　of　all　progress
and　improvement；　such　a　privilege　is　to　be　held　sacred　and　inviolable。
It　is　unwise；　moreover；　to　denounce　as　dangerous　any　bold　assertions
against；　or　rash　attacks　upon；　an　opinion　which　is　held　by　the　largest
and　most　moral　class　of　the　munity；　for　that　would　be　giving　them
an　importance　which　they　do　not　deserve。　When　I　hear　that　the
freedom　of　the　will；　the　hope　of　a　future　life；　and　the　existence　of
God　have　been　overthrown　by　the　arguments　of　some　able　writer；　I
feel　a　strong　desire　to　read　his　book；　for　I　expect　that　he　will　add
to　my　knowledge　and　impart　greater　clearness　and　distinctness　to　my
views　by　the　argumentative　power　shown　in　his　writings。　But　I　am
perfectly　certain；　even　before　I　have　opened　the　book；　that　he　has　not
succeeded　in　a　single　point；　not　because　I　believe　I　am　in
possession　of　irrefutable　demonstrations　of　these　important
propositions；　but　because　this　transcendental　critique；　which　has
disclosed　to　me　the　power　and　the　limits　of　pure　reason；　has　fully
convinced　me　that；　as　it　is　insufficient　to　establish　the　affirmative；
it　is　as　powerless；　and　even　more　so；　to　assure　us　of　the　truth　of　the
negative　answer　to　these　questions。　From　what　source　does　this
free…thinker　derive　his　knowledge　that　there　is；　for　example；　no
Supreme　Being？　This　proposition　lies　out　of　the　field　of　possible
experience；　and；　therefore；　beyond　the　limits　of　human　cognition。
But　I　would　not　read　at；　all　the　answer　which　the　dogmatical
maintainer　of　the　good　cause　makes　to　his　opponent；　because　I　know
well　beforehand；　that　he　will　merely　attack　the　fallacious　grounds
of　his　adversary；　without　being　able　to　establish　his　own
assertions。　Besides；　a　new　illusory　argument；　in　the　construction　of
which　talent　and　acuteness　are　shown；　is　suggestive　of　new　ideas　and
new　trains　of　reasoning；　and　in　this　respect　the　old　and　everyday
sophistries　are　quite　useless。　Again；　the　dogmatical　opponent　of
religion　gives　employment　to　criticism；　and　enables　us　to　test　and
correct　its　principles；　while　there　is　no　occasion　for　anxiety　in
regard　to　the　influence　and　results　of　his　reasoning。
　　But；　it　will　be　said；　must　we　not　warn　the　youth　entrusted　to
academical　care　against　such　writings；　must　we　not　preserve　them
from　the　knowledge　of　these　dangerous　assertions；　until　their
judgement　is　ripened；　or　rather　until　the　doctrines　which　we　wish　to
inculcate　are　so　firmly　rooted　in　their　minds　as　to　withstand　all
attempts　at　instilling　the　contrary　dogmas；　from　whatever　quarter　they
may　e？
　　If　we　are　to　confine　ourselves　to　the　dogmatical　procedure　in　the
sphere　of　pure　reason；　and　find　ourselves　unable　to　settle　such
disputes　otherwise　than　by　being　a　party　in　them；　and　setting
counter…assertions　against　the　statements　advanced　by　our　opponents；
there　is　certainly　no　plan　more　advisable　for　the　moment；　but；　at
the　same　time；　none　more　absurd　and　inefficient　for　the　future；　than
this　retaining　of　the　youthful　mind　under　guardianship　for　a　time；　and
thus　preserving　it…　for　so　long　at　least…　from　seduction　into　error。
But　when；　at　a　later　period；　either　curiosity；　or　the　prevalent
fashion　of　thought　places　such　writings　in　their　hands；　will　the
so…called　convictions　of　their　youth　stand　firm？　The　young　thinker；
who　has　in　his　armoury　none　but　dogmatical　weapons　with　which　to
resist　the　attacks　of　his　opponent；　and　who　cannot　detect　the　latent
dialectic　which　lies　in　his　own　opinions　as　well　as　in　those　of　the
opposite　party；　sees　the　advance　of　illusory　arguments　and　grounds
of　proof　which　have　the　advantage　of　novelty；　against　as　illusory
grounds　of　proof　destitute　of　this　advantage；　and　which；　perhaps；
excite　the　suspicion　that　the　natural　credulity　of　his　youth　has
been　abused　by　his　instructors。　He　thinks　he　can　find　no　better
means　of　showing　that　he　has　out　grown　the　discipline　of　his
minority　than　by　despising　those　well…meant　warnings；　and；　knowing
no　system　of　thought　but　that　of　dogmatism；　he　drinks　deep　draughts　of
the　poison　that　is　to　sap　the　principles　in　which　his　early　years　were
trained。
　　Exactly　the　opposite　of　the　system　here　remended　ought　to　be
pursued　in　academical　instruction。　This　can　only　be　effected；　however；
by　a　thorough　training　in　the　critical　investigation　of　pure　reason。
For；　in　order　to　bring　the　principles　of　this　critique　into　exercise
as　soon　as　possible；　and　to　demonstrate　their　perfect　even　in　the
presence　of　the　highest　degree　of　dialectical　illusion；　the　student
ought　to　examine　the　assertions　made　on　both　sides　of　speculative
questions　step　by　step；　and　to　test　them　by　these　principles。　It
cannot　be　a　difficult　task　for　him　to　show　the　fallacies　inherent　in
these　propositions；　and　thus　he　begins　early　to　feel　his　own　power
of　securing　himself　against　the　influence　of　such　sophistical
arguments；　which　must　finally　lose；　for　him；　all　their　illusory　power。
And；　although　the　same　blows　which　overturn　the　edifice　of　his
opponent　are　as　fatal　to　his　own　speculative　structures；　if　such　he
has　wished　to　rear；　he　need　not　feel　any　sorrow　in　regard　to　this
seeming　misfortune；　as　he　has　now　before　him　a　fair　prospect　into
the　practical　region　in　which　he　may　reasonably　hope　to　find　a　more
secure　foundation　for　a　rational　system。
　　There　is；　accordingly；　no　proper　polemic　in　the　sphere　of　pure
reason。　Both　parties　beat　the　air　and　fight　with　their　own　shadows；　as
they　pass　beyond　the　limits　of　nature；　and　can　find　no　tangible
point　of　attack…　no　firm　footing　for　their　dogmatical　conflict。
Fight　as　vigorously　as　they　may；　the　shadows　which　they　hew　down；
immediately　start　up　again；　like　the　heroes　in　Walhalla；　and　renew　the
bloodless　and　unceasing　contest。
　　But　neither　can　we　admit　that　there　is　any　proper　sceptical
employment　of　pure　reason；　such　as　might　be　based　upon　the　principle
of　neutrality　in　all　speculative　disputes。　To　excite　reason　against
itself；　to　place　weapons　in　the　hands　of　the　party　on　the　one　side
as　well　as　in　those　of　the　other；　and　to　remain　an　undisturbed　and
sarcastic　spectator　of　the　fierce　struggle　that　ensues；　seems；　from
the　dogmatical　point　of　view；　to　be　a　part　fitting　only　a　malevolent
disposition。　But；　when　the　sophist　evidences　an　invincible　obstinacy
and　blindness；　and　a　pride　which　no　criticism　can　moderate；　there　is
no　other　practicable　course　than　to　oppose　to　this　pride　and　obstinacy
similar　feelings　and　pretensions　on　the　other　side；　equally　well　or
ill　founded；　so　that　reason；　staggered　by　the　reflections　thus
forced　upon　it；　finds　it　necessary　to　moderate　its　confidence　in
such　pretensions　and　to　listen　to　the　advice　of　criticism。　But　we
cannot　stop　at　these　doubts；　much　less　regard　the　conviction　of　our
ignorance；　not　only　as　a　cure　for　the　conceit　natural　to　dogmatism；
but　as　the　settlement　of　the　disputes　in　which　reason　is　involved　with
itself。　On　the　contrary；　scepticism　is　merely　a　means　of　awakening
reason　from　its　dogmatic　dreams　and　exciting　it　to　a　more　careful
investigation　into　its　own　powers　and　pretensions。　But；　as
scepticism　appears　to　be　the　shortest　road　to　a　permanent　peace　in　the
domain　of　philosophy；　and　as　it　is　the　track　pursued　by　the　many　who
aim　at　giving　a　philosophical　colouring　to　their　contemptuous
dislike　of　all　inquiries　of　this　kind；　I　think　it　nec