the spirit of laws-第23部分

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　would　cease；　fear　would　take　possession　of　the　people's　minds；　and　paleness　spread　itself　over　every　countenance：　the　more　confidence；　honour；　affection；　and　security　in　the　subject；　the　more　extended　is　the　power　of　the　monarch。

We　shall　give　here　a　few　more　reflections　on　this　point。　In　monarchies；　the　prince　is　the　party　that　prosecutes　the　person　accused；　and　causes　him　to　be　punished　or　acquitted。　Now；　were　he　himself　to　sit　upon　the　trial；　he　would　be　both　judge　and　party。

In　this　government　the　prince　has　frequently　the　benefit　of　confiscation；　so　that　here　again；　by　determining　criminal　causes；　he　would　be　both　judge　and　party。

Further；　by　this　method　he　would　deprive　himself　of　the　most　glorious　attribute　of　sovereignty；　namely；　that　of　granting　pardon；＇11＇　for　it　would　be　quite　ridiculous　of　him　to　make　and　unmake　his　decisions；　surely　he　would　not　choose　to　contradict　himself。

Besides；　this　would　be　confounding　all　ideas；　it　would　be　impossible　to　tell　whether　a　man　was　acquitted；　or　received　his　pardon。

Louis　XIII　being　desirous　to　sit　in　judgment　upon　the　trial　of　the　Duke　de　la　Valette；＇12＇　sent　for　some　members　of　the　parliament　and　of　the　privy　council；　to　debate　the　matter；　upon　their　being　ordered　by　the　king　to　give　their　opinion　concerning　the　warrant　for　his　arrest；　the　president；　De　Believre；　said　〃that　he　found　it　very　strange　that　a　prince　should　pass　sentence　upon　a　subject；　that　kings　had　reserved　to　themselves　the　power　of　pardoning；　and　left　that　of　condemning　to　their　officers；　that　his　majesty　wanted　to　see　before　him　at　the　bar　a　person　who；　by　his　decision；　was　to　be　hurried　away　into　the　other　world！　That　the　prince's　countenance　should　inspire　with　hopes；　and　not　confound　with　fears；　that　his　presence　alone　removed　ecclesiastic　censures；　and　that　subjects　ought　not　to　go　away　dissatisfied　from　the　sovereign。〃　When　sentence　was　passed；　the　same　magistrate　declared；　〃This　is　an　unprecedented　judgment　to　see；　contrary　to　the　example　of　past　ages　　a　king　of　France；　in　the　quality　of　a　judge；　condemning　a　gentleman　to　death。〃＇13＇

Again；　sentences　passed　by　the　prince　would　be　an　inexhaustible　source　of　injustice　and　abuse；　the　courtiers　by　their　importunity　would　always　be　able　to　extort　his　decisions。　Some　Roman　emperors　were　so　mad　as　to　sit　as　judges　themselves；　the　consequence　was　that　no　reigns　ever　so　surprised　the　world　with　oppression　and　injustice。

〃Claudius；〃　says　Tacitus；＇14＇　〃having　appropriated　to　himself　the　determination　of　lawsuits；　and　the　function　of　magistrates；　gave　occasion　to　all　manner　of　rapine。〃　But　Nero；　upon　coming　to　the　empire　after　Claudius；　endeavoured　to　conciliate　the　minds　of　the　people　by　declaring　〃that　he　would　take　care　not　to　be　judge　himself　in　private　causes；　that　the　parties　might　not　be　exposed　within　the　walls　of　a　palace　to　the　iniquitous　influence　of　a　few　freedmen。〃＇15＇

〃Under　the　reign　of　Arcadius；〃　says　Zozimus；＇16＇　〃a　swarm　of　calumniators　spread　themselves　on　every　side；　and　infested　the　court。　Upon　a　person's　decease；　it　was　immediately　supposed　he　had　left　no　children；＇17＇　and；　in　consequence　of　this；　his　property　was　given　away　by　a　rescript。　For　as　the　prince　was　surprisingly　stupid；　and　the　empress　excessively　enterprising；　she　was　a　slave　to　the　insatiable　avarice　of　her　domestics　and　confidants；　insomuch　that　to　an　honest　man　nothing　could　be　more　desirable　than　death。〃

〃Formerly；〃　says　Procopius＇18＇　〃there　used　to　be　very　few　people　at　court；　but　in　Justinian's　reign；　as　the　judges　had　no　longer　the　liberty　of　administering　justice；　their　tribunals　were　deserted；　while　the　prince's　palace　resounded　with　the　litigious　clamours　of　the　several　parties。〃　Everybody　knows　what　a　prostitution　there　was　of　public　judgments；　and　even　of　the　very　laws　themselves；　at　that　emperor's　court。

The　laws　are　the　eye　of　the　prince；　by　them　he　sees　what　would　otherwise　escape　his　observation。　Should　he　attempt　the　function　of　a　judge；　he　would　not　then　labour　for　himself；　but　for　impostors；　whose　aim　is　to　deceive　him。

6。　That　in　Monarchies　Ministers　ought　not　to　sit　as　Judges。　It　is　likewise　a　very　great　inconvenience　in　monarchies　for　the　ministers　of　the　prince　to　sit　as　judges。　We　have　still　instances　of　states　where　there　are　a　great　number　of　judges　to　decide　exchequer　causes；　and　where　the　ministers　nevertheless　（a　thing　most　incredible！）　would　fain　determine　them。　Many　are　the　reflections　that　here　arise；　but　this　single　one　will　suffice　for　my　purpose。

There　is　in　the　very　nature　of　things　a　kind　of　contrast　between　a　prince's　council　and　his　courts　of　judicature。　The　king's　council　ought　to　be　composed　of　a　few　persons；　and　the　courts　of　judicature　of　a　great　many。　The　reason　is；　in　the　former；　things　should　be　undertaken　and　conducted　with　a　kind　of　warmth　and　passion；　which　can　hardly　be　expected　but　from　four　or　five　men　who　make　it　their　sole　business。　On　the　contrary；　in　courts　of　judicature　a　certain　coolness　in　requisite；　and　an　indifference；　in　some　measure；　to　all　manner　of　affairs。

7。　Of　a　single　Magistrate。　A　magistracy　of　this　kind　cannot　take　place　but　in　a　despotic　government。　We　have　an　instance　in　the　Roman　history　how　far　a　single　magistrate　may　abuse　his　power。　Might　it　not　be　very　well　expected　that　Appius　on　his　tribunal　should　contemn　all　laws；　after　having　violated　that　of　his　own　enacting？＇19＇　Livy　has　given　us　the　iniquitous　distinction　of　the　Decemvir。　He　had　suborned　a　man　to　reclaim　Virginia　in　his　presence　as　his　slave；　Virginia's　relatives　insisted　that　by　virtue　of　his　own　law　she　should　be　consigned　to　them；　till　the　definitive　judgment　was　passed。　Upon　which　he　declared　that　his　law　had　been　enacted　only　in　favour　of　the　father；　and　that　as　Virginius　was　absent；　no　application　could　be　made　of　it　to　the　present　case。＇20＇

8。　Of　Accusation　in　different　Governments。　At　Rome＇21＇　it　was　lawful　for　one　citizen　to　accuse　another。　This　was　agreeable　to　the　spirit　of　a　republic；　where　each　citizen　ought　to　have　an　unlimited　zeal　for　the　public　good；　and　is　supposed　to　hold　all　the　rights　of　his　country　in　his　own　hands。　Under　the　emperors；　the　republican　maxims　were　still　pursued；　and　instantly　appeared　a　pernicious　tribe；　a　swarm　of　informers。　Crafty；　wicked　men；　who　could　stoop　to　any　indignity　to　serve　the　purposes　of　their　ambition；　were　sure　to　busy　themselves　in　the　search　of　criminals　whose　condemnation　might　be　agreeable　to　the　prince；　this　was　the　road　to　honour　and　preferment；＇22＇　but　luckily　we　are　strangers　to　it　in　our　country。

We　have　at　present　an　admirable　law；　namely；　that　by　which　the　prince；　who　is　established　for　the　execution　of　the　laws；　appoints　an　officer　in　each　court　of　judicature　to　prosecute　all　sorts　of　crimes　in　his　name；　hence　the　profession　of　informers　is　a　thing　unknown　to　us；　for　if　this　public　avenger　were　suspected　to　abuse　his　office；　he　would　soon　be　obliged　to　mention　his　author。

By　Plato's　Laws＇23＇　those　who　neglect　to　inform　or　to。　assist　the　magistrates　are　liable　to　punishment。　This　would　not　be　so　proper　in　our　days。　The　public　prosecutor　watches　for　the　safety　of　the　citizens；　he　proceeds　in　his　office　while　they　enjoy　their　quiet　and　ease。

9。　Of　the　Severity　of　Punishments　in　different　Governments。　The　severity　of　punishments　is　fitter　for　despotic　governments；　whose　principle　is　terror；　than　for　a　monarchy　or　a　republic；　whose　spring　is　honour　and　virtue。

In　moderate　governments；　the　love　of　one's　country；　shame；　and　the　fear　of　blame　are　restraining　motives；　capable　of　preventing　a　multitude　of　crimes。　Here　the　greatest　punishment　of　a　bad　action　is　conviction。　The　civil　laws　have　therefore　a　softer　way　of　correcting；　and　do　not　require　so　much　force　and　severity。

In　those　states　a　good　legislator　is　less　bent　upon　punishing　than　preventing　crimes；　he　is　more　attentive　to　inspire　good　morals　than　to　inflict　penalties。

It　is　a　constant　remark　of　the　Chinese　authors＇24＇　that　the　more　the　penal　laws　were　increased　in　their　empire；　the　nearer　they　drew　towards　a　revolution。　This　is　because　punishments　were　augmented　in　proportion　as　the　public　morals　were　corrupted。

It　would　be　an　easy　matter　to　prove　that　in　all；　or　almost　all；　the　governments　of　Europe；　penalties　have　increased　or　diminished　in　proportion　as　those　governments　favoured　or　discouraged　liberty。

In　despotic　governments；　people　are　so　unhappy　as　to　have　a　greater　dread　of　death　than　regret　for　the　loss　of　life；　consequently　their　punishments　ought　to　be　more　severe。　In　moderate　states　they　are　more　afraid　of　losing　their　lives　than　apprehensive　of　the　pain　of　dying；　those　punishments；　therefore；　which　deprive　them　simply　of　life　are　sufficient。

Men　in　excess　of　happiness　or　misery　are　equally　inclinable　to　severity；　witness　conquerors　and　monks。　It　is　mediocrity　alone；　and　a　mixture　of　prosperous　and　adverse　fortune；　that　inspires　us　with　lenity　and　pity。

What　we　see　practised　by　individuals　is　equally　observable　in　regard　to　nations。　In　countries　inhabited　by　savages　who　lead　a　very　hard　life；　and　in　despotic　governments；　where　there　is　only　one　person　on　whom　fortune　lavishes　her　favours；　while　the　miserable　subjects　lie　exposed　to　her　insults；　people　are　equally　cruel。　Lenity　reigns　in　moderate　governments。

When　in　reading　history　we　observe　the　cruelty　of　the　sultans　in　administration　of　justice；　we　shudder　at　the　very　thought　of　the　miseries　of　human　nature。

In　moderate　governments；　a　good　legislator　may　make　use　of　everything　by　way　of　punishment。　Is　it　not　very　extraordinary　that　one　of　the　chief　penalties　at　Sparta　was　to　deprive　a　person　of　the　power　of　lending　out　his　wife；　or　of　receiving　the　wife　of　another　man；　and　to　oblige　him　to　have　no　company　at　home　but　virgins？　In　short；　whatever　the　law　calls　a　punishment　is　such　effectively。

10。　Of　the　ancient　French　Laws。　In　the　ancient　French　laws　we　find　the　true　spirit　of　monarchy。　In　cases　relating　to　pecuniary　mulcts；　the　common　people　are　less　severely　punished　than　the　nobility。＇25＇　But　in　criminal＇26＇　cases　it　is　quite　the　reverse；　the　nobleman　loses　his　honour　and　his　voice　in　court；　while　the　peasant；　who　has　no　honour　to　lose；　undergoes　a　corporal　punishment。

11。　That　when　People　are　v