memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第22部分

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aptured　from　the　enemy；　and　each　at　once　was　garrisoned　by　a　full　division　of　troops；　if　not　more；　so　that　success　was　actually　crippling　our　armies　in　the　field　by　detachments　to　guard　and　protect　the　interests　of　a　hostile　population。

I　gave　notice　of　this　purpose；　as　early　as　the　4th　of　September；　to　General　Halleck；　in　a　letter　concluding　with　these　words：

If　the　people　raise　a　howl　against　my　barbarity　and　cruelty；　I　will　answer　that　war　is　war；　and　not　popularity…seeking。　　If　they　want　peace；　they　and　their　relatives　most　stop　the　war。

I　knew；　of　course；　that　such　a　measure　would　be　strongly　criticised；　but　made　up　my　mind　to　do　it　with　the　absolute　certainty　of　its　justness；　and　that　time　would　sanction　its　wisdom。　I　knew　that　the　people　of　the　South　would　read　in　this　measure　two　important　conclusions：　one；　that　we　were　in　earnest；　and　the　other；　if　they　were　sincere　in　their　common　and　popular　clamor　〃to　die　in　the　last　ditch；〃　that　the　opportunity　would　soon　come。

Soon　after　our　reaching　Atlanta；　General　Hood　had　sent　in　by　a　flag　of　truce　a　proposition；　offering　a　general　exchange　of　prisoners；　saying　that　he　was　authorized　to　make　such　an　exchange　by　the　Richmond　authorities；　out　of　the　vast　number　of　our　men　then　held　captive　at　Andersonville；　the　same　whom　General　Stoneman　had　hoped　to　rescue　at　the　time　of　his　raid。　　Some　of　these　prisoners　had　already　escaped　and　got　in；　had　described　the　pitiable　condition　of　the　remainder；　and；　although　I　felt　a　sympathy　for　their　hardships　and　sufferings　as　deeply　as　any　man　could；　yet　as　nearly　all　the　prisoners　who　had　been　captured　by　us　during　the　campaign　had　been　sent；　as　fast　as　taken；　to　the　usual　depots　North；　they　were　then　beyond　my　control。　　There　were　still　about　two　thousand；　mostly　captured　at　Jonesboro；　who　had　been　sent　back　by　cars；　but　had　not　passed　Chattanooga。　　These　I　ordered　back；　and　offered　General　Hood　to　exchange　them　for　Stoneman；　Buell；　and　such　of　my　own　army　as　would　make　up　the　equivalent；　but　I　would　not　exchange　for　his　prisoners　generally；　because　I　knew　these　would　have　to　be　sent　to　their　own　regiments；　away　from　my　army；　whereas　all　we　could　give　him　could　at　once　be　put　to　duty　in　his　immediate　army。　　Quite　an　angry　correspondence　grew　up　between　us；　which　was　published　at　the　time　in　the　newspapers；　but　it　is　not　to　be　found　in　any　book　of　which　I　have　present　knowledge；　and　therefore　is　given　here；　as　illustrative　of　the　events　referred　to；　and　of　the　feelings　of　the　actors　in　the　game　of　war　at　that　particular　crisis；　together　with　certain　other　original　letters　of　Generals　Grant　and　Halleck；　never　hitherto　published。


HEADQUARTERS　ARMIES　OF　THE　UNITED　STATES　CITY　POINT；　VIRGINIA；　September　12；　1864

Major…General　W。　T。　SHERMAN；　commanding　Military　Division　of　the　Mississippi

GENERAL：　I　send　Lieutenant…Colonel　Horace　Porter；　of　my　staff；　with　this。　　Colonel　Porter　will　explain　to　you　the　exact　condition　of　affairs　here；　better　than　I　can　do　in　the　limits　of　a　letter。　Although　I　feel　myself　strong　enough　now　for　offensive　operations；　I　am　holding　on　quietly；　to　get　advantage　of　recruits　and　convalescents；　who　are　coming　forward　very　rapidly。　　My　lines　are　necessarily　very　long；　extending　from　Deep　Bottom；　north　of　the　James；　across　the　peninsula　formed　by　the　Appomattox　and　the　James；　and　south　of　the　Appomattox　to　the　Weldon　road。　　This　line　is　very　strongly　fortified；　and　can　be　held　with　comparatively　few　men；　but；　from　its　great　length；　necessarily　takes　many　in　the　aggregate。　　I　propose；　when　I　do　move；　to　extend　my　left　so　as　to　control　what　is　known　as　the　Southside；　or　Lynchburg　&　Petersburg　road；　then；　if　possible；　to　keep　the　Danville　road　out。　　At　the　same　time　this　move　is　made；　I　want　to　send　a　force　of　from　six　to　ten　thousand　men　against　Wilmington。　　The　way　I　propose　to　do　this　is　to　land　the　men　north　of　Fort　Fisher；　and　hold　that　point。　　At　the　same　time　a　large　naval　fleet　will　be　assembled　there；　and　the　iron…clads　will　run　the　batteries　as　they　did　at　Mobile。　　This　will　give　us　the　same　control　of　the　harbor　of　Wilmington　that　we　now　have　of　the　harbor　of　Mobile。　　What　you　are　to　do　with　the　forces　at　your　command；　I　do　not　exactly　see。　　The　difficulties　of　supplying　your　army；　except　when　they　are　constantly　moving　beyond　where　you　are；　I　plainly　see。　　If　it　had　not　been　for　Price's　movement；　Canby　could　have　sent　twelve　thousand　more　men　to　Mobile。　》From　your　command　on　the　Mississippi；　an　equal　number　could　have　been　taken。　　With　these　forces；　my　idea　world　have　been　to　divide　them；　sending　one…half　to　Mobile；　and　the　other　half　to　Savannah。　You　could　then　move　as　proposed　in　your　telegram；　so　as　to　threaten　Macon　and　Augusta　equally。　　Whichever　one　should　be　abandoned　by　the　enemy；　you　could　take　and　open　up　anew　base　of　supplies。　　My　object　now　in　sending　a　staff…officer　to　you　is　not　so　much　to　suggest　operations　for　you　as　to　get　your　views；　and　to　have　plans　matured　by　the　time　every　thing　can　be　got　ready。　　It　would　probably　be　the　5th　of　October　before　any　of　the　plans　here　indicated　will　be　executed。　　If　you　have　any　promotions　to　recommend；　send　the　names　forward；　and　I　will　approve　them。

In　conclusion；　it　is　hardly　necessary　for　me　to　say　that　I　feel　you　have　accomplished　the　most　gigantic　undertaking　given　to　any　general　in　this　war；　and　with　a　skill　and　ability　that　will　be　acknowledged　in　history　as　unsurpassed；　if　not　unequaled。　　It　gives　me　as　much　pleasure　to　record　this　in　your　favor　as　it　world　in　favor　of　any　living　man；　myself　included。　Truly　yours；

U。　S。　GRANT；　Lieutenant…General。


HEADQUARTERS　MILITARY　DIVISION　OF　THE　MISSISSIPPI　IN　THE　FIELD；　ATLANTA；　GEORGIA；　September　20；　1864。

Lieutenant…General　U。　S。　GRANT；　Commander…in…Chief；　City　Point；　Virgina

GENERAL：　I　have　the　honor　to　acknowledge；　at　the　hands　of　Lieutenant　　Colonel　Porter；　of　your　staff；　your　letter　of　September　12th；　and　accept　with　with　thanks　the　honorable　and　kindly　mention　of　the　services　of　this　army　in　the　great　cause　in　which　we　are　all　engaged。

I　send　by　Colonel　Porter　all　official　reports　which　are　completed；　and　will　in　a　few　days　submit　a　list　of　names　which　are　deemed　worthy　of　promotion。

I　think　we　owe　it　to　the　President　to　save　him　the　invidious　task　of　selection　among　the　vast　number　of　worthy　applicants；　and　have　ordered　my　army　commanders　to　prepare　their　lists　with　great　care；　and　to　express　their　preferences；　based　upon　claims　of　actual　capacity　and　services　rendered。

These　I　will　consolidate；　and　submit　in　such　a　form　that；　if　mistakes　are　made；　they　will　at　least　be　sanctioned　by　the　best　contemporaneous　evidence　of　merit；　for　I　know　that　vacancies　do　not　exist　equal　in　number　to　that　of　the　officers　who　really　deserve　promotion。

As　to　the　future；　I　am　pleased　to　know　that　your　army　is　being　steadily　reinforced　by　a　good　class　of　men；　and　I　hope　it　will　go　on　until　you　have　a　force　that　is　numerically　double　that　of　your　antagonist；　so　that　with　one　part　you　can　watch　him；　and　with　the　other　push　out　boldly　from　your　left　flank；　occupy　the　Southside　Railroad；　compel　him　to　attack　you　in　position；　or　accept　battle　on　your　own　terms。

We　ought　to　ask　our　country　for　the　largest　possible　armies　that　can　be　raised；　as　so　important　a　thing　as　the　self…existence　of　a　great　nation　should　not　be　left　to　the　fickle　chances　of　war。

Now　that　Mobile　is　shut　out　to　the　commerce　of　our　enemy；　it　calls　for　no　further　effort　on　our　part；　unless　the　capture　of　the　city　can　be　followed　by　the　occupation　of　the　Alabama　River　and　the　railroad　to　Columbus；　Georgia；　when　that　place　would　be　a　magnificent　auxiliary　to　my　further　progress　into　Georgia；　but；　until　General　Canby　is　much　reinforced；　and　until　he　can　more　thoroughly　subdue　the　scattered　armies　west　of　the　Mississippi；　I　suppose　that　much　cannot　be　attempted　by　him　against　the　Alabama　River　and　Columbus；　Georgia。

The　utter　destruction　of　Wilmington；　North　Carolina；　is　of　importance　only　in　connection　with　the　necessity　of　cutting　off　all　foreign　trade　to　our　enemy；　and　if　Admiral　Farragut　can　get　across　the　bar；　and　move　quickly；　I　suppose　he　will　succeed。　　From　my　knowledge　of　the　mouth　of　Cape　Fear　River；　I　anticipate　more　difficulty　in　getting　the　heavy　ships　across　the　bar　than　in　reaching　the　town　of　Wilmington；　but；　of　course；　the　soundings　of　the　channel　are　well　known　at　Washington；　as　well　as　the　draught　of　his　iron…clads；　so　that　it　must　be　demonstrated　to　be　feasible；　or　else　it　would　not　be　attempted。　　If　successful；　I　suppose　that　Fort　Caswell　will　be　occupied；　and　the　fleet　at　once　sent　to　the　Savannah　River。　　Then　the　reduction　of　that　city　is　the　next　question。　　It　once　in　our　possession；　and　the　river　open　to　us；　I　would　not　hesitate　to　cross　the　State　of　Georgia　with　sixty　thousand　men；　hauling　some　stores；　and　depending　on　the　country　for　the　balance。　　Where　a　million　of　people　find　subsistence；　my　army　won't　starve；　but；　as　you　know；　in　a　country　like　Georgia；　with　few　roads　and　innumerable　streams；　an　inferior　force　can　so　delay　an　army　and　harass　it；　that　it　would　not　be　a　formidable　object；　but　if　the　enemy　knew　that　we　had　our　boats　in　the　Savannah　River　I　could　rapidly　move　to　Milledgeville；　where　there　is　abundance　of　corn　and　meat；　and　could　so　threaten　Macon　and　Augusta　that　the　enemy　world　doubtless　give　up　Macon　for　Augusta；　then　I　would　move　so　as　to　interpose　between　Augusta　and　Savannah；　and　force　him　to　give　us　Augusta；　with　the　only　powder…mills　and　factories　remaining　in　the　South；　or　let　us　have　the　use　of　the　Savannah　River。　　Either　horn　of　the　dilemma　will　be　worth　a　battle。　　I　would　prefer　his　holding　Augusta　（as　the　probabilities　are）；　for　then；　with　the　Savannah　River　in　our　possession；　the　taking　of　Augusta　would　be　a　mere　matter　of　time。　　This　campaign　can　be　made　in　the　winter。

But　the　more　I　study　the　game；　the　more　am　I　convinced　that　it　would　be　wrong　for　us　to　penetrate　farther　into　Georgia　without　an　objective　beyond。　　It　would　not　be　productive　of　much　good。　　I　can　start　east　and　make　a　circuit　south　and　back；　doing　vast　damage　to　the　State；　but　resulting　in　no　permanent　good；　and　by　mere　threatening　to　do　so；　I　hold　a　rod　over　the　Georgians；　who　are　not　over…loyal　to　the