the spirit of laws-第40部分

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2＇　and　therefore　the　people　could　never　obtain　any　satisfaction　for　the　injuries　done　them。

Though；　in　general；　the　judiciary　power　ought　not　to　be　united　with　any　part　of　the　legislative；　yet　this　is　liable　to　three　exceptions；　founded　on　the　particular　interest　of　the　party　accused。

The　great　are　always　obnoxious　to　popular　envy；　and　were　they　to　be　judged　by　the　people；　they　might　be　in　danger　from　their　judges；　and　would；　moreover；　be　deprived　of　the　privilege　which　the　meanest　subject　is　possessed　of　in　a　free　state；　of　being　tried　by　his　peers。　The　nobility；　for　this　reason；　ought　not　to　be　cited　before　the　ordinary　courts　of　judicature；　but　before　that　part　of　the　legislature　which　is　composed　of　their　own　body。

It　is　possible　that　the　law；　which　is　clearsighted　in　one　sense；　and　blind　in　another；　might；　in　some　cases；　be　too　severe。　But　as　we　have　already　observed；　the　national　judges　are　no　more　than　the　mouth　that　pronounces　the　words　of　the　law；　mere　passive　beings；　incapable　of　moderating　either　its　force　or　rigour。　That　part；　therefore；　of　the　legislative　body；　which　we　have　just　now　observed　to　be　a　necessary　tribunal　on　another　occasion；　is　also　a　necessary　tribunal　in　this；　it　belongs　to　its　supreme　authority　to　moderate　the　law　in　favour　of　the　law　itself；　by　mitigating　the　sentence。

It　might　also　happen　that　a　subject　entrusted　with　the　administration　of　public　affairs　may　infringe　the　rights　of　the　people；　and　be　guilty　of　crimes　which　the　ordinary　magistrates　either　could　not　or　would　not　punish。　But；　in　general；　the　legislative　power　cannot　try　causes：　and　much　less　can　it　try　this　particular　case；　where　it　represents　the　party　aggrieved；　which　is　the　people。　It　can　only；　therefore；　impeach。　But　before　what　court　shall　it　bring　its　impeachment？　Must　it　go　and　demean　itself　before　the　ordinary　tribunals；　which　are　its　inferiors；　and；　being　composed；　moreover；　of　men　who　are　chosen　from　the　people　as　well　as　itself；　will　naturally　be　swayed　by　the　authority　of　so　powerful　an　accuser？　No：　in　order　to　preserve　the　dignity　of　the　people；　and　the　security　of　the　subject；　the　legislative　part　which　represents　the　people　must　bring　in　its　charge　before　the　legislative　part　which　represents　the　nobility；　who　have　neither　the　same　interests　nor　the　same　passions。

Here　is　an　advantage　which　this　government　has　over　most　of　the　ancient　republics；　where　this　abuse　prevailed；　that　the　people　were　at　the　same　time　both　judge　and　accuser。

The　executive　power；　pursuant　of　what　has　been　already　said；　ought　to　have　a　share　in　the　legislature　by　the　power　of　rejecting；　otherwise　it　would　soon　be　stripped　of　its　prerogative。　But　should　the　legislative　power　usurp　a　share　of　the　executive；　the　latter　would　be　equally　undone。　

If　the　prince　were　to　have　a　part　in　the　legislature　by　the　power　of　resolving；　liberty　would　be　lost。　But　as　it　is　necessary　he　should　have　a　share　in　the　legislature　for　the　support　of　his　own　prerogative；　this　share　must　consist　in　the　power　of　rejecting。

The　change　of　government　at　Rome　was　owing　to　this；　that　neither　the　senate；　who　had　one　part　of　the　executive　power；　nor　the　magistrates；　who　were　entrusted　with　the　other；　had　the　right　of　rejecting；　which　was　entirely　lodged　in　the　people。

Here　then　is　the　fundamental　constitution　of　the　government　we　are　treating　of。　The　legislative　body　being　composed　of　two　parts；　they　check　one　another　by　the　mutual　privilege　of　rejecting。　They　are　both　restrained　by　the　executive　power；　as　the　executive　is　by　the　legislative。

These　three　powers　should　naturally　form　a　state　of　repose　or　inaction。　But　as　there　is　a　necessity　for　movement　in　the　course　of　human　affairs；　they　are　forced　to　move；　but　still　in　concert。

As　the　executive　power　has　no　other　part　in　the　legislative　than　the　privilege　of　rejecting；　it　can　have　no　share　in　the　public　debates。　It　is　not　even　necessary　that　it　should　propose；　because　as　it　may　always　disapprove　of　the　resolutions　that　shall　be　taken；　it　may　likewise　reject　the　decisions　on　those　proposals　which　were　made　against　its　will。

In　some　ancient　commonwealths；　where　public　debates　were　carried　on　by　the　people　in　a　body；　it　was　natural　for　the　executive　power　to　propose　and　debate　in　conjunction　with　the　people；　otherwise　their　resolutions　must　have　been　attended　with　a　strange　confusion。

Were　the　executive　power　to　determine　the　raising　of　public　money；　otherwise　than　by　giving　its　consent；　liberty　would　be　at　an　end；　because　it　would　become　legislative　in　the　most　important　point　of　legislation。　

If　the　legislative　power　was　to　settle　the　subsidies；　not　from　year　to　year；　but　for　ever；　it　would　run　the　risk　of　losing　its　liberty；　because　the　executive　power　would　be　no　longer　dependent；　and　when　once　it　was　possessed　of　such　a　perpetual　right；　it　would　be　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　it　held　it　of　itself　or　of　another。　The　same　may　be　said　if　it　should　come　to　a　resolution　of　entrusting；　not　an　annual；　but　a　perpetual　command　of　the　fleets　and　armies　to　the　executive　power。

To　prevent　the　executive　power　from　being　able　to　oppress；　it　is　requisite　that　the　armies　with　which　it　is　entrusted　should　consist　of　the　people；　and　have　the　same　spirit　as　the　people；　as　was　the　case　at　Rome　till　the　time　of　Marius。　To　obtain　this　end；　there　are　only　two　ways；　either　that　the　persons　employed　in　the　army　should　have　sufficient　property　to　answer　for　their　conduct　to　their　fellow…subjects；　and　be　enlisted　only　for　a　year；　as　was　customary　at　Rome：　or　if　there　should　be　a　standing　army；　composed　chiefly　of　the　most　despicable　part　of　the　nation；　the　legislative　power　should　have　a　right　to　disband　them　as　soon　as　it　pleased；　the　soldiers　should　live　in　common　with　the　rest　of　the　people；　and　no　separate　camp；　barracks；　or　fortress　should　be　suffered。

When　once　an　army　is　established；　it　ought　not　to　depend　immediately　on　the　legislative；　but　on　the　executive；　power；　and　this　from　the　very　nature　of　the　thing；　its　business　consisting　more　in　action　than　in　deliberation。

It　is　natural　for　mankind　to　set　a　higher　value　upon　courage　than　timidity；　on　activity　than　prudence；　on　strength　than　counsel。　Hence　the　army　will　ever　despise　a　senate；　and　respect　their　own　officers。　They　will　naturally　slight　the　orders　sent　them　by　a　body　of　men　whom　they　look　upon　as　cowards；　and　therefore　unworthy　to　command　them。　So　that　as　soon　as　the　troops　depend　entirely　on　the　legislative　body；　it　becomes　a　military　government；　and　if　the　contrary　has　ever　happened；　it　has　been　owing　to　some　extraordinary　circumstances。　It　is　because　the　army　was　always　kept　divided；　it　is　because　it　was　composed　of　several　bodies　that　depended　each　on　a　particular　province；　it　is　because　the　capital　towns　were　strong　places；　defended　by　their　natural　situation；　and　not　garrisoned　with　regular　troops。　Holland；　for　instance；　is　still　safer　than　Venice；　she　might　drown　or　starve　the　revolted　troops；　for　as　they　are　not　quartered　in　towns　capable　of　furnishing　them　with　necessary　subsistence；　this　subsistence　is　of　course　precarious。

In　perusing　the　admirable　treatise　of　Tacitus　On　the　Manners　of　the　Germans；＇13＇　we　find　it　is　from　that　nation　the　English　have　borrowed　the　idea　of　their　political　government。　This　beautiful　system　was　invented　first　in　the　woods。

As　all　human　things　have　an　end；　the　state　we　are　speaking　of　will　lose　its　liberty；　will　perish。　Have　not　Rome；　Sparta；　and　Carthage　perished？　It　will　perish　when　the　legislative　power　shall　be　more　corrupt　than　the　executive。

It　is　not　my　business　to　examine　whether　the　English　actually　enjoy　this　liberty　or　not。　Sufficient　it　is　for　my　purpose　to　observe　that　it　is　established　by　their　laws；　and　I　inquire　no　further。

Neither　do　I　pretend　by　this　to　undervalue　other　governments；　nor　to　say　that　this　extreme　political　liberty　ought　to　give　uneasiness　to　those　who　have　only　a　moderate　share　of　it。　How　should　I　have　any　such　design；　I　who　think　that　even　the　highest　refinement　of　reason　is　not　always　desirable；　and　that　mankind　generally　find　their　account　better　in　mediums　than　in　extremes？

Harrington；　in　his　Oceana；　has　also　inquired　into　the　utmost　degree　of　liberty　to　which　the　constitution　of　a　state　may　be　carried。　But　of　him　indeed　it　may　be　said　that　for　want　of　knowing　the　nature　of　real　liberty　he　busied　himself　in　pursuit　of　an　imaginary　one；　and　that　he　built　a　Chalcedon；　though　he　had　a　Byzantium　before　his　eyes。

7。　Of　the　Monarchies　we　are　acquainted　with。　The　monarchies　we　are　acquainted　with　have　not；　like　that　we　have　been　speaking　of；　liberty　for　their　direct　view：　the　only　aim　is　the　glory　of　the　subject；　of　the　state；　and　of　the　sovereign。　But　hence　there　results　a　spirit　of　liberty；　which　in　those　states　is　capable　of　achieving　as　great　things；　and　of　contributing　as　much　perhaps　to　happiness　as　liberty　itself。

Here　the　three　powers　are　not　distributed　and　founded　on　the　model　of　the　constitution　above…mentioned；　they　have　each　a　particular　distribution；　according　to　which　they　border　more　or　less　on　political　liberty；　and　if　they　did　not　border　upon　it；　monarchy　would　degenerate　into　despotic　government。

8。　Why　the　Ancients　had　not　a　clear　Idea　of　Monarchy。　The　ancients　had　no　notion　of　a　government　founded　on　a　body　of　nobles；　and　much　less　on　a　legislative　body　composed　of　the　representatives　of　the　people。　The　republics　of　Greece　and　Italy　were　cities　that　had　each　their　own　form　of　government；　and　convened　their　subjects　within　their　walls。　Before　Rome　had　swallowed　up　all　the　other　republics；　there　was　scarcely　anywhere　a　king　to　be　found；　no；　not　in　Italy；　Gaul；　Spain；　or　Germany；　they　were　all　petty　states　or　republics。　Even　Africa　itself　was　subject　to　a　great　commonwealth：　and　Asia　Minor　was　occupied　by　Greek　colonies。　There　was；　therefore；　no　instance　of　deputies　of　towns　or　assemblies　of　the　states；　one　must　have　gone　as　far　as　Persia　to　find　a　monarchy。

I　am　not　ignorant　that　there　were　confederate　republics；　in　which　several　towns　sent　deputies　to　an　assembly。　But　I　affirm　there　was　no　monarchy　on　that　model。

The　first　plan；　therefore；　of　the　monarchies　we　are　acquainted　with　was　thus　formed。　The　German　nations　that　conquer