thoughts on the present discontents-第15部分

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There　was　a　circumstance　in　that　debate　too　remarkable　to　be
overlooked。　　This　debt　of　the　Civil　List　was　all　along　argued　upon
the　same　footing　as　a　debt　of　the　State；　contracted　upon　national
authority。　　Its　payment　was　urged　as　equally　pressing　upon　the
public　faith　and　honour；　and　when　the　whole　year's　account　was
stated；　in　what　is　called　THE　BUDGET；　the　Ministry　valued　themselves
on　the　payment　of　so　much　public　debt；　just　as　if　they　had
discharged　500；000　pounds　of　navy　or　exchequer　bills。　　Though；　in
truth；　their　payment；　from　the　Sinking　Fund；　of　debt　which　was　never
contracted　by　Parliamentary　authority；　was；　to　all　intents　and
purposes；　so　much　debt　incurred。　　But　such　is　the　present　notion　of
public　credit　and　payment　of　debt。　　No　wonder　that　it　produces　such
effects。

Nor　was　the　House　at　all　more　attentive　to　a　provident　security
against　future；　than　it　had　been　to　a　vindictive　retrospect　to　past；
mismanagements。　　I　should　have　thought　indeed　that　a　Ministerial
promise；　during　their　own　continuance　in　office；　might　have　been
given；　though　this　would　have　been　but　a　poor　security　for　the
public。　　Mr。　Pelham　gave　such　an　assurance；　and　he　kept　his　word。
But　nothing　was　capable　of　extorting　from　our　Ministers　anything
which　had　the　least　resemblance　to　a　promise　of　confining　the
expenses　of　the　Civil　List　within　the　limits　which　had　been　settled
by　Parliament。　　This　reserve　of　theirs　I　look　upon　to　be　equivalent
to　the　clearest　declaration　that　they　were　resolved　upon　a　contrary
course。

However；　to　put　the　matter　beyond　all　doubt；　in　the　Speech　from　the
Throne；　after　thanking　Parliament　for　the　relief　so　liberally
granted；　the　Ministers　inform　the　two　Houses　that　they　will
ENDEAVOUR　to　confine　the　expenses　of　the　Civil　Governmentwithin
what　limits；　think　you？　those　which　the　law　had　prescribed？　　Not　in
the　least〃such　limits　as　the　HONOUR　OF　THE　CROWN　can　possibly
admit。〃

Thus　they　established　an　arbitrary　standard　for　that　dignity　which
Parliament　had　defined　and　limited　to　a　legal　standard。　　They　gave
themselves；　under　the　lax　and　indeterminate　idea　of　the　HONOUR　OF
THE　CROWN；　a　full　loose　for　all　manner　of　dissipation；　and　all
manner　of　corruption。　　This　arbitrary　standard　they　were　not　afraid
to　hold　out　to　both　Houses；　while　an　idle　and　inoperative　Act　of
Parliament；　estimating　the　dignity　of　the　Crown　at　800；000　pounds；
and　confining　it　to　that　sum；　adds　to　the　number　of　obsolete
statutes　which　load　the　shelves　of　libraries　without　any　sort　of
advantage　to　the　people。

After　this　proceeding；　I　suppose　that　no　man　can　be　so　weak　as　to
think　that　the　Crown　is　limited　to　any　settled　allowance　whatsoever。
For　if　the　Ministry　has　800；000　pounds　a　year　by　the　law　of　the
land；　and　if　by　the　law　of　Parliament　all　the　debts　which　exceed　it
are　to　be　paid　previous　to　the　production　of　any　account；　I　presume
that　this　is　equivalent　to　an　income　with　no　other　limits　than　the
abilities　of　the　subject　and　the　moderation　of　the　Courtthat　is　to
say；　it　is　such　in　income　as　is　possessed　by　every　absolute　Monarch
in　Europe。　　It　amounts；　as　a　person　of　great　ability　said　in　the
debate；　to　an　unlimited　power　of　drawing　upon　the　Sinking　Fund。　　Its
effect　on　the　public　credit　of　this　kingdom　must　be　obvious；　for　in
vain　is　the　Sinking　Fund　the　great　buttress　of　all　the　rest；　if　it
be　in　the　power　of　the　Ministry　to　resort　to　it　for　the　payment　of
any　debts　which　they　may　choose　to　incur；　under　the　name　of　the
Civil　List；　and　through　the　medium　of　a　committee；　which　thinks
itself　obliged　by　law　to　vote　supplies　without　any　other　account
than　that　of　the　more　existence　of　the　debt。

Five　hundred　thousand　pounds　is　a　serious　sum。　　But　it　is　nothing　to
the　prolific　principle　upon　which　the　sum　was　voteda　principle
that　may　be　well　called；　THE　FRUITFUL　MOTHER　OF　A　HUNDRED　MORE。
Neither　is　the　damage　to　public　credit　of　very　great　consequence
when　compared　with　that　which　results　to　public　morals　and　to　the
safety　of　the　Constitution；　from　the　exhaustless　mine　of　corruption
opened　by　the　precedent；　and　to　be　wrought　by　the　principle　of　the
late　payment　of　the　debts　of　the　Civil　List。　　The　power　of
discretionary　disqualification　by　one　law　of　Parliament；　and　the
necessity　of　paying　every　debt　of　the　Civil　List　by　another　law　of
Parliament；　if　suffered　to　pass　unnoticed；　must　establish　such　a
fund　of　rewards　and　terrors　as　will　make　Parliament　the　best
appendage　and　support　of　arbitrary　power　that　ever　was　invented　by
the　wit　of　man。　　This　is　felt。　　The　quarrel　is　begun　between　the
Representatives　and　the　People。　　The　Court　Faction　have　at　length
committed　them。

In　such　a　strait　the　wisest　may　well　be　perplexed；　and　the　boldest
staggered。　　The　circumstances　are　in　a　great　measure　new。　　We　have
hardly　any　landmarks　from　the　wisdom　of　our　ancestors　to　guide　us。
At　best　we　can　only　follow　the　spirit　of　their　proceeding　in　other
cases。　　I　know　the　diligence　with　which　my　observations　on　our
public　disorders　have　been　made。　　I　am　very　sure　of　the　integrity　of
the　motives　on　which　they　are　published：　　I　cannot　be　equally
confident　in　any　plan　for　the　absolute　cure　of　those　disorders；　or
for　their　certain　future　prevention。　　My　aim　is　to　bring　this　matter
into　more　public　discussion。　　Let　the　sagacity　of　others　work　upon
it。　　It　is　not　uncommon　for　medical　writers　to　describe　histories　of
diseases；　very　accurately；　on　whose　cure　they　can　say　but　very
little。

The　first　ideas　which　generally　suggest　themselves　for　the　cure　of
Parliamentary　disorders　are；　to　shorten　the　duration　of　Parliaments；
and　to　disqualify　all；　or　a　great　number　of　placemen；　from　a　seat　in
the　House　of　Commons。　　Whatever　efficacy　there　may　be　in　those
remedies；　I　am　sure　in　the　present　state　of　things　it　is　impossible
to　apply　them。　　A　restoration　of　the　right　of　free　election　is　a
preliminary　indispensable　to　every　other　reformation。　　What
alterations　ought　afterwards　to　be　made　in　the　constitution　is　a
matter　of　deep　and　difficult　research。

If　I　wrote　merely　to　please　the　popular　palate；　it　would　indeed　be
as　little　troublesome　to　me　as　to　another　to　extol　these　remedies；
so　famous　in　speculation；　but　to　which　their　greatest　admirers　have
never　attempted　seriously　to　resort　in　practice。　　I　confess　them；
that　I　have　no　sort　of　reliance　upon　either　a　Triennial　Parliament
or　a　Place…bill。　　With　regard　to　the　former；　perhaps；　it　might
rather　serve　to　counteract　than　to　promote　the　ends　that　are
proposed　by　it。　　To　say　nothing　of　the　horrible　disorders　among　the
people　attending　frequent　elections；　I　should　be　fearful　of
committing；　every　three　years；　the　independent　gentlemen　of　the
country　into　a　contest　with　the　Treasury。　　It　is　easy　to　see　which
of　the　contending　parties　would　be　ruined　first。　　Whoever　has　taken
a　careful　view　of　public　proceedings；　so　as　to　endeavour　to　ground
his　speculations　on　his　experience；　must　have　observed　how
prodigiously　greater　the　power　of　Ministry　is　in　the　first　and　last
session　of　a　Parliament；　than　it　is　in　the　intermediate　periods；
when　Members　sit　a　little　on　their　seats。　　The　persons　of　the
greatest　Parliamentary　experience；　with　whom　I　have　conversed；　did
constantly；　in　canvassing　the　fate　of　questions；　allow　something　to
the　Court　side；　upon　account　of　the　elections　depending　or　imminent。
The　evil　complained　of；　if　it　exists　in　the　present　state　of　things；
would　hardly　be　removed　by　a　triennial　Parliament：　　for；　unless　the
influence　of　Government　in　elections　can　be　entirely　taken　away；　the
more　frequently　they　return；　the　more　they　will　harass　private
independence；　the　more　generally　men　will　be　compelled　to　fly　to　the
settled　systematic　interest　of　Government；　and　to　the　resources　of　a
boundless　Civil　List。　　Certainly　something　may　be　done；　and　ought　to
be　done；　towards　lessening　that　influence　in　elections；　and　this
will　be　necessary　upon　a　plan　either　of　longer　or　shorter　duration
of　Parliament。　　But　nothing　can　so　perfectly　remove　the　evil；　as　not
to　render　such　contentions；　foot　frequently　repeated；　utterly
ruinous；　first　to　independence　of　fortune；　and　then　to　independence
of　spirit。　　As　I　am　only　giving　an　opinion　on　this　point；　and　not　at
all　debating　it　in　an　adverse　line；　I　hope　I　may　be　excused　in
another　observation。　　With　great　truth　I　may　aver　that　I　never
remember　to　have　talked　on　this　subject　with　any　man　much　conversant
with　public　business　who　considered　short　Parliaments　as　a　real
improvement　of　the　Constitution。　　Gentlemen；　warm　in　a　popular
cause；　are　ready　enough　to　attribute　all　the　declarations　of　such
persons　to　corrupt　motives。　　But　the　habit　of　affairs；　if；　on　one
hand；　it　tends　to　corrupt　the　mind；　furnishes　it；　on　the　other；　with
the；　means　of　better　information。　　The　authority　of　such　persons
will　always　have　some　weight。　　It　may　stand　upon　a　par　with　the
speculations　of　those　who　are　less　practised　in　business；　and　who；
with　perhaps　purer　intentions；　have　not　so　effectual　means　of
judging。　　It　is　besides　an　effect　of　vulgar　and　puerile　malignity　to
imagine　that　every　Statesman　is　of　course　corrupt：　　and　that　his
opinion；　upon　every　constitutional　point；　is　solely　formed　upon　some
sinister　interest。

The　next　favourite　remedy　is　a　Place…bill。　　The　same　principle
guides　in　both：　　I　mean　the　opinion　which　is　entertained　by　many　of
the　infallibility　of　laws　and　regulations；　in　the　cure　of　public
distempers。　　Without　being　as　unreasonably　doubtful　as　many　are
unwisely　confident；　I　will　only　say；　that　this　also　is　a　matter　very
well　worthy　of　serious　and　mature　reflection。　　It　is　not　easy　to
foresee　what　the　effect　would　be　of　disconnecting　with　Parliament；
the　greatest　part　of　those　who　hold　civil　employments；　and　of　such
mighty　and　important　bodies　as　the　military　and　naval
establishments。　　It　were　better；　perhaps；　that　they　should　have　a
corrupt　interest　in　the　forms　of　the　constitution；　than　they　should
have　none　at　all。　　This　is　a　question　altogether　different　from　the
disqualification　of　a　particular　description　of　Revenue　Officers
from　seats　in　Parliament；　or；　perhaps；　of　all　the　lower　sorts　of
them　from　votes　in　elections。　　In　the　former　case；　onl