history of philosophy-第32部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


and　becomes　a　universal；　the　best　known　example　of　this　is　to　be　found　in　positive　and　negative
electricity　in　so　far　as　it　is　positive　and　negative。　There　is　another　shortcoming　of　a　formal　nature；
and　one　of　which　all　empiricists　partake；　—　that　is　that　they　believe　themselves　to　be　keeping　to
experience　alone；　it　is　to　them　an　unknown　fact　that　in　receiving　these　perceptions　they　are
indulging　in　metaphysics。　Man　does　not　stop　short　at　the　individual；　nor　can　he　do　so。　He　seeks
the　universal；　but　thoughts；　even　if　not　Notions　likewise；　are　what　constitute　the　same。　The　most
remarkable　thought…form　is　that　of　force；　we　thus　speak　of　the　force　of　electricity；　of　magnetism；
of　gravity。　Force；　however；　is　a　universal　and　not　a　perceptible；　quite　uncritically　and
unconsciously　the　empiricists　thus　permit　of　determinations　such　as　these。

3。　Bacon　finally　gives　the　objects　with　which　Philosophy　mainly　has　to　deal。　These　objects　contrast
much　with　that　which　we　derive　from　perception　and　experience。　“In　the　summary　which　Bacon
gives　of　what　he　conceives　ought　to　be　the　objects　of　philosophical　inquiry；　are　the　following；　and
we　select　those　which　he　principally　dwells　upon　in　his　works：　‘The　prolongation　of　life；　the
restitution　of　youth　in　some　degree；　the　retardation　of　old　age；　and　the　altering　of　statures；　the
altering　of　features；　versions　of　bodies　into　other　bodies；　making　of　new　species；　impression　of　the
air　and　raising　tempests；　greater　pleasures　of　the　senses；　&c。’”　He　likewise　deals　with　objects
such　as　these；　and　he　seeks　to　direct　attention　upon　whether　in　their　regard　the　means　could　not　be
found　to　carry　out　their　ends；　in　such　powers　we　should　be　able　to　make　some　progress。　“He
complains　that　such　investigations　have　been　neglected　by　those　whom　be　designates　ignavi
regionum　exploratores。　In　his　Natural　History　he　gives　formal　receipts　for　making　gold；　and
performing　many　wonders。”　（10）　Bacon　thus　does　not　by　any　means　take　the　intelligent
standpoint　of　an　investigation　of　nature；　being　still　involved　in　the　grossest　superstition；　false　magic；
&c。　This　we　find　to　be　on　the　whole　propounded　in　an　intelligent　way；　and　Bacon　thus　remains
within　the　conceptions　of　his　time。　“The　conversion　of　silver；　quicksilver；　or　any　other　metal　into
gold　is　a　thing　difficult　to　believe；　yet　it　is　far　more　probable　that　a　man　who　knows　clearly　the
natures　of　weight；　of　the　colour　of　yellow；　of　malleability；　and　extension；　of　volatility　and　fixedness；
and　who　has　also　made　diligent　search　into　the　first　seeds　and　menstruums　of　minerals；　may　at　last
by　much　and　sagacious　endeavour　produce　gold；　than　that　a　few　grains　of　an　elixir　may　so　do。　。　。　。
So　again　a　man　who　knows　well　the　nature　of　rarefaction；　of　assimilation；　and　of　alimentation；　shall
by　diets；　bathings；　and　the　like　prolong　life；　or　in　some　degree　renew　the　vigour　of　youth。”　（11）
These　assertions　are　thus　not　as　crude　as　they　at　first　appear。　In　dealing　with　Medicine　Bacon
speaks　amongst　other　things　of　maceration　（Malacissatio　per　exterius）　（12）　and　so　forth。

Bacon　emphasizes　what　has　reference　to　the　formal　aspect　of　investigation。　For　he　says；　“Natural
philosophy　is　divided　into　two　parts；　the　first　consists　in　the　investigation　of　causes；　the　second　in
the　production　of　effects；　the　causes　to　be　investigated　are　either　final　or　formal　causes；　or　else
material　or　efficient　causes。　The　former　constitutes　metaphysics；　the　latter　physics。　This　last　Bacon
looks　upon　as　a　branch　of　philosophy　very　inferior　in　point　of　dignity　and　importance　to　the　other
and　accordingly　to　ascertain　the　most　probable　means　of　improving　our　knowledge　of　metaphysics
is　the　great　object　of　his　Organon。〃　（13）　He　himself　says：　“It　is　a　correct　position　that　‘true
knowledge　is　knowledge　by　causes。　And　causes；　again；　are　not　improperly；　distributed　into　four
kind：　the　material；　the　formal；　the　efficient；　and　the　final。’”　（14）　（Vol。　I。　p。　174；　Vol。　II。　p。　138。）

But　in　this　connection　an　important　point　is　that　Bacon　has　turned　against　the　teleological
investigation　of　nature；　against　the　investigation　into　final　causes。　“The　investigation　of　final　causes
is　useless；　they　corrupt　rather　than　advance　the　sciences　except　such　as　have　to　do　with　human
action。”　（15）　To　Bacon　the　important　matter　is　to　investigate　by　the　study　of　caus？　efficientes。
To　the　consideration　of　final　causes　such　assertions　as　these　belong：　“That　the　hairs　of　the　eyelids
are　for　a　protection　to　the　eyes；　that　the　thick　skins　and　hides　of　living　creatures　are　to　defend
them　from　heat　and　cold；　that　the　trees　have　leaves　so　that　the　fruit　may　not　suffer　from　sun　and
wind”　（16）：　the　hair　is　on　the　head　on　account　of　warmth；　thunder　and　lightning　are　the
punishment　of　God；　or　else　they　make　fruitful　the　earth；　marmots　sleep　during　the　winter　because
they　can　find　nothing　to　eat；　snails　have　a　shell　in　order　that　they　may　be　secure　against　attacks；　the
bee　is　provided　with　a　sting。　According　to　Bacon　this　has　been　worked　out　in　innumerable
different　ways。　The　negative　and　external　side　of　utility　is　turned　round；　and　the　lack　of　this
adaptation　to　end　is　likewise　drawn　within　the　same　embrace。　It　may；　for　example；　be　said　that　if
sun　or　moon　were　to　shine　at　all　times；　the　police　might　save　much　money；　and　this　would　provide
men　with　food　and　drink　for　whole　months　together。　It　was　right　that　Bacon　should　set　himself　to
oppose　this　investigation　into　final　causes；　because　it　relates　to　external　expediency；　just　as　Kant
was　right　in　distinguishing　the　inward　teleology　from　the　outward。　As　against　the　external　end；　there
is；　in　fact；　the　inward　end；　i。e。　the　inward　Notion　of　the　thing　itself；　as　we　found　it　earlier　in
Aristotle　（Vol。　II。　pp。　166…163）。　Because　the　organism　possesses　an　inward　adaptation　to　its
ends；　its　members　are　indeed　likewise　externally　adapted　as　regards　one　another；　but　the　ends；　as
external　ends；　are　heterogeneous　to　the　individual；　are　unconnected　with　the　object　which　is
investigated。　Speaking　generally；　the　Notion　of　nature　is　not　in　nature　itself；　which　would　mean　that
the　end　was　in　nature　itself；　but　as　teleological；　the　Notion　is　something　foreign　to　it。　It　does　not
have　the　end　in　itself　in　such　a　way　that　we　have　to　accord　respect　to　it　—　as　the　individual　man
has　his　end　in　himself　and　hence　has　to　be　respected。　But　even　the　individual　man　as　individual　has
only　a　right　to　respect　from　the　individual　as　such；　and　not　from　the　universal。　He　who　acts　in　the
name　of　the　universal；　of　the　state；　as　a　general　does　for　instance；　does　not　require　to　respect　the
individual　at　all；　for　the　latter；　although　an　end　in　himself；　does　not　cease　to　be　relative。　He　is　this
end　in　himself；　not　as　excluding　himself　and　setting　himself　in　opposition；　but　only　in　so　far　as　his
true　reality　is　the　universal　Notion。　The　end　of　the　animal　in　itself　as　an　individual　is　its　own
self…preservation；　but　its　true　end　in　itself　is　the　species。　Its　self…preservation　is　not　involved　in　this；
for　the　self…preservation　of　its　individuality　is　disadvantageous　to　the　species；　while　the　abrogation
of　itself　is　favourable　thereto。

Now　Bacon　separates　the　universal　principle　and　the　efficient　cause；　and　for　that　reason　he
removes　investigation　into　ends　from　physics　to　metaphysics。　Or　he　recognizes　the　Notion；　not　as
universal　in　nature；　but　only　as　necessity；　i。e。　as　a　universal　which　presents　itself　in　the　opposition
of　its　moments；　not　one　which　has　bound　them　into　a　unity　—　in　other　words　he　only
acknowledges　a　comprehension　of　one　determinate　from　another　determinate　going　on　into　infinity；
and　not　of　both　from　their　Notion。　Bacon　has　thus　made　investigation　into　the　efficient　cause　more
general；　and　he　asserts　that　this　investigation　alone　belongs　to　physics；　although　be　allows　that　both
kinds　of　investigation　may　exist　side　by　side。　（17）　Through　that　view　he　effected　a　great　deal；　and
in　so　far　as　it　has　counteracted　the　senseless　superstition　which　in　the　Germanic　nations　far
exceeded　in　its　horrors　and　absurdity　that　of　the　ancient　world；　it　has　the　very　merit　which　we　met
with　in　the　Epicurean　philosophy。　That　philosophy　opposed　itself　to　the　superstitious　Stoics　and　to
superstition　generally　—　which　last　makes　any　existence　that　we　set　before　ourselves　into　a　cause
（a　Beyond　which　is　made　to　exist　in　a　sensuous　way　and　to　operate　as　a　cause）；　or　makes　two
sensuous　things　which　have　no　relation　operate　on　one　another。　This　polemic　of　Bacon’s　against
spectres；　astrology；　magic；　&c。；　（18）　can　certainly　not　be　regarded　exactly　as　Philosophy　like　his
other　reflections；　but　it　is　at　least　of　service　to　culture。

He　also　advises　that　attention　should　be　directed　to　formal　causes；　the　forms　of　things；　and　that
they　should　be　recognized。　（19）　“But　to　give　an　exact　definition　of　the　meaning　which　Bacon
attaches　to　the　phrase　formal　causes　is　rather　difficult；　because　his　language　upon　this　subject　is
uncertain　in　a　very　remarkable　degree。”　（20）　“It　may　be　thought　that　he　understood　by　this　the
immanent　determinations　of　things；　the　laws　of　nature；　as　a　matter　of　fact　the　forms　are　none　else
than　universal　determinations；　species；　&c。”　（21）　He　says：　“The　discovery　of　the　formal　is
despaired　of。　The　efficient　and　the　material　（as　they　are　investigated　and　received；　that　is　as　remote
causes；　without　reference　to　the　latent　process　leading　to　the　forms）　are　but　slight　and　superficial；
and　contribute　little；　if　anything；　to　true　and　active　science。　For　though　in　nature　nothing　really
exists　beside　individual　bodies；　performing　pure　individual　acts　according　to　a　fixed　law；　yet　in
philosophy　this　very　law；　and　the　investigation；　discovery　and　explanation　of　it；　is　the　foundation　as
well　of　knowledge　as　of　operation。　And　it　is　this　law；　with　its　clauses；　that　I　mean　when　I　speak　of
Forms　。　。　。　Let　the　investigation　of　Forms　which　are　eternal　and　immutable　constitute　metaphysics。
Whosoever　is　acquainted　with　Forms　embraces　the　unity　of　nature　in　substances　the　most　unlike。”
（22）　He　goes　through　this　in　detail；　and　quotes　many　examples　to　illustrate　it；　such　as　that　of　Heat。
“Mind　must　raise　itself　from　differences　to　specie