democracy in america-1-第42部分

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inion　that　this　excessive　dependence　of　the　Legislature　tended　to　alter　the　nature　of　the　main　consequences　of　the　representative　system；　since　it　vested　the　source；　not　only　of　authority；　but　of　government；　in　the　people。　　They　increased　the　length　of　the　time　for　which　the　representatives　were　returned；　in　order　to　give　them　freer　scope　for　the　exercise　of　their　own　judgment。

The　Federal　Constitution；　as　well　as　the　Constitutions　of　the　different　States；　divided　the　legislative　body　into　two　branches。　　But　in　the　States　these　two　branches　were　composed　of　the　same　elements；　and　elected　in　the　same　manner。　　The　consequence　was　that　the　passions　and　inclinations　of　the　populace　were　as　rapidly　and　as　energetically　represented　in　one　chamber　as　in　the　other；　and　that　laws　were　made　with　all　the　characteristics　of　violence　and　precipitation。　　By　the　Federal　Constitution　the　two　houses　originate　in　like　manner　in　the　choice　of　the　people；　but　the　conditions　of　eligibility　and　the　mode　of　election　were　changed；　to　the　end　that；　if；　as　is　the　case　in　certain　nations；　one　branch　of　the　Legislature　represents　the　same　interests　as　the　other；　it　may　at　least　represent　a　superior　degree　of　intelligence　and　discretion。　A　mature　age　was　made　one　of　the　conditions　of　the　senatorial　dignity；　and　the　Upper　House　was　chosen　by　an　elected　assembly　of　a　limited　number　of　members。

To　concentrate　the　whole　social　force　in　the　hands　of　the　legislative　body　is　the　natural　tendency　of　democracies；　for　as　this　is　the　power　which　emanates　the　most　directly　from　the　people；　it　is　made　to　participate　most　fully　in　the　preponderating　authority　of　the　multitude；　and　it　is　naturally　led　to　monopolize　every　species　of　influence。　　This　concentration　is　at　once　prejudicial　to　a　well…conducted　administration；　and　favorable　to　the　despotism　of　the　majority。　　The　legislators　of　the　States　frequently　yielded　to　these　democratic　propensities；　which　were　invariably　and　courageously　resisted　by　the　founders　of　the　Union。　

In　the　States　the　executive　power　is　vested　in　the　hands　of　a　magistrate；　who　is　apparently　placed　upon　a　level　with　the　Legislature；　but　who　is　in　reality　nothing　more　than　the　blind　agent　and　the　passive　instrument　of　its　decisions。　　He　can　derive　no　influence　from　the　duration　of　his　functions；　which　terminate　with　the　revolving　year；　or　from　the　exercise　of　prerogatives　which　can　scarcely　be　said　to　exist。　　The　Legislature　can　condemn　him　to　inaction　by　intrusting　the　execution　of　the　laws　to　special　committees　of　its　own　members；　and　can　annul　his　temporary　dignity　by　depriving　him　of　his　salary。　　The　Federal　Constitution　vests　all　the　privileges　and　all　the　responsibility　of　the　executive　power　in　a　single　individual。　　The　duration　of　the　Presidency　is　fixed　at　four　years；　the　salary　of　the　individual　who　fills　that　office　cannot　be　altered　during　the　term　of　his　functions；　he　is　protected　by　a　body　of　official　dependents；　and　armed　with　a　suspensive　veto。　In　short；　every　effort　was　made　to　confer　a　strong　and　independent　position　upon　the　executive　authority　within　the　limits　which　had　been　prescribed　to　it。

In　the　Constitutions　of　all　the　States　the　judicial　power　is　that　which　remains　the　most　independent　of　the　legislative　authority；　nevertheless；　in　all　the　States　the　Legislature　has　reserved　to　itself　the　right　of　regulating　the　emoluments　of　the　judges；　a　practice　which　necessarily　subjects　these　magistrates　to　its　immediate　influence。　　In　some　States　the　judges　are　only　temporarily　appointed；　which　deprives　them　of　a　great　portion　of　their　power　and　their　freedom。　　In　others　the　legislative　and　judicial　powers　are　entirely　confounded；　thus　the　Senate　of　New　York；　for　instance；　constitutes　in　certain　cases　the　Superior　Court　of　the　State。　　The　Federal　Constitution；　on　the　other　hand；　carefully　separates　the　judicial　authority　from　all　external　influences；　and　it　provides　for　the　independence　of　the　judges；　by　declaring　that　their　salary　shall　not　be　altered；　and　that　their　functions　shall　be　inalienable。

The　practical　consequences　of　these　different　systems　may　easily　be　perceived。　　An　attentive　observer　will　soon　remark　that　the　business　of　the　Union　is　incomparably　better　conducted　than　that　of　any　individual　State。　The　conduct　of　the　Federal　Government　is　more　fair　and　more　temperate　than　that　of　the　States；　its　designs　are　more　fraught　with　wisdom；　its　projects　are　more　durable　and　more　skilfully　combined；　its　measures　are　put　into　execution　with　more　vigor　and　consistency。

I　recapitulate　the　substance　of　this　chapter　in　a　few　words：　The　existence　of　democracies　is　threatened　by　two　dangers；　viz。；　the　complete　subjection　of　the　legislative　body　to　the　caprices　of　the　electoral　body；　and　the　concentration　of　all　the　powers　of　the　Government　in　the　legislative　authority。　　The　growth　of　these　evils　has　been　encouraged　by　the　policy　of　the　legislators　of　the　States；　but　it　has　been　resisted　by　the　legislators　of　the　Union　by　every　means　which　lay　within　their　control。

Characteristics　Which　Distinguish　The　Federal　Constitution　Of　The　United　States　Of　America　From　All　Other　Federal　Constitutions　　American　Union　appears　to　resemble　all　other　confederations　…　Nevertheless　its　effects　are　different　…　Reason　of　this　…　Distinctions　between　the　Union　and　all　other　confederations　…　The　American　Government　not　a　federal　but　an　imperfect　national　Government。

The　United　States　of　America　do　not　afford　either　the　first　or　the　only　instance　of　confederate　States；　several　of　which　have　existed　in　modern　Europe；　without　adverting　to　those　of　antiquity。　　Switzerland；　the　Germanic　Empire；　and　the　Republic　of　the　United　Provinces　either　have　been　or　still　are　confederations。　　In　studying　the　constitutions　of　these　different　countries；　the　politician　is　surprised　to　observe　that　the　powers　with　which　they　invested　the　Federal　Government　are　nearly　identical　with　the　privileges　awarded　by　the　American　Constitution　to　the　Government　of　the　United　States。　They　confer　upon　the　central　power　the　same　rights　of　making　peace　and　war；　of　raising　money　and　troops；　and　of　providing　for　the　general　exigencies　and　the　common　interests　of　the　nation。　　Nevertheless　the　Federal　Government　of　these　different　peoples　has　always　been　as　remarkable　for　its　weakness　and　inefficiency　as　that　of　the　Union　is　for　its　vigorous　and　enterprising　spirit。　Again；　the　first　American　Confederation　perished　through　the　excessive　weakness　of　its　Government；　and　this　weak　Government　was；　notwithstanding；　in　possession　of　rights　even　more　extensive　than　those　of　the　Federal　Government　of　the　present　day。　　But　the　more　recent　Constitution　of　the　United　States　contains　certain　principles　which　exercise　a　most　important　influence；　although　they　do　not　at　once　strike　the　observer。　

This　Constitution；　which　may　at　first　sight　be　confounded　with　the　federal　constitutions　which　preceded　it；　rests　upon　a　novel　theory；　which　may　be　considered　as　a　great　invention　in　modern　political　science。　　In　all　the　confederations　which　had　been　formed　before　the　American　Constitution　of　1789　the　allied　States　agreed　to　obey　the　injunctions　of　a　Federal　Government；　but　they　reserved　to　themselves　the　right　of　ordaining　and　enforcing　the　execution　of　the　laws　of　the　Union。　　The　American　States　which　combined　in　1789　agreed　that　the　Federal　Government　should　not　only　dictate　the　laws；　but　that　it　should　execute　it　own　enactments。　　In　both　cases　the　right　is　the　same；　but　the　exercise　of　the　right　is　different；　and　this　alteration　produced　the　most　momentous　consequences。　

In　all　the　confederations　which　had　been　formed　before　the　American　Union　the　Federal　Government　demanded　its　supplies　at　the　hands　of　the　separate　Governments；　and　if　the　measure　it　prescribed　was　onerous　to　any　one　of　those　bodies　means　were　found　to　evade　its　claims：　if　the　State　was　powerful；　it　had　recourse　to　arms；　if　it　was　weak；　it　connived　at　the　resistance　which　the　law　of　the　Union；　its　sovereign；　met　with；　and　resorted　to　inaction　under　the　plea　of　inability。　　Under　these　circumstances　one　of　the　two　alternatives　has　invariably　occurred；　either　the　most　preponderant　of　the　allied　peoples　has　assumed　the　privileges　of　the　Federal　authority　and　ruled　all　the　States　in　its　name；　*p　or　the　Federal　Government　has　been　abandoned　by　its　natural　supporters；　anarchy　has　arisen　between　the　confederates；　and　the　Union　has　lost　all　powers　of　action。　*q

＇Footnote　p：　This　was　the　case　in　Greece；　when　Philip　undertook　to　execute　the　decree　of　the　Amphictyons；　in　the　Low　Countries；　where　the　province　of　Holland　always　gave　the　law；　and；　in　our　own　time；　in　the　Germanic　Confederation；　in　which　Austria　and　Prussia　assume　a　great　degree　of　influence　over　the　whole　country；　in　the　name　of　the　Diet。＇

＇Footnote　q：　Such　has　always　been　the　situation　of　the　Swiss　Confederation；　which　would　have　perished　ages　ago　but　for　the　mutual　jealousies　of　its　neighbors。＇

In　America　the　subjects　of　the　Union　are　not　States；　but　private　citizens：　the　national　Government　levies　a　tax；　not　upon　the　State　of　Massachusetts；　but　upon　each　inhabitant　of　Massachusetts。　　All　former　confederate　governments　presided　over　communities；　but　that　of　the　Union　rules　individuals；　its　force　is　not　borrowed；　but　self…derived；　and　it　is　served　by　its　own　civil　and　military　officers；　by　its　own　army；　and　its　own　courts　of　justice。　　It　cannot　be　doubted　that　the　spirit　of　the　nation；　the　passions　of　the　multitude；　and　the　provincial　prejudices　of　each　State　tend　singularly　to　diminish　the　authority　of　a　Federal　authority　thus　constituted；　and　to　facilitate　the　means　of　resistance　to　its　mandates；　but　the　comparative　weakness　of　a　restricted　sovereignty　is　an　evil　inherent　in　the　Federal　system。　　In　America；　each　State　has　fewer　opportunities　of　resistance　and　fewer　temptations　to　non…compliance；　nor　can　such　a　design　be　put　in　execution　（if　indeed　it　be　entertained）　without　an　open　violation　of　the　laws　of　the　Union；　a　direct　interruption　of　the　ordinary　course　of　justice；　and　a　bold　declaration　of　revolt；　in　a　word；　without　taking　a　decisive　step　which　men　hesitate　to　adopt。　

In　all　former　confederations　the　privileges　of　the　Union　furnished　more　elements　of　disc