the.world.is.flat-第27部分

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the　best　tax　breaks；　education　incentives；　and　subsidies；　on　top　of　their　cheap　labor；　
to　encourage　offshoring　to　their　shores。　
Ohio　State　University　business　professor　Oded　Shenkar；　author　of　the　book　The　Chinese　
Century；　told　BusinessWeek　（December　6；　2004）　that　he　gives　it　to　American　companies　
straight：　〃If　you　still　make　anything　labor　intensive；　get　out　now　rather　than　bleed　
to　death。　Shaving　5％　here　and　there　won't　work。〃　Chinese　producers　can　make　the　same　
adjustments。　〃You　need　an　entirely　new　business　model　to　compete；〃　he　said。　
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China's　flattening　power　is　also　fueled　by　the　fact　that　it　is　developing　a　huge　
domestic　market　of　its　own。　The　same　BusinessWeek　article　noted　that　this　brings　
economies　of　scale；　intense　local　rivalries　that　keep　prices　low；　an　army　of　engineers　
that　is　growing　by　350；000　annually；　young　workers　and　managers　willing　to　put　in　
twelve…hour　days；　an　unparalleled　component　base　in　electronics　and　light　industry；　
〃and　an　entrepreneurial　zeal　to　do　whatever　it　takes　to　please　big　retailers　such　
as　Wal…Mart　Stores；　Target；　Best　Buy　and　J。C。　Penney。〃　
Critics　of　China's　business　practices　say　that　its　size　and　economic　power　mean　that　
it　will　soon　be　setting　the　global　floor　not　only　for　low　wages　but　also　for　lax　labor　
laws　and　workplace　standards。　This　is　known　in　the　business　as　〃the　China　price。〃　
But　what　is　really　scary　is　that　China　is　not　attracting　so　much　global　investment　
by　simply　racing　everyone　to　the　bottom。　That　is　just　a　short…term　strategy。　The　
biggest　mistake　any　business　can　make　when　it　comes　to　China　is　thinking　that　it　is　
only　winning　on　wages　and　not　improving　quality　and　productivity。　In　the　private；　
non…state…owned　sector　of　Chinese　industry；　productivity　increased　17　percent　
annually…I　repeat；　17　percent　annually…between　1995　and　2002；　according　to　a　study　
by　the　U。S。　Conference　Board。　This　is　due　to　China's　absorption　of　both　new　
technologies　and　modern　business　practices；　starting　from　a　very　low　base。　
Incidentally；　the　Conference　Board　study　noted；　China　lost　15　million　manufacturing　
jobs　during　this　period；　compared　with　2　million　in　the　United　States。　〃As　its　
manufacturing　productivity　accelerates；　China　is　losing　jobs　in　manufacturing…many　
more　than　the　United　States　is…and　gaining　them　in　services；　a　pattern　that　has　been　
playing　out　in　the　developed　world　for　many　years；〃　the　study　said。　
China's　real　long…term　strategy　is　to　outrace　America　and　the　E。U。　countries　to　the　
top；　and　the　Chinese　are　off　to　a　good　start。　China's　leaders　are　much　more　focused　
than　many　of　their　Western　counterparts　on　how　to　train　their　young　people　in　the　
math；　science；　and　computer　skills　required　for　success　in　the　flat　world；　how　to　
build　a　physical　and　telecom　infrastructure　that　will　allow　Chinese　people　to　plug　
and　play　faster　
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and　easier　than　others；　and　how　to　create　incentives　that　will　attract　global　
investors。　What　China's　leaders　really　want　is　the　next　generation　of　underwear　or　
airplane　wings　to　be　designed　in　China　as　well。　That　is　where　things　are　heading　in　


another　decade。　So　in　thirty　years　we　will　have　gone　from　〃sold　in　China〃　to　〃made　
in　China〃to　〃designed　in　China〃　to　〃dreamed　upin　China〃…or　from　China　as　collaborator　
with　the　worldwide　manufacturers　on　nothing　to　China　as　a　low…cost；　high…quality；　
hyperefficient　collaborator　with　worldwide　manufacturers　on　everything。　This　should　
allow　China　to　maintain　its　role　as　a　major　flattening　force；　provided　that　political　
instability　does　not　disrupt　the　process。　Indeed；　while　researching　this　chapter；　
I　came　across　an　online　Silicon　Valley　newsletter　called　the　Inquirer；　which　follows　
the　semiconductor　industry。　What　caught　my　eye　was　its　November　5；　2001；　article　
headlined；　〃China　to　Become　Center　of　Everything。〃　It　quoted　a　China　People's　Daily　
article　that　claimed　that　four　hundred　out　of　the　Forbes　500　companies　have　invested　
in　more　than　two　thousand　projects　in　mainland　China。　And　that　was　four　years　ago。　
Japan；　being　right　next　door　to　China；　has　taken　a　very　aggressive　approach　to　
internalizing　the　China　challenge。　Osamu　Watanabe；　chairman　of　the　Japan　External　
Trade　Organization　（JETRO）；　Japan's　official　organ　for　promoting　exports；　told　me　
in　Tokyo；　〃China　is　developing　very　rapidly　and　making　the　shift　from　low…grade　
products　to　high…grade；　high…tech　ones。〃　As　a　result；　added　Watanabe；　Japanese　
companies；　to　remain　globally　competitive；　have　had　to　shift　some　production　and　a　
lot　of　assembly　of　middle…range　products　to　China；　while　shifting　at　home　to　making　
〃even　higher　value…added　products。〃　So　China　and　Japan　〃are　becoming　part　of　the　same　
supply　chain。〃　After　a　prolonged　recession；　Japan's　economy　started　to　bounce　back　
in　2003；　due　to　the　sale　of　thousands　of　tons　of　machinery；　assembly　robots；　and　other　
critical　components　in　China。　In　2003；　China　replaced　the　United　States　as　the　biggest　
importer　of　Japanese　products。　Still；　the　Japanese　government　is　urging　its　companies　
to　be　careful　not　to　overinvest　in　China。　It　encourages　them　to　practice　what　Watanabe　
called　a　〃China　plus　one〃　strategy：　to　keep　one　production　leg　in　China　but　the　other　
in　

a　different　Asian　country…just　in　case　political　turmoil　unflattens　China　one　day。　
This　China　flattener　has　been　wrenching　for　certain　manufacturing　workers　around　the　
world；　but　a　godsend　for　all　consumers。　Fortune　magazine　（October　4；　2004）　quoted　
a　study　by　Morgan　Stanley　estimating　that　since　the　mid…1990s　alone；　cheap　imports　
from　China　have　saved　U。S。　consumers　roughly　600　billion　and　have　saved　U。S。　
manufacturers　untold　billions　in　cheaper　parts　for　their　products。　This　savings；　in　
turn；　Fortune　noted；　has　helped　the　Federal　Reserve　to　hold　down　interest　rates　longer；　
giving　more　Americans　a　chance　to　buy　homes　or　refinance　the　ones　they　have；　and　giving　
businesses　more　capital　to　invest　in　new　innovations。　
In　an　effort　to　better　understand　how　offshoring　to　China　works；　I　sat　down　in　Beijing　
with　Jack　Perkowski　of　ASIMCO；　a　pioneer　in　this　form　of　collaboration。　If　they　ever　
have　a　category　in　the　Olympics　called　〃extreme　capitalism；〃　bet　on　Perkowski　to　win　
the　gold。　In　1988　he　stepped　down　as　a　top　investment　banker　at　Paine　Webber　and　went　
to　a　leverage　buyout　firm；　but　two　years　later；　at　age　forty…two；　decided　it　was　time　
for　a　new　challenge。　With　some　partners；　he　raised　150　million　to　buy　companies　in　
China　and　headed　off　for　the　adventure　of　his　life。　Since　then　he　has　lost　and　remade　
millions　of　dollars；　learned　every　lesson　the　hard　way；　but　survived　to　become　a　


powerful　example　of　what　offshoring　to　China　is　all　about　and　what　a　powerful　
collaborative　tool　it　can　become。　
〃When　I　first　startedback　in1992…1993；　everyone　thoughtthe　hard　part　was　toactually　
find　and　gain　access　to　opportunities　in　China；〃　recalled　Perkowski。　It　turned　out　
that　there　were　opportunities　aplenty　but　a　critical　shortage　of　Chinese　managers　
who　understood　how　to　run　an　auto　parts　factory　along　capitalist　lines；　with　an　
emphasis　on　exports　and　making　world…class　products　for　the　Chinese　market。　As　
Perkowski　put　it；　the　easy　part　was　setting　up　shop　in　China。　The　hard　part　was　getting　
the　right　local　managers　who　could　run　the　store。　So　when　he　initially　started　buying　
majority　ownership　in　Chinese　auto　parts　companies；　Perkowski　began　by　importing　
managers　from　abroad。　Bad　idea。　It　was　too　expensive；　and　operating　in　China　was　just　
too　foreign　for　foreigners。　Scratch　plan　A。　
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〃So　we　sent　all　the　expats　home；　which　gave　me　problems　with　my　investor　base；　and　
went　to　plan　B；〃　he　said。　〃We　then　tried　to　convert　the　'Old　China'　managers　who　
typically　came　along　with　the　plants　we　bought；　but　that　didn't　work　either。　They　
were　simply　too　used　to　working　in　a　planned　economy　where　they　never　had　to　deal　
with　the　marketplace；　just　deliver　their　quotas。　Those　managers　who　did　have　an　
entrepreneurial　flair　got　drunk　on　their　first　sip　of　capitalism　and　were　ready　to　
try　anything。　
〃The　Chinese　are　very　entrepreneurial；〃　said　Perkowski；　〃but　back　then；　before　China　
joined　the　WTO；　there　was　no　rule　of　law　and　no　bond　or　stock　market　to　restrain　this　
entrepreneurialism。　Your　only　choices　were　managers　from　the　state…owned　sector；　who　
were　very　bureaucratic；　or　managers　from　the　first　wave　of　private　companies；　who　
were　practicing　cowboy　capitalism。　Neither　is　where　you　want　to　be。　If　your　managers　
are　too　bureaucratic；　you　can't　get　anything　done…they　just　give　excuses　about　how　
China　is　different…and　if　they　are　too　entrepreneurial；　you　can't　sleep　at　night；　
because　you　have　no　idea　what　they　are　going　to　do。〃　Perkowski　had　a　lot　of　sleepless　
nights。　
One　of　his　first　purchases　in　China　was　an　interest　in　a　company　making　rubber　parts。　
When　he　subsequently　reached　an　agreement　with　his　Chinese　partner　to　purchase　his　
shares　in　the　company；　the　Chinese　partner　signed　a　noncompete　clause　as　part　of　the　
transaction。　As　soon　as　the　deal　closed；　however；　the　Chinese　partner　went　out　and　
opened　a　new　factory。　〃Noncompete〃　did　not　quite　translate　into　Mandarin。　Scratch　
plan　B。　
Meanwhile；　Perkowski's　partnership　was　hemorrhaging　money…　Perkowski's　tuition　for　
learning　how　to　do　business　in　China…and　he　found　himself　owning　a　string　of　Chinese　
auto　parts　factories。　〃Around　1997　was　the　low　point；〃　he　said。　〃Our　company　as　a　
whole　was　shrinking　and　we　were　not　profitable。　While　some　of　our　companies　were　doing　
okay；　we　were　generally　in　tough　shape。　Although　we　had　majority　ownership　and　could　
theoretically　put　anyone　on　the　field　that　we　wanted；　I　looked　at　my　＇managerial＇　
bench　and　I　had　no　one　to　put　in　the　game。〃　Time　for　plan　C。　
〃We　essentially　concluded　that；　while　we　liked　China；　we　wanted　no　
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part　of'Old　China；'　and　instead　wanted　to　place　our　bets　on　'New　China'　managers；〃　
said　Perkowski。　〃We　began　looking　for　a　new　breed　of　Chinese　managers　who　were　
open…minded　and　had　gotten　some　form　of　management　training。　We　were　looking　for　
individuals　who　were　experienced　at　operating　in　China　and　yet　were　familiar　with