thoughts on the present discontents-第5部分

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These　were　some　of　the　many　artifices　used　to　reconcile　the　people
to　the　great　change　which　was　made　in　the　persons　who　composed　the
Ministry；　and　the　still　greater　which　was　made　and　avowed　in　its
constitution。　　As　to　individuals；　other　methods　were　employed　with
them；　in　order　so　thoroughly　to　disunite　every　party；　and　even　every
family；　that　NO　CONCERT；　ORDER；　OR　EFFECT；　MIGHT　APPEAR　IN　ANY
FUTURE　OPPOSITION。　　And　in　this　manner　an　Administration　without
connection　with　the　people；　or　with　one　another；　was　first　put　in
possession　of　Government。　　What　good　consequences　followed　from　it；
we　have　all　seen；　whether　with　regard　to　virtue；　public　or　private；
to　the　ease　and　happiness　of　the　Sovereign；　or　to　the　real　strength
of　Government。　　But　as　so　much　stress　was　then　laid　on　the　necessity
of　this　new　project；　it　will　not　be　amiss　to　take　a　view　of　the
effects　of　this　Royal　servitude　and　vile　durance；　which　was　so
deplored　in　the　reign　of　the　late　Monarch；　and　was　so　carefully　to
be　avoided　in　the　reign　of　his　successor。　　The　effects　were　these。

In　times　full　of　doubt　and　danger　to　his　person　and　family；　George
the　Second　maintained　the　dignity　of　his　Crown　connected　with　the
liberty　of　his　people；　not　only　unimpaired；　but　improved；　for　the
space　of　thirty…three　years。　　He　overcame　a　dangerous　rebellion；
abetted　by　foreign　force；　and　raging　in　the　heart　of　his　kingdoms；
and　thereby　destroyed　the　seeds　of　all　future　rebellion　that　could
arise　upon　the　same　principle。　　He　carried　the　glory；　the　power；　the
commerce　of　England；　to　a　height　unknown　even　to　this　renowned
nation　in　the　times　of　its　greatest　prosperity：　　and　he　left　his
succession　resting　on　the　true　and　only　true　foundation　of　all
national　and　all　regal　greatness；　affection　at　home；　reputation
abroad；　trust　in　allies；　terror　in　rival　nations。　　The　most　ardent
lover　of　his　country　cannot　wish　for　Great　Britain　a　happier　fate
than　to　continue　as　she　was　then　left。　　A　people　emulous　as　we　are
in　affection　to　our　present　Sovereign；　know　not　how　to　form　a　prayer
to　Heaven　for　a　greater　blessing　upon　his　virtues；　or　a　higher　state
of　felicity　and　glory；　than　that　he　should　live；　and　should　reign；
and；　when　Providence　ordains　it；　should　die；　exactly　like　his
illustrious　predecessor。

A　great　Prince　may　be　obliged　（though　such　a　thing　cannot　happen
very　often）　to　sacrifice　his　private　inclination　to　his　public
interest。　　A　wise　Prince　will　not　think　that　such　a　restraint
implies　a　condition　of　servility；　and　truly；　if　such　was　the
condition　of　the　last　reign；　and　the　effects　were　also　such　as　we
have　described；　we　ought；　no　less　for　the　sake　of　the　Sovereign　whom
we　love；　than　for　our　own；　to　hear　arguments　convincing　indeed；
before　we　depart　from　the　maxims　of　that　reign；　or　fly　in　the　face
of　this　great　body　of　strong　and　recent　experience。

One　of　the　principal　topics　which　was　then；　and　has　been　since；　much
employed　by　that　political　school；　is　an　effectual　terror　of　the
growth　of　an　aristocratic　power；　prejudicial　to　the　rights　of　the
Crown；　and　the　balance　of　the　constitution。　　Any　new　powers
exercised　in　the　House　of　Lords；　or　in　the　House　of　Commons；　or　by
the　Crown；　ought　certainly　to　excite　the　vigilant　and　anxious
jealousy　of　a　free　people。　　Even　a　new　and　unprecedented　course　of
action　in　the　whole　Legislature；　without　great　and　evident　reason；
may　be　a　subject　of　just　uneasiness。　　I　will　not　affirm；　that　there
may　not　have　lately　appeared　in　the　House　of　Lords　a　disposition　to
some　attempts　derogatory　to　the　legal　rights　of　the　subject。　　If　any
such　have　really　appeared；　they　have　arisen；　not　from　a　power
properly　aristocratic；　but　from　the　same　influence　which　is　charged
with　having　excited　attempts　of　a　similar　nature　in　the　House　of
Commons；　which　House；　if　it　should　have　been　betrayed　into　an
unfortunate　quarrel　with　its　constituents；　and　involved　in　a　charge
of　the　very　same　nature；　could　have　neither　power　nor　inclination　to
repel　such　attempts　in　others。　　Those　attempts　in　the　House　of　Lords
can　no　more　be　called　aristocratic　proceedings；　than　the　proceedings
with　regard　to　the　county　of　Middlesex　in　the　House　of　Commons　can
with　any　sense　be　called　democratical。

It　is　true；　that　the　Peers　have　a　great　influence　in　the　kingdom；
and　in　every　part　of　the　public　concerns。　　While　they　are　men　of
property；　it　is　impossible　to　prevent　it；　except　by　such　means　as
must　prevent　all　property　from　its　natural　operation：　　an　event　not
easily　to　be　compassed；　while　property　is　power；　nor　by　any　means　to
be　wished；　while　the　least　notion　exists　of　the　method　by　which　the
spirit　of　liberty　acts；　and　of　the　means　by　which　it　is　preserved。
If　any　particular　Peers；　by　their　uniform；　upright；　constitutional
conduct；　by　their　public　and　their　private　virtues；　have　acquired　an
influence　in　the　country；　the　people　on　whose　favour　that　influence
depends；　and　from　whom　it　arose；　will　never　be　duped　into　an
opinion；　that　such　greatness　in　a　Peer　is　the　despotism　of　an
aristocracy；　when　they　know　and　feel　it　to　be　the　effect　and　pledge
of　their　own　importance。

I　am　no　friend　to　aristocracy；　in　the　sense　at　least　in　which　that
word　is　usually　understood。　　If　it　were　not　a　bad　habit　to　moot
cases　on　the　supposed　ruin　of　the　constitution；　I　should　be　free　to
declare；　that　if　it　must　perish；　I　would　rather　by　far　see　it
resolved　into　any　other　form；　than　lost　in　that　austere　and　insolent
domination。　　But；　whatever　my　dislikes　may　be；　my　fears　are　not　upon
that　quarter。　　The　question；　on　the　influence　of　a　Court；　and　of　a
Peerage；　is　not；　which　of　the　two　dangers　is　the　most　eligible；　but
which　is　the　most　imminent。　　He　is　but　a　poor　observer；　who　has　not
seen；　that　the　generality　of　Peers；　far　from　supporting　themselves
in　a　state　of　independent　greatness；　are　but　too　apt　to　fall　into　an
oblivion　of　their　proper　dignity；　and　to　run　headlong　into　an　abject
servitude。　　Would　to　God　it　were　true；　that　the　fault　of　our　Peers
were　too　much　spirit！　　It　is　worthy　of　some　observation；　that　these
gentlemen；　so　jealous　of　aristocracy；　make　no　complaints　of　the
power　of　those　peers　（neither　few　nor　inconsiderable）　who　are　always
in　the　train　of　a　Court；　and　whose　whole　weight　must　be　considered
as　a　portion　of　the　settled　influence　of　the　Crown。　　This　is　all
safe　and　right；　but　if　some　Peers　（I　am　very　sorry　they　are　not　as
many　as　they　ought　to　be）　set　themselves；　in　the　great　concern　of
Peers　and　Commons；　against　a　back…stairs　influence　and　clandestine
government；　then　the　alarm　begins；　then　the　constitution　is　in
danger　of　being　forced　into　an　aristocracy。

I　rest　a　little　the　longer　on　this　Court　topic；　because　it　was　much
insisted　upon　at　the　time　of　the　great　change；　and　has　been　since
frequently　revived　by　many　of　the　agents　of　that　party：　　for；　whilst
they　are　terrifying　the　great　and　opulent　with　the　horrors　of　mob…
government；　they　are　by　other　managers　attempting　（though　hitherto
with　little　success）　to　alarm　the　people　with　a　phantom　of　tyranny
in　the　Nobles。　　All　this　is　done　upon　their　favourite　principle　of
disunion；　of　sowing　jealousies　amongst　the　different　orders　of　the
State；　and　of　disjointing　the　natural　strength　of　the　kingdom；　that
it　may　be　rendered　incapable　of　resisting　the　sinister　designs　of
wicked　men；　who　have　engrossed　the　Royal　power。


Thus　much　of　the　topics　chosen　by　the　courtiers　to　recommend　their
system；　it　will　be　necessary　to　open　a　little　more　at　large　the
nature　of　that　party　which　was　formed　for　its　support。　　Without
this；　the　whole　would　have　been　no　better　than　a　visionary
amusement；　like　the　scheme　of　Harrington's　political　club；　and　not　a
business　in　which　the　nation　had　a　real　concern。　　As　a　powerful
party；　and　a　party　constructed　on　a　new　principle；　it　is　a　very
inviting　object　of　curiosity。

It　must　be　remembered；　that　since　the　Revolution；　until　the　period
we　are　speaking　of；　the　influence　of　the　Crown　had　been　always
employed　in　supporting　the　Ministers　of　State；　and　in　carrying　on
the　public　business　according　to　their　opinions。　　But　the　party　now
in　question　is　formed　upon　a　very　different　idea。　　It　is　to
intercept　the　favour；　protection；　and　confidence　of　the　Crown　in　the
passage　to　its　Ministers；　it　is　to　come　between　them　and　their
importance　in　Parliament；　it　is　to　separate　them　from　all　their
natural　and　acquired　dependencies；　it　is　intended　as　the　control；
not　the　support；　of　Administration。　　The　machinery　of　this　system　is
perplexed　in　its　movements；　and　false　in　its　principle。　　It　is
formed　on　a　supposition　that　the　King　is　something　external　to　his
government；　and　that　he　may　be　honoured　and　aggrandised；　even　by　its
debility　and　disgrace。　　The　plan　proceeds　expressly　on　the　idea　of
enfeebling　the　regular　executory　power。　　It　proceeds　on　the　idea　of
weakening　the　State　in　order　to　strengthen　the　Court。　　The　scheme
depending　entirely　on　distrust；　on　disconnection；　on　mutability　by
principle；　on　systematic　weakness　in　every　particular　member；　it　is
impossible　that　the　total　result　should　be　substantial　strength　of
any　kind。

As　a　foundation　of　their　scheme；　the　Cabal　have　established　a　sort
of　Rota　in　the　Court。　　All　sorts　of　parties；　by　this　means；　have
been　brought　into　Administration；　from　whence　few　have　had　the　good
fortune　to　escape　without　disgrace；　none　at　all　without　considerable
losses。　　In　the　beginning　of　each　arrangement　no　professions　of
confidence　and　support　are　wanting；　to　induce　the　leading　men　to
engage。　　But　while　the　Ministers　of　the　day　appear　in　all　the　pomp
and　pride　of　power；　while　they　have　all　their　canvas　spread　out　to
the　wind；　and　every　sail　filled　with　the　fair　and　prosperous　gale　of
Royal　favour；　in　a　short　time　they　find；　they　know　not　how；　a
current；　which　sets　directly　against　them；　which　prevents　all
progress；　and　even　drives　them　backwards。　　They　grow　ashamed　and
mortified　in　a　situation；　which；　by　its　vicinity　to　power；　only
serves　to　remind　them　the　more　strongly　of　their　insignificance。
They　are　obliged　either　to　execute　the　orders　of　their　inferiors；　or
to　see　themselves　opposed　by　the　natural　instruments　of　their
office。　　With　the　loss　of　th