a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第4部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！








（16：96）　If　men　were　naturally　bound　by　the　Divine　law　and　right；　or　if　the



Divine　law　and　right　were　a　natural　necessity；　there　would　have　been　no　need



for　God　to　make　a　covenant　with　mankind；　and　to　bind　them　thereto　with　an



oath　and　agreement。







（16：97）　We　must；　then；　fully　grant　that　the　Divine　law　and　right　originated



at　the　time　when　men　by　express　covenant　agreed　to　obey　God　in　all　things；



and　ceded；　as　it　were；　their　natural　freedom；　transferring　their　rights　to



God　in　the　manner　described　in　speaking　of　the　formation　of　a　state。







（98）　However；　I　will　treat　of　these　matters　more　at　length　presently。







＇16：8＇　（99）　It　may　be　insisted　that　sovereigns　are　as　much　bound　by　the



Divine　law　as　subjects：　whereas　we　have　asserted　that　they　retain　their



natural　rights；　and　may　do　whatever　they　like。







（16：100）　In　order　to　clear　up　the　whole　difficulty；　which　arises　rather



concerning　the　natural　right　than　the　natural　state；　I　maintain　that



everyone　is　bound；　in　the　state　of　nature；　to　live　according　to　Divine　law；



in　the　same　way　as　he　is　bound　to　live　according　to　the　dictates　of　sound



reason；　namely；　inasmuch　as　it　is　to　his　advantage；　and　necessary　for　his



salvation；　but；　if　he　will　not　so　live；　he　may　do　otherwise　at　his　own　risk。



（101）　He　is　thus　bound　to　live　according　to　his　own　laws；　not　according　to



anyone　else's；　and　to　recognize　no　man　as　a　judge；　or　as　a　superior　in



religion。　（102）　Such；　in　my　opinion；　is　the　position　of　a　sovereign；　for　he



may　take　advice　from　his　fellow…men；　but　he　is　not　bound　to　recognize　any　as



a　judge；　nor　anyone　besides　himself　as　an　arbitrator　on　any　question　of



right；　unless　it　be　a　prophet　sent　expressly　by　God　and　attesting　his



mission　by　indisputable　signs。　（103）　Even　then　he　does　not　recognize　a　man；



but　God　Himself　as　His　judge。







＇16：9＇　（104）　If　a　sovereign　refuses　to　obey　God　as　revealed　in　His　law；



he　does　so　at　his　own　risk　and　loss；　but　without　violating　any　civil　or



natural　right。　（105）　For　the　civil　right　is　dependent　on　his　own　decree；　and



natural　right　is　dependent　on　the　laws　of　nature；　which　latter　are　not



adapted　to　religion；　whose　sole　aim　is　the　good　of　humanity；　but　to　the



order　of　nature　…　that　is；　to　God's　eternal　decree　unknown　to　us。







（16：106）　This　truth　seems　to　be　adumbrated　in　a　somewhat　obscurer　form　by



those　who　maintain　that　men　can　sin　against　God's　revelation；　but　not



against　the　eternal　decree　by　which　He　has　ordained　all　things。







（107）　We　may　be　asked；　what　should　we　do　if　the　sovereign　commands　anything



contrary　to　religion；　and　the　obedience　which　we　have　expressly　vowed　to



God？　should　we　obey　the　Divine　law　or　the　human　law？　（108）　I　shall　treat　of



this　question　at　length　hereafter；　and　will　therefore　merely　say　now；　that



God　should　be　obeyed　before　all　else；　when　we　have　a　certain　and



indisputable　revelation　of　His　will：　but　men　are　very　prone　to　error　on



religious　subjects；　and；　according　to　the　diversity　of　their　dispositions；



are　wont　with　considerable　stir　to　put　forward　their　own　inventions；　as



experience　more　than　sufficiently　attests；　so　that　if　no　one　were　bound　to



obey　the　state　in　matters　which；　in　his　own　opinion　concern　religion；



the　rights　of　the　state　would　be　dependent　on　every　man's　judgment



and　passions。　（109）　No　one　would　consider　himself　bound　to　obey　laws　framed



against　his　faith　or　superstition；　and　on　this　pretext　he　might　assume



unbounded　license。　（110）　In　this　way；　the　rights　of　the　civil　authorities



would　be　utterly　set　at　nought；　so　that　we　must　conclude　that　the　sovereign



power；　which　alone　is　bound　both　by　Divine　and　natural　right　to　preserve　and



guard　the　laws　of　the　state；　should　have　supreme　authority　for　making　any



laws　about　religion　which　it　thinks　fit；　all　are　bound　to　obey　its　behests



on　the　subject　in　accordance　with　their　promise　which　God　bids　them　to　keep。







（16：111）　However；　if　the　sovereign　power　be　heathen；　we　should　either　enter



into　no　engagements　therewith；　and　yield　up　our　lives　sooner　than　transfer



to　it　any　of　our　rights；　or；　if　the　engagement　be　made；　and　our　rights



transferred；　we　should　（inasmuch　as　we　should　have　ourselves　transferred　the



right　of　defending　ourselves　and　our　religion）　be　bound　to　obey　them；　and　to



keep　our　word：　we　might　even　rightly　be　bound　so　to　do；　except　in　those



cases　where　God；　by　indisputable　revelation；　has　promised　His　special　aid



against　tyranny；　or　given　us　special　exemption　from　obedience。　（112）　Thus　we



see　that；　of　all　the　Jews　in　Babylon；　there　were　only　three　youths　who　were



certain　of　the　help　of　God；　and；　therefore；　refused　to　obey　Nebuchadnezzar。



（113）　All　the　rest；　with　the　sole　exception　of　Daniel；　who　was　beloved　by



the　king；　were　doubtless　compelled　by　right　to　obey；　perhaps　thinking　that



they　had　been　delivered　up　by　God　into　the　hands　of　the　king；　and　that　the



king　had　obtained　and　preserved　his　dominion　by　God's　design。　（114）　On　the



other　hand；　Eleazar；　before　his　country　had　utterly　fallen；　wished　to　give　a



proof　of　his　constancy　to　his　compatriots；　in　order　that　they　might　follow



in　his　footsteps；　and　go　to　any　lengths；　rather　than　allow　their　right　and



power　to　be　transferred　to　the　Greeks；　or　brave　any　torture　rather　than



swear　allegiance　to　the　heathen。　（115）　Instances　are　occurring　every　day　in



confirmation　of　what　I　here　advance。　（116）　The　rulers　of　Christian



kingdoms　do　not　hesitate；　with　a　view　to　strengthening　their　dominion；　to



make　treaties　with　Turks　and　heathen；　and　to　give　orders　to　their　subjects



who　settle　among　such　peoples　not　to　assume　more　freedom；　either　in



things　secular　or　religious；　than　is　set　down　in　the　treaty；　or　allowed　by



the　foreign　government。　（117）　We　may　see　this　exemplified　in　the　Dutch



treaty　with　the　Japanese；　which　I　have　already　mentioned。



















＇17：0＇　CHAPTER　XVII　…　IT　IS　SHOWN　THAT　NO　ONE　CAN；　OR



NEED；　TRANSFER　ALL　HIS　RIGHTS　TO　THE　SOVEREIGN　POWER。



OF　THE　HEBREW　REPUBLIC；　AS　IT　WAS　DURING　THE　LIFETIME



OF　MOSES；　AND　AFTER　HIS　DEATH；　TILL　THE　FOUNDATION



OF　THE　MONARCHY；　AND　　　OF　ITS　EXCELLENCE。　LASTLY；　OF



THE　CAUSES　WHY　THE　THEOCRATIC　REPUBLIC　FELL；　AND　WHY



IT　COULD　HARDLY　HAVE　CONTINUED　WITHOUT　DISSENSION。







＇17：1＇　（1）　The　theory　put　forward　in　the　last　chapter；　of　the　universal



rights　of　the　sovereign　power；　and　of　the　natural　rights　of　the　individual



transferred　thereto；　though　it　corresponds　in　many　respects　with　actual



practice；　and　though　practice　may　be　so　arranged　as　to　conform　to　it　more



and　more；　must　nevertheless　always　remain　in　many　respects　purely　ideal。　（2）



No　one　can　ever　so　utterly　transfer　to　another　his　power　and；　consequently；



his　rights；　as　to　cease　to　be　a　man；　nor　can　there　ever　be　a　power　so



sovereign　that　it　can　carry　out　every　possible　wish。　（3）　It　will　always　be



vain　to　order　a　subject　to　hate　what　he　believes　brings　him　advantage；　or　to



love　what　brings　him　loss；　or　not　to　be　offended　at　insults；　or　not　to　wish



to　be　free　from　fear；　or　a　hundred　other　things　of　the　sort；　which



necessarily　follow　from　the　laws　of　human　nature。　（4）　So　much；　I　think；　is



abundantly　shown　by　experience：　for　men　have　never　so　far　ceded　their　power



as　to　cease　to　be　an　object　of　fear　to　the　rulers　who　received　such　power



and　right；　and　dominions　have　always　been　in　as　much　danger　from　their　own



subjects　as　from　external　enemies。　（5）　If　it　were　really　the　case；　that　men



could　be　deprived　of　their　natural　rights　so　utterly　as　never　to　have　any



further　influence　on　affairs　＇Endnote　29＇；　except　with　the　permission　of　the



holders　of　sovereign　right；　it　would　then　be　possible　to　maintain　with



impunity　the　most　violent　tyranny；　which；　I　suppose；　no　one　would　for　an



instant　admit。







（17：6）　We　must；　therefore；　grant　that　every　man　retains　some　part　of　his



right；　in　dependence　on　his　own　decision；　and　no　one　else's。







（7）　However；　in　order　correctly　to　understand　the　extent　of　the　sovereign's



right　and　power；　we　must　take　notice　that　it　does　not　cover　only　those



actions　to　which　it　can　compel　men　by　fear；　but　absolutely　every　action



which　it　can　induce　men　to　perform：　for　it　is　the　fact　of　obedience；　not　the



motive　for　obedience；　which　makes　a　man　a　subject。







（17：8）　Whatever　be　the　cause　which　leads　a　man　to　obey　the　commands　of　the



sovereign；　whether　it　be　fear　or　hope；　or　love　of　his　country；　or　any　other



emotion　…　the　fact　remains　that　the　man　takes　counsel　with　himself；　and



nevertheless　acts　as　his　sovereign　orders。　（9）　We　must　not；　therefore；



assert　that　all　actions　resulting　from　a　man's　deliberation　with　himself　are



done　in　obedience　to　the　rights　of　the　individual　rather　than　the　sovereign：



as　a　matter　of　fact；　all　actions　spring　from　a　man's　deliberation　with



himself；　whether　the　determining　motive　be　love　or　fear　of　punishment；



therefore；　either　dominion　does　not　exist；　and　has　no　rights　over　its



subjects；　or　else　it　extends　over　every　instance　in　which　it　can　prevail　on



men　to　decide　to　obey　it。　（10）　Consequently；　every　action　which　a　subject



performs　in　accordance　with　the　commands　of　the　sovereign；　whether　such



action　springs　from　love；　or　fear；　or　（as　is　more　frequently　the　case）　from



hope　and　fear　together；　or　from　reverence。　compounded　of　fear　and



admiration；　or；　indeed；　any　motive　whatever；　is　performed　in　virtue　of　his



submission　to　the　sovereign；　and　not　in　virtue　of　his　own　authority。







（17：11）　This　point　is　made　still　more　clear　by　the　fact　that　obedience　does



not　consist　so　much　in　the　outward　act　as　in　the　mental　state　of　the　person



obeying；　so　that　he　is　most　under　the　dominion　of　another　who　with　his　whole



heart　determines　to　obey　another's　commands；　and　consequently　the　firmest