the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第76部分

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sum　total　of　that　which　is　given　in　phenomena；　considered　as　an
absolute　whole；　is　itself　a　perception…　and　we　cannot　therefore　seek
for　explanations　of　this　whole　beyond　itself；　in　other　perceptions。
The　explanation　of　this　whole　is　the　proper　object　of　the
transcendental　problems　of　pure　reason。
　　Although；　therefore；　the　solution　of　these　problems　is
unattainable　through　experience；　we　must　not　permit　ourselves　to　say
that　it　is　uncertain　how　the　object　of　our　inquiries　is　constituted。
For　the　object　is　in　our　own　mind　and　cannot　be　discovered　in
experience；　and　we　have　only　to　take　care　that　our　thoughts　are
consistent　with　each　other；　and　to　avoid　falling　into　the　amphiboly　of
regarding　our　idea　as　a　representation　of　an　object　empirically　given；
and　therefore　to　be　cognized　according　to　the　laws　of　experience。　A
dogmatical　solution　is　therefore　not　only　unsatisfactory　but
impossible。　The　critical　solution；　which　may　be　a　perfectly　certain
one；　does　not　consider　the　question　objectively；　but　proceeds　by
inquiring　into　the　basis　of　the　cognition　upon　which　the　question
rests。

　　　　　SECTION　V。　Sceptical　Exposition　of　the　Cosmological　Problems
　　　　　　　　　　　presented　in　the　four　Transcendental　Ideas。

　　We　should　be　quite　willing　to　desist　from　the　demand　of　a　dogmatical
answer　to　our　questions；　if　we　understood　beforehand　that；　be　the
answer　what　it　may；　it　would　only　serve　to　increase　our　ignorance；
to　throw　us　from　one　inprehensibility　into　another；　from　one
obscurity　into　another　still　greater；　and　perhaps　lead　us　into
irreconcilable　contradictions。　If　a　dogmatical　affirmative　or　negative
answer　is　demanded；　is　it　at　all　prudent　to　set　aside　the　probable
grounds　of　a　solution　which　lie　before　us　and　to　take　into
consideration　what　advantage　we　shall　gain；　if　the　answer　is　to　favour
the　one　side　or　the　other？　If　it　happens　that　in　both　cases　the　answer
is　mere　nonsense；　we　have　in　this　an　irresistible　summons　to　institute
a　critical　investigation　of　the　question；　for　the　purpose　of
discovering　whether　it　is　based　on　a　groundless　presupposition　and
relates　to　an　idea；　the　falsity　of　which　would　be　more　easily
exposed　in　its　application　and　consequences　than　in　the　mere
representation　of　its　content。　This　is　the　great　utility　of　the
sceptical　mode　of　treating　the　questions　addressed　by　pure　reason　to
itself。　By　this　method　we　easily　rid　ourselves　of　the　confusions　of
dogmatism；　and　establish　in　its　place　a　temperate　criticism；　which；　as
a　genuine　cathartic；　will　successfully　remove　the　presumptuous　notions
of　philosophy　and　their　consequence…　the　vain　pretension　to
universal　science。
　　If；　then；　I　could　understand　the　nature　of　a　cosmological　idea　and
perceive；　before　I　entered　on　the　discussion　of　the　subject　at　all；
that；　whatever　side　of　the　question　regarding　the　unconditioned　of　the
regressive　synthesis　of　phenomena　it　favoured…　it　must　either　be　too
great　or　too　small　for　every　conception　of　the　understanding…　I
would　be　able　to　prehend　how　the　idea；　which　relates　to　an　object
of　experience…　an　experience　which　must　be　adequate　to　and　in
accordance　with　a　possible　conception　of　the　understanding…　must　be
pletely　void　and　without　significance；　inasmuch　as　its　object　is
inadequate；　consider　it　as　we　may。　And　this　is　actually　the　case
with　all　cosmological　conceptions；　which；　for　the　reason　above
mentioned；　involve　reason；　so　long　as　it　remains　attached　to　them；
in　an　unavoidable　antinomy。　For　suppose：
　　First；　that　the　world　has　no　beginning…　in　this　case　it　is　too　large
for　our　conception；　for　this　conception；　which　consists　in　a
successive　regress；　cannot　overtake　the　whole　eternity　that　has
elapsed。　Grant　that　it　has　a　beginning；　it　is　then　too　small　for　the
conception　of　the　understanding。　For；　as　a　beginning　presupposes　a
time　preceding；　it　cannot　be　unconditioned；　and　the　law　of　the
empirical　employment　of　the　understanding　imposes　the　necessity　of
looking　for　a　higher　condition　of　time；　and　the　world　is；　therefore；
evidently　too　small　for　this　law。
　　The　same　is　the　case　with　the　double　answer　to　the　question
regarding　the　extent；　in　space；　of　the　world。　For；　if　it　is　infinite
and　unlimited；　it　must　be　too　large　for　every　possible　empirical
conception。　If　it　is　finite　and　limited；　we　have　a　right　to　ask：　〃What
determines　these　limits？〃　Void　space　is　not　a　self…subsistent
correlate　of　things；　and　cannot　be　a　final　condition…　and　still　less
an　empirical　condition；　forming　a　part　of　a　possible　experience。　For
how　can　we　have　any　experience　or　perception　of　an　absolute　void？
But　the　absolute　totality　of　the　empirical　synthesis　requires　that　the
unconditioned　be　an　empirical　conception。　Consequently；　a　finite　world
is　too　small　for　our　conception。
　　Secondly；　if　every　phenomenon　（matter）　in　space　consists　of　an
infinite　number　of　parts；　the　regress　of　the　division　is　always　too
great　for　our　conception；　and　if　the　division　of　space　must　cease　with
some　member　of　the　division　（the　simple）；　it　is　too　small　for　the　idea
of　the　unconditioned。　For　the　member　at　which　we　have　discontinued　our
division　still　admits　a　regress　to　many　more　parts　contained　in　the
object。
　　Thirdly；　suppose　that　every　event　in　the　world　happens　in　accordance
with　the　laws　of　nature；　the　causality　of　a　cause　must　itself　be　an
event　and　necessitates　a　regress　to　a　still　higher　cause；　and
consequently　the　unceasing　prolongation　of　the　series　of　conditions
a　parte　priori。　Operative　nature　is　therefore　too　large　for　every
conception　we　can　form　in　the　synthesis　of　cosmical　events。
　　If　we　admit　the　existence　of　spontaneously　produced　events；　that　is；
of　free　agency；　we　are　driven；　in　our　search　for　sufficient　reasons；
on　an　unavoidable　law　of　nature　and　are　pelled　to　appeal　to　the
empirical　law　of　causality；　and　we　find　that　any　such　totality　of
connection　in　our　synthesis　is　too　small　for　our　necessary　empirical
conception。
　　Fourthly；　if　we　assume　the　existence　of　an　absolutely　necessary
being…　whether　it　be　the　world　or　something　in　the　world；　or　the　cause
of　the　world…　we　must　place　it　in　a　time　at　an　infinite　distance
from　any　given　moment；　for；　otherwise；　it　must　be　dependent　on　some
other　and　higher　existence。　Such　an　existence　is；　in　this　case；　too
large　for　our　empirical　conception；　and　unattainable　by　the
continued　regress　of　any　synthesis。
　　But　if　we　believe　that　everything　in　the　world…　be　it　condition　or
conditioned…　is　contingent；　every　given　existence　is　too　small　for　our
conception。　For　in　this　case　we　are　pelled　to　seek　for　some　other
existence　upon　which　the　former　depends。
　　We　have　said　that　in　all　these　cases　the　cosmological　idea　is　either
too　great　or　too　small　for　the　empirical　regress　in　a　synthesis；　and
consequently　for　every　possible　conception　of　the　understanding。　Why
did　we　not　express　ourselves　in　a　manner　exactly　the　reverse　of　this
and；　instead　of　accusing　the　cosmological　idea　of　over　stepping　or
of　falling　short　of　its　true　aim；　possible　experience；　say　that；　in
the　first　case；　the　empirical　conception　is　always　too　small　for　the
idea；　and　in　the　second　too　great；　and　thus　attach　the　blame　of
these　contradictions　to　the　empirical　regress？　The　reason　is　this。
Possible　experience　can　alone　give　reality　to　our　conceptions；　without
it　a　conception　is　merely　an　idea；　without　truth　or　relation　to　an
object。　Hence　a　possible　empirical　conception　must　be　the　standard
by　which　we　are　to　judge　whether　an　idea　is　anything　more　than　an　idea
and　fiction　of　thought；　or　whether　it　relates　to　an　object　in　the
world。　If　we　say　of　a　thing　that　in　relation　to　some　other　thing　it　is
too　large　or　too　small；　the　former　is　considered　as　existing　for　the
sake　of　the　latter；　and　requiring　to　be　adapted　to　it。　Among　the
trivial　subjects　of　discussion　in　the　old　schools　of　dialectics　was
this　question：　〃If　a　ball　cannot　pass　through　a　hole；　shall　we　say
that　the　ball　is　too　large　or　the　hole　too　small？〃　In　this　case　it
is　indifferent　what　expression　we　employ；　for　we　do　not　know　which
exists　for　the　sake　of　the　other。　On　the　other　hand；　we　cannot　say：
〃The　man　is　too　long　for　his　coat〃；　but：　〃The　coat　is　too　short　for
the　man。〃
　　We　are　thus　led　to　the　well…founded　suspicion　that　the
cosmological　ideas；　and　all　the　conflicting　sophistical　assertions
connected　with　them；　are　based　upon　a　false　and　fictitious
conception　of　the　mode　in　which　the　object　of　these　ideas　is　presented
to　us；　and　this　suspicion　will　probably　direct　us　how　to　expose　the
illusion　that　has　so　long　led　us　astray　from　the　truth。

　　　　　　SECTION　VI。　Transcendental　Idealism　as　the　Key　to　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　Solution　of　Pure　Cosmological　Dialectic。

　　In　the　transcendental　aesthetic　we　proved　that　everything　intuited
in　space　and　time；　all　objects　of　a　possible　experience；　are　nothing
but　phenomena；　that　is；　mere　representations；　and　that　these；　as
presented　to　us…　as　extended　bodies；　or　as　series　of　changes…　have
no　self…subsistent　existence　apart　from　human　thought。　This　doctrine　I
call　Transcendental　Idealism。*　The　realist　in　the　transcendental　sense
regards　these　modifications　of　our　sensibility；　these　mere
representations；　as　things　subsisting　in　themselves。

　　*I　have　elsewhere　termed　this　theory　formal　idealism；　to　distinguish
it　from　material　idealism；　which　doubts　or　denies　the　existence　of
external　things。　To　avoid　ambiguity；　it　seems　advisable　in　many
cases　to　employ　this　term　instead　of　that　mentioned　in　the　text。

　　It　would　be　unjust　to　accuse　us　of　holding　the　long…decried　theory
of　empirical　idealism；　which；　while　admitting　the　reality　of　space；
denies；　or　at　least　doubts；　the　existence　of　bodies　extended　in　it；
and　thus　leaves　us　without　a　sufficient　criterion　of　reality　and
illusion。　The　supporters　of　this　theory　find　no　difficulty　in
admitting　the　reality　of　the　phenomena　of　the　internal　sense　in
time；　nay；　they　go　the　length　of　maintaining　that　this　internal
experience　is　of　itself　a　sufficient　proof　of　the　real　existence　of
its　object　as　a　thing　in　itself。
　　Transcendental　idealism　allows　that　the　objects　of　external
intuition…　as　intuited　in　space；　and　all　changes　in　time…　as
represented　by　the　internal　sense；　are