the advancement of learning-第31部分

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oved　touching　a　uniformity　of　method　in　multiformity　of　matter；　yet　we　see　how　that　opinion；　besides　the　weakness　of　it；　hath　been　of　ill　desert　towards　learning；　as　that　which　taketh　the　way　to　reduce　learning　to　certain　empty　and　barren　generalities；　being　but　the　very　husks　and　shells　of　sciences；　all　the　kernel　being　forced　out　and　expulsed　with　the　torture　and　press　of　the　Method。　And　therefore　as　I　did　allow　well　of　particular　topics　for　invention；　so　I　do　allow　likewise　of　particular　Methods　of　tradition。

10。　Another　diversity　of　judgment　　in　the　delivery　and　teaching　of　knowledge　is　according　unto　the　light　and　presuppositions　of　that　which　is　delivered；　for　that　knowledge　which　is　new；　and　foreign　from　opinions　received；　is　to　be　delivered　in　another　form　than　that　that　is　agreeable　and　familiar；　and　therefore　Aristotle；　when　he　thinks　to　tax　Democritus；　doth　in　truth　commend　him；　where　he　saith；　IF　WE　SHALL　INDEED　DISPUTE；　AND　NOT　FOLLOW　AFTER　SIMILITUDES；　ETC。　For　those　whose　conceits　are　seated　in　popular　opinions；　need　only　but　to　prove　or　dispute；　but　those　whose　conceits　are　beyond　popular　opinions；　have　a　double　labour；　the　one　to　make　themselves　conceived；　and　the　other　to　prove　and　demonstrate：　so　that　it　is　of　necessity　with　them　to　have　recourse　to　similitudes　and　translations　to　express　themselves。　And　therefore　in　the　infancy　of　learning；　and　in　rude　times；　when　those　conceits　which　are　now　trivial　were　then　new；　the　world　was　full　of　parables　and　similitudes；　for　else　would　men　either　have　passed　over　without　mark；　or　else　rejected　for　paradoxes；　that　which　was　offered；　before　they　had　understood　or　judged。　So　in　divine　learning；　we　see　how　frequent　parables　and　tropes　are：　for　it　is　a　rule；　that　whatsoever　science　is　not　consonant　to　presuppositions；　must　pray　in　aid　of　similitudes。

11。　There　be　also　other　diversities　of　Methods　vulgar　and　received：　as　that　of　Resolution　or　Analysis；　of　Constitution　or　Systasis；　of　Concealment　or　Cryptic；　etc。；　which　I　do　allow　well　of；　though　I　have　stood　upon　those　which　are　least　handled　and　observed。　All　which　I　have　remembered　to　this　purpose；　because　I　would　erect　and　constitute　one　general　inquiry；　which　seems　to　me　deficient；　touching　the　Wisdom　of　Tradition。

12。　But　unto　this　part　of　knowledge　concerning　Methods　doth　further　belong　not　only　the　architecture　of　the　whole　frame　of　a　work；　but　also　the　several　beams　and　columns　thereof；　not　as　to　their　stuff；　but　as　to　their　quantity　and　figure。　And　therefore　Method　considereth　not　only　the　disposition　of　the　argument　or　subject；　but　likewise　the　propositions：　not　as　to　their　truth　or　matter；　but　as　to　their　limitation　and　manner。　For　herein　Ramus　merited　better　a　great　deal　in　reviving　the　good　rules　of　propositions；　《　Kaqo/lov　prowtov　kata　panto/s；　》　ETC。；　than　he　did　in　introducing　the　canker　of　epitomes；　　and　yet　（as　it　is　the　conduction　of　human　things　that；　according　to　the　ancient　fables；　THE　MOST　PRECIOUS　THINGS　HAVE　THE　MOST　PERNICIOUS　KEEPERS）　it　was　so；　that　the　attempt　of　the　one　made　him　fall　upon　the　other。　For　he　had　need　be　well　conducted　that　should　design　to　make　axioms　convertible；　if　he　make　them　not　withal　circular；　and　non…promovent；　or　incurring　into　themselves；　but　yet　the　intention　was　excellent。

13。　The　other　considerations　of　method；　concerning　propositions；　are　chiefly　touching　the　utmost　propositions；　which　limit　the　dimensions　of　sciences；　for　every　knowledge　may　be　fitly　said；　besides　the　profundity　（which　is　the　truth　and　substance　of　it；　that　makes　it　solid）　to　have　a　longitude　and　a　latitude；　accounting　the　latitude　towards　other　sciences；　and　the　longitude　towards　action；　that　is；　from　the　greatest　generality　to　the　most　particular　precept。　The　one　giveth　rule　how　far　one　knowledge　ought　to　intermeddle　within　the　province　of　another；　which　is　the　rule　they　call　《　Kaqauto　》；　　the　other　giveth　rule　unto　what　degree　of　particularity　a　knowledge　should　descend：　which　latter　I　find　passed　over　in　silence；　being　in　my　judgment　the　more　material；　for　certainly　there　must　be　somewhat　left　to　practice；　but　how　much　is　worthy　the　inquiry。　We　see　remote　and　superficial　generalities　do　but　offer　knowledge　＇54＇　to　scorn　of　practical　men；　and　are　no　more　aiding　to　practice　than　an　Ortelius'　universal　map　is　to　direct　the　way　between　London　and　York。　The　better　sort　of　rules　have　been　not　unfitly　compared　to　glasses　of　steel　unpolished；　where　you　may　see　the　images　of　things；　but　first　they　must　be　filed：　so　the　rules　will　help；　if　they　be　laboured　and　polished　by　practice。　But　how　crystalline　they　may　be　made　at　the　first；　and　how　far　forth　they　may　be　polished　aforehand；　is　the　question；　the　inquiry　whereof　seemeth　to　me　deficient。

14。　There　hath　been　also　laboured　and　put　in　practice　a　method；　which　is　not　a　lawful　method；　but　a　method　of　imposture；　which　is　to　deliver　knowledges　in　such　manner；　as　men　may　speedily　come　to　make　a　show　of　learning　who　have　it　not：　such　was　the　travail　of　Raymundus　Lullius；　in　making　that　art　which　bears　his　name：　not　unlike　to　some　books　of　typocosmy；　which　have　been　made　since；　being　nothing　but　a　mass　of　words　of　all　arts；　to　give　men　countenance；　that　those　which　use　the　terms　might　be　thought　to　understand　the　art；　which　collections　are　much　like　a　fripper's　or　broker's　shop；　that　hath　ends　of　everything；　but　nothing　of　worth。

XVIII。1。　Now　we　descend　to　that　part　which　concerneth　the　illustration　of　tradition；　comprehended　in　that　science　which　we　call　rhetoric；　or　art　of　eloquence；　a　science　excellent；　and　excellently　well　laboured。　For　though　in　true　value　it　is　inferior　to　wisdom；　（as　it　is　said　by　God　to　Moses；　when　he　disabled　himself　for　want　of　this　faculty；　AARON　SHALL　BE　THY　SPEAKER；　AND　THOSE　SHALT　BE　TO　HIM　AS　GOD：）　yet　with　people　it　is　the　more　mighty：　so　Salomon　saith；　SAPIENS　CORDE　APPELLABITUR　PRUDENS；　SED　DULCIS　ELOQUIO　MAJORA　REPERIET；　signifying；　that　profoundness　of　wisdom　will　help　a　man　to　a　name　or　admiration；　but　that　it　is　eloquence　that　prevaileth　in　an　active　life。　And　as　to　the　labouring　of　it；　the　emulation　of　Aristotle　with　the　rhetoricians　of　his　time；　and　the　experience　of　Cicero　hath　made　them　in　their　works　of　rhetorics　exceed　themselves。　Again；　the　excellency　of　examples　of　eloquence　in　the　orations　of　Demosthenes　and　Cicero；　added　to　the　perfection　of　the　precepts　of　eloquence；　hath　doubled　the　progression　in　this　art；　and　therefore　the　deficiencies　which　I　shall　note　will　rather　be　in　some　collections；　which　may　as　hand…maids　attend　the　art；　than　in　the　rules　or　use　of　the　art　itself。

2。　Notwithstanding；　to　stir　the　earth　a　little　about　the　roots　of　this　science；　as　we　have　done　of　the　rest；　the　duty　and　office　of　rhetoric　is；　to　apply　reason　to　imagination　for　the　better　moving　of　the　will。　For　we　see　reason　is　disturbed　in　the　administration　thereof　by　three　means；　by　illaqueation　or　sophism；　which　pertains　to　logic；　by　imagination　or　impression；　which　pertains　to　rhetoric；　and　by　passion　or　auction；　which　pertains　to　morality。　And　as　in　negotiation　with　others；　men　are　wrought　by　cunning；　by　importunity；　and　by　vehemency；　so　in　this　negotiation　within　ourselves；　men　are　undermined　by　inconsequences；　solicited　and　importuned　by　impressions　or　observations；　and　transported　by　passions。　Neither　is　the　nature　of　man　so　unfortunately　built；　as　that　those　powers　and　arts　should　have　force　to　disturb　reason；　and　not　to　establish　and　advance　it。　For　the　end　of　logic　is；　to　teach　a　form　of　argument　to　secure　reason；　and　not　to　entrap　it；　the　end　of　morality　is　to　procure　the　affections　to　obey　reason；　and　not　to　invade　it；　the　end　of　rhetoric　is；　to　fill　the　imagination　to　second　reason；　and　not　to　oppress　it：　for　these　abuses　of　art　come　in　but　EX　OBLIQUO；　for　caution。

3。　And　therefore　it　was　great　injustice　in　Plato；　though　springing　out　of　a　just　hatred　to　the　rhetoricians　of　his　time；　to　esteem　of　rhetoric　but　as　a　voluptuary　art；　resembling　it　to　cookery；　that　did　mar　wholesome　meats；　and　help　unwholesome　by　variety　of　sauces　to　the　pleasure　of　the　taste。　For　we　see　that　speech　is　much　more　conversant　in　adorning　that　which　is　good；　than　in　colouring　that　which　is　evil；　for　there　is　no　man　but　speaketh　more　honestly　than　he　can　do　or　think：　and　it　was　excellently　noted　by　Thucydides　in　Cleon；　that　because　he　used　to　hold　on　the　bad　side　in　causes　of　estate；　therefore　he　was　ever　inveighing　against　eloquence　and　good　speech；　　knowing　that　no　man　can　speak　fair　of　courses　sordid　and　base。　And　therefore　as　Plato　said　elegantly；　THAT　VIRTUE；　IF　SHE　COULD　BE　SEEN；　WOULD　MOVE　GREAT　LOVE　AND　AFFECTION；　so　seeing　that　she　cannot　be　showed　to　the　sense　by　corporal　shape；　the　next　degree　is　to　show　her　to　the　imagination　in　lively　representation：　for　to　show　her　to　reason　only　in　subtilty　of　argument；　was　a　thing　ever　derided　in　Chrysippus　and　many　of　the　Stoics；　who　thought　to　thrust　virtue　upon　men　by　sharp　disputations　and　conclusions；　which　have　no　sympathy　with　the　will　of　man。

4。　Again；　if　the　affections　in　themselves　were　pliant　and　obedient　to　reason；　it　were　true　there　should　be　no　great　use　of　persuasions　and　insinuations　to　the　will；　more　than　of　naked　proposition　and　proofs；　but　in　regard　of　the　continual　mutinies　and　seditions　of　the　affections；

Video　meliora；　proboque；　Deteriora　sequor：

reason　would　become　captive　and　servile；　if　eloquence　of　persuasions　did　not　practise　and　win　the　imagination　from　the　affections'　part；　and　contract　a　confederacy　between　the　reason　and　imagination　against　the　affections；　for　the　affections　themselves　carry　ever　an　appetite　to　good；　as　reason　doth。　The　difference　is；　that　the　affection　beholdeth　merely　the　present；　reason　beholdeth　the　future　and　sum　of　time。　And　therefore　the　present　filling　the　imagination　more；　reason　is　commonly　vanquished；　but　after　that　force　of　eloquence　and　persuasion　hath　made　things　future　and　remote　appear　as　present；　then　upon　the　revolt　of　the　imagination　reason　prevaileth。

5。　We　conclude；　therefore；　that　rhetoric　can　be　no　more　charged　with　the　colouring　of　the　worse　part；　than　logic　with　sophistry；　or　morality　with　vice。　For　we　know　the　doctrines　of　contraries　are　the　same；　though　the　use　be　opposite。　It　appeareth　also　that　logic