the idea of justice in political economy-第6部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


them　as　just。
　　　　When　the　great　social　communities　which　follow　the　most
various　interests　and　what　is　just　in　them　are　concerned；　the
attempt　will　always　be　made；　more　or　less；　to　weigh　the　different
qualities　and　accomplishments　of　men　in　their　result　and　in　their
connection　with　the　objects　of　the　community。　Talents　and
knowledge；　virtues　and　accomplishments；　merit　in　short　is
considered。　Moral　qualities　are　often　apparently　overlooked；
great　talents　whose　achievements　and　deeds　are　generally　visible
are　apparently　over…estimated。　But　only　because　one　is　more
noticed　than　the　other；　and　the　moral　judgment　which　values
individuals　according　to　what　they　are　to　the　whole　can　naturally
only　judge　by　what　it　sees。
　　　　And　therein　lies　the　contrast　between　moral　and　economic
value。　In　the　ordinary　economic　valuation　activities　and　products
have　value　in　the　same　measure；　as　individuals　covet　them　for　the
satisfaction　of　their　personal　needs。　In　the　moral　valuation；　on
which　the　judgment　as　to　justice　depends；　the　activities　of
individuals　receive　their　value；　according　as　they　serve　the
inherent　ends　of　the　whole。　True　justice；　says　Ihering；　is　a
balancing　between　consequences　and　acts；　which　is　weighed　equally
to　all　citizens　according　to　the　measure　of　the　value　of　these
acts　to　society。　Both　valuations　go　in　life　side　by　side；
combating　and　influencing　one　another。　The　one　rules　the　market；
the　other　moral　judgments　and　conceptions。　They　approach　each
other　as　mankind　grows　more　perfect。　Through　what　mechanism　the
arising　conflicts　are　lessened　and　mitigated；　we　still　have　to
discuss。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IV

　　　　If　in　the　economic　order　we　could　recognize　only　the　ruling
of　blind　forces；　of　selfish　interests；　natural　masses　and
mechanical　processes；　it　would　be　a　constant　battle；　a　chaotic
anarchy；　it　would　present　the　〃bellum　omnium　contra　omnes。〃　That
this　is　not　the　case　was　perceived　by　those　who　saw　in　the
exertion　of　egoism　the　only　motive　force　of　economic　life；　they
helped　themselves　over　the　inexplicable　conclusion　that　out　of
the　blind　struggle　of　selfish　individuals　peaceful　society　should
grow　out；　with　the　ideal　conception　of　a　pre…established　harmony
of　forces　as　in　the　conception　of　Leibnitz。　And　yet　any　impartial
glance　at　life　tells　us　that　this　harmony　does　not　exist；　but
that　it　is　striven　for　slowly　and　gradually。
　　　　No；　harmony　does　not　exist　per　se；　selfish　impulses　combat
each　other；　natural　masses　tend　to　destroy　each　other；　the
mechanical　action　of　natural　forces　interferes　relentlessly　still
to…day；　the　struggle　for　existence　is　to…day　still　carried　on　in
the　struggle　of　competition；　the　buoyancy　of　individual　activity
has　even　with　the　noblest　and　most　distinguished　men　a　flavor　of
egoism；　with　the　masses　it　is；　inwardly　curbed　indeed　by　the
moral　results　of　social　life；　the　potent　cause　of　most　actions。
While　struggle　and　strife　never　cease　they　do　not　preserve　the
same　character　throughout　the　course　of　history。　The　struggle
which　ended　in　annihilation；　in　subjugation；　turns　into　a
peaceful　contest　which　is　decided　by　an　umpire。　The　forms　of
dependence　grow　milder　and　more　human。　Class　government　grows
more　moderate。　Every　brutal　strength；　every　undue　assertion　of
superior　force　is　made　punishable　by　law。　Demand　and　supply；　as
they　confront　each　other　in　the　different　systems　of　custom　and
law；　are　quite　different　in　their　result。　In　short　all　emanations
of　egoism　are　moderated；　regulated　and　restrained　by　the　moral
cultivation　of　the　labor　of　many　thousand　years。　That　this　is　so
is　the　simple　consequence　of　those　ideal　conceptions　which
originate　in　social　life；　form　the　centre　of　all　religions；　all
systems　of　social　ethics；　all　morals　and　all　law。　And　in　the
realm　of　these　ideal　conceptions　the　idea　of　justice；　if　not　the
first　and　only　power；　is　none　the　less　one　of　the　most　important。
Others　of　equal　might　are　grouped　with　it。　Aside　from　the　idea　of
God；　of　immortality；　of　perfection　and　of　progress；　the　idea　of
justice　which　gives　each　one　his　share；　is　confronted　in　the
field　of　social　policy　by　some　other　ideas。　These　are　in　the
first　place　the　idea　of　community；　which　allots　to　the　whole　that
which　belongs　to　it；　which　regards　the　promotion　of　the　whole
more　than　the　rights　of　the　parts；　in　the　secund　place　the　idea
of　benevolence；　which　in　its　consciousness　of　community　gives
more　to　the　poor　man　than　he　can　justly　demand；　finally；　the　idea
of　liberty；　which　permits　each　part　to　act　freely；　placing
numerous　limits　upon　justice　and　the　community。　That　this　results
in　many　restrictions　upon　the　exercise　of　justice　we　will　here
only　suggest；　not　demonstrate。　But　the　fact　always　remains　that
the　constantly　growing　and　developing　conceptions　of　justice
extend　their　influence　daily　and　hourly　into　the　activity　of
practical　life；　that　in　the　form　of　moral　and　religious　sense　of
duty；　social　custom　and　actual　law；　they　regulate　and　modify　rude
forces　and　selfish　impulses。　The　conflict　between　interest　and
moral　ideas　will　of　course　never　cease；　but　only　be　moderated。
All　human　life　only　exists　under　the　presumption　of　this　never
ceasing　internal　combat。　There　are　always　claims　of　economic
justice　which　appear　to　be　only　bold　ideal　dreams；　but　there　are
always　many　which　have　conquered　in　life；　or　at　least　have
obtained　for　themselves　the　majorities；　the　leading　powers。　And
to　them　the　more　refined　economic　culture　owes　its　humane
character。
　　　　Practically　the　most　important　form　in　which　these　ideas
conquer　is　that　of　custom　and　of　law。　Without　these　formal　means
the　conceptions　and　judgments　of　justice　cannot　easily　be
realized；　cannot　easily　be　transmitted　from　generation　to
generation。　Custom　and　law　lend　permanence　and　stability　to　ideas
of　morality；　and　effect　the　agreement　of　men　about　that　which
ought　to　be。　From　the　moral　disposition　of　men　arise　rules　of
custom；　which　as　distinct　rules　of　life　curb　the　wild　play　of
passions　and　impulses。　Custom　is　that　which　we　regularly
practice；　originating　in　experience　and　recollection；　in　the
judicious　conception　of　common　purpose　and　in　moral　reflection。
As　crude　as　custom　may。　originally　be；　its　rule　is　always　an
improvement　in　comparison　with　the　purely　natural　play　of
instincts。　It　appears　to　the　growing　generation　the　appropriate；
necessary；　just　and　obvious　condition　of　all　intercourse；　all
division　of　labor；　all　social　existence。　As　an　independent　power
it　confronts　the　individuals　and　their　impulses　and　becomes　the
foundation　of　all　morals；　all　religion；　as　well　as　all　rights　and
all　institutions。
　　　　Originally　inflexible　and　relentless　in　itself　custom　later
becomes　more　variable　in　individual　morality；　adapts　itself　to
conditions；　though　it　still　exacts　the　more　noble　and　sublime；　in
the　positive　law；　which　is　gradually　separated　from　custom；　it
becomes　a　rule；　demanding　less；　but　for　this　〃less〃　a　much
stricter　obedience。　Custom　in　higher　stages　of　culture　only
prevails　through　fear　of　reproach；　of　contempt；　of　social
ostracism。　Formal　law　only　chooses　the　rules　of　social　life　most
important　for　common　interest；　but　enforces　their　observation；
when　necessary；　through　the　physical　compulsion　which　the　whole
can　exercise　over　the　individual。
　　　　Internally　of　the　same　nature　as　morals　and　custom；　i。e。；
originating　equally　in　social　ideals　and　primarily　in　the　idea　of
justice；　the　law　adopts　through　its　external；　formal　nature　the
character　of　something　independent；　in　consequence　of　which
independence　the　law　can　only　uphold　justice　within　its　own　range
and　can　only　execute　it　in　a　certain　sense。
　　　　To　the　essence　of　right　and　law；　as　it　has　been　evolved　from
religion；　morals　and　customs　by　an　experience　of　many　thousand
years；　belongs　above　all　the　uniform　and　sure　execution　of　the
rules　which　have　once　been　confirmed　universally　and　uniformly。
Without　uniform　application；　without　a　sure　administration；　law
does　not　remain　law。　To　achieve　this　is　extraordinary　difficult；
on　account　of　the　manifold　complexity　of　life。　The　goal　we　can
only　reach　by　limiting　ourselves　to　that　which　is　of　the　most
importance　and　by　long；　laborious；　logical　brain…work；　which
reduces　the　rules　of　law　to　a　few　clear　and　universally
intelligible　sentences。　The　exercise　of　the　judicial　power　is
raised　by　this　quality　above　the　level　of　personal　feelings　and
changing　disposition；　laws　are　guided　by　it　to　a　safe　and　uniform
application。　The　more　severely　law　interferes；　subordinates
details；　proceeds　radically　and　relentlessly；　the　more　important
this　formal　criterion　grows。　The　uniform　and　just　application　of
law　becomes　so　important　that　the　imperfect　law　whose　just
application　is　secured　is　preferred　to　the　more　perfect　and
materially　more　just　law　whose　application　varies；　becomes
uncertain　and　thus　unjust　everywhere　or　in　the　hands　of　judges
and　officials　of　to…day。　Nearly。　all　positive　law；　therefore；　and
especially　written　law；　which　the　thinking　mind　generates　by　the
machinery　of　legislation；　which　has　not　as　customary　law　been
derived　from　use；　is　inflexible；　feeble；　confined　to　outward；
clearly　visible　marks；　it　cannot　regard　individualities　and　their
natures；　it　deals　with　rough　averages。　Instead　of　testing
individuals；　for　example；　it　divides　adults　and　minors　according
to　a　fixed　age；　approximately　correct　for　the　totality；　but　more
or　less　arbitrary　in　regard　to　the　individual。　It　calls　all　adult
men　to　the　polls；　not　because　they　are　really　of　equal　importance
to　the　commonwealth；　but　because　the　application　of　every　more
complicated　distinction　would　result　practically　in　greater
injustices。　Thus　law　becomes　often　inequitable　and　materially
unjust；　not　because　formal　justice　is　superior；　but　because　it　is
more　easily　attained　in　the　existing　stage　of　civilization。　This
gives　rise　to　thousands　of　conflicts　between　material　and　formal
…　justice；　which　are　so　often　decisive　for　the　practical
questions　of　distribution　of　wealth　and　incomes。
　　　　If　there　is　any　demand　of　justice　which　it　is　desired　to
introduce　into　our　institutions　through　the　channel　of　ordinary
reform　by　positive　law；　it　is　not　only　n