thoughts on the present discontents-第16部分

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from　seats　in　Parliament；　or；　perhaps；　of　all　the　lower　sorts　of
them　from　votes　in　elections。　　In　the　former　case；　only　the　few　are
affected；　in　the　latter；　only　the　inconsiderable。　　But　a　great
official；　a　great　professional；　a　great　military　and　naval　interest；
all　necessarily　comprehending　many　people　of　the　first　weight；
ability；　wealth；　and　spirit；　has　been　gradually　formed　in　the
kingdom。　　These　new　interests　must　be　let　into　a　share　of
representation；　else　possibly　they　may　be　inclined　to　destroy　those
institutions　of　which　they　are　not　permitted　to　partake。　　This　is
not　a　thing　to　be　trifled　with：　　nor　is　it　every　well…meaning　man
that　is　fit　to　put　his　hands　to　it。　　Many　other　serious
considerations　occur。　　I　do　not　open　them　here；　because　they　are　not
directly　to　my　purpose；　proposing　only　to　give　the　reader　some　taste
of　the　difficulties　that　attend　all　capital　changes　in　the
Constitution；　just　to　hint　the　uncertainty；　to　say　no　worse；　of
being　able　to　prevent　the　Court；　as　long　as　it　has　the　means　of
influence　abundantly　in　its　power；　from　applying　that　influence　to
Parliament；　and　perhaps；　if　the　public　method　were　precluded；　of
doing　it　in　some　worse　and　more　dangerous　method。　　Underhand　and
oblique　ways　would　be　studied。　　The　science　of　evasion；　already
tolerably　understood；　would　then　be　brought　to　the　greatest
perfection。　　It　is　no　inconsiderable　part　of　wisdom；　to　know　how
much　of　an　evil　ought　to　be　tolerated；　lest；　by　attempting　a　degree
of　purity　impracticable　in　degenerate　times　and　manners；　instead　of
cutting　off　the　subsisting　ill　practices；　new　corruptions　might　be
produced　for　the　concealment　and　security　of　the　old。　　It　were
better；　undoubtedly；　that　no　influence　at　all　could　affect　the　mind
of　a　Member　of　Parliament。　　But　of　all　modes　of　influence；　in　my
opinion；　a　place　under　the　Government　is　the　least　disgraceful　to
the　man　who　holds　it；　and　by　far　the　most　safe　to　the　country。　　I
would　not　shut　out　that　sort　of　influence　which　is　open　and　visible；
which　is　connected　with　the　dignity　and　the　service　of　the　State；
when　it　is　not　in　my　power　to　prevent　the　influence　of　contracts；　of
subscriptions；　of　direct　bribery；　and　those　innumerable　methods　of
clandestine　corruption；　which　are　abundantly　in　the　hands　of　the
Court；　and　which　will　be　applied　as　long　as　these　means　of
corruption；　and　the　disposition　to　be　corrupted；　have　existence
amongst　us。　　Our　Constitution　stands　on　a　nice　equipoise；　with　steep
precipices　and　deep　waters　upon　all　sides　of　it。　　In　removing　it
from　a　dangerous　leaning　towards　one　side；　there　may　be　a　risk　of
oversetting　it　on　the　other。　　Every　project　of　a　material　change　in
a　Government　so　complicated　as　ours；　combined　at　the　same　time　with
external　circumstances　still　more　complicated；　is　a　matter　full　of
difficulties；　in　which　a　considerate　man　will　not　be　too　ready　to
decide；　a　prudent　man　too　ready　to　undertake；　or　an　honest　man　too
ready　to　promise。　　They　do　not　respect　the　public　nor　themselves；
who　engage　for　more　than　they　are　sure　that　they　ought　to　attempt；
or　that　they　are　able　to　perform。　　These　are　my　sentiments；　weak
perhaps；　but　honest　and　unbiassed；　and　submitted　entirely　to　the
opinion　of　grave　men；　well　affected　to　the　constitution　of　their
country；　and　of　experience　in　what　may　best　promote　or　hurt　it。

Indeed；　in　the　situation　in　which　we　stand；　with　an　immense　revenue；
an　enormous　debt；　mighty　establishments；　Government　itself　a　great
banker　and　a　great　merchant；　I　see　no　other　way　for　the　preservation
of　a　decent　attention　to　public　interest　in　the　Representatives；　but
THE　INTERPOSITION　OF　THE　BODY　OF　THE　PEOPLE　ITSELF；　whenever　it
shall　appear；　by　some　flagrant　and　notorious　act；　by　some　capital
innovation；　that　these　Representatives　are　going　to　over…leap　the
fences　of　the　law；　and　to　introduce　an　arbitrary　power。　　This
interposition　is　a　most　unpleasant　remedy。　　But；　if　it　be　a　legal
remedy；　it　is　intended　on　some　occasion　to　be　used；　to　be　used　then
only；　when　it　is　evident　that　nothing　else　can　hold　the　Constitution
to　its　true　principles。


The　distempers　of　Monarchy　were　the　great　subjects　of　apprehension
and　redress；　in　the　last　century；　in　this；　the　distempers　of
Parliament。　　It　is　not　in　Parliament　alone　that　the　remedy　for
Parliamentary　disorders　can　be　completed；　hardly；　indeed；　can　it
begin　there。　　Until　a　confidence　in　Government　is　re…established；
the　people　ought　to　be　excited　to　a　more　strict　and　detailed
attention　to　the　conduct　of　their　Representatives。　　Standards；　for
judging　more　systematically　upon　their　conduct；　ought　to　be　settled
in　the　meetings　of　counties　and　corporations。　　Frequent　and　correct
lists　of　the　voters　in　all　important　questions　ought　to　be　procured。

By　such　means　something　may　be　done。　　By　such　means　it　may　appear
who　those　are；　that；　by　an　indiscriminate　support　of　all
Administrations；　have　totally　banished　all　integrity　and　confidence
out　of　public　proceedings；　have　confounded　the　best　men　with　the
worst；　and　weakened　and　dissolved；　instead　of　strengthening　and
compacting；　the　general　frame　of　Government。　　If　any　person　is　more
concerned　for　government　and　order　than　for　the　liberties　of　his
country；　even　he　is　equally　concerned　to　put　an　end　to　this　course
of　indiscriminate　support。　　It　is　this　blind　and　undistinguishing
support　that　feeds　the　spring　of　those　very　disorders；　by　which　he
is　frighted　into　the　arms　of　the　faction　which　contains　in　itself
the　source　of　all　disorders；　by　enfeebling　all　the　visible　and
regular　authority　of　the　State。　　The　distemper　is　increased　by　his
injudicious　and　preposterous　endeavours；　or　pretences；　for　the　cure
of　it。

An　exterior　Administration；　chosen　for　its　impotency；　or　after　it　is
chosen　purposely　rendered　impotent；　in　order　to　be　rendered
subservient；　will　not　be　obeyed。　　The　laws　themselves　will　not　be
respected；　when　those　who　execute　them　are　despised：　　and　they　will
be　despised；　when　their　power　is　not　immediate　from　the　Crown；　or
natural　in　the　kingdom。　　Never　were　Ministers　better　supported　in
Parliament。　　Parliamentary　support　comes　and　goes　with　office；
totally　regardless　of　the　man；　or　the　merit。　　Is　Government
strengthened？　　It　grows　weaker　and　weaker。　　The　popular　torrent
gains　upon　it　every　hour。　　Let　us　learn　from　our　experience。　　It　is
not　support　that　is　wanting　to　Government；　but　reformation。　　When
Ministry　rests　upon　public　opinion；　it　is　not　indeed　built　upon　a
rock　of　adamant；　it　has；　however；　some　stability。　　But　when　it
stands　upon　private　humour；　its　structure　is　of　stubble；　and　its
foundation　is　on　quicksand。　　I　repeat　it　againHe　that　supports
every　Administration；　subverts　all　Government。　　The　reason　is　this。
The　whole　business　in　which　a　Court　usually　takes　an　interest　goes
on　at　present　equally　well；　in　whatever　hands；　whether　high　or　low；
wise　or　foolish；　scandalous　or　reputable；　there　is　nothing；
therefore；　to　hold　it　firm　to　any　one　body　of　men；　or　to　any　one
consistent　scheme　of　politics。　　Nothing　interposes　to　prevent　the
full　operation　of　all　the　caprices　and　all　the　passions　of　a　Court
upon　the　servants　of　the　public。　　The　system　of　Administration　is
open　to　continual　shocks　and　changes；　upon　the　principles　of　the
meanest　cabal；　and　the　most　contemptible　intrigue。　　Nothing　can　be
solid　and　permanent。　　All　good　men　at　length　fly　with　horror　from
such　a　service。　　Men　of　rank　and　ability；　with　the　spirit　which
ought　to　animate　such　men　in　a　free　state；　while　they　decline　the
jurisdiction　of　dark　cabal　on　their　actions　and　their　fortunes；
will；　for　both；　cheerfully　put　themselves　upon　their　country。　　They
will　trust　an　inquisitive　and　distinguishing　Parliament；　because　it
does　inquire；　and　does　distinguish。　　If　they　act　well；　they　know
that；　in　such　a　Parliament；　they　will　be　supported　against　any
intrigue；　if　they　act　ill；　they　know　that　no　intrigue　can　protect
them。　　This　situation；　however　awful；　is　honourable。　　But　in　one
hour；　and　in　the　self…same　Assembly；　without　any　assigned　or
assignable　cause；　to　be　precipitated　from　the　highest　authority　to
the　most　marked　neglect；　possibly　into　the　greatest　peril　of　life
and　reputation；　is　a　situation　full　of　danger；　and　destitute　of
honour。　　It　will　be　shunned　equally　by　every　man　of　prudence；　and
every　man　of　spirit。

Such　are　the　consequences　of　the　division　of　Court　from　the
Administration；　and　of　the　division　of　public　men　among　themselves。
By　the　former　of　these；　lawful　Government　is　undone；　by　the　latter；
all　opposition　to　lawless　power　is　rendered　impotent。　　Government
may　in　a　great　measure　be　restored；　if　any　considerable　bodies　of
men　have　honesty　and　resolution　enough　never　to　accept
Administration；　unless　this　garrison　of　KING'S　MEN；　which　is
stationed；　as　in　a　citadel；　to　control　and　enslave　it；　be　entirely
broken　and　disbanded；　and　every　work　they　have　thrown　up　be　levelled
with　the　ground。　　The　disposition　of　public　men　to　keep　this　corps
together；　and　to　act　under　it；　or　to　co…operate　with　it；　is　a
touchstone　by　which　every　Administration　ought　in　future　to　be
tried。　　There　has　not　been　one　which　has　not　sufficiently
experienced　the　utter　incompatibility　of　that　faction　with　the
public　peace；　and　with　all　the　ends　of　good　Government；　since；　if
they　opposed　it；　they　soon　lost　every　power　of　serving　the　Crown；　if
they　submitted　to　it　they　lost　all　the　esteem　of　their　country。
Until　Ministers　give　to　the　public　a　full　proof　of　their　entire
alienation　from　that　system；　however　plausible　their　pretences；　we
may　be　sure　they　are　more　intent　on　the　emoluments　than　the　duties
of　office。　　If　they　refuse　to　give　this　proof；　we　know　of　what　stuff
they　are　made。　　In　this　particular；　it　ought　to　be　the　electors'
business　to　look　to　their　Representatives。　　The　electors　ought　to
esteem　it　no　less　culpable　in　their　Member　to　give　a　single　vote　in
Parliament　to　such　an　Administration；　than　to　take　an　office　under
it；　to　endure　it；　than　to　act　in　it。　　The　notorious　infidelity　and
versatility　of　Members　of　Parliament；　in　their　opinions　of　men　and
things；　ought　in　a　particular　manner　to　be　considered　by　the
electors　in　the　inquiry　which　is　recommended　to