thoughts on the present discontents-第23部分

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It　is　always　to　be　lamented　when　men　are　driven　to　search　into　the
foundations　of　the　commonwealth。　　It　is　certainly　necessary　to
resort　to　the　theory　of　your　government　whenever　you　propose　any
alteration　in　the　frame　of　it；　whether　that　alteration　means　the
revival　of　some　former　antiquated　and　forsaken　constitution　of
state；　or　the　introduction　of　some　new　improvement　in　the
commonwealth。　　The　object　of　our　deliberation　is；　to　promote　the
good　purposes　for　which　elections　have　been　instituted；　and　to
prevent　their　inconveniences。　　If　we　thought　frequent　elections
attended　with　no　inconvenience；　or　with　but　a　trifling
inconvenience；　the　strong　overruling　principle　of　the　Constitution
would　sweep　us　like　a　torrent　towards　them。　　But　your　remedy　is　to
be　suited　to　your　diseaseyour　present　disease；　and　to　your　whole
disease。　　That　man　thinks　much　too　highly；　and　therefore　he　thinks
weakly　and　delusively；　of　any　contrivance　of　human　wisdom；　who
believes　that　it　can　make　any　sort　of　approach　to　perfection。　　There
is　not；　there　never　was；　a　principle　of　government　under　heaven；
that　does　not；　in　the　very　pursuit　of　the　good　it　proposes；
naturally　and　inevitably　lead　into　some　inconvenience；　which　makes
it　absolutely　necessary　to　counterwork　and　weaken　the　application　of
that　first　principle　itself；　and　to　abandon　something　of　the　extent
of　the　advantage　you　proposed　by　it；　in　order　to　prevent　also　the
inconveniences　which　have　arisen　from　the　instrument　of　all　the　good
you　had　in　view。

To　govern　according　to　the　sense　and　agreeably　to　the　interests　of
the　people　is　a　great　and　glorious　object　of　government。　　This
object　cannot　be　obtained　but　through　the　medium　of　popular
election；　and　popular　election　is　a　mighty　evil。　　It　is　such；　and　so
great　an　evil；　that　though　there　are　few　nations　whose　monarchs　were
not　originally　elective；　very　few　are　now　elected。　　They　are　the
distempers　of　elections；　that　have　destroyed　all　free　states。　　To
cure　these　distempers　is　difficult；　if　not　impossible；　the　only
thing　therefore　left　to　save　the　commonwealth　is　to　prevent　their
return　too　frequently。　　The　objects　in　view　are；　to　have　parliaments
as　frequent　as　they　can　be　without　distracting　them　in　the
prosecution　of　public　business；　on　one　hand；　to　secure　their
dependence　upon　the　people；　on　the　other　to　give　them　that　quiet　in
their　minds；　and　that　ease　in　their　fortunes；　as　to　enable　them　to
perform　the　most　arduous　and　most　painful　duty　in　the　world　with
spirit；　with　efficiency；　with　independency；　and　with　experience；　as
real　public　counsellors；　not　as　the　canvassers　at　a　perpetual
election。　　It　is　wise　to　compass　as　many　good　ends　as　possibly　you
can；　and　seeing　there　are　inconveniences　on　both　sides；　with
benefits　on　both；　to　give　up　a　part　of　the　benefit　to　soften　the
inconvenience。　　The　perfect　cure　is　impracticable；　because　the
disorder　is　dear　to　those　from　whom　alone　the　cure　can　possibly　be
derived。　　The　utmost　to　be　done　is　to　palliate；　to　mitigate；　to
respite；　to　put　off　the　evil　day　of　the　Constitution　to　its　latest
possible　hour；　and　may　it　be　a　very　late　one！

This　bill；　I　fear；　would　precipitate　one　of　two　consequences；　I　know
not　which　most　likely；　or　which　most　dangerous：　　either　that　the
Crown　by　its　constant　stated　power；　influence；　and　revenue；　would
wear　out　all　opposition　in　elections；　or　that　a　violent　and　furious
popular　spirit　would　arise。　　I　must　see；　to　satisfy　me；　the
remedies；　I　must　see；　from　their　operation　in　the　cure　of　the　old
evil；　and　in　the　cure　of　those　new　evils；　which　are　inseparable　from
all　remedies；　how　they　balance　each　other；　and　what　is　the　total
result。　　The　excellence　of　mathematics　and　metaphysics　is　to　have
but　one　thing　before　you；　but　he　forms　the　best　judgment　in　all
moral　disquisitions；　who　has　the　greatest　number　and　variety　of
considerations；　in　one　view　before　him；　and　can　take　them　in　with
the　best　possible　consideration　of　the　middle　results　of　all。

We　of　the　opposition；　who　are　not　friends　to　the　bill；　give　this
pledge　at　least　of　our　integrity　and　sincerity　to　the　people；　that
in　our　situation　of　systematic　opposition　to　the　present　ministers；
in　which　all　our　hope　of　rendering　it　effectual　depends　upon　popular
interest　and　favour；　we　will　not　flatter　them　by　a　surrender　of　our
uninfluenced　judgment　and　opinion；　we　give　a　security；　that　if　ever
we　should　be　in　another　situation；　no　flattery　to　any　other　sort　of
power　and　influence　would　induce　us　to　act　against　the　true
interests　of　the　people。

All　are　agreed　that　parliaments　should　not　be　perpetual；　the　only
question　is；　what　is　the　most　convenient　time　for　their　duration？
On　which　there　are　three　opinions。　　We　are　agreed；　too；　that　the
term　ought　not　to　be　chosen　most　likely　in　its　operation　to　spread
corruption；　and　to　augment　the　already　overgrown　influence　of　the
crown。　　On　these　principles　I　mean　to　debate　the　question。　　It　is
easy　to　pretend　a　zeal　for　liberty。　　Those　who　think　themselves　not
likely　to　be　encumbered　with　the　performance　of　their　promises；
either　from　their　known　inability；　or　total　indifference　about　the
performance；　never　fail　to　entertain　the　most　lofty　ideas。　　They　are
certainly　the　most　specious；　and　they　cost　them　neither　reflection
to　frame；　nor　pains　to　modify；　nor　management　to　support。　　The　task
is　of　another　nature　to　those　who　mean　to　promise　nothing　that　it　is
not　in　their　intentions；　or　may　possibly　be　in　their　power　to
perform；　to　those　who　are　bound　and　principled　no　more　to　delude　the
understandings　than　to　violate　the　liberty　of　their　fellow…subjects。
Faithful　watchmen　we　ought　to　be　over　the　rights　and　privileges　of
the　people。　　But　our　duty；　if　we　are　qualified　for　it　as　we　ought；
is　to　give　them　information；　and　not　to　receive　it　from　them；　we　are
not　to　go　to　school　to　them　to　learn　the　principles　of　law　and
government。　　In　doing　so　we　should　not　dutifully　serve；　but　we
should　basely　and　scandalously　betray；　the　people；　who　are　not
capable　of　this　service　by　nature；　nor　in　any　instance　called　to　it
by　the　Constitution。　　I　reverentially　look　up　to　the　opinion　of　the
people；　and　with　an　awe　that　is　almost　superstitious。　　I　should　be
ashamed　to　show　my　face　before　them；　if　I　changed　my　ground；　as　they
cried　up　or　cried　down　men；　or　things；　or　opinions；　if　I　wavered　and
shifted　about　with　every　change；　and　joined　in　it；　or　opposed；　as
best　answered　any　low　interest　or　passion；　if　I　held　them　up　hopes；
which　I　knew　I　never　intended；　or　promised　what　I　well　knew　I　could
not　perform。　　Of　all　these　things　they　are　perfect　sovereign　judges
without　appeal；　but　as　to　the　detail　of　particular　measures；　or　to
any　general　schemes　of　policy；　they　have　neither　enough　of
speculation　in　the　closet；　nor　of　experience　in　business；　to　decide
upon　it。　　They　can　well　see　whether　we　are　tools　of　a　court；　or
their　honest　servants。　　Of　that　they　can　well　judge；　and　I　wish　that
they　always　exercised　their　judgment；　but　of　the　particular　merits
of　a　measure　I　have　other　standards。　　That　the　frequency　of
elections　proposed　by　this　bill　has　a　tendency　to　increase　the　power
and　consideration　of　the　electors；　not　lessen　corruptibility；　I　do
most　readily　allow；　so　far　as　it　is　desirable；　this　is　what　it　has；
I　will　tell　you　now　what　it　has　not：　　1st。　　It　has　no　sort　of
tendency　to　increase　their　integrity　and　public　spirit；　unless　an
increase　of　power　has　an　operation　upon　voters　in　elections；　that　it
has　in　no　other　situation　in　the　world；　and　upon　no　other　part　of
mankind。　2nd。　　This　bill　has　no　tendency　to　limit　the　quantity　of
influence　in　the　Crown；　to　render　its　operation　more　difficult；　or
to　counteract　that　operation；　which　it　cannot　prevent；　in　any　way
whatsoever。　　It　has　its　full　weight；　its　full　range；　and　its
uncontrolled　operation　on　the　electors　exactly　as　it　had　before。
3rd。　　Nor；　thirdly；　does　it　abate　the　interest　or　inclination　of
Ministers　to　apply　that　influence　to　the　electors：　　on　the　contrary；
it　renders　it　much　more　necessary　to　them；　if　they　seek　to　have　a
majority　in　parliament；　to　increase　the　means　of　that　influence；　and
redouble　their　diligence；　and　to　sharpen　dexterity　in　the
application。　　The　whole　effect　of　the　bill　is　therefore　the　removing
the　application　of　some　part　of　the　influence　from　the　elected　to
the　electors；　and　further　to　strengthen　and　extend　a　court　interest
already　great　and　powerful　in　boroughs；　here　to　fix　their　magazines
and　places　of　arms；　and　thus　to　make　them　the　principal；　not　the
secondary；　theatre　of　their　manoeuvres　for　securing　a　determined
majority　in　parliament。

I　believe　nobody　will　deny　that　the　electors　are　corruptible。　　They
are　men；　it　is　saying　nothing　worse　of　them；　many　of　them　are　but
ill…informed　in　their　minds；　many　feeble　in　their　circumstances；
easily　over…reached；　easily　seduced。　　If　they　are　many；　the　wages　of
corruption　are　the　lower；　and　would　to　God　it　were　not　rather　a
contemptible　and　hypocritical　adulation　than　a　charitable　sentiment；
to　say　that　there　is　already　no　debauchery；　no　corruption；　no
bribery；　no　perjury；　no　blind　fury；　and　interested　faction　among　the
electors　in　many　parts　of　this　kingdom：　　nor　is　it　surprising；　or　at
all　blamable；　in　that　class　of　private　men；　when　they　see　their
neighbours　aggrandised；　and　themselves　poor　and　virtuous；　without
that　eclat　or　dignity　which　attends　men　in　higher　stations。

But　admit　it　were　true　that　the　great　mass　of　the　electors　were　too
vast　an　object　for　court　influence　to　grasp；　or　extend　to；　and　that
in　despair　they　must　abandon　it；　he　must　be　very　ignorant　of　the
state　of　every　popular　interest；　who　does　not　know　that　in　all　the
corporations；　all　the　open　boroughsindeed；　in　every　district　of
the　kingdomthere　is　some　leading　man；　some　agitator；　some　wealthy
merchant；　or　considerable　manufacturer；　some　active　attorney；　some
popular　preacher；　some　money…lender；　&c。；　&c。；　who　is　followed　by
the　whole　flock。　　This　is　the　style　of　all　free　countries。


…　Multum　in　Fabia　valet　hic；　valet　ille　Velina；
Cuilibet　hic　fasces　dabit　eripietque　curule。


These　spirits；　each　of　which　informs　and　governs　his　own　little　orb；
are　neither　so　many；　n