thoughts on the present discontents-第11部分

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has　profited　by　that　faction　which　presumptuously　choose　to　call
themselves　HIS　FRIENDS。

If　particular　men　had　grown　into　an　attachment；　by　the　distinguished
honour　of　the　society　of　their　Sovereign；　and；　by　being　the
partakers　of　his　amusements；　came　sometimes　to　prefer　the
gratification　of　his　personal　inclinations　to　the　support　of　his
high　character；　the　thing　would　be　very　natural；　and　it　would　be
excusable　enough。　　But　the　pleasant　part　of　the　story　is；　that　these
KING'S　FRIENDS　have　no　more　ground　for　usurping　such　a　title；　than　a
resident　freeholder　in　Cumberland　or　in　Cornwall。　　They　are　only
known　to　their　Sovereign　by　kissing　his　hand；　for　the　offices；
pensions；　and　grants　into　which　they　have　deceived　his　benignity。
May　no　storm　ever　come；　which　will　put　the　firmness　of　their
attachment　to　the　proof；　and　which；　in　the　midst　of　confusions　and
terrors；　and　sufferings；　may　demonstrate　the　eternal　difference
between　a　true　and　severe　friend　to　the　Monarchy；　and　a　slippery
sycophant　of　the　Court；　Quantum　infido　scurrae　distabit　amicus！


So　far　I　have　considered　the　effect　of　the　Court　system；　chiefly　as
it　operates　upon　the　executive　Government；　on　the　temper　of　the
people　and　on　the　happiness　of　the　Sovereign。　　It　remains　that　we
should　consider；　with　a　little　attention；　its　operation　upon
Parliament。

Parliament　was　indeed　the　great　object　of　all　these　politics；　the
end　at　which　they　aimed；　as　well　as　the　instrument　by　which　they
were　to　operate。　　But；　before　Parliament　could　be　made　subservient
to　a　system；　by　which　it　was　to　be　degraded　from　the　dignity　of　a
national　council；　into　a　mere　member　of　the　Court；　it　must　be
greatly　changed　from　its　original　character。

In　speaking　of　this　body；　I　have　my　eye　chiefly　on　the　House　of
Commons。　　I　hope　I　shall　be　indulged　in　a　few　observations　on　the
nature　and　character　of　that　assembly；　not　with　regard　to　its　LEGAL
FORM　AND　POWER；　but　to　its　SPIRIT；　and　to　the　purposes　it　is　meant
to　answer　in　the　constitution。

The　House　of　Commons　was　supposed　originally　to　be　NO　PART　OF　THE
STANDING　GOVERNMENT　OF　THIS　COUNTRY。　　It　was　considered　as　a
control；　issuing　immediately　from　the　people；　and　speedily　to　be
resolved　into　the　mass　from　whence　it　arose。　　In　this　respect　it　was
in　the　higher　part　of　Government　what　juries　are　in　the　lower。　　The
capacity　of　a　magistrate　being　transitory；　and　that　of　a　citizen
permanent；　the　latter　capacity　it　was　hoped　would　of　course
preponderate　in　all　discussions；　not　only　between　the　people　and　the
standing　authority　of　the　Crown；　but　between　the　people　and　the
fleeting　authority　of　the　House　of　Commons　itself。　　It　was　hoped
that；　being　of　a　middle　nature　between　subject　and　Government；　they
would　feel　with　a　more　tender　and　a　nearer　interest　everything　that
concerned　the　people；　than　the　other　remoter　and　more　permanent
parts　of　Legislature。

Whatever　alterations　time　and　the　necessary　accommodation　of
business　may　have　introduced；　this　character　can　never　be　sustained；
unless　the　House　of　Commons　shall　be　made　to　bear　some　stamp　of　the
actual　disposition　of　the　people　at　large。　　It　would　（among　public
misfortunes）　be　an　evil　more　natural　and　tolerable；　that　the　House
of　Commons　should　be　infected　with　every　epidemical　frenzy　of　the
people；　as　this　would　indicate　some　consanguinity；　some　sympathy　of
nature　with　their　constituents；　than　that　they　should　in　all　cases
be　wholly　untouched　by　the　opinions　and　feelings　of　the　people　out
of　doors。　　By　this　want　of　sympathy　they　would　cease　to　be　a　House
of　Commons。　　For　it　is　not　the　derivation　of　the　power　of　that　House
from　the　people；　which　makes　it　in　a　distinct　sense　their
representative。　　The　King　is　the　representative　of　the　people；　so
are　the　Lords；　so　are　the　Judges。　　They　all　are　trustees　for　the
people；　as　well　as　the　Commons；　because　no　power　is　given　for　the
sole　sake　of　the　holder；　and　although　Government　certainly　is　an
institution　of　Divine　authority；　yet　its　forms；　and　the　persons　who
administer　it；　all　originate　from　the　people。

A　popular　origin　cannot　therefore　be　the　characteristical
distinction　of　a　popular　representative。　　This　belongs　equally　to
all　parts　of　Government；　and　in　all　forms。　　The　virtue；　spirit；　and
essence　of　a　House　of　Commons　consists　in　its　being　the　express
image　of　the　feelings　of　the　nation。　　It　was　not　instituted　to　be　a
control　upon　the　people；　as　of　late　it　has　been　taught；　by　a
doctrine　of　the　most　pernicious　tendency。　　It　was　designed　as　a
control　FOR　the　people。　　Other　institutions　have　been　formed　for　the
purpose　of　checking　popular　excesses；　and　they　are；　I　apprehend；
fully　adequate　to　their　object。　　If　not；　they　ought　to　be　made　so。
The　House　of　Commons；　as　it　was　never　intended　for　the　support　of
peace　and　subordination；　is　miserably　appointed　for　that　service；
having　no　stronger　weapon　than　its　Mace；　and　no　better　officer　than
its　Serjeant…at…Arms；　which　it　can　command　of　its　own　proper
authority。　　A　vigilant　and　jealous　eye　over　executory　and　judicial
magistracy；　an　anxious　care　of　public　money；　an　openness；
approaching　towards　facility；　to　public　complaint；　these　seem　to　be
the　true　characteristics　of　a　House　of　Commons。　　But　an　addressing
House　of　Commons；　and　a　petitioning　nation；　a　House　of　Commons　full
of　confidence；　when　the　nation　is　plunged　in　despair；　in　the　utmost
harmony　with　Ministers；　whom　the　people　regard　with　the　utmost
abhorrence；　who　vote　thanks；　when　the　public　opinion　calls　upon　them
for　impeachments；　who　are　eager　to　grant；　when　the　general　voice
demands　account；　who；　in　all　disputes　between　the　people　and
Administration；　presume　against　the　people；　who　punish　their
disorder；　but　refuse　even　to　inquire　into　the　provocations　to　them；
this　is　an　unnatural；　a　monstrous　state　of　things　in　this
constitution。　　Such　an　Assembly　may　be　a　great；　wise；　awful　senate；
but　it　is　not；　to　any　popular　purpose；　a　House　of　Commons。　　This
change　from　an　immediate　state　of　procuration　and　delegation　to　a
course　of　acting　as　from　original　power；　is　the　way　in　which　all　the
popular　magistracies　in　the　world　have　been　perverted　from　their
purposes。　　It　is　indeed　their　greatest　and　sometimes　their　incurable
corruption。　　For　there　is　a　material　distinction　between　that
corruption　by　which　particular　points　are　carried　against　reason
（this　is　a　thing　which　cannot　be　prevented　by　human　wisdom；　and　is
of　less　consequence）；　and　the　corruption　of　the　principle　itself。
For　then　the　evil　is　not　accidental；　but　settled。　　The　distemper
becomes　the　natural　habit。

For　my　part；　I　shall　be　compelled　to　conclude　the　principle　of
Parliament　to　be　totally　corrupted；　and　therefore　its　ends　entirely
defeated；　when　I　see　two　symptoms：　　first；　a　rule　of　indiscriminate
support　to　all　Ministers；　because　this　destroys　the　very　end　of
Parliament　as　a　control；　and　is　a　general　previous　sanction　to
misgovernment；　and　secondly；　the　setting　up　any　claims　adverse　to
the　right　of　free　election；　for　this　tends　to　subvert　the　legal
authority　by　which　the　House　of　Commons　sits。

I　know　that；　since　the　Revolution；　along　with　many　dangerous；　many
useful　powers　of　Government　have　been　weakened。　　It　is　absolutely
necessary　to　have　frequent　recourse　to　the　Legislature。　　Parliaments
must　therefore　sit　every　year；　and　for　great　part　of　the　year。　　The
dreadful　disorders　of　frequent　elections　have　also　necessitated　a
septennial　instead　of　a　triennial　duration。　　These　circumstances；　I
mean　the　constant　habit　of　authority；　and　the　infrequency　of
elections；　have　tended　very　much　to　draw　the　House　of　Commons
towards　the　character　of　a　standing　Senate。　　It　is　a　disorder　which
has　arisen　from　the　cure　of　greater　disorders；　it　has　arisen　from
the　extreme　difficulty　of　reconciling　liberty　under　a　monarchical
Government；　with　external　strength　and　with　internal　tranquillity。

It　is　very　clear　that　we　cannot　free　ourselves　entirely　from　this
great　inconvenience；　but　I　would　not　increase　an　evil；　because　I　was
not　able　to　remove　it；　and　because　it　was　not　in　my　power　to　keep
the　House　of　Commons　religiously　true　to　its　first　principles；　I
would　not　argue　for　carrying　it　to　a　total　oblivion　of　them。　　This
has　been　the　great　scheme　of　power　in　our　time。　　They　who　will　not
conform　their　conduct　to　the　public　good；　and　cannot　support　it　by
the　prerogative　of　the　Crown；　have　adopted　a　new　plan。　　They　have
totally　abandoned　the　shattered　and　old…fashioned　fortress　of
prerogative；　and　made　a　lodgment　in　the　stronghold　of　Parliament
itself。　　If　they　have　any　evil　design　to　which　there　is　no　ordinary
legal　power　commensurate；　they　bring　it　into　Parliament。　　In
Parliament　the　whole　is　executed　from　the　beginning　to　the　end。　　In
Parliament　the　power　of　obtaining　their　object　is　absolute；　and　the
safety　in　the　proceeding　perfect：　　no　rules　to　confine；　no　after
reckonings　to　terrify。　　Parliament　cannot　with　any　great　propriety
punish　others　for　things　in　which　they　themselves　have　been
accomplices。　　Thus　the　control　of　Parliament　upon　the　executory
power　is　lost；　because　Parliament　is　made　to　partake　in　every
considerable　act　of　Government。　　IMPEACHMENT；　THAT　GREAT　GUARDIAN　OF
THE　PURITY　OF　THE　CONSTITUTION；　IS　IN　DANGER　OF　BEING　LOST；　EVEN　TO
THE　IDEA　OF　IT。

By　this　plan　several　important　ends　are　answered　to　the　Cabal。　　If
the　authority　of　Parliament　supports　itself；　the　credit　of　every　act
of　Government；　which　they　contrive；　is　saved；　but　if　the　act　be　so
very　odious　that　the　whole　strength　of　Parliament　is　insufficient　to
recommend　it；　then　Parliament　is　itself　discredited；　and　this
discredit　increases　more　and　more　that　indifference　to　the
constitution；　which　it　is　the　constant　aim　of　its　enemies；　by　their
abuse　of　Parliamentary　powers；　to　render　general　among　the　people。
Whenever　Parliament　is　persuaded　to　assume　the　offices　of　executive
Government；　it　will　lose　all　the　confidence；　love；　and　veneration
which　it　has　ever　enjoyed；　whilst　it　was　supposed　the　CORRECTIVE　and
CONTROL　of　the　acting　powers　of　the　State。　　This　would　be　the　event；
though　its　conduct　in　such　a　perversion　of　its　functions　should　be
tolerably　just　and　moderate；　but　if　it　should　be　in