the critique of pure reason-第107部分

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teleological　laws；　and　in　this　way　to　attain　to　the　highest　possible

degree　of　systematic　unity。　The　hypothesis　of　a　supreme

intelligence；　as　the　sole　cause　of　the　universe…　an　intelligence　which

has　for　us　no　more　than　an　ideal　existence…　is　accordingly　always　of

the　greatest　service　to　reason。　Thus；　if　we　presuppose；　in　relation　to

the　figure　of　the　earth　（which　is　round；　but　somewhat　flattened　at　the

poles）；*　or　that　of　mountains　or　seas；　wise　designs　on　the　part　of

an　author　of　the　universe；　we　cannot　fail　to　make；　by　the　light　of

this　supposition；　a　great　number　of　interesting　discoveries。　If　we

keep　to　this　hypothesis；　as　a　principle　which　is　purely　regulative；

even　error　cannot　be　very　detrimental。　For；　in　this　case；　error　can

have　no　more　serious　consequences　than　that；　where　we　expected　to

discover　a　teleological　connection　（nexus　finalis）；　only　a

mechanical　or　physical　connection　appears。　In　such　a　case；　we　merely

fail　to　find　the　additional　form　of　unity　we　expected；　but　we　do　not

lose　the　rational　unity　which　the　mind　requires　in　its　procedure　in

experience。　But　even　a　miscarriage　of　this　sort　cannot　affect　the

law　in　its　general　and　teleological　relations。　For　although　we　may

convict　an　anatomist　of　an　error；　when　he　connects　the　limb　of　some

animal　with　a　certain　purpose；　it　is　quite　impossible　to　prove　in　a

single　case　that　any　arrangement　of　nature；　be　it　what　it　may；　is

entirely　without　aim　or　design。　And　thus　medical　physiology；　by　the

aid　of　a　principle　presented　to　it　by　pure　reason；　extends　its　very

limited　empirical　knowledge　of　the　purposes　of　the　different　parts

of　an　organized　body　so　far　that　it　may　be　asserted　with　the　utmost

confidence；　and　with　the　approbation　of　all　reflecting　men；　that　every

organ　or　bodily　part　of　an　animal　has　its　use　and　answers　a　certain

design。　Now；　this　is　a　supposition　which；　if　regarded　as　of　a

constitutive　character；　goes　much　farther　than　any　experience　or

observation　of　ours　can　justify。　Hence　it　is　evident　that　it　is

nothing　more　than　a　regulative　principle　of　reason；　which　aims　at

the　highest　degree　of　systematic　unity；　by　the　aid　of　the　idea　of　a

causality　according　to　design　in　a　supreme　cause…　a　cause　which　it

regards　as　the　highest　intelligence。



　　*The　advantages　which　a　circular　form；　in　the　case　of　the　earth；　has

over　every　other；　are　well　known。　But　few　are　aware　that　the　slight

flattening　at　the　poles；　which　gives　it　the　figure　of　a　spheroid；　is

the　only　cause　which　prevents　the　elevations　of　continents　or　even

of　mountains；　perhaps　thrown　up　by　some　internal　convulsion；　from

continually　altering　the　position　of　the　axis　of　the　earth…　and　that

to　some　considerable　degree　in　a　short　time。　The　great　protuberance　of

the　earth　under　the　Equator　serves　to　overbalance　the　impetus　of　all

other　masses　of　earth；　and　thus　to　preserve　the　axis　of　the　earth；

so　far　as　we　can　observe；　in　its　present　position。　And　yet　this　wise

arrangement　has　been　unthinkingly　explained　from　the　equilibrium　of

the　formerly　fluid　mass。



　　If；　however；　we　neglect　this　restriction　of　the　idea　to　a　purely

regulative　influence；　reason　is　betrayed　into　numerous　errors。　For

it　has　then　left　the　ground　of　experience；　in　which　alone　are　to　be

found　the　criteria　of　truth；　and　has　ventured　into　the　region　of　the

incomprehensible　and　unsearchable；　on　the　heights　of　which　it　loses

its　power　and　collectedness；　because　it　has　completely　severed　its

connection　with　experience。

　　The　first　error　which　arises　from　our　employing　the　idea　of　a

Supreme　Being　as　a　constitutive　（in　repugnance　to　the　very　nature　of

an　idea）；　and　not　as　a　regulative　principle；　is　the　error　of

inactive　reason　（ignava　ratio）。*　We　may　so　term　every　principle

which　requires　us　to　regard　our　investigations　of　nature　as　absolutely

complete；　and　allows　reason　to　cease　its　inquiries；　as　if　it　had　fully

executed　its　task。　Thus　the　psychological　idea　of　the　ego；　when

employed　as　a　constitutive　principle　for　the　explanation　of　the

phenomena　of　the　soul；　and　for　the　extension　of　our　knowledge

regarding　this　subject　beyond　the　limits　of　experience…　even　to　the

condition　of　the　soul　after　death…　is　convenient　enough　for　the

purposes　of　pure　reason；　but　detrimental　and　even　ruinous　to　its

interests　in　the　sphere　of　nature　and　experience。　The　dogmatizing

spiritualist　explains　the　unchanging　unity　of　our　personality

through　all　changes　of　condition　from　the　unity　of　a　thinking

substance；　the　interest　which　we　take　in　things　and　events　that　can

happen　only　after　our　death；　from　a　consciousness　of　the　immaterial

nature　of　our　thinking　subject；　and　so　on。　Thus　he　dispenses　with

all　empirical　investigations　into　the　cause　of　these　internal

phenomena；　and　with　all　possible　explanations　of　them　upon　purely

natural　grounds；　while；　at　the　dictation　of　a　transcendent　reason；

he　passes　by　the　immanent　sources　of　cognition　in　experience；

greatly　to　his　own　ease　and　convenience；　but　to　the　sacrifice　of

all；　genuine　insight　and　intelligence。　These　prejudicial

consequences　become　still　more　evident；　in　the　case　of　the

dogmatical　treatment　of　our　idea　of　a　Supreme　Intelligence；　and　the

theological　system　of　nature　（physico…theology）　which　is　falsely　based

upon　it。　For；　in　this　case；　the　aims　which　we　observe　in　nature；　and

often　those　which　we　merely　fancy　to　exist；　make　the　investigation

of　causes　a　very　easy　task；　by　directing　us　to　refer　such　and　such

phenomena　immediately　to　the　unsearchable　will　and　counsel　of　the

Supreme　Wisdom；　while　we　ought　to　investigate　their　causes　in　the

general　laws　of　the　mechanism　of　matter。　We　are　thus　recommended　to

consider　the　labour　of　reason　as　ended；　when　we　have　merely

dispensed　with　its　employment；　which　is　guided　surely　and　safely

only　by　the　order　of　nature　and　the　series　of　changes　in　the　world…

which　are　arranged　according　to　immanent　and　general　laws。　This

error　may　be　avoided；　if　we　do　not　merely　consider　from　the　view…point

of　final　aims　certain　parts　of　nature；　such　as　the　division　and

structure　of　a　continent；　the　constitution　and　direction　of　certain

mountain…chains；　or　even　the　organization　existing　in　the　vegetable

and　animal　kingdoms；　but　look　upon　this　systematic　unity　of　nature

in　a　perfectly　general　way；　in　relation　to　the　idea　of　a　Supreme

Intelligence。　If　we　pursue　this　advice；　we　lay　as　a　foundation　for　all

investigation　the　conformity　to　aims　of　all　phenomena　of　nature　in

accordance　with　universal　laws；　for　which　no　particular　arrangement　of

nature　is　exempt；　but　only　cognized　by　us　with　more　or　less

difficulty；　and　we　possess　a　regulative　principle　of　the　systematic

unity　of　a　teleological　connection；　which　we　do　not　attempt　to

anticipate　or　predetermine。　All　that　we　do；　and　ought　to　do；　is　to

follow　out　the　physico…mechanical　connection　in　nature　according　to

general　laws；　with　the　hope　of　discovering；　sooner　or　later；　the

teleological　connection　also。　Thus；　and　thus　only；　can　the　principle

of　final　unity　aid　in　the　extension　of　the　employment　of　reason　in　the

sphere　of　experience；　without　being　in　any　case　detrimental　to　its

interests。



　　*This　was　the　term　applied　by　the　old　dialecticians　to　a　sophistical

argument；　which　ran　thus：　If　it　is　your　fate　to　die　of　this　disease；

you　will　die；　whether　you　employ　a　physician　or　not。　Cicero　says

that　this　mode　of　reasoning　has　received　this　appellation；　because；　if

followed；　it　puts　an　end　to　the　employment　of　reason　in　the　affairs　of

life。　For　a　similar　reason；　I　have　applied　this　designation　to　the

sophistical　argument　of　pure　reason。



　　The　second　error　which　arises　from　the　misconception　of　the

principle　of　systematic　unity　is　that　of　perverted　reason　（perversa

ratio；　usteron　roteron　rationis）。　The　idea　of　systematic　unity　is

available　as　a　regulative　principle　in　the　connection　of　phenomena

according　to　general　natural　laws；　and；　how　far　soever　we　have　to

travel　upon　the　path　of　experience　to　discover　some　fact　or　event；

this　idea　requires　us　to　believe　that　we　have　approached　all　the

more　nearly　to　the　completion　of　its　use　in　the　sphere　of　nature；

although　that　completion　can　never　be　attained。　But　this　error

reverses　the　procedure　of　reason。　We　begin　by　hypostatizing　the

principle　of　systematic　unity；　and　by　giving　an　anthropomorphic

determination　to　the　conception　of　a　Supreme　Intelligence；　and　then

proceed　forcibly　to　impose　aims　upon　nature。　Thus　not　only　does

teleology；　which　ought　to　aid　in　the　completion　of　unity　in　accordance

with　general　laws；　operate　to　the　destruction　of　its　influence；　but　it

hinders　reason　from　attaining　its　proper　aim；　that　is；　the　proof；　upon

natural　grounds；　of　the　existence　of　a　supreme　intelligent　cause。　For；

if　we　cannot　presuppose　supreme　finality　in　nature　a　priori；　that

is；　as　essentially　belonging　to　nature；　how　can　we　be　directed　to

endeavour　to　discover　this　unity　and；　rising　gradually　through　its

different　degrees；　to　approach　the　supreme　perfection　of　an　author

of　all…　a　perfection　which　is　absolutely　necessary；　and　therefore

cognizable　a　priori？　The　regulative　principle　directs　us　to　presuppose

systematic　unity　absolutely　and；　consequently；　as　following　from　the

essential　nature　of　things…　but　only　as　a　unity　of　nature；　not

merely　cognized　empirically；　but　presupposed　a　priori；　although　only

in　an　indeterminate　manner。　But　if　I　insist　on　basing　nature　upon

the　foundation　of　a　supreme　ordaining　Being；　the　unity　of　nature　is　in

effect　lost。　For；　in　this　case；　it　is　quite　foreign　and　unessential　to

the　nature　of　things；　and　cannot　be　cognized　from　the　general　laws

of　nature。　And　thus　arises　a　vicious　circular　argument；　what　ought

to　have　been　proved　having　been　presupposed。

　　To　take　the　regulative　principle　of　systematic　unity　in　nature　for　a

constitutive　principle；　and　to　hypostatize　and　make　a　cause　out　of

that　which　is　properly　the　ideal　ground　of　the　consistent　a