the spirit of laws-第51部分

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heir　whole　felicity　consist　in　idleness。

The　effect　of　wealth　in　a　country　is　to　inspire　every　heart　with　ambition：　that　of　poverty　is　to　give　birth　to　despair。　The　former　is　excited　by　labour；　the　latter　is　soothed　by　indolence。

Nature　is　just　to　all　mankind；　and　repays　them　for　their　industry：　she　renders　them　industrious　by　annexing　rewards　in　proportion　to　their　labour。　But　if　an　arbitrary　prince　should　attempt　to　deprive　the　people　of　nature's　bounty；　they　would　fall　into　a　disrelish　of　industry；　and　then　indolence　and　inaction　must　be　their　only　happiness。

3。　Of　Taxes　in　Countries　where　Part　of　the　People　are　Villains　or　Bondmen。　The　state　of　villainage　is　sometimes　established　after　a　conquest。　In　that　case；　the　bondman　or　villain　that　tills　the　land　ought　to　have　a　kind　of　partnership　with　his　master。　Nothing　but　a　communication　of　loss　or　profit　can　reconcile　those　who　are　doomed　to　labour　to　such　as　are　blessed　with　a　state　of　affluence。

4。　Of　a　Republic　in　the　like　Case。　When　a　republic　has　reduced　a　nation　to　the　drudgery　of　cultivating　her　lands；　she　ought　never　to　suffer　the　free　subject　to　have　the　power　of　increasing　the　tribute　of　the　bondman。　This　was　not　permitted　at　Sparta。　Those　brave　people　thought　the　Helotes＇1＇　would　be　more　industrious　in　cultivating　their　lands；　and　knowing　that　their　servitude　was　not　to　increase；　they　imagined；　likewise；　that　the　masters　would　be　better　citizens；　when　they　desired　no　more　than　what　they　were　accustomed　to　enjoy。

5。　Of　a　Monarchy　in　the　like　Case。　When　the　nobles　of　a　monarchical　state　cause　the　lands　to　be　cultivated　for　their　own　use　by　a　conquered　people；　they　ought　never　to　have　the　power　of　increasing　the　service　or　tribute。＇2＇　Besides；　it　is　right　the　prince　should　be　satisfied　with　his　own　demesne　and　the　military　service。　But　if　he　wants　to　raise　taxes　on　the　vassals　of　his　nobility；　the　lords　of　the　several　districts　ought　to　be　answerable　for　the　tax；＇3＇　and　be　obliged　to　pay　it　for　the　vassals；　by　whom　they　may　be　afterwards　reimbursed。　If　this　rule　be　not　followed；　the　lord　and　the　collectors　of　the　public　taxes　will　harass　the　poor　vassal　by　turns　till　he　perishes　with　misery　or　flies　into　the　woods。

6。　Of　a　despotic　Government　in　the　like　Case。　The　foregoing　rule　is　still　more　indispensably　necessary　in　a　despotic　government。　The　lord　who　is　every　moment　liable　to　be　stripped　of　his　lands　and　his　vassals　is　not　so　eager　to　preserve　them。

When　Peter　I　thought　proper　to　follow　the　custom　of　Germany；　and　to　demand　his　taxes　in　money；　he　made　a　very　prudent　regulation；　which　is　still　followed　in　Russia。　The　gentleman　levies　the　tax　on　the　peasant；　and　pays　it　to　the　Czar。　If　the　number　of　peasants　diminishes；　he　pays　all　the　same；　if　it　increases；　he　pays　no　more；　so　that　it　is　his　interest　not　to　worry　or　oppress　his　vassals。

7。　Of　Taxes　in　Countries　where　Villainage　is　not　established。　When　the　inhabitants　of　a　state　are　all　free　subjects；　and　each　man　enjoys　his　property　with　as　much　right　as　the　prince　his　sovereignty；　taxes　may　then　be　laid　either　on　persons；　on　lands；　on　merchandise；　on　two　of　these；　or　on　all　three　together。

In　the　taxing　of　persons；　it　would　be　an　unjust　proportion　to　conform　exactly　to　that　of　property。　At　Athens　the　people　were　divided　into　four　classes。＇4＇　Those　who　drew　five　hundred　measures　of　liquid　or　dried　fruit　from　their　estates　paid　a　talent＇5＇　to　the　public；　those　who　drew　three　hundred　measures　paid　half　a　talent；　those　who　had　two　hundred　measures　paid　ten　min？；　those　of　the　fourth　class　paid　nothing　at　all。　The　tax　was　fair；　though　it　was　not　proportionable：　if　it　did　not　follow　the　measure　of　people's　property；　it　followed　that　of　their　wants。　It　was　judged　that　every　man　had　an　equal　share　of　what　was　necessary　for　nature；　that　whatsoever　was　necessary　for　nature　ought　not　to　be　taxed；　that　to　this　succeeded　the　useful；　which　ought　to　be　taxed；　but　less　than　the　superfluous；　and　that　the　largeness　of　the　taxes　on　what　was　superfluous　prevented　superfluity。

In　the　taxing　of　lands　it　is　customary　to　make　lists　or　registers；　in　which　the　different　classes　of　estates　are　ranged。　But　it　is　very　difficult　to　know　these　differences；　and　still　more　so　to　find　people　that　are　not　interested　in　mistaking　them。　Here；　therefore；　are　two　sorts　of　injustice；　that　of　the　man　and　that　of　the　thing。　But　if　in　general　the　tax　be　not　exorbitant；　and　the　people　continue　to　have　plenty　of　necessaries；　these　particular　acts　of　injustice　will　do　no　harm。　On　the　contrary；　if　the　people　are　permitted　to　enjoy　only　just　what　is　necessary　for　subsistence；　the　least　disproportion　will　be　of　the　greatest　consequence。

If　some　subjects　do　not　pay　enough；　the　mischief　is　not　so　great；　their　convenience　and　ease　turn　always　to　the　public　advantage；　if　some　private　people　pay　too　much；　their　ruin　redounds　to　the　public　detriment。　If　the　government　proportions　its　fortune　to　that　of　individuals；　the　ease　and　convenience　of　the　latter　will　soon　make　its　fortune　rise。　The　whole　depends　upon　a　critical　moment：　shall　the　state　begin　with　impoverishing　the　subjects　to　enrich　itself？　Or　had　it　better　wait　to　be　enriched　by　its　subjects？　Is　it　more　advisable　for　it　to　have　the　former　or　the　latter　advantage？　Which　shall　it　choose　　to　begin　or　to　end　with　opulence？　

The　duties　felt　least　by　the　people　are　those　on　merchandise；　because　they　are　not　demanded　of　them　in　form。　They　may　be　so　prudently　managed　that　the　people　themselves　shall　hardly　know　they　pay　them。　For　this　purpose　it　is　of　the　utmost　consequence　that　the　person　who　sells　the　merchandise　should　pay　the　duty。　He　is　very　sensible　that　he　does　not　pay　it　for　himself；　and　the　consumer；　who　pays　it　in　the　main；　confounds　it　with　the　price。　Some　authors　have　observed　that　Nero　had　abolished　the　duty　of　the　five…and…twentieth　part　arising　from　the　sale　of　slaves；＇6＇　and　yet　he　had　only　ordained　that　it　should　be　paid　by　the　seller　instead　of　the　purchaser；　this　regulation；　which　left　the　impost　entire；　seemed　nevertheless　to　suppress　it。

There　are　two　states　in　Europe　where　the　imposts　are　very　heavy　upon　liquors：　in　one　the　brewer　alone　pays　the　duty；　in　the　other　it　is　levied　indiscriminately　upon　all　the　consumers；　in　the　first　nobody　feels　the　rigour　of　the　impost；　in　the　second　it　is　looked　upon　as　a　grievance；　in　the　former　the　subject　is　sensible　only　of　the　liberty　he　has　of　not　paying；　in　the　latter　he　feels　only　the　necessity　that　compels　him　to　pay。

Further；　the　obliging　the　consumers　to　pay　requires　a　perpetual　rummaging　and　searching　into　their　houses。　Now　nothing　is　more　contrary　than　this　to　liberty；　and　those　who　establish　these　sorts　of　duties　have　not　surely　been　so　happy　as　to　hit　upon　the　best　method　of　collecting　the　revenue。

8。　In　what　Manner　the　Deception　is　preserved。　In　order　to　make　the　purchaser　confound　the　price　of　the　commodity　with　the　impost；　there　must　be　some　proportion　between　the　impost　and　the　value　of　the　commodity：　for　which　reason　there　ought　not　to　be　an　excessive　duty　upon　merchandise　of　little　value。　There　are　countries　in　which　the　duty　exceeds　seventeen　or　eighteen　times　the　value　of　the　commodity。　In　this　case　the　prince　removes　the　disguise：　his　subjects　plainly　see　they　are　dealt　with　in　an　unreasonable　manner；　which　renders　them　most　exquisitely　sensible　of　their　servile　condition。

Besides；　the　prince；　to　be　able　to　levy　a　duty　so　disproportioned　to　the　value　of　the　commodity；　must　be　himself　the　vendor；　and　the　people　must　not　have　it　in　their　power　to　purchase　it　elsewhere：　a　practice　subject　to　a　thousand　inconveniences。

Smuggling　being　in　this　case　extremely　lucrative；　the　natural　and　most　reasonable　penalty；　namely；　the　confiscation　of　the　merchandise；　becomes　incapable　of　putting　a　stop　to　it；　especially　as　this　very　merchandise　is　intrinsically　of　inconsiderable　value。　Recourse　must　therefore　be　had　to　extravagant　punishments；　such　as　those　inflicted　for　capital　crimes。

All　proportion　then　of　penalties　is　at　an　end。　Persons　that　cannot　really　be　considered　as　vicious　are　punished　like　the　most　infamous　criminals；　which　of　all　things　in　the　world　is　the　most　contrary　to　the　spirit　of　a　moderate　government。

Again；　in　proportion　as　people　are　tempted　to　cheat　the　farmer　of　the　revenues；　the　more　the　latter　is　enriched；　and　the　former　impoverished。　To　put　a　stop　to　smuggling；　the　farmer　must　be　invested　with　extraordinary　means　of　oppressing；　and　then　the　country　is　ruined。

9。　Of　a　bad　Kind　of　Impost。　We　shall　here；　by　the　way；　take　notice　of　an　impost　laid　in　particular　countries　on　the　different　articles　of　civil　contracts。　As　these　are　things　subject　to　very　nice　disquisitions；　a　vast　deal　of　knowledge　is　necessary　to　make　any　tolerable　defence　against　the　farmer　of　the　revenues；　who　interprets；　in　that　case；　the　regulations　of　the　prince；　and　exercises　an　arbitrary　power　over　people's　fortunes。　Experience　has　demonstrated　that　a　duty　on　the　paper　on　which　the　deeds　are　drawn　would　be　of　far　greater　service。

10。　That　the　Greatness　of　Taxes　depends　on　the　Nature　of　the　Government。　Taxes　ought　to　be　very　light　in　despotic　governments：　otherwise　who　would　be　at　the　trouble　of　tilling　the　land？　Besides；　how　is　it　possible　to　pay　heavy　duties　in　a　government　that　makes　no　manner　of　return　to　the　different　contributions　of　the　subject？

The　exorbitant　power　of　the　prince；　and　the　extreme　depression　of　the　people；　require　that　there　should　not　be　even　a　possibility　of　the　least　mistake　between　them。　The　taxes　ought　to　be　so　easy　to　collect；　and　so　clearly　settled；　as　to　leave　no　opportunity　for　the　collectors　to　increase　or　diminish　them。　A　portion　of　the　fruits　of　the　earth；　a　capitation；　a　duty　of　so　much　per　cent　on　merchandise；　are　the　only　taxes　suitable　to　that　government。

Merchants　in　despotic　countries　ought　to　have　a　personal　safeguard；　to　which　all　due　respect　should　be　paid。　Without　this　they　would　be　too　weak　to　dispute　with　the　custom…house　officers。

11。　Of　Confiscations。　With　respect　to　confiscations；　there　is　one　thing　very　particular　that；　contrary　to　the　general　custom；　they　are　more　severe　in　Europe　than　in　Asia。　In　Europe　not　only　the　merchandise；　but　even　sometimes　the　ships　and