a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第15部分

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disposition　of　another；　for　no　one　can　willingly　transfer　his　natural　right



of　free　reason　and　judgment；　or　be　compelled　so　to　do。　（3）　For　this



reason　government　which　attempts　to　control　minds　is　accounted　tyrannical；



and　it　is　considered　an　abuse　of　sovereignty　and　a　usurpation　of　the　rights



of　subjects；　to　seek　to　prescribe　what　shall　be　accepted　as　true；　or



rejected　as　false；　or　what　opinions　should　actuate　men　in　their　worship　of



God。　（4）　All　these　questions　fall　within　a　man's　natural　right；　which　he



cannot　abdicate　even　with　his　own　consent。







（20：5）　I　admit　that　the　judgment　can　be　biassed　in　many　ways；　and　to　an



almost　incredible　degree；　so　that　while　exempt　from　direct　external　control



it　may　be　so　dependent　on　another　man's　words；　that　it　may　fitly　be　said　to



be　ruled　by　him；　but　although　this　influence　is　carried　to　great　lengths；　it



has　never　gone　so　far　as　to　invalidate　the　statement；　that　every　man's



understanding　is　his　own；　and　that　brains　are　as　diverse　as　palates。







（20：6）　Moses；　not　by　fraud；　but　by　Divine　virtue；　gained　such　a　hold　over



the　popular　judgment　that　he　was　accounted　superhuman；　and　believed　to　speak



and　act　through　the　inspiration　of　the　Deity；　nevertheless；　even　he　could



not　escape　murmurs　and　evil　interpretations。　（7）　How　much　less　then　can



other　monarchs　avoid　them！　（8）　Yet　such　unlimited　power；　if　it　exists　at



all；　must　belong　to　a　monarch；　and　least　of　all　to　a　democracy；　where　the



whole　or　a　great　part　of　the　people　wield　authority　collectively。　（9）　This



is　a　fact　which　I　think　everyone　can　explain　for　himself。







（20：10）　However　unlimited；　therefore；　the　power　of　a　sovereign　may　be；



however　implicitly　it　is　trusted　as　the　exponent　of　law　and　religion；　it　can



never　prevent　men　from　forming　judgments　according　to　their　intellect；　or



being　influenced　by　any　given　emotion。　（11）　It　is　true　that　it　has　the　right



to　treat　as　enemies　all　men　whose　opinions　do　not；　on　all　subjects；　entirely



coincide　with　its　own；　but　we　are　not　discussing　its　strict　rights；　but　its



proper　course　of　action。　（12）　I　grant　that　it　has　the　right　to　rule　in　the



most　violent　manner；　and　to　put　citizens　to　death　for　very　trivial　causes；



but　no　one　supposes　it　can　do　this　with　the　approval　of　sound　judgment。　（13）



Nay；　inasmuch　as　such　things　cannot　be　done　without　extreme　peril　to　itself；



we　may　even　deny　that　it　has　the　absolute　power　to　do　them；　or；



consequently；　the　absolute　right；　for　the　rights　of　the　sovereign　are



limited　by　his　power。







＇20：2＇　（14）　Since；　therefore；　no　one　can　abdicate　his　freedom　of　judgment



and　feeling；　since　every　man　is　by　indefeasible　natural　right　the　master　of



his　own　thoughts；　it　follows　that　men　thinking　in　diverse　and　contradictory



fashions；　cannot；　without　disastrous　results；　be　compelled　to　speak　only



according　to　the　dictates　of　the　supreme　power。　（15）　Not　even　the　most



experienced；　to　say　nothing　of　the　multitude；　know　how　to　keep　silence。　（16）



Men's　common　failing　is　to　confide　their　plans　to　others；　though　there　be



need　for　secrecy；　so　that　a　government　would　be　most　harsh　which　deprived



the　individual　of　his　freedom　of　saying　and　teaching　what　he　thought；　and



would　be　moderate　if　such　freedom　were　granted。　（17）　Still　we　cannot　deny



that　authority　may　be　as　much　injured　by　words　as　by　actions；　hence；



although　the　freedom　we　are　discussing　cannot　be　entirely　denied　to



subjects；　its　unlimited　concession　would　be　most　baneful；　we　must；



therefore；　now　inquire；　how　far　such　freedom　can　and　ought　to　be　conceded



without　danger　to　the　peace　of　the　state；　or　the　power　of　the　rulers；　and



this；　as　I　said　at　the　beginning　of　Chapter　XVI。；　is　my　principal　object。



（18）　It　follows；　plainly；　from　the　explanation　given　above；　of　the



foundations　of　a　state；　that　the　ultimate　aim　of　government　is　not　to



rule；　or　restrain；　by　fear；　nor　to　exact　obedience；　but　contrariwise；　to



free　every　man　from　fear；　that　he　may　live　in　all　possible　security；　in



other　words；　to　strengthen　his　natural　right　to　exist　and　work　…　without



injury　to　himself　or　others。







（20：19）　No；　the　object　of　government　is　not　to　change　men　from　rational



beings　into　beasts　or　puppets；　but　to　enable　them　to　develope　their　minds



and　bodies　in　security；　and　to　employ　their　reason　unshackled；　neither



showing　hatred；　anger；　or　deceit；　nor　watched　with　the　eyes　of　jealousy　and



injustice。　（20）　In　fact；　the　true　aim　of　government　is　liberty。







（20：21）　Now　we　have　seen　that　in　forming　a　state　the　power　of　making　laws



must　either　be　vested　in　the　body　of　the　citizens；　or　in　a　portion　of　them；



or　in　one　man。　（22）　For；　although　mens　free　judgments　are　very　diverse；　each



one　thinking　that　he　alone　knows　everything；　and　although　complete　unanimity



of　feeling　and　speech　is　out　of　the　question；　it　is　impossible　to　preserve



peace；　unless　individuals　abdicate　their　right　of　acting　entirely　on　their



own　judgment。　＇20：3＇　（23）　Therefore；　the　individual　justly　cedes　the　right



of　free　action；　though　not　of　free　reason　and　judgment；　no　one　can　act



against　the　authorities　without　danger　to　the　state；　though　his　feelings　and



judgment　may　be　at　variance　therewith；　he　may　even　speak　against　them；



provided　that　he　does　so　from　rational　conviction；　not　from　fraud；　anger；　or



hatred；　and　provided　that　he　does　not　attempt　to　introduce　any　change　on　his



private　authority。







（20：24）　For　instance；　supposing　a　man　shows　that　a　law　is　repugnant　to　sound



reason；　and　should　therefore　be　repealed；　if　he　submits　his　opinion　to　the



judgment　of　the　authorities　（who；　alone；　have　the　right　of　making　and



repealing　laws）；　and　meanwhile　acts　in　nowise　contrary　to　that　law；　he　has



deserved　well　of　the　state；　and　has　behaved　as　a　good　citizen　should；　but　if



he　accuses　the　authorities　of　injustice；　and　stirs　up　the　people　against



them；　or　if　he　seditiously　strives　to　abrogate　the　law　without　their



consent；　he　is　a　mere　agitator　and　rebel。







（20：25）　Thus　we　see　how　an　individual　may　declare　and　teach　what　he



believes；　without　injury　to　the　authority　of　his　rulers；　or　to　the　public



peace；　namely；　by　leaving　in　their　hands　the　entire　power　of　legislation　as



it　affects　action；　and　by　doing　nothing　against　their　laws；　though　he



be　compelled　often　to　act　in　contradiction　to　what　he　believes；　and



openly　feels；　to　be　best。







（20：26）　Such　a　course　can　be　taken　without　detriment　to　justice　and



dutifulness；　nay；　it　is　the　one　which　a　just　and　dutiful　man　would　adopt。



（27）　We　have　shown　that　justice　is　dependent　on　the　laws　of　the　authorities；



so　that　no　one　who　contravenes　their　accepted　decrees　can　be　just；　while　the



highest　regard　for　duty；　as　we　have　pointed　out　in　the　preceding　chapter；　is



exercised　in　maintaining　public　peace　and　tranquillity；　these　could　not　be



preserved　if　every　man　were　to　live　as　he　pleased；　therefore　it　is　no　less



than　undutiful　for　a　man　to　act　contrary　to　his　country's　laws；　for　if　the



practice　became　universal　the　ruin　of　states　would　necessarily　follow。







（20：28）　Hence；　so　long　as　a　man　acts　in　obedience　to　the　laws　of　his　rulers；



he　in　nowise　contravenes　his　reason；　for　in　obedience　to　reason　he



transferred　the　right　of　controlling　his　actions　from　his　own　hands　to



theirs。　（29）　This　doctrine　we　can　confirm　from　actual　custom；　for　in　a



conference　of　great　and　small　powers；　schemes　are　seldom　carried



unanimously；　yet　all　unite　in　carrying　out　what　is　decided　on；　whether　they



voted　for　or　against。　（30）　But　I　return　to　my　proposition。







（20：31）　From　the　fundamental　notions　of　a　state；　we　have　discovered　how　a



man　may　exercise　free　judgment　without　detriment　to　the　supreme　power：　from



the　same　premises　we　can　no　less　easily　determine　what　opinions　would　be



seditious。　（32）　Evidently　those　which　by　their　very　nature　nullify　the



compact　by　which　the　right　of　free　action　was　ceded。　（33）　For　instance；　a



man　who　holds　that　the　supreme　power　has　no　rights　over　him；　or　that



promises　ought　not　to　be　kept；　or　that　everyone　should　live　as　he　pleases；



or　other　doctrines　of　this　nature　in　direct　opposition　to　the　above…



mentioned　contract；　is　seditious；　not　so　much　from　his　actual　opinions



and　judgment；　as　from　the　deeds　which　they　involve；　for　he　who　maintains



such　theories　abrogates　the　contract　which　tacitly；　or　openly；　he　made　with



his　rulers。　（34）　Other　opinions　which　do　not　involve　acts　violating　the



contract；　such　as　revenge；　anger；　and　t　he　like；　are　not　seditious；　unless



it　be　in　some。　corrupt　state；　where　superstitious　and　ambitious　persons；



unable　to　endure　men　of　learning；　are　so　popular　with　the　multitude



that　their　word　is　more　valued　than　the　law。







（20：35）　However；　I　do　not　deny　that　there　are　some　doctrines　which；　while



they　are　apparently　only　concerned　with　abstract　truths　and　falsehoods；　are



yet　propounded　and　published　with　unworthy　motives。　（36）　This　question　we



have　discussed　in　Chapter　XV。；　and　shown　that　reason　should　nevertheless



remain　unshackled。　（37）　If　we　hold　to　the　principle　that　a　man's　loyalty　to



the　state　should　be　judged；　like　his　loyalty　to　God；　from　his　actions　only　…



namely；　from　his　charity　towards　his　neighbours；　we　cannot　doubt　that　the



best　government　will　allow　freedom　of　philosophical　speculation　no　less　than



of　religious　belief。　（38）　I　confess　that　from　such　freedom　inconveniences



may　sometimes　arise；　but　what　question　was　ever　settled　so　wisely　that　no



abuses　could　possibly　spring　therefrom？　（39）　He　who　seeks　to　regulate



everything　by　law；　is　more　likely　to　arouse　vices　than　to　reform　them。　（40）



It　is　best　to　grant　what　cannot　be　abolished；　even　though　it　be　in　itself



harmful。　（41）　How　many　evils　spring　from　luxury；　envy；　avarice；　drunkenness；