战争与和平(下)-第23部分

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o　him；　a　book　read　by　him；　the　work　he　is　employed　in；　even　the　air　he　breathes；　or　the　light　that　falls　on　the　objects　around　him；　we　perceive　that　every　one　of　those　circumstances　has　its　influence　on　him；　and　controls　at　least　one　side　of　his　activity。　And　the　more　we　perceive　of　those　influences；　the　smaller　the　idea　we　form　of　his　freedom；　and　the　greater　our　conception　of　the　necessity　to　which　he　is　subject。
2。　The　second　cause　of　variation　is　due　to　the　degree　of　distinctness　with　which　the　man’s　position　in　time　is　perceived；　the　clearness　of　the　notion　formed　by　us　of　the　place　the　man’s　action　fills　in　time。　It　is　owing　to　this　class　of　considerations　that　the　fall　of　the　first　man；　leading　to　the　origin　of　the　human　race；　seems　to　us　obviously　less　free　than　the　marriage　of　any　one　of　our　contemporaries。　It　is　owing　to　this　class　of　considerations　that　the　life　and　acts　of　men　who　lived　years　ago　cannot　seem　to　me　as　free　as　the　life　of　my　contemporaries；　the　consequences　of　whose　acts　are　still　unknown　to　me。
The　variation　in　our　conception　of　free　will　in　this　connection　depends　on　the　interval　of　time　that　has　elapsed　between　the　action　and　our　criticism　of　it。
If　I　examine　an　act　I　have　committed　a　moment　ago　in　approximately　the　same　circumstances　as　I　am　placed　in　now；　my　act　appears　to　me　indubitably　free。　But　if　I　examine　an　act　I　have　committed　a　month　ago；　then　being　placed　in　other　circumstances；　I　cannot　help　recognising　that　had　not　that　act　been　committed；　much　that　is　good　and　agreeable；　and　even　inevitable；　resulting　from　that　act；　could　not　have　taken　place。　If　I　reflect　on　a　still　more　remote　action；　performed　ten　years　or　more　ago；　the　consequences　of　my　act　are　even　plainer　to　me；　and　it　will　be　difficult　for　me　to　conceive　what　would　have　happened　if　that　action　had　not　taken　place。　The　further　back　I　go　in　my　reminiscences；　or　what　is　the　same　thing；　the　further　forward　in　my　criticism　of　them；　the　more　doubtful　becomes　my　view　of　the　freedom　of　my　action。
We　find　precisely　the　same　ratio　of　variation　in　our　views　of　the　element　of　free　will　in　the　general　affairs　of　men　in　history。　A　contemporary　event　we　conceive　of　as　undoubtedly　the　doing　of　all　the　men　we　know　of　concerned　in　it。　But　with　a　more　remote　event；　we　see　its　inevitable　consequences；　which　prevent　our　conceiving　of　anything　else　as　possible。　And　the　further　back　we　go　in　the　examination　of　events；　the　less　arbitrary　they　seem　to　us。
The　Austro…Prussian　war　appears　to　us　to　be　undoubtedly　the　result　of　the　crafty　acts　of　Bismarck　and　so　on。
The　Napoleonic　wars；　though　more　doubtful；　appear　to　us　the　effect　of　the　free　will　of　the　leading　heroes　of　those　wars。　But　in　the　Crusades　we　see　an　event；　filling　its　definite　place　in　history；　without　which　the　modern　history　of　Europe　is　inconceivable；　although　to　the　chroniclers　of　the　Crusades；　those　events　appeared　simply　due　to　the　will　of　a　few　persons。　In　the　migrations　of　peoples　it　never　occurs　to　any　one　now　that　the　renewal　of　the　European　world　depended　on　a　caprice　of　Attila’s。　The　more　remote　in　history　the　subject　of　our　observations；　the　more　doubtful　we　feel　of　the　free　will　of　the　persons　concerned　in　the　event；　and　the　more　obvious　is　the　law　of　necessity　in　it。
3。　The　third　element　influencing　our　judgment　is　the　degree　to　which　we　can　apprehend　that　endless　chain　of　causation　demanded　by　the　reason；　in　which　every　phenomenon　comprehended；　and　so　every　act　of　man；　must　have　its　definite　place；　as　a　result　of　past　and　a　cause　of　future　acts。
This　is　the　element　that　causes　our　acts　and　those　of　others　to　appear　to　us　on　one　side　more　free　the　less　we　know　of　the　physiological；　psychological；　and　historical　laws　deduced　from　observation；　and　the　less　thoroughly　the　physiological；　psychological；　or　historical　cause　of　the　act　has　been　investigated　by　us；　and　on　the　other　hand　the　less　simple　the　act　observed　and　the　less　complex　the　character　and　mind　of　the　man　whose　action　we　are　examining。
When　we　have　absolutely　no　understanding　of　the　causes　of　an　action—whether　vicious　or　virtuous　or　simply　non…moral—we　ascribe　a　greater　element　of　free　will　to　it。　In　the　case　of　a　crime；　we　are　more　urgent　in　demanding　punishment　for　the　act；　in　the　case　of　a　virtuous　act；　we　are　warmer　in　our　appreciation　of　its　merits。　In　cases　of　no　moral　bearing；　we　recognise　more　individuality；　originality；　and　independence　in　it。　But　if　only　one　of　the　innumerable　causes　of　the　act　is　known　to　us；　we　recognise　a　certain　element　of　necessity；　and　are　less　ready　to　exact　punishment　for　the　crime；　to　acknowledge　merit　in　the　virtuous　act；　or　freedom　in　the　apparent　originality。　The　fact　that　the　criminal　was　reared　in　vicious　surroundings　softens　his　fault　in　our　eyes。　The　self…sacrifice　of　a　father；　of　a　mother；　or　self…sacrifice　with　the　possibility　of　reward　is　more　comprehensible　than　gratuitous　self…sacrifice；　and　so　is　regarded　by　us　as　less　deserving　of　sympathy　and　less　the　work　of　free　will。　The　founder　of　a　sect；　of　a　party；　or　the　inventor　impresses　us　less　when　we　understand　how　and　by　what　the　way　was　paved　for　his　activity。　If　we　have　a　large　range　of　experiments；　if　our　observation　is　continually　directed　to　seeking　correlations　in　men’s　actions　between　causes　and　effects；　their　actions　will　seem　to　us　more　necessary　and　less　free；　the　more　accurately　we　connect　causes　and　effects。　If　the　actions　investigated　are　simple；　and　we　have　had　a　vast　number　of　such　actions　under　observation；　our　conception　of　their　inevitability　will　be　even　more　complete。　The　dishonest　conduct　of　the　son　of　a　dishonest　father；　the　misbehaviour　of　women；　who　have　been　led　into　certain　surroundings；　the　relapse　of　the　reformed　drunkard　into　drunkenness；　and　so　on；　are　instances　of　conduct　which　seem　to　us　to　be　less　free　the　better　we　understand　their　cause。　If　the　man　himself　whose　conduct　we　are　examining　is　on　the　lowest　stage　of　mental　development；　like　a　child；　a　mad…man；　or　a　simpleton；　then　when　we　know　the　causes　of　the　act　and　the　simplicity　of　the　character　and　intelligence；　we　see　so　great　an　element　of　necessity；　and　so　little　free　will；　that　we　can　foretell　the　act　that　will　follow；　as　soon　as　we　know　the　cause　bound　to　bring　it　forth。
In　all　legislative　codes　the　exoneration　of　crime　or　admission　of　mitigating　circumstances　rests　only　on　those　three　classes　of　consideration。　The　guilt　is　conceived　as　greater　or　less　according　to　the　greater　or　lesser　knowledge　of　the　conditions　in　which　the　man　judged　is　placed；　the　greater　or　less　interval　of　time　between　the　perpetration　of　the　crime　and　the　judgment　of　it；　and　the　greater　or　less　comprehension　of　the　causes　that　led　to　the　act。


Chapter　10
AND　THUS　our　conception　of　free　will　and　necessity　is　gradually　diminished　or　increased　according　to　the　degree　of　connection　with　the　external　world；　the　degree　of　remoteness　in　time；　and　the　degree　of　dependence　on　causes　which　we　see　in　the　phenomenon　of　man’s　life　that　we　examine。　So　that　if　we　examine　the　case　of　a　man　in　which　the　connection　with　the　external　world　is　better　known；　the　interval　of　time　between　the　examination　and　the　act　greater；　and　the　causes　of　the　action　easier　to　comprehend；　we　form　a　conception　of　a　greater　element　of　necessity　and　less　free　will。　If　we　examine　a　man　in　a　less　close　dependence　on　external　conditions；　if　his　action　is　committed　at　a　moment　nearer　the　present；　and　the　causes　leading　him　to　it　are　beyond　our　ken；　we　form　a　conception　of　a　less　element　of　necessity　and　a　greater　element　of　free　will　in　his　action。
But　in　neither　case；　however　we　shift　our　point　of　view；　however　clear　we　make　to　ourselves　the　connection　in　which　the　man　is　placed　with　the　external　world；　or　however　fully　comprehensible　it　may　appear　to　us；　however　long　or　short　a　period　of　time　we　select；　however　explicable　or　unfathomable　the　causes　of　the　act　may　be　to　us；　we　can　never　conceive　of　complete　free　will；　nor　of　complete　necessity　in　any　action。
1。　However　carefully　we　imagine　a　man　excluded　from　the　influence　of　the　external　world；　we　can　never　form　a　conception　of　freedom　in　space。　Every　act　of　man’s　is　inevitably　limited　by　what　surrounds　him　and　by　his　own　body。　I　raise　my　arm　and　let　it　fall。　My　action　seems　to　me　free；　but　asking　myself　could　I　raise　my　arm　in　any　direction；　I　see　that　I　moved　it　in　the　direction　in　which　there　was　least　hindrance　to　the　action　arising　from　bodies　around　me　or　from　the　construction　of　my　own　body。　I　chose　one　out　of　all　the　possible　directions；　because　in　that　direction　I　met　with　least　hindrance。　For　my　action　to　be　entirely　free；　it　would　have　to　meet　with　no　hindrance　in　any　direction。　To　conceive　a　man　quite　free；　we　have　to　conceive　him　outside　of　space；　which　is　obviously　impossible。
2。　However　near　we　bring　the　time　of　criticism　to　the　time　of　action；　we　can　never　form　a　conception　of　freedom　in　time。　For　if　I　examine　an　act　committed　a　second　ago；　I　must　still　recognise　that　it　is　not　free；　since　the　act　is　irrevocably　linked　to　the　moment　at　which　it　was　committed。　Can　I　lift　my　arm？　I　lift　it；　but　I　ask　myself：　Could　I　not　have　lifted　my　arm　in　that　moment　of　time　that　has　just　passed？　To　convince　myself　of　that；　I　do　not　lift　my　arm　the　next　moment。　But　I　am　not　abstaining　from　lifting　it　that　first　moment　of　which　I　asked　myself　the　question。　The　time　has　gone　by　and　to　detain　it　was　not　in　my　power；　and　the　hand　which　I　then　raised　and　the　air　in　which　I　raised　it　are　not　the　same　as　the　hand　I　do　not　raise　now　or　the　air　in　which　I　do　not　now　raise　it。　The　moment　in　which　the　first　movement　took　place　is　irrevocable；　and　in　that　moment　I　could　only　perform　one　action；　and　whatever　movement　I　had　made；　that　movement　could　have　been　the　only　one。　The　fact　that　the　following　moment　I　abstained　from　lifting　my　arm　did　not　prove　that　I　could　have　abstained　from　lifting　it。　And　since　my　movement　could　only　be　one　in　one　moment　of　time；　it　could　have　been　no　other。　To　conceive　it　to　oneself　as　free；　one　must　conceive　it　in　the　present　on　the　boundary　between　the　past　and　the　future；　that　is；　outside　time；　which　is　impossible。
3。　However　we　increase　the　degree　of　difficulty　of　comprehending　the　causes　of　the　act；　we　never　reac