the advancement of learning-第34部分

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self；　without　casting　beams　upon　society；　assuredly　divinity　knoweth　it　not；

9。　It　decideth　also　the　controversies　between　Zeno　and　Socrates；　and　their　schools　and　successions；　on　the　one　side；　who　placed　felicity　in　virtue　simply　or　attended；　the　actions　and　exercises　whereof　do　chiefly　embrace　and　concern　society；　and　on　the　other　side；　the　Cyrenaics　and　Epicureans；　who　placed　it　in　pleasure；　and　made　virtue；　（as　it　is　used　in　some　comedies　of　errors；　wherein　the　mistress　and　the　maid　change　habits；）　to　be　but　as　a　servant；　without　which　pleasure　cannot　be　served　and　attended；　and　the　reformed　school　of　the　Epicureans；　which　placed　it　in　serenity　of　mind　and　freedom　from　perturbation；　（as　if　they　would　have　deposed　Jupiter　again；　and　restored　Saturn　and　the　first　age；　when　there　was　no　summer　nor　winter；　spring　nor　autumn；　but　all　after　one　air　and　season；）　and　Herillus；　who　placed　felicity　in　extinguishment　of　the　disputes　of　the　mind；　making　no　fixed　nature　of　good　and　evil；　esteeming　things　according　to　the　clearness　of　the　desires；　or　the　reluctation；　which　opinion　was　revived　in　the　heresy　of　the　Anabaptists；　measuring　things　according　to　the　motions　of　the　spirit；　and　the　constancy　or　wavering　of　belief：　all　which　are　manifest　to　tend　to　private　repose　and　contentment；　and　not　to　point　of　society。

10。　It　censureth　also　the　philosophy　of　Epictetus；　which　presupposeth　that　felicity　must　be　placed　in　those　things　which　are　in　our　power；　lest　we　be　liable　to　fortune　and　disturbance：　as　if　it　were　not　a　thing　much　more　happy　to　fail　in　good　and　virtuous　ends　for　the　public；　than　to　obtain　all　that　we　can　wish　to　ourselves　in　our　proper　fortune；　as　Gonsalvo　said　to　his　soldiers；　showing　them　Naples；　and　protesting；　HE　HAD　RATHER　DIE　ONE　FOOT　FORWARDS；　THAN　TO　HAVE　HIS　LIFE　SECURED　FOR　LONG　BY　ONE　FOOT　OF　RETREAT。　Whereunto　the　wisdom　of　that　heavenly　leader　hath　signed；　who　hath　affirmed　that　A　GOOD　CONSCIENCE　IS　A　CONTINUAL　FEAST；　showing　plainly　that　the　conscience　of　good　intensions；　howsoever　succeeding；　is　a　more　continual　joy　to　nature；　than　all　the　provision　which　can　be　made　for　security　and　repose。

11。　It　censureth　likewise　that　abuse　of　philosophy；　which　grew　general　about　the　time　of　Epictetus；　in　converting　it　into　an　occupation　or　profession；　as　if　the　purpose　had　been；　not　to　resist　and　extinguish　perturbations；　but　to　fly　and　avoid　the　causes　of　them；　and　to　shape　a　particular　kind　and　course　of　life　to　that　end；　introducing　such　a　health　of　mind；　as　was　that　health　of　body　of　which　Aristotle　speaketh　of　Herodicus；　who　did　nothing　all　his　life　long　but　intend　his　health：　whereas　if　men　refer　themselves　to　duties　of　society；　as　that　health　of　body　is　best；　which　is　ablest　to　endure　all　alterations　and　extremities；　so　likewise　that　health　of　mind　is　most　proper；　which　can　go　through　the　greatest　temptations　and　perturbations。　So　as　Diogenes'　opinion　is　to　be　accepted；　who　commended　not　them　which　abstained；　but　them　which　sustained；　and　could　refrain　their　mind　IN　PRAECIPITIO；　and　could　give　unto　the　mind；　as　is　used　in　horsemanship；　the　shortest　stop　or　turn。

12。　Lastly；　it　censureth　the　tenderness　and　want　of　application　in　some　of　the　most　ancient　and　reverend　philosophers　and　philosophical　men；　that　did　retire　too　easily　from　civil　business；　for　avoiding　of　indignities　and　perturbations：　whereas　the　resolution　of　men　truly　moral　ought　to　be　such　as　the　same　Consalvo　said　the　honour　of　a　soldier　should　be；　E　TEL？CRASSIORE；　and　not　so　fine　as　that　everything　should　catch　in　it　and　endanger　it。

XXI。　1。　To　resume　private　or　particular　good；　it　falleth　into　the　division　of　good　active　and　passive：　for　this　difference　of　good；　not　unlike　to　that　which　amongst　the　Romans　was　expressed　in　the　familiar　or　household　terms　of　PROMUS　and　CONDUS；　is　formed　also　in　all　things；　and　is　best　disclosed　in　the　two　several　appetites　in　creatures；　the　one　to　preserve　or　continue　themselves；　and　the　other　to　dilate　or　multiply　themselves；　whereof　the　latter　seemeth　to　be　the　worthier：　for　in　nature　the　heavens；　which　are　the　more　worthy；　are　the　agent；　and　the　earth；　which　is　the　less　worthy；　is　the　patient。　In　the　pleasures　of　living　creatures；　that　of　generation　is　greater　than　that　of　food；　in　divine　doctrine；　BEATIUS　EST　DARE　QUAM　ACCIPERE；　and　in　life；　there　is　no　man's　spirit　so　soft；　but　esteemeth　the　effecting　of　somewhat　that　he　hath　fixed　in　his　desire；　more　than　sensuality；　which　priority　of　the　active　good；　is　much　upheld　by　the　consideration　of　our　estate　to　be　mortal　and　exposed　to　fortune。　For　if　we　might　have　a　＇59＇　perpetuity　and　certainty　in　our　pleasures；　the　state　of　them　would　advance　their　price：　but　when　we　see　it　is　but　MAGNI　AESTIMAMUS　MORI　TARDIUS；　and　NE　GLORIERIS　DE　CRASTINO；　NESCIS　PARTUM　DIEI；　it　maketh　us　to　desire　to　have　somewhat　secured　and　exempted　from　time；　which　are　only　our　deeds　and　works：　as　it　is　said　OPERA　EORUM　SEQUUNTUR　EOS。　The　pre…eminence　likewise　of　this　active　good　is　upheld　by　the　affection　which　is　natural　in　man　towards　variety　and　proceeding；　which　in　the　pleasures　of　the　sense；　which　is　the　principal　part　of　passive　good；　can　have　no　great　latitude：　COGITA　QUAMDIU　EADEM　FECERIS；　CIBUS；　SOMNUS；　LUDUS；　PER　HUNC　CIRCULUM　CURRITUR；　MORI　VELLE　NON　TANTUM　FORTIS；　AUT　MISER；　AUT　PRUDENS；　SED　ETIAM　FASTIDIOSUS　POTEST。　But　in　enterprises；　pursuits；　and　purposes　of　life；　there　is　much　variety；　whereof　men　are　sensible　with　pleasure　in　their　inceptions；　progressions；　recoils；　reintegrations；　approaches　and　attainings　to　their　ends：　so　as　it　was　well　said　VITA　SINE　PROPOSITO　LANGUIDA　ET　VAGA　EST。　Neither　hath　this　active　good　any　identity　with　the　good　of　society；　though　in　some　case　it　hath　an　incidence　into　it；　for　although　it　do　many　times　bring　forth　acts　of　beneficence；　yet　it　is　with　a　respect　private　to　a　man's　own　power；　glory；　amplification；　continuance；　as　appeareth　plainly；　when　it　findeth　a　contrary　subject。　For　that　gigantine　state　of　mind　which　possesseth　the　troublers　of　the　world；　such　as　was　Lucius　Sylla；　and　infinite　other　in　smaller　model；　who　would　have　all　men　happy　or　unhappy　as　they　were　their　friends　or　enemies；　and　would　give　form　to　the　world；　according　to　their　own　humours；　（which　is　the　true　Theomachy；）　pretendeth　and　aspireth　to　active　good；　though　it　recedeth　farthest　from　good　of　society；　which　we　have　determined　to　be　the　greater。

2。　To　resume　passive　good；　it　receiveth　a　subdivision　of　conservative　and　perfective。　For　let　us　take　a　brief　review　of　that　which　we　have　said：　we　have　spoken　first　of　the　good　of　society；　the　intention　whereof　embraceth　the　form　of　human　nature；　whereof　we　are　members　and　portions；　and　not　our　own　proper　and　individual　form：　we　have　spoken　of　active　good；　and　supposed　it　as　a　part　of　private　and　particular　good：　and　rightly；　for　there　is　impressed　upon　all　things　a　triple　desire　or　appetite　proceeding　from　love　to　themselves；　one　of　preserving　and　continuing　their　form；　another　of　advancing　and　perfecting　their　form；　and　a　third　of　multiplying　and　extending　their　form　upon　other　things；　whereof　the　multiplying；　or　signature　of　it　upon　other　things；　is　that　which　we　handled　by　the　name　of　active　good。　So　as　there　remaineth　the　conserving　of　it；　and　perfecting　or　raising　of　it；　which　latter　is　the　highest　degree　of　passive　good。　For　to　preserve　in　state　is　the　less；　to　preserve　with　advancement　is　the　greater。　So　in　man；

Igneus　est　ollis　vigor；　et　caelestis　origo。

His　approach　or　assumption　to　divine　or　angelical　nature　is　the　perfection　of　his　form；　the　error　or　false　imitation　of　which　good　is　that　which　is　the　tempest　of　human　life；　while　man；　upon　the　instinct　of　an　advancement　formal　and　essential　is　carried　to　seek　an　advancement　local。　For　as　those　which　are　sick；　and　find　no　remedy；　do　tumble　up　and　down　and　change　place；　as　if　by　a　remove　local　they　could　obtain　a　remove　internal；　so　is　it　with　men　in　ambition；　when　failing　of　the　means　to　exalt　their　nature；　they　are　in　a　perpetual　estuation　to　exalt　their　place。　So　then　passive　good　is；　as　was　said；　either　conservative　or　perfective。

3。　To　resume　the　good　of　conservation　or　comfort；　which　consisteth　in　the　fruition　of　that　which　is　agreeable　to　our　natures；　it　seemeth　to　be　the　most　pure　and　natural　of　pleasures；　but　yet　the　softest　and　the　lowest。　And　this　also　receiveth　a　difference；　which　hath　neither　been　well　judged　of；　nor　well　inquired：　for　the　good　of　fruition　or　contentment　is　placed　either　in　the　sincereness　of　the　fruition；　or　in　the　quickness　and　vigour　of　it；　the　one　superinduced　by　equality；　the　other　by　vicissitude；　the　one　having　less　mixture　of　evil；　the　other　more　impression　of　good。　Which　of　these　is　the　greater　good　is　a　question　controverted；　but　whether　man's　nature　may　not　be　capable　of　both；　is　a　question　not　inquired。

4。　The　former　question　being　debated　between　Socrates　and　a　sophist；　Socrates　placing　felicity　in　an　equal　and　constant　peace　of　mind；　and　the　sophist　in　much　desiring　and　much　enjoying；　they　fell　from　argument　to　ill　words：　the　sophist　saying　that　Socrates'　felicity　was　the　felicity　of　a　block　or　stone；　and　Socrates　saying　that　the　sophist's　felicity　was　the　felicity　of　one　that　had　the　itch；　who　did　nothing　but　itch　and　scratch。　And　both　these　opinions　do　not　want　their　supports。　For　the　opinion　of　Socrates　is　much　upheld　by　the　general　consent　even　of　the　Epicures　themselves；　that　virtue　beareth　a　great　part　in　felicity；　and　if　so；　certain　it　is；　that　virtue　hath　more　use　in　clearing　perturbations　than　in　compassing　desires。　The　sophist's　opinion　is　much　favoured　by　the　assertion　we　last　spoke　of；　that　good　of　advancement　is　greater　than　good　of　simple　preservation；　because　every　obtaining　a　desire　hath　a　show　of　advancement；　as　motion　though　in　a　circle　has　a　show　of　progression。

5。　But　the　second　question；　decided　the　true　way；　maketh　the　former　superfluous。　For　can　it　be　doubted　but　that　there　are　some　who　take　more　pleasure　in　enjoying　pleasures　than　some　other；　and　yet　nevertheless　are　less　troubled　with　the　loss　or　leaving　of　them　？　so　as　this　same；　NON　UTI　UT　NON　APPETAS；　NON　APPETERE　UT　NON　METUAS；　SUNT　ANIMI　PUSILLI　ET　DIFFIDENTIS。　And　it　seemeth　to　me；　that　most　of　the　doctrines　of　the　philosophers　ar