thoughts on the present discontents-第13部分

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to　cover　and　to　sanctify　everything。　　He　that　will　have　a　sure　and
honourable　seat；　in　the　House　of　Commons；　must　take　care　how　he
adventures　to　cultivate　popular　qualities；　otherwise　he　may；
remember　the　old　maxim；　Breves　et　infaustos　populi　Romani　amores。
If；　therefore；　a　pursuit　of　popularity　expose　a　man　to　greater
dangers　than　a　disposition　to　servility；　the　principle　which　is　the
life　and　soul　of　popular　elections　will　perish　out　of　the
Constitution。

It　behoves　the　people　of　England　to　consider　how　the　House　of
Commons　under　the　operation　of　these　examples　must　of　necessity　be
constituted。　　On　the　side　of　the　Court　will　be；　all　honours；
offices；　emoluments；　every　sort　of　personal　gratification　to　avarice
or　vanity；　and；　what　is　of　more　moment　to　most　gentlemen；　the　means
of　growing；　by　innumerable　petty　services　to　individuals；　into　a
spreading　interest　in　their　country。　　On　the　other　hand；　let　us
suppose　a　person　unconnected　with　the　Court；　and　in　opposition　to
its　system。　　For　his　own　person；　no　office；　or　emolument；　or　title；
no　promotion　ecclesiastical；　or　civil；　or　military；　or　naval；　for
children；　or　brothers；　or　kindred。　　In　vain　an　expiring　interest　in
a　borough　calls　for　offices；　or　small　livings；　for　the　children　of
mayors；　and　aldermen；　and　capital　burgesses。　　His　court　rival　has
them　all。　　He　can　do　an　infinite　number　of　acts　of　generosity　and
kindness；　and　even　of　public　spirit。　　He　can　procure　indemnity　from
quarters。　　He　can　procure　advantages　in　trade。　　He　can　get　pardons
for　offences。　　He　can　obtain　a　thousand　favours；　and　avert　a
thousand　evils。　　He　may；　while　he　betrays　every　valuable　interest　of
the　kingdom；　be　a　benefactor；　a　patron；　a　father；　a　guardian　angel；
to　his　borough。　　The　unfortunate　independent　member　has　nothing　to
offer；　but　harsh　refusal；　or　pitiful　excuse；　or　despondent
representation　of　a　hopeless　interest。　　Except　from　his　private
fortune；　in　which　he　may　be　equalled；　perhaps　exceeded；　by　his　Court
competitor；　he　has　no　way　of　showing　any　one　good　quality；　or　of
making　a　single　friend。　　In　the　House；　he　votes　for　ever　in　a
dispirited　minority。　　If　he　speaks；　the　doors　are　locked。　　A　body　of
loquacious　placemen　go　out　to　tell　the　world；　that　all　he　aims　at；
is　to　get　into　office。　　If　he　has　not　the　talent　of　elocution；　which
is　the　case　of　many　as　wise　and　knowing　men　as　any　in　the　House；　he
is　liable　to　all　these　inconveniences；　without　the　eclat　which
attends　upon　any　tolerably　successful　exertion　of　eloquence。　　Can　we
conceive　a　more　discouraging　post　of　duty　than　this？　　Strip　it　of
the　poor　reward　of　popularity；　suffer　even　the　excesses　committed　in
defence　of　the　popular　interest　to　become　a　ground　for　the　majority
of　that　House　to　form　a　disqualification　out　of　the　line　of　the　law；
and　at　their　pleasure；　attended　not　only　with　the　loss　of　the
franchise；　but　with　every　kind　of　personal　disgrace；　if　this　shall
happen；　the　people　of　this　kingdom　may　be　assured　that　they　cannot
be　firmly　or　faithfully　served　by　any　man。　　It　is　out　of　the　nature
of　men　and　things　that　they　should；　and　their　presumption　will　be
equal　to　their　folly；　if　they　expect　it。　　The　power　of　the　people；
within　the　laws；　must　show　itself　sufficient　to　protect　every
representative　in　the　animated　performance　of　his　duty；　or　that　duty
cannot　be　performed。　　The　House　of　Commons　can　never　be　a　control　on
other　parts　of　Government；　unless　they　are　controlled　themselves　by
their　constituents；　and　unless　these　constituents　possess　some　right
in　the　choice　of　that　House；　which　it　is　not　in　the　power　of　that
House　to　take　away。　　If　they　suffer　this　power　of　arbitrary
incapacitation　to　stand；　they　have　utterly　perverted　every　other
power　of　the　House　of　Commons。　　The　late　proceeding；　I　will　not　say；
IS　contrary　to　law；　it　MUST　be　so；　for　the　power　which　is　claimed
cannot；　by　any　possibility；　be　a　legal　power　in　any　limited　member
of　Government。

The　power　which　they　claim；　of　declaring　incapacities；　would　not　be
above　the　just　claims　of　a　final　judicature；　if　they　had　not　laid　it
down　as　a　leading　principle；　that　they　had　no　rule　in　the　exercise
of　this　claim　but　their　own　DISCRETION。　　Not　one　of　their　abettors
has　ever　undertaken　to　assign　the　principle　of　unfitness；　the
species　or　degree　of　delinquency；　on　which　the　House　of　Commons　will
expel；　nor　the　mode　of　proceeding　upon　it；　nor　the　evidence　upon
which　it　is　established。　　The　direct　consequence　of　which　is；　that
the　first　franchise　of　an　Englishman；　and　that　on　which　all　the　rest
vitally　depend；　is　to　be　forfeited　for　some　offence　which　no　man
knows；　and　which　is　to　be　proved　by　no　known　rule　whatsoever　of
legal　evidence。　　This　is　so　anomalous　to　our　whole　constitution；
that　I　will　venture　to　say；　the　most　trivial　right；　which　the
subject　claims；　never　was；　nor　can　be；　forfeited　in　such　a　manner。

The　whole　of　their　usurpation　is　established　upon　this　method　of
arguing。　　We　do　not　make　laws。　　No；　we　do　not　contend　for　this
power。　　We　only　declare　law；　and；　as　we　are　a　tribunal　both
competent　and　supreme；　what　we　declare　to　be　law　becomes　law；
although　it　should　not　have　been　so　before。　　Thus　the　circumstance
of　having　no　appeal　from　their　jurisdiction　is　made　to　imply　that
they　have　no　rule　in　the　exercise　of　it：　　the　judgment　does　not
derive　its　validity　from　its　conformity　to　the　law；　but
preposterously　the　law　is　made　to　attend　on　the　judgment；　and　the
rule　of　the　judgment　is　no　other　than　the　OCCASIONAL　WILL　OF　THE
HOUSE。　　An　arbitrary　discretion　leads；　legality　follows；　which　is
just　the　very　nature　and　description　of　a　legislative　act。

This　claim　in　their　hands　was　no　barren　theory。　　It　was　pursued　into
its　utmost　consequences；　and　a　dangerous　principle　has　begot　a
correspondent　practice。　　A　systematic　spirit　has　been　shown　upon
both　sides。　　The　electors　of　Middlesex　chose　a　person　whom　the　House
of　Commons　had　voted　incapable；　and　the　House　of　Commons　has　taken
in　a　member　whom　the　electors　of　Middlesex　had　not　chosen。　　By　a
construction　on　that　legislative　power　which　had　been　assumed；　they
declared　that　the　true　legal　sense　of　the　country　was　contained　in
the　minority；　on　that　occasion；　and　might；　on　a　resistance　to　a　vote
of　incapacity；　be　contained　in　any　minority。

When　any　construction　of　law　goes　against　the　spirit　of　the
privilege　it　was　meant　to　support；　it　is　a　vicious　construction。　　It
is　material　to　us　to　be　represented　really　and　bona　fide；　and　not　in
forms；　in　types；　and　shadows；　and　fictions　of　law。　　The　right　of
election　was　not　established　merely　as　a　MATTER　OF　FORM；　to　satisfy
some　method　and　rule　of　technical　reasoning；　it　was　not　a　principle
which　might　substitute　a　Titius　or　a　Maevius；　a　John　Doe　or　Richard
Roe；　in　the　place　of　a　man　specially　chosen；　not　a　principle　which
was　just　as　well　satisfied　with　one　man　as　with　another。　　It　is　a
right；　the　effect　of　which　is　to　give　to　the　people　that　man；　and
that　man　only；　whom　by　their　voices；　actually；　not　constructively
given；　they　declare　that　they　know；　esteem；　love；　and　trust。　　This
right　is　a　matter　within　their　own　power　of　judging　and　feeling；　not
an　ens　rationis　and　creature　of　law：　　nor　can　those　devices；　by
which　anything　else　is　substituted　in　the　place　of　such　an　actual
choice；　answer　in　the　least　degree　the　end　of　representation。

I　know　that　the　courts　of　law　have　made　as　strained　constructions　in
other　cases。　　Such　is　the　construction　in　common　recoveries。　　The
method　of　construction　which　in　that　case　gives　to　the　persons　in
remainder；　for　their　security　and　representative；　the　door…keeper；
crier；　or　sweeper　of　the　Court；　or　some　other　shadowy　being　without
substance　or　effect；　is　a　fiction　of　a　very　coarse　texture。　　This
was　however　suffered；　by　the　acquiescence　of　the　whole　kingdom；　for
ages；　because　the　evasion　of　the　old　Statute　of　Westminster；　which
authorised　perpetuities；　had　more　sense　and　utility　than　the　law
which　was　evaded。　　But　an　attempt　to　turn　the　right　of　election　into
such　a　farce　and　mockery　as　a　fictitious　fine　and　recovery；　will；　I
hope；　have　another　fate；　because　the　laws　which　give　it　are
infinitely　dear　to　us；　and　the　evasion　is　infinitely　contemptible。

The　people　indeed　have　been　told；　that　this　power　of　discretionary
disqualification　is　vested　in　hands　that　they　may　trust；　and　who
will　be　sure　not　to　abuse　it　to　their　prejudice。　　Until　I　find
something　in　this　argument　differing　from　that　on　which　every　mode
of　despotism　has　been　defended；　I　shall　not　be　inclined　to　pay　it
any　great　compliment。　　The　people　are　satisfied　to　trust　themselves
with　the　exercise　of　their　own　privileges；　and　do　not　desire　this
kind　intervention　of　the　House　of　Commons　to　free　them　from　the
burthen。　　They　are　certainly　in　the　right。　　They　ought　not　to　trust
the　House　of　Commons　with　a　power　over　their　franchises；　because　the
constitution；　which　placed　two　other　co…ordinate　powers　to　control
it；　reposed　no　such　confidence　in　that　body。　　It　were　a　folly　well
deserving　servitude　for　its　punishment；　to　be　full　of　confidence
where　the　laws　are　full　of　distrust；　and　to　give　to　an　House　of
Commons；　arrogating　to　its　sole　resolution　the　most　harsh　and　odious
part　of　legislative　authority；　that　degree　of　submission　which　is
due　only　to　the　Legislature　itself。

When　the　House　of　Commons；　in　an　endeavour　to　obtain　new　advantages
at　the　expense　of　the　other　orders　of　the　State；　for　the　benefits　of
the　COMMONS　AT　LARGE；　have　pursued　strong　measures；　if　it　were　not
just；　it　was　at　least　natural；　that　the　constituents　should　connive
at　all　their　proceedings；　because　we　were　ourselves　ultimately　to
profit。　　But　when　this　submission　is　urged　to　us；　in　a　contest
between　the　representatives　and　ourselves；　and　where　nothing　can　be
put　into　their　scale　which　is　not　taken　from　ours；　they　fancy　us　to
be　children　when　they　tell　us　they　are　our　representatives；　our　own
flesh　and　blood；　and　that　all　the　stripes　they　give　us　are　for　our
good。　　The　very　desire　of　that　body　to　have　such　a　trust　contrary　to
law　reposed　in　them；　shows　that　they　are　not　worthy　of　it。　　They
certainly　will　abuse　it；　because　all　men　possessed　of　an
uncontrolled　discretionary　p