the advancement of learning-第29部分

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uman　actions　and　arts；　together　with　the　making　of　man　COMMUNIS　MENSURA；　have　brought　into　natural　philosophy；　not　much　better　than　the　heresy　of　the　Anthropomorphites；　bred　in　the　cells　of　gross　and　solitary　monks；　and　the　opinion　of　Epicurus；　answerable　to　the　same　in　heathenism；　who　supposed　the　Gods　to　be　of　human　shape。　And　therefore　Velleius　the　Epicurean　needed　not　to　have　asked　why　God　should　have　adorned　the　heavens　with　stars；　as　if　he　had　been　an　AEDILIS；　one　that　should　have　set　forth　some　magnificent　shows　or　plays。　For　if　that　great　Workmaster　had　been　of　a　human　disposition；　he　would　have　cast　the　stars　into　some　pleasant　and　beautiful　works　and　orders；　like　the　frets　in　the　roofs　of　houses；　whereas　one　can　scarce　find　a　posture　in　square；　or　triangle；　or　straight　line；　amongst　such　an　infinite　number；　so　differing　a　harmony　there　is　between　the　spirit　of　man　and　the　spirit　of　nature。

10。　Let　us　consider　again　the　false　appearances　imposed　upon　us　by　every　man's　own　individual　nature　and　custom；　in　that　feigned　supposition　that　Plato　　maketh　of　the　cave：　for　certainly　if　a　child　were　continued　in　a　grot　or　cave　under　the　earth　until　maturity　of　age；　and　came　suddenly　abroad；　he　would　have　strange　and　absurd　imaginations。　So　in　like　manner；　although　our　persons　live　in　the　view　of　heaven；　yet　our　spirits　are　included　in　the　caves　of　our　own　complexions　and　customs；　which　minister　unto　us　infinite　errors　and　vain　opinions；　if　they　be　not　recalled　to　examination。　But　hereof　we　have　given　many　examples　in　one　of　the　errors；　or　peccant　humours；　which　we　ran　briefly　over　in　our　first　book。

11。　And　lastly；　let　us　consider　the　false　appearances　that　are　imposed　upon　us　by　words；　which　are　framed　and　applied　according　to　the　conceit　and　capacities　of　the　vulgar　sort：　and　although　we　think　we　govern　our　words；　and　prescribe　it　well；　LOQUENDUM　UT　VULGUS；　SENTIENDUM　UT　SAPIENTES；　yet　certain　it　is　that　words；　as　a　Tartar's　bow；　do　shoot　back　upon　the　understanding　of　the　wisest；　and　mightily　entangle　and　pervert　the　judgment。　So　as　it　is　almost　necessary　in　all　controversies　and　disputations　to　imitate　the　wisdom　of　the　mathematicians；　in　setting　down　in　the　very　beginning　the　definitions　of　our　words　and　terms　that　others　may　know　how　we　accept　and　understand　them；　and　whether　they　concur　with　us　or　no。　For　it　cometh　to　pass　for　want　of　this　that　we　are　sure　to　end　there　where　we　ought　to　have　begun；　which　is；　in　questions　and　differences　about　words。　To　conclude　therefore；　it　must　be　confessed　that　it　is　not　possible　to　divorce　ourselves　from　these　fallacies　and　false　appearances；　because　they　are　inseparable　from　our　nature　and　condition　of　life；　so　yet　nevertheless　the　caution　of　them；　（for　all　elenches；　as　was　said；　are　but　cautions；）　doth　extremely　import　the　true　conduct　of　human　judgment。　The　particular　elenches　or　cautions　against　these　three　false　appearances；　I　find　altogether　deficient。

12。　There　remaineth　one　part　of　judgment　of　great　excellency；　which　to　mine　understanding　is　so　slightly　touched；　as　I　may　report　that　also　deficient；　which　is　the　application　of　the　differing　kinds　of　proofs　to　the　differing　kinds　of　subjects；　for　there　being　but　four　kinds　of　demonstrations；　that　is；　by　the　immediate　consent　of　the　mind　or　sense；　by　induction；　by　syllogism；　and　by　congruity　（which　is　that　which　Aristotle　calleth　DEMONSTRATION　IN　ORB　OR　CIRCLE；　and　not　A　NOTIORIBUS；）　every　of　these　hath　certain　subjects　in　the　matter　of　sciences；　in　which　respectively　they　have　chiefest　use；　and　certain　others；　from　which　respectively　they　ought　to　be　excluded；　and　the　rigour　and　curiosity　in　requiring　the　more　severe　proofs　in　some　things；　and　chiefly　the　facility　in　contenting　ourselves　with　the　more　remiss　proofs　in　others；　hath　been　amongst　the　greatest　causes　of　detriment　and　hinderance　to　knowledge。　The　distributions　and　assignations　of　demonstrations；　according　to　the　analogy　of　sciences；　I　note　as　deficient。

XV。　1。　The　custody　or　retaining　of　knowledge　is　either　in　writing　or　memoir；　whereof　writing　hath　two　parts；　the　nature　of　the　character；　and　the　order　of　the　entry；　for　the　art　of　characters；　or　other　visible　notes　of　words　or　things；　it　hath　nearest　conjugation　with　grammar；　and　therefore　I　refer　it　to　the　due　place：　for　the　disposition　and　collocation　of　that　knowledge　which　we　preserve　in　writing；　it　consisteth　in　a　good　digest　of　common…places；　wherein　I　am　not　ignorant　of　the　prejudice　imputed　to　the　use　of　commonplace　books；　as　causing　a　retardation　of　reading；　and　some　sloth　or　relaxation　of　memory。　But　because　it　is　but　a　counterfeit　thing　in　knowledges　to　be　forward　and　pregnant；　except　a　man　be　deep　and　full；　I　hold　the　entry　of　commonplaces　to　be　a　matter　of　great　use　and　essence　in　studying；　as　that　which　assureth　copie　of　invention；　and　contracteth　judgment　to　a　strength。　But　this　is　true；　that　of　the　methods　of　common…places　that　I　have　seen；　there　is　none　of　any　sufficient　worth；　all　of　them　carrying　merely　the　face　of　a　school；　and　not　of　a　world；　and　referring　to　vulgar　matters　and　pedantical　divisions；　without　all　life　or　respect　to　action。

2。　For　the　other　principal　part　of　the　custody　of　knowledge；　which　is　Memory；　I　find　that　faculty　in　my　judgment　weakly　inquired　of。　An　art　　there　is　extant　of　it；　but　it　seemeth　to　me　that　there　are　better　precepts　than　that　art；　and　better　practices　of　that　art　than　those　received。　It　is　certain　the　art；　as　it　is；　may　be　raised　to　points　of　ostentation　prodigious：　but　in　use；　as　it　is　now　managed；　it　is　barren；　（not　burdensome；　nor　dangerous　to　natural　memory；　as　is　imagined；　but　barren；）　that　is；　not　dexterous　to　be　applied　to　the　serious　use　of　business　and　occasions。　And　therefore　I　make　no　more　estimation　of　repeating　a　great　number　of　names　or　words　upon　once　hearing；　or　the　pouring　forth　＇51＇　of　a　number　of　verses　or　rhymes；　EX　TEMPORE；　or　the　making　of　a　satirical　simile　of　everything；　or　the　turning　of　everything　to　a　jest；　or　the　falsifying　or　contradicting　of　everything　by　cavil；　or　the　like；　（whereof　in　the　faculties　of　the　mind　there　is　great　copie；　and　such　as　by　device　and　practice　may　be　exalted　to　an　extreme　degree　of　wonder；）　than　I　do　of　the　tricks　of　tumblers；　FUNAMBULOES；　BALADINES：　　the　one　being　the　same　in　the　mind　that　the　other　is　in　the　body；　matters　of　strangeness　without　worthiness。

3。　This　art　of　memory　is　but　built　upon　two　intentions；　the　one　prenotion；　the　other　emblem。　Prenotion　dischargeth　the　indefinite　seeking　of　that　we　would　remember；　and　directeth　us　to　seek　in　a　narrow　compass；　that　is；　somewhat　that　hath　congruity　with　our　place　of　memory。　Emblem　reduceth　conceits　intellectual　to　images　sensible；　which　strike　the　memory　more；　out　of　which　axioms　may　be　drawn　much　better　practice　than　that　in　use；　and　besides　which　axioms；　there　are　divers　moe　touching　help　of　memory；　not　inferior　to　them。　But　I　did　in　the　beginning　distinguish；　not　to　report　those　things　deficient；　which　are　but　only　ill　managed。

XVI。　1。　There　remaineth　the　fourth　kind　of　rational　knowledge；　which　is　transitive；　concerning　the　expressing　or　transferring　our　knowledge　to　others；　which　I　will　term　by　the　general　name　of　tradition　or　delivery。　Tradition　hath　three　parts；　the　first　concerning　the　organ　of　tradition：　the　second　concerning　the　method　of　tradition；　and　the　third　concerning　the　illustration　of　tradition。

2。　For　the　organ　of　tradition；　it　is　either　speech　or　writing：　for　Aristotle　saith　well；　WORDS　ARE　THE　IMAGES　OF　COGITATIONS；　AND　LETTERS　ARE　THE　IMAGES　OF　WORDS；　but　yet　it　is　not　of　necessity　that　cogitations　be　expressed　by　the　medium　of　words。　FOR　WHATSOEVER　IS　CAPABLE　OF　SUFFICIENT　DIFFERENCES；　AND　THOSE　PERCEPTIBLE　BY　THE　SENSE；　IS　IN　NATURE　COMPETENT　TO　EXPRESS　COGITATIONS。　And　therefore　we　see　in　the　commerce　of　barbarous　people；　that　understand　not　one　another's　language；　and　in　the　practice　of　divers　that　are　dumb　and　deaf；　that　men's　minds　are　expressed　in　gestures；　though　not　exactly；　yet　to　serve　the　turn。　And　we　understand　further；　that　it　is　the　use　of　China；　and　the　kingdoms　of　the　high　Levant；　to　write　in　characters　real；　which　express　neither　letters　nor　words　in　gross；　but　things　or　notions；　insomuch　as　countries　and　provinces；　which　understand　not　one　another's　language；　can　nevertheless　read　one　another's　writings；　because　the　characters　are　accepted　more　generally　than　the　languages　do　extend；　and　therefore　they　have　a　vast　multitude　of　characters；　as　many；　I　suppose；　as　radical　words。

3。　These　notes　of　cogitations　are　of　two　sorts；　the　one　when　the　note　hath　some　similitude　or　congruity　with　the　notion：　the　other　AD　PLACITUM；　having　force　only　by　contract　or　acceptation。　Of　the　former　sort　are　hieroglyphics　and　gestures。　For　as　to　hieroglyphics；　things　of　ancient　use；　and　embraced　chiefly　by　the　Egyptians；　one　of　the　most　ancient　nations；　they　are　but　as　continued　impresses　and　emblems。　And　as　for　gestures；　they　are　as　transitory　hieroglyphics；　and　are　to　hieroglyphics　as　words　spoken　are　written；　in　that　they　abide　not；　but　they　have　evermore；　as　well　as　the　other；　an　affinity　with　the　things　signified；　as　Periander；　being　consulted　with　how　to　preserve　a　tyranny　newly　usurped；　bid　the　messenger　attend　and　report　what　he　saw　him　do；　and　went　into　his　garden　and　topped　all　the　highest　flowers：　signifying；　that　it　consisted　in　the　cutting　off　and　keeping　low　of　the　nobility　and　grandees。　AD　PLACITUM；　are　the　characters　real　before　mentioned；　and　words：　although　some　have　been　willing　by　curious　inquiry；　or　rather　by　apt　feigning　to　have　derived　imposition　of　names　from　reason　and　intendment；　a　speculation　elegant；　and；　by　reason　it　searcheth　into　antiquity；　reverent；　but　sparingly　mixed　with　truth；　and　of　small　fruit。　This　portion　of　knowledge；　touching　the　notes　of　things　and　cogitations　in　general；　I　find　not　inquired　but　deficient。　And　although　it　may　seem　of　no　great　use；　considering　that　words　and　writings　by　letter　do　far　excel　all　the　other　ways；　yet　because　this　part　concerneth；　as　it　were；　the　mint　of　knowledge；　（for　words　are　the　tokens　current　and　accepted　for　conceits；　as　moneys　are　for　values；　and　that　it　is　fit　men　be　not　ignorant　that　moneys　may　be　of　another　kind　than　gold　and　silver；）　I　thought