thoughts on the present discontents-第20部分

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between　civil　and　criminal　jurisdiction；　and　of　the　separate　maxims
that　govern　these　two　provinces　of　law；　that　are　eternally　separate。
Undoubtedly　the　courts　of　law；　where　a　new　case　comes　before　them；
as　they　do　every　hour；　then；　that　there　may　be　no　defect　in　justice；
call　in　similar　principles；　and　the　example　of　the　nearest
determination；　and　do　everything　to　draw　the　law　to　as　near　a
conformity　to　general　equity　and　right　reason　as　they　can　bring　it
with　its　being　a　fixed　principle。　　Boni　judicis　est　ampliare
justitiamthat　is；　to　make　open　and　liberal　justice。　　But　in
criminal　matters　this　parity　of　reason；　and　these　analogies；　ever
have　been；　and　ever　ought　to　be；　shunned。

Whatever　is　incident　to　a　court　of　judicature；　is　necessary　to　the
House　of　Commons；　as　judging　in　elections。　　But　a　power　of　making
incapacities　is　not　necessary　to　a　court　of　judicature；　therefore　a
power　of　making　incapacities　is　not　necessary　to　the　House　of
Commons。

Incapacity；　declared　by　whatever　authority；　stands　upon　two
principles：　　first；　an　incapacity　arising　from　the　supposed
incongruity　of　two　duties　in　the　commonwealth；　secondly；　an
incapacity　arising　from　unfitness　by　infirmity　of　nature；　or　the
criminality　of　conduct。　　As　to　the　first　class　of　incapacities；　they
have　no　hardship　annexed　to　them。　　The　persons　so　incapacitated　are
paid　by　one　dignity　for　what　they　abandon　in　another；　and；　for　the
most　part；　the　situation　arises　from　their　own　choice。　　But　as　to
the　second；　arising　from　an　unfitness　not　fixed　by　nature；　but
superinduced　by　some　positive　acts；　or　arising　from　honourable
motives；　such　as　an　occasional　personal　disability；　of　all　things　it
ought　to　be　defined　by　the　fixed　rule　of　lawwhat　Lord　Coke　calls
the　Golden　Metwand　of　the　Law；　and　not　by　the　crooked　cord　of
discretion。　　Whatever　is　general　is　better　born。　　We　take　our　common
lot　with　men　of　the　same　description。　　But　to　be　selected　and　marked
out　by　a　particular　brand　of　unworthiness　among　our　fellow…citizens；
is　a　lot　of　all　others　the　hardest　to　be　borne：　　and　consequently　is
of　all　others　that　act　which　ought　only　to　be　trusted　to　the
legislature；　as　not　only　legislative　in　its　nature；　but　of　all　parts
of　legislature　the　most　odious。　　The　question　is　over；　if　this　is
shown　not　to　be　a　legislative　act。　　But　what　is　very　usual　and
natural；　is　to　corrupt　judicature　into　legislature。　　On　this　point
it　is　proper　to　inquire　whether　a　court　of　judicature；　which　decides
without　appeal；　has　it　as　a　necessary　incident　of　such　judicature；
that　whatever　it　decides　de　jure　is　law。　　Nobody　will；　I　hope；
assert　this；　because　the　direct　consequence　would　be　the　entire
extinction　of　the　difference　between　true　and　false　judgments。　　For；
if　the　judgment　makes　the　law；　and　not　the　law　directs　the　judgment；
it　is　impossible　there　could　be　such　a　thing　as　an　illegal　judgment
given。

But；　instead　of　standing　upon　this　ground；　they　introduce　another
question；　wholly　foreign　to　it；　whether　it　ought　not　to　be　submitted
to　as　if　it　were　law。　　And　then　the　question　is；　By　the　Constitution
of　this　country；　what　degree　of　submission　is　due　to　the
authoritative　acts　of　a　limited　power？　　This　question　of　submission；
determine　it　how　you　please；　has　nothing　to　do　in　this　discussion
and　in　this　House。　　Here　it　is　not　how　long　the　people　are　bound　to
tolerate　the　illegality　of　our　judgments；　but　whether　we　have　a
right　to　substitute　our　occasional　opinion　in　the　place　of　law；　so
as　to　deprive　the　citizen　of　his　franchise。



SPEECH　ON　THE　POWERS　OF　JURIES　IN　PROSECUTIONS　FOR　LIBELS
MARCH；　1771



I　have　always　understood　that　a　superintendence　over　the　doctrines；
as　well　as　the　proceedings；　of　the　courts　of　justice；　was　a
principal　object　of　the　constitution　of　this　House；　that　you　were　to
watch　at　once　over　the　lawyer　and　the　law；　that　there　should　he　an
orthodox　faith　as　well　as　proper　works：　　and　I　have　always　looked
with　a　degree　of　reverence　and　admiration　on　this　mode　of
superintendence。　　For　being　totally　disengaged　from　the　detail　of
juridical　practice；　we　come　to　something；　perhaps；　the　better
qualified；　and　certainly　much　the　better　disposed　to　assert　the
genuine　principle　of　the　laws；　in　which　we　can；　as　a　body；　have　no
other　than　an　enlarged　and　a　public　interest。　　We　have　no　common
cause　of　a　professional　attachment；　or　professional　emulations；　to
bias　our　minds；　we　have　no　foregone　opinions；　which；　from　obstinacy
and　false　point　of　honour；　we　think　ourselves　at　all　events　obliged
to　support。　　So　that　with　our　own　minds　perfectly　disengaged　from
the　exercise；　we　may　superintend　the　execution　of　the　national
justice；　which　from　this　circumstance　is　better　secured　to　the
people　than　in　any　other　country　under　heaven　it　can　be。　　As　our
situation　puts　us　in　a　proper　condition；　our　power　enables　us　to
execute　this　trust。　　We　may；　when　we　see　cause　of　complaint；
administer　a　remedy；　it　is　in　our　choice　by　an　address　to　remove　an
improper　judge；　by　impeachment　before　the　peers　to　pursue　to
destruction　a　corrupt　judge；　or　by　bill　to　assert；　to　explain；　to
enforce；　or　to　reform　the　law；　just　as　the　occasion　and　necessity　of
the　case　shall　guide　us。　　We　stand　in　a　situation　very　honourable　to
ourselves；　and　very　useful　to　our　country；　if　we　do　not　abuse　or
abandon　the　trust　that　is　placed　in　us。

The　question　now　before　you　is　upon　the　power　of　juries　in
prosecuting　for　libels。　　There　are　four　opinions。　　1。　That　the
doctrine　as　held　by　the　courts　is　proper　and　constitutional；　and
therefore　should　not　be　altered。　　2。　That　it　is　neither　proper　nor
constitutional；　but　that　it　will　be　rendered　worse　by　your
interference。　　3。　That　it　is　wrong；　but　that　the　only　remedy　is　a
bill　of　retrospect。　　4。　The　opinion　of　those　who　bring　in　the　bill；
that　the　thing　is　wrong；　but　that　it　is　enough　to　direct　the
judgment　of　the　court　in　future。

The　bill　brought　in　is　for　the　purpose　of　asserting　and　securing　a
great　object　in　the　juridical　constitution　of　this　kingdom；　which；
from　a　long　series　of　practices　and　opinions　in　our　judges；　has；　in
one　point；　and　in　one　very　essential　point；　deviated　from　the　true
principle。

It　is　the　very　ancient　privilege　of　the　people　of　England　that　they
shall　be　tried；　except　in　the　known　exceptions；　not　by　judges
appointed　by　the　Crown；　but　by　their　own　fellow…subjects；　the　peers
of　that　county　court　at　which　they　owe　their　suit　and　service；　out
of　this　principle　trial　by　juries　has　grown。　　This　principle　has
not；　that　I　can　find；　been　contested　in　any　case；　by　any　authority
whatsoever；　but　there　is　one　case；　in　which；　without　directly
contesting　the　principle；　the　whole　substance；　energy；　acid　virtue
of　the　privilege；　is　taken　out　of　it；　that　is；　in　the　case　of　a
trial　by　indictment　or　information　for　libel。　　The　doctrine　in　that
case　laid　down　by　several　judges　amounts　to　this；　that　the　jury　have
no　competence　where　a　libel　is　alleged；　except　to　find　the　gross
corporeal　facts　of　the　writing　and　the　publication；　together　with
the　identity　of　the　things　and　persons　to　which　it　refers；　but　that
the　intent　and　the　tendency　of　the　work；　in　which　intent　and
tendency　the　whole　criminality　consists；　is　the　sole　and　exclusive
province　of　the　judge。　　Thus　having　reduced　the　jury　to　the
cognisance　of　facts；　not　in　themselves　presumptively　criminal；　but
actions　neutral　and　indifferent　the　whole　matter；　in　which　the
subject　has　any　concern　or　interest；　is　taken　out　of　the　hands　of
the　jury：　　and　if　the　jury　take　more　upon　themselves；　what　they　so
take　is　contrary　to　their　duty；　it　is　no　moral；　but　a　merely　natural
power；　the　same；　by　which　they　may　do　any　other　improper　act；　the
same；　by　which　they　may　even　prejudice　themselves　with　regard　to　any
other　part　of　the　issue　before　them。　　Such　is　the　matter　as　it　now
stands；　in　possession　of　your　highest　criminal　courts；　handed　down
to　them　from　very　respectable　legal　ancestors。　　If　this　can　once　be
established　in　this　case；　the　application　in　principle　to　other
cases　will　be　easy；　and　the　practice　will　run　upon　a　descent；　until
the　progress　of　an　encroaching　jurisdiction　（for　it　is　in　its　nature
to　encroach；　when　once　it　has　passed　its　limits）　coming　to　confine
the　juries；　case　after　case；　to　the　corporeal　fact；　and　to　that
alone；　and　excluding　the　intention　of　mind；　the　only　source　of　merit
and　demerit；　of　reward　or　punishment；　juries　become　a　dead　letter　in
the　constitution。

For　which　reason　it　is　high　time　to　take　this　matter　into　the
consideration　of　Parliament；　and　for　that　purpose　it　will　be
necessary　to　examine；　first；　whether　there　is　anything　in　the
peculiar　nature　of　this　crime　that　makes　it　necessary　to　exclude　the
jury　from　considering　the　intention　in　it；　more　than　in　others。　　So
far　from　it；　that　I　take　it　to　be　much　less　so　from　the　analogy　of
other　criminal　cases；　where　no　such　restraint　is　ordinarily　put　upon
them。　　The　act　of　homicide　is　prima　facie　criminal。　　The　intention
is　afterwards　to　appear；　for　the　jury　to　acquit　or　condemn。　　In
burglary　do　they　insist　that　the　jury　have　nothing　to　do　but　to　find
the　taking　of　goods；　and　that；　if　they　do；　they　must　necessarily
find　the　party　guilty；　and　leave　the　rest　to　the　judge；　and　that
they　have　nothing　to　do　with　the　word　felonice　in　the　indictment？

The　next　point　is　to　consider　it　as　a　question　of　constitutional
policy；　that　is；　whether　the　decision　of　the　question　of　libel　ought
to　be　left　to　the　judges　as　a　presumption　of　law；　rather　than　to　the
jury　as　matter　of　popular　judgment；　as　the　malice　in　the　case　of
murder；　the　felony　in　the　case　of　stealing。　　If　the　intent　and
tendency　are　not　matters　within　the　province　of　popular　judgment；
but　legal　and　technical　conclusions；　formed　upon　general　principles
of　law；　let　us　see　what　they　are。　　Certainly　they　are　most
unfavourable；　indeed；　totally　adverse；　to　the　Constitution　of　this
country。

Here　we　must　have　recourse　to　analogies；　for　we　cannot　argue　on
ruled　cases　one　way　or　the　other。　　See　the　history。　　The　old　books；
deficient　in　general　in　Crown　cases　furnish　us　with　little　on　this
head。　　As　to　the　crime；　in　the　very　early　Saxon　Law；　I　see　an
offence　of　this　spec