the spirit of laws-第22部分

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In　governments　where　there　are　necessary　distinctions　of　persons；　there　must　likewise　be　privileges。　This　also　diminishes　the　simplicity；　and　creates　a　thousand　exceptions。

One　of　the　privileges　least　burdensome　to　society；　and　especially　to　him　who　confers　it；　is　that　of　pleading　in　one　court　in　preference　to　another。　Here　new　difficulties　arise；　when　it　becomes　a　question　before　which　court　we　shall　plead。

Far　different　is　the　case　of　the　people　under　despotic　governments。　In　those　countries　I　can　see　nothing　that　the　legislator　is　able　to　decree；　or　the　magistrate　to　judge。　As　the　lands　belong　to　the　prince；　it　follows　that　there　are　scarcely　any　civil　laws　in　regard　to　landed　property。　From　the　right　the　sovereign　has　to　successions；　it　follows；　likewise；　that　there　are　none　relating　to　inheritances。　The　monopolies　established　by　the　prince　for　himself　in　some　countries　render　all　sorts　of　commercial　laws　quite　useless。　The　marriages　which　they　usually　contract　with　female　slaves　are　the　cause　that　there　are　scarcely　any　civil　laws　relating　to　dowries；　or　to　the　particular　advantage　of　married　women。　From　the　prodigious　multitude　of　slaves；　it　follows；　likewise；　that　there　are　very　few　who　have　any　such　thing　as　a　will　of　their　own；　and　of　course　are　answerable　for　their　conduct　before　a　judge。　Most　moral　actions　that　are　only　in　consequence　of　a　father's；　a　husband's；　or　a　master's　will；　are　regulated　by　them；　and　not　by　the　magistrates。

I　forgot　to　observe　that　as　what　we　call　honour　is　a　thing　hardly　known　in　those　countries；　the　several　difficulties　relating　to　this　article；　though　of　such　importance　with　us；　are　with　them　quite　out　of　the　question。　Despotic　power　is　self…sufficient；　round　it　there　is　an　absolute　vacuum。　Hence　it　is　that　when　travellers　favour　us　with　the　description　of　countries　where　arbitrary　sway　prevails；　they　seldom　make　mention　of　civil　laws。＇1＇

All　occasions；　therefore；　of　wrangling　and　law…suits　are　here　removed。　And　to　this　in　part　is　it　owing　that　litigious　people　in　those　countries　are　so　roughly　handled。　As　the　injustice　of　their　demand　is　neither　screened；　palliated；　nor　protected　by　an　infinite　number　of　laws；　of　course　it　is　immediately　discovered。

2。　Of　the　Simplicity　of　Criminal　Laws　in　different　Governments。　We　hear　it　generally　said；　that　justice　ought　to　be　administered　with　us　as　in　Turkey。　Is　it　possible；　then；　that　the　most　ignorant　of　all　nations　should　be　the　most　clear…sighted　on　a　point　which　it　most　behoves　mankind　to　know？

If　we　examine　the　set　forms　of　justice　with　respect　to　the　trouble　the　subject　undergoes　in　recovering　his　property；　or　in　obtaining　satisfaction　for　an　injury　or　affront；　we　shall　find　them　doubtless　too　numerous：　but　if　we　consider　them　in　the　relation　they　bear　to　the　liberty　and　security　of　every　individual；　we　shall　often　find　them　too　few；　and　be　convinced　that　the　trouble；　expense；　delays；　and　even　the　very　dangers　of　our　judiciary　proceedings；　are　the　price　that　each　subject　pays　for　his　liberty。

In　Turkey；　where　little　regard　is　shown　to　the　honour；　life；　or　estate　of　the　subject；　all　causes　are　speedily　decided。　The　method　of　determining　them　is　a　matter　of　indifference；　provided　they　be　determined。　The　pasha；　after　a　quick　hearing；　orders　which　party　he　pleases　to　be　bastinadoed；　and　then　sends　them　about　their　business。

Here　it　would　be　dangerous　to　be　of　a　litigious　disposition；　this　supposes　a　strong　desire　of　obtaining　justice；　a　settled　aversion；　an　active　mind；　and　a　steadiness　in　pursuing　one's　point。　All　this　should　be　avoided　in　a　government　where　fear　ought　to　be　the　only　prevailing　sentiment；　and　in　which　popular　disturbances　are　frequently　attended　with　sudden　and　unforeseen　revolutions。　Here　every　man　ought　to　know　that　the　magistrate　must　not　hear　his　name　mentioned；　and　that　his　security　depends　entirely　on　his　being　reduced　to　a　kind　of　annihilation。

But　in　moderate　governments；　where　the　life　of　the　meanest　subject　is　deemed　precious；　no　man　is　stripped　of　his　honour　or　property　until　after　a　long　inquiry；　and　no　man　is　bereft　of　life　till　his　very　country　has　attacked　him　　an　attack　that　is　never　made　without　leaving　him　all　possible　means　of　making　his　defence。

Hence　it　is　that　when　a　person　renders　himself　absolute；＇2＇　he　immediately　thinks　of　reducing　the　number　of　laws。　In　a　government　thus　constituted　they　are　more　affected　with　particular　inconveniences　than　with　the　liberty　of　the　subject；　which　is　very　little　minded。

In　republics；　it　is　plain　that　as　many　formalities　at　least　are　necessary　as　in　monarchies。　In　both　governments　they　increase　in　proportion　to　the　value　which　is　set　on　the　honour；　fortune；　liberty；　and　life　of　the　subject。

In　republican　governments；　men　are　all　equal；　equal　they　are　also　in　despotic　governments：　in　the　former；　because　they　are　everything；　in　the　latter；　because　they　are　nothing。

3。　In　what　Governments　and　in　what　Cases　the　Judges　ought　to　determine　according　to　the　express　Letter　of　the　Law。　The　nearer　a　government　approaches　towards　a　republic；　the　more　the　manner　of　judging　becomes　settled　and　fixed；　hence　it　was　a　fault　in　the　republic　of　Sparta　for　the　Ephori　to　pass　such　arbitrary　judgments　without　having　any　laws　to　direct　them。　The　first　consuls　at　Rome　pronounced　sentence　in　the　same　manner　as　the　Ephori；　but　the　inconvenience　of　this　proceeding　was　soon　felt；　and　they　were　obliged　to　have　recourse　to　express　and　determinate　laws。

In　despotic　governments　there　are　no　laws；　the　judge　himself　is　his　own　rule。　There　are　laws　in　monarchies；　and　where　these　are　explicit；　the　judge　conforms　to　them；　where　they　are　otherwise；　he　endeavours　to　investigate　their　spirit。　In　republics；　the　very　nature　of　the　constitution　requires　the　judges　to　follow　the　letter　of　the　law；　otherwise　the　law　might　be　explained　to　the　prejudice　of　every　citizen；　in　cases　where　their　honour；　property；　or　life　is　concerned。

At　Rome　the　judges　had　no　more　to　do　than　to　declare　that　the　persons　accused　were　guilty　of　a　particular　crime；　and　then　the　punishment　was　found　in　the　laws；　as　may　be　seen　in　divers　laws　still　extant。　In　England　the　jury　give　their　verdict　whether　the　fact　brought　under　their　cognisance　be　proved　or　not；　if　it　be　proved；　the　judge　pronounces　the　punishment　inflicted　by　the　law；　and　for　this　he　needs　only　to　open　his　eyes。

4。　Of　the　Manner　of　passing　Judgment。　Hence　arise　the　different　modes　of　passing　judgment。　In　monarchies　the　judges　choose　the　method　of　arbitration；　they　deliberate　together；　they　communicate　their　sentiments　for　the　sake　of　unanimity；　they　moderate　their　opinions；　in　order　to　render　them　conformable　to　those　of　others：　and　the　lesser　number　are　obliged　to　give　way　to　the　majority。　But　this　is　not　agreeable　to　the　nature　of　a　republic。　At　Rome；　and　in　the　cities　of　Greece；　the　judges　never　entered　into　a　consultation；　each　gave　his　opinion　in　one　of　these　three　ways：　〃I　absolve；〃　〃I　condemn；〃　〃It　does　not　appear　clear　to　me〃；＇3＇　this　was　because　the　people　judged；　or　were　supposed　to　judge。　But　the　people　are　far　from　being　civilians；　all　these　restrictions　and　methods　of　arbitration　are　above　their　reach；　they　must　have　only　one　object　and　one　single　fact　set　before　them；　and　then　they　have　only　to　see　whether　they　ought　to　condemn；　to　acquit；　or　to　suspend　their　judgment。

The　Romans　introduced　set　forms　of　actions；＇4＇　after　the　example　of　the　Greeks；　and　established　a　rule　that　each　cause　should　be　directed　by　its　proper　action。　This　was　necessary　in　their　manner　of　judging；　it　was　necessary　to　fix　the　state　of　the　question；　that　the　people　might　have　it　always　before　their　eyes。　Otherwise；　in　a　long　process；　this　state　of　the　question　would　continually　change；　and　be　no　longer　distinguished。

Hence　it　followed　that　the　Roman　judges　granted　only　the　simple　demand；　without　making　any　addition；　deduction；　or　limitation。　But　the　pr？tors　devised　other　forms　of　actions；　which　were　called　ex　bona　fide；　in　which　the　method　of　pronouncing　sentence　was　left　to　the　disposition　of　the　judge。　This　was　more　agreeable　to　the　spirit　of　monarchy。　Hence　it　is　a　saying　among　the　French　lawyers；　that　in　France＇5＇　all　actions　are　ex　bona　fide。

5。　In　what　Governments　the　Sovereign　may　be　Judge。　Machiavel＇6＇　attributes　the　loss　of　the　liberty　of　Florence　to　the　people's　not　judging　in　a　body　in　cases　of　high　treason　against　themselves；　as　was　customary　at　Rome。　For　this　purpose　they　had　eight　judges：　〃but　the　few；〃　says　Machiavel；　〃are　corrupted　by　a　few。〃　I　should　willingly　adopt　the　maxim　of　this　great　man。　But　as　in　those　cases　the　political　interest　prevails　in　some　measure　over　the　civil　（for　it　is　always　an　inconvenience　that　the　people　should　be　judges　in　their　own　cause）；　in　order　to　remedy　this　evil；　the　laws　must　provide　as　much　as　possible　for　the　security　of　individuals。

With　this　view　the　Roman　legislators　did　two　things：　they　gave　the　persons　accused　permission　to　banish　themselves＇7＇　before　sentence　was　pronounced；＇8＇　and　they　ordained　that　the　goods　of　those　who　were　condemned　should　be　sacred；　to　prevent　their　being　confiscated　to　the　people。　We　shall　see　in　Book　XI　the　other　limitations　that　were　set　to　the　judicatory　power　residing　in　the　people。

Solon　knew　how　to　prevent　the　abuse　which　the　people　might　make　of　their　power　in　criminal　judgments。　He　ordained　that　the　Court　of　Areopagus　should　re…examine　the　affair；　that　if　they　believed　the　party　accused　was　unjustly　acquitted＇9＇　they　should　impeach　him　again　before　the　people；　that　if　they　believed　him　unjustly　condemned＇10＇　they　should　prevent　the　execution　of　the　sentence；　and　make　them　rejudge　the　proceeding　　an　admirable　law；　that　subjected　the　people　to　the　censure　of　the　magistracy　which　they　most　revered；　and　even　to　their　own！

In　affairs　of　this　kind　it　is　always　proper　to　throw　in　some　delays；　especially　when　the　party　accused　is　under　confinement；　to　the　end　that　the　people　may　grow　calm　and　give　their　judgment　coolly。

In　despotic　governments；　the　prince　himself　may　be　judge。　But　in　monarchies　this　cannot　be；　the　constitution　by　such　means　would　be　subverted；　and　the　dependent　intermediate　powers　annihilated；　all　set　forms　of　judgment　would　cease；　fear　woul