a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第3部分
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state； and not the good of the agent； the latter is a slave and does
himself no good： but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole
people； and not that of the ruler； is the supreme law； obedience to the
sovereign power does not make a man a slave； of no use to himself； but a
subject。 （58） Therefore； that state is the freest whose laws are founded on
sound reason； so that every member of it may； if he will； be free ＇Endnote
27＇； that is； live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason。
（16：59） Children； though they are bound to obey all the commands of their
parents； are yet not slaves： for the commands of parents look generally to
the children's benefit。
（60） We must； therefore； acknowledge a great difference between a slave； a
son； and a subject； their positions may be thus defined。 （61） A slave is one
who is bound to obey his master's orders； though they are given solely in
the master's interest： a son is one who obeys his father's orders； given
in his own interest； a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power；
given for the common interest； wherein he is included。
（16：62） I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a
democracy： I have especially desired to do so； for I believe it to be of all
forms of government the most natural； and the most consonant with individual
liberty。 （63） In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he
has no further voice in affairs； he only hands it over to the majority of a
society； whereof he is a unit。 Thus all men remain as they were in the state
of nature； equals。
（16：64） This is the only form of government which I have treated of at
length； for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of
freedom in a state。
（65） I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of
government； for we may gather from what has been said whence their right
arises without going into its origin。 （66） The possessor of sovereign power；
whether he be one； or many； or the whole body politic； has the sovereign
right of imposing any commands he pleases： and he who has either
voluntarily； or under compulsion； transferred the right to defend him to
another； has； in so doing； renounced his natural right and is therefore
bound to obey； in all things； the commands of the sovereign power； and will
be bound so to do so long as the king； or nobles； or the people preserve the
sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer。 （67） I need
add no more。
＇16：5＇ （68） The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed； we shall
readily be able to define private civil right； wrong； justice； and
injustice； with their relations to the state； and also to determine what
constitutes an ally； or an enemy； or the crime of treason。
（16：69） By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man
possesses to preserve his existence； a liberty limited by the edicts of the
sovereign power； and preserved only by its authority： for when a man has
transferred to another his right of living as he likes； which was only
limited by his power； that is； has transferred his liberty and power of
self…defence； he is bound to live as that other dictates； and to trust to
him entirely for his defence。 （70） Wrong takes place when a citizen； or
subject； is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction
to the authority of the law； or the edict of the sovereign power。
（16：71） Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community： nor can it ever
accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign； who has the right to do
what he likes。 （72） It can only arise； therefore； between private persons；
who are bound by law and right not to injure one another。 （73） Justice
consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due： injustice
consists in depriving a man； under the pretence of legality； of what the
laws； rightly interpreted； would allow him。 （74） These last are also called
equity and iniquity； because those who administer the laws are bound to show
no respect of persons； but to account all men equal； and to defend every
man's right equally； neither envying the rich nor despising the poor。
＇16：6＇（75） The men of two states become allies； when for the sake of
avoiding war； or for some other advantage； they covenant to do each other no
hurt； but on the contrary； to assist each other if necessity arises； each
retaining his independence。 （76） Such a covenant is valid so long as its
basis of danger or advantage is in force： no one enters into an engagement；
or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing
good； or the fear of some evil： if this basis be removed the compact thereby
becomes void： this has been abundantly shown by experience。 （77） For
although different states make treaties not to harm one another； they always
take every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the
stronger party； and do not rely on the compact； unless there is a
sufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it。
（78） Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith； nor would there be any
wrong done thereby： for who in his proper senses； and aware of the right of
the sovereign power； would trust in the promises of one who has the will and
the power to do what he likes； and who aims solely at the safety and
advantage of his dominion？ （79） Moreover； if we consult loyalty and
religion； we shall see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by
his promises to the injury of his dominion； for he cannot keep such promises
without breaking the engagement he made with his subjects； by which both he
and they are most solemnly bound。 （80） An enemy is one who lives apart from
the state； and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as an
ally。 It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy； but the rights of the
state。 （81） The rights of the state are the same in regard to him who
does not recognize by any compact the state authority； as they are against
him who has done the state an injury： it has the right to force him as best
it can； either to submit； or to contract an alliance。
＇16：7＇ （82） Lastly； treason can only be committed by subjects； who by
compact； either tacit or expressed； have transferred all their rights to the
state： a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted；
for whatever reason； to seize the sovereign power； or to place it in
different hands。 （83） I say； has attempted； for if punishment were not to
overtake him till he had succeeded； it would often come too late； the
sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already。
（16：84） I also say； has attempted； for whatever reason； to seize the
sovereign power； and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt
should be followed by public loss or public gain。 （85） Whatever be his
reason for acting； the crime is treason； and he is rightly condemned： in
war； everyone would admit the justice of his sentence。 （86） If a man does
not keep to his post； but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his
commander； whatever may be his motive； so long as he acts on his own motion；
even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy； he is rightly
put to death； because he has violated his oath； and infringed the rights of
his commander。 （87） That all citizens are equally bound by these rights in
time of peace； is not so generally recognized； but the reasons for obedience
are in both cases identical。 （88） The state must be preserved and directed
by the sole authority of the sovereign； and such authority and right have
been accorded by universal consent to him alone： if； therefore； anyone else
attempts； without his consent； to execute any public enterprise； even though
the state might （as we said） reap benefit therefrom； such person has none
the less infringed the sovereigns right； and would be rightly punished for
treason。
（16：89） In order that every scruple may be removed； we may now answer the
inquiry； whether our former assertion that everyone who has not the
practice of reason； may； in the state of nature； live by sovereign natural
right； according to the laws of his desires； is not in direct opposition to
the law and right of God as revealed。 （90） For as all men absolutely
（whether they be less endowed with reason or more） are equally bound by the
Divine command to love their neighbour as themselves； it may be said that
they cannot； without wrong； do injury to anyone； or live according to their
desires。
（16：91） This objection； so far as the state of nature is concerned； can be
easily answered； for the state of nature is； both in nature and in time；
prior to religion。 （92） No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to
God ＇Endnote 28＇； nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason；
but solely by revelation confirmed by signs。 （93） Therefore； previous to
revelation； no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is
necessarily in ignorance。 （94） The state of nature must by no means be
confounded with a state of religion； but must be conceived as without
either religion or law； and consequently without sin or wrong： this is how
we have described it； and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul。 （95） It
is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of nature as
prior to； and lacking the Divine revealed law and right； but in respect of
freedom also； wherewith all men are born endowed。
（16：96） If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right； or if the
Divine law and right were a natural necessity； there would hav
