thoughts on the present discontents-第14部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


certainly　will　abuse　it；　because　all　men　possessed　of　an
uncontrolled　discretionary　power　leading　to　the　aggrandisement　and
profit　of　their　own　body　have　always　abused　it：　　and　I　see　no
particular　sanctity　in　our　times；　that　is　at　all　likely；　by　a
miraculous　operation；　to　overrule　the　course　of　nature。

But　we　must　purposely　shut　our　eyes；　if　we　consider　this　matter
merely　as　a　contest　between　the　House　of　Commons　and　the　Electors。
The　true　contest　is　between　the　Electors　of　the　Kingdom　and　the
Crown；　the　Crown　acting　by　an　instrumental　House　of　Commons。　　It　is
precisely　the　same；　whether　the　Ministers　of　the　Crown　can
disqualify　by　a　dependent　House　of　Commons；　or　by　a　dependent　court
of　STAR　CHAMBER；　or　by　a　dependent　court　of　King's　Bench。　　If　once
Members　of　Parliament　can　be　practically　convinced　that　they　do　not
depend　on　the　affection　or　opinion　of　the　people　for　their　political
being；　they　will　give　themselves　over；　without　even　an　appearance　of
reserve；　to　the　influence　of　the　Court。

Indeed；　a　Parliament　unconnected　with　the　people；　is　essential　to　a
Ministry　unconnected　with　the　people；　and　therefore　those　who　saw
through　what　mighty　difficulties　the　interior　Ministry　waded；　and
the　exterior　were　dragged；　in　this　business；　will　conceive　of　what
prodigious　importance；　the　new　corps　of　KING'S　MEN　held　this
principle　of　occasional　and　personal　incapacitation；　to　the　whole
body　of　their　design。

When　the　House　of　Commons　was　thus　made　to　consider　itself　as　the
master　of　its　constituents；　there　wanted　but　one　thing　to　secure
that　House　against　all　possible　future　deviation　towards　popularity；
an　unlimited　fund　of　money　to　be　laid　out　according　to　the　pleasure
of　the　Court。


To　complete　the　scheme　of　bringing　our　Court　to　a　resemblance　to　the
neighbouring　Monarchies；　it　was　necessary；　in　effect；　to　destroy
those　appropriations　of　revenue；　which　seem　to　limit　the　property；
as　the　other　laws　had　done　the　powers；　of　the　Crown。　　An　opportunity
for　this　purpose　was　taken；　upon　an　application　to　Parliament　for
payment　of　the　debts　of　the　Civil　List；　which　in　1769　had　amounted
to　513；000　pounds。　　Such　application　had　been　made　upon　former
occasions；　but　to　do　it　in　the　former　manner　would　by　no　means
answer　the　present　purpose。

Whenever　the　Crown　had　come　to　the　Commons　to　desire　a　supply　for
the　discharging　of　debts　due　on　the　Civil　List；　it　was　always　asked
and　granted　with　one　of　the　three　following　qualifications；
sometimes　with　all　of　them。　　Either　it　was　stated　that　the　revenue
had　been　diverted　from　its　purposes　by　Parliament；　or　that　those
duties　had　fallen　short　of　the　sum　for　which　they　were　given　by
Parliament；　and　that　the　intention　of　the　Legislature　had　not　been
fulfilled；　or　that　the　money　required　to　discharge　the　Civil　List
debt　was　to　be　raised　chargeable　on　the　Civil　List　duties。　　In　the
reign　of　Queen　Anne；　the　Crown　was　found　in　debt。　　The　lessening　and
granting　away　some　part　of　her　revenue　by　Parliament　was　alleged　as
the　cause　of　that　debt；　and　pleaded　as　an　equitable　ground　（such　it
certainly　was）；　for　discharging　it。　　It　does　not　appear　that　the
duties　which　wore　then　applied　to　the　ordinary　Government　produced
clear　above　580；000　pounds　a　year；　because；　when　they　were
afterwards　granted　to　George　the　First；　120；000　pounds　was　added；　to
complete　the　whole　to　700；000　pounds　a　year。　　Indeed　it　was　then
asserted；　and；　I　have　no　doubt；　truly；　that　for　many　years　the　nett
produce　did　not　amount　to　above　550；000　pounds。　　The　Queen's
extraordinary　charges　were　besides　very　considerable；　equal；　at
least；　to　any　we　have　known　in　our　time。　　The　application　to
Parliament　was　not　for　an　absolute　grant　of　money；　but　to　empower
the　Queen　to　raise　it　by　borrowing　upon　the　Civil　List　funds。

The　Civil　List　debt　was　twice　paid　in　the　reign　of　George　the　First。
The　money　was　granted　upon　the　same　plan　which　had　been　followed　in
the　reign　of　Queen　Anne。　　The　Civil　List　revenues　were　then
mortgaged　for　the　sum　to　be　raised；　and　stood　charged　with　the
ransom　of　their　own　deliverance。

George　the　Second　received　an　addition　to　his　Civil　List。　　Duties
were　granted　for　the　purpose　of　raising　800；000　pounds　a　year。　　It
was　not　until　he　had　reigned　nineteen　years；　and　after　the　last
rebellion；　that　he　called　upon　Parliament　for　a　discharge　of　the
Civil　List　debt。　　The　extraordinary　charges　brought　on　by　the
rebellion；　account　fully　for　the　necessities　of　the　Crown。　　However；
the　extraordinary　charges　of　Government　were　not　thought　a　ground
fit　to　be　relied　on。　　A　deficiency　of　the　Civil　List　duties　for
several　years　before　was　stated　as　the　principal；　if　not　the　sole；
ground　on　which　an　application　to　Parliament　could　be　justified。
About　this　time　the　produce　of　these　duties　had　fallen　pretty　low；
and　even　upon　an　average　of　the　whole　reign　they　never　produced
800；000　pounds　a　year　clear　to　the　Treasury。

That　Prince　reigned　fourteen　years　afterwards：　　not　only　no　new
demands　were　made；　but　with　so　much　good　order　were　his　revenues　and
expenses　regulated；　that；　although　many　parts　of　the　establishment
of　the　Court　were　upon　a　larger　and　more　liberal　scale　than　they
have　been　since；　there　was　a　considerable　sum　in　hand；　on　his
decease；　amounting　to　about　170；000　pounds；　applicable　to　the
service　of　the　Civil　List　of　his　present　Majesty。　　So　that；　if　this
reign　commenced　with　a　greater　charge　than　usual；　there　was　enough；
and　more　than　enough；　abundantly　to　supply　all　the　extraordinary
expense。　　That　the　Civil　List　should　have　been　exceeded　in　the　two
former　reigns；　especially　in　the　reign　of　George　the　First；　was　not
at　all　surprising。　　His　revenue　was　but　700；000　pounds　annually；　if
it　ever　produced　so　much　clear。　　The　prodigious　and　dangerous
disaffection　to　the　very　being　of　the　establishment；　and　the　cause
of　a　Pretender　then　powerfully　abetted　from　abroad；　produced　many
demands　of　an　extraordinary　nature　both　abroad　and　at　home。　　Much
management　and　great　expenses　were　necessary。　　But　the　throne　of　no
Prince　has　stood　upon　more　unshaken　foundations　than　that　of　his
present　Majesty。

To　have　exceeded　the　sum　given　for　the　Civil　List；　and　to　have
incurred　a　debt　without　special　authority　of　Parliament；　was；　prima
facie；　a　criminal　act：　　as　such　Ministers　ought　naturally　rather　to
have　withdrawn　it　from　the　inspection；　than　to　have　exposed　it　to
the　scrutiny；　of　Parliament。　　Certainly　they　ought；　of　themselves；
officially　to　have　come　armed　with　every　sort　of　argument；　which；　by
explaining；　could　excuse　a　matter　in　itself　of　presumptive　guilt。
But　the　terrors　of　the　House　of　Commons　are　no　longer　for　Ministers。

On　the　other　hand；　the　peculiar　character　of　the　House　of　Commons；
as　trustee　of　the　public　purse；　would　have　led　them　to　call　with　a
punctilious　solicitude　for　every　public　account；　and　to　have
examined　into　them　with　the　most　rigorous　accuracy。

The　capital　use　of　an　account　is；　that　the　reality　of　the　charge；
the　reason　of　incurring　it；　and　the　justice　and　necessity　of
discharging　it；　should　all　appear　antecedent　to　the　payment。　　No　man
ever　pays　first；　and　calls　for　his　account　afterwards；　because　he
would　thereby　let　out　of　his　hands　the　principal；　and　indeed　only
effectual；　means　of　compelling　a　full　and　fair　one。　　But；　in
national　business；　there　is　an　additional　reason　for　a　previous
production　of　every　account。　　It　is　a　cheek；　perhaps　the　only　one；
upon　a　corrupt　and　prodigal　use　of　public　money。　　An　account　after
payment　is　to　no　rational　purpose　an　account。　　However；　the　House　of
Commons　thought　all　these　to　be　antiquated　principles；　they　were　of
opinion　that　the　most　Parliamentary　way　of　proceeding　was；　to　pay
first　what　the　Court　thought　proper　to　demand；　and　to　take　its
chance　for　an　examination　into　accounts　at　some　time　of　greater
leisure。

The　nation　had　settled　800；000　pounds　a　year　on　the　Crown；　as
sufficient　for　the　purpose　of　its　dignity；　upon　the　estimate　of　its
own　Ministers。　　When　Ministers　came　to　Parliament；　and　said　that
this　allowance　had　not　been　sufficient　for　the　purpose；　and　that
they　had　incurred　a　debt　of　500；000　pounds；　would　it　not　have　been
natural　for　Parliament　first　to　have　asked；　how；　and　by　what　means；
their　appropriated　allowance　came　to　be　insufficient？　　Would　it　not
have　savoured　of　some　attention　to　justice；　to　have　seen　in　what
periods　of　Administration　this　debt　had　been　originally　incurred；
that　they　might　discover；　and　if　need　were；　animadvert　on　the
persons　who　were　found　the　most　culpable？　　To　put　their　hands　upon
such　articles　of　expenditure　as　they　thought　improper　or　excessive；
and　to　secure；　in　future；　against　such　misapplication　or　exceeding？
Accounts　for　any　other　purposes　are　but　a　matter　of　curiosity；　and
no　genuine　Parliamentary　object。　　All　the　accounts　which　could
answer　any　Parliamentary　end　were　refused；　or　postponed　by　previous
questions。　　Every　idea　of　prevention　was　rejected；　as　conveying　an
improper　suspicion　of　the　Ministers　of　the　Crown。

When　every　leading　account　had　been　refused；　many　others　were
granted　with　sufficient　facility。

But　with　great　candour　also；　the　House　was　informed；　that　hardly　any
of　them　could　be　ready　until　the　next　session；　some　of　them　perhaps
not　so　soon。　　But；　in　order　firmly　to　establish　the　precedent　of
PAYMENT　PREVIOUS　TO　ACCOUNT；　and　to　form　it　into　a　settled　rule　of
the　House；　the　god　in　the　machine　was　brought　down；　nothing　less
than　the　wonder…working　LAW　OF　PARLIAMENT。　　It　was　alleged；　that　it
is　the　law　of　Parliament；　when　any　demand　comes　from　the　Crown；　that
the　House　must　go　immediately　into　the　Committee　of　Supply；　in　which
Committee　it　was　allowed；　that　the　production　and　examination　of
accounts　would　be　quite　proper　and　regular。　　It　was　therefore
carried　that　they　should　go　into　the　Committee　without　delay；　and
without　accounts；　in　order　to　examine　with　great　order　and
regularity　things　that　could　not　possibly　come　before　them。　　After
this　stroke　of　orderly　and　Parliamentary　wit　and　humour；　they　went
into　the　Committee；　and　very　generously　voted　the　payment。

There　was　a　circumstance　in　that　debate　too　remarkable　to　be
overlooked。　　This　debt　of　the　C