history of philosophy-第49部分

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the　affections　of　the　body　would　not　be　in　God；　in　so　far　as　He　constitutes　our　mind；　but　the　idea
of　another　thing：　that　is　to　say；　the　ideas　of　the　affections　of　our　body　would　not　be　likewise　in　our
mind。”　What　is　perplexing　to　understand　in　Spinoza's　system　is；　on　the　one　hand；　the　absolute
identity　of　thought　and　Being；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　their　absolute　indifference　to　one　another；
because　each　of　them　is　a　manifestation　of　the　whole　essence　of　God。　The　unity　of　the　body　and
consciousness　is；　according　to　Spinoza；　this；　that　the　individual　is　a　mode　of　the　absolute
substance；　which；　as　consciousness；　is　the　representation　of　the　manner　in　which　the　body　is
affected　by　external　things；　all　that　is　in　consciousness　is　also　in　extension；　and　conversely。　“Mind
knows　itself　only　in　so　far　as　it　perceives　the　ideas　of　the　affections　of　body；”　it　has　only　the　idea
of　the　affections　of　its　body；　this　idea　is　synthetic　combination；　as　we　shall　immediately　see。　“The
ideas；　whether　of　the　attributes　of　God　or　of　individual　things；　do　not　recognize　as　their　efficient
cause　their　objects　themselves；　or　the　things　perceived；　but　God　Himself；　in　so　far　as　He　is　that
which　thinks。”（9）　Buhle　（Geschichte　der　neuern　Philos。　Vol。　III。　Section　II。　p。　524）　sums　up　these
propositions　of　Spinoza　thus：　“Thought　is　inseparably　bound　up　with　extension；　therefore　all　that
takes　place　in　extension　must　also　take　place　in　consciousness。”　Spinoza；　however；　also　accepts
both　in　their　separation　from　one　another。　The　idea　of　body；　he　writes　（Epistol。　LXVI。　p。　673）；
includes　only　these　two　in　itself；　and　does　not　express　any　other　attributes。　The　body　which　it
represents　is　regarded　under　the　attribute　of　extension；　but　the　idea　itself　is　a　mode　of　thought。
Here　we　see　a　dividing　asunder；　mere　identity；　the　undistinguishable　nature　of　all　things　in　the
Absolute；　is　insufficient　even　for　Spinoza。

The　individuum；　individuality　itself；　is　thus　defined　by　Spinoza　（Ethic。　P。　11。　Prop。　XIII。　Defin。　p。
92）：　“When　several　bodies　of　the　same　or　of　different　magnitudes　are　so　pressed　together　that　they
rest　on　one　another；　or　when；　moving　with　like　or　different　degrees　of　rapidity；　they　communicate
their　movement　to　one　another　in　a　certain　measure；　we　say　that　such　bodies　are　united　to　one
another；　and　that　all　together　they　form　one　body　or　individuum；　which　by　this　union　distinguishes
itself　from　all　the　other　bodies。〃　Here　we　are　at　the　extreme　limit　of　Spinoza's　system；　and　it　is　here
that　his　weak　point　appears。　Individuation；　the　one；　is　a　mere　synthesis；　it　is　quite　a　different　thing
from　the　Ichts　or　self…hood　of　Boehme　（supra；　pp。　205…207）；　since　Spinoza　has　only　universality；
thought；　and　not　self…consciousness。　If；　before　considering　this　in　reference　to　the　whole；　we　take
it　from　the　other　side；　namely　from　the　understanding；　the　distinction　really　falls　under　that　head　it　is
not　deduced；　it　is　found。　Thus；　as　we　have　already　seen　（p。　270）　“the　understanding　in　act
（intellectus　actu）；　as　also　will；　desire；　love；　must　be　referred　to　natura　naturata；　not　to　natura
naturans。　For　by　the　understanding；　as　recognized　for　itself；　we　do　not　mean　absolute　thought；
but　only　a　certain　mode　of　thought　—　a　mode　which　is　distinct　from　other　modes　like　desire；　love；
etc。；　and　on　that　account　must　be　conceived　by　means　of　absolute　thought；　i。e。；　by　means　of　an
attribute　of　God　which　expresses　an　eternal　and　infinite　essentiality　of　thought；　without　which　the
understanding；　as　also　the　rest　of　the　modes　of　thought；　could　neither　be　nor　be　conceived　to　be。”
（Spinoza；　Ethices；　P。　1。　Propos。　XXXI。　pp。　62；　63）。　Spinoza　is　unacquainted　with　an　infinity　of
form；　which　would　be　something　quite　different　from　that　of　rigid；　unyielding　substance。　What　is
requisite　is　to　recognize　God　as　the　essence　of　essences；　as　universal　substance；　identity；　and　yet
to　preserve　distinctions。

Spinoza　goes　on　to　say：　“What　constitutes　the　real　（actuale）　existence　of　the　human　mind　is　nothing
else　than　the　idea　of　a　particular”　（individual）　“thing；　that　actually　exists；”　not　of　an　infinite　thing。
“The　essence　of　man　involves　no　necessary　existence；　i。e。；　according　to　the　order　of　nature　a　man
may　just　as　well　be　as　not　be。”　For　the　human　consciousness；　as　it　does　not　belong　to　essence　as
an　attribute；　is　a　mode　—　a　mode　of　the　attribute　of　thought。　But　neither　is　the　body；　according　to
Spinoza；　the　cause　of　consciousness；　nor　is　consciousness　the　cause　of　the　body；　but　the　finite
cause　is　here　only　the　relation　of　like　to　like；　body　is　determined　by　body；　conception　by
conception。　“The　body　can　neither　determine　the　mind　to　thought；　nor　can　the　mind　determine　the
body　to　motion；　or　rest；　or　anything　else。　For　all　modes　of　thought　have　God　as　Cause；　in　so　far　as
He　is　a　thinking　thing；　and　not　in　so　far　as　He　is　revealed　by　means　of　another　attribute。　What
therefore　determines　the　mind　to　thought；　is　a　mode　of　thought　and　not　of　extension；　similarly
motion　and　rest　of　the　body　must　be　derived　from　another　body。”（10）　I　might　quote　many　other
such　particular　propositions　from　Spinoza；　but　they　are　very　formal；　and　a　continual　repetition　of
one　and　the　same　thing。

Buhle　（Gesch。　d。　neuern　Phil。　Vol。　III。　Section　2；　pp。　525…528）；　attributes　limited　conceptions　to
Spinoza：　“The　soul　experiences　in　the　body　all　the　'other'　of　which　it　becomes　aware　as　outside　of
the　body；　and　it　becomes　aware　of　this　'other'　only　by　means　of　the　conceptions　of　the　qualities
which　the　body　perceives　therein。　If；　therefore；　the　body　can　perceive　no　qualities　of　a　thing；　the
soul　also　can　come　to　no　knowledge　of　it。　On　the　other　hand；　the　soul　is　equally　unable　to　arrive　at
the　perception　of　the　body　which　belongs　to　it；　the　soul　knows　not　that　the　body　is　there；　and
knows　itself　even　in　no　other　way　than　by　means　of　the　qualities　which　the　body　perceives　in　things
which　are　outside　of　it；　and　by　means　of　the　conceptions　of　the　same。　For　the　body　is　an　individual
thing；　determined　in　a　certain　manner；　which　can　only　gradually；　in　association　with　and　amidst
other　individual　things；　attain　to　existence；　and　can　preserve　itself　in　existence　only　as　thus
connected；　combined　and　associated　with　others；”　i。e。；　in　infinite　progress；　the　body　can　by　no
means　be　conceived　from　itself。　“The　soul's　consciousness　expresses　a　certain　determinate　form　of
a　Notion；　as　the　Notion　itself　expresses　a　determinate　form　of　an　individual　thing。　But　the　individual
thing；　its　Notion；　and　the　Notion　of　this　Notion　are　altogether　and　entirely　one　and　the　same　thing；
only　regarded　under　different　attributes。　As　the　soul　is　nothing　else　than　the　immediate　Notion　of
the　body；　and　is　one　and　the　same　thing　with　this；　the　excellence　of　the　soul　can　never　be　anything
else　than　the　excellence　of　the　body。　The　capacities　of　the　understanding　are　nothing　but　the
capacities　of　the　body；　if　they　are　looked　at　from　the　corporeal　point　of　view；　and　the　decisions　of
the　will　are　likewise　determinations　of　the　body。　Individual　things　are　derived　from　God　in　an
eternal　and　infinite　manner”　（i。e。；　once　and　for　all）；　“and　not　in　a　transitory；　finite　and　evanescent
manner；　they　are　derived　from　one　another　merely　inasmuch　as　they　mutually　produce　and　destroy
each　other；　but　in　their　eternal　existence　they　endure　unchangeable。　All　individual　things　mutually
presuppose　each　other；　one　cannot　be　thought　without　the　other；　that　is　to　say　they　constitute
together　an　inseparable　whole；　they　exist　side　by　side　in　one　utterly　indivisible；　infinite　Thing；　and　in
no　other　way　whatever。

3。　We　have　now　to　speak　of　Spinoza's　system　of　morals；　and　that　is　a　subject　of　importance。　Its
great　principle　is　no　other　than　this；　that　the　finite　spirit　is　moral　in　so　far　as　it　has　the　true　Idea；　i。e。；
in　so　far　as　it　directs　its　knowledge　and　will　on　God；　for　truth　is　merely　the　knowledge　of　God。　It
may　be　said　that　there　is　no　morality　loftier　than　this；　since　its　only　requisite　is　to　have　a　clear　idea
of　God。　The　first　thing　Spinoza　speaks　of　in　this　regard　is　the　affections：　“Everything　strives　after
self…preservation。　This　striving　is　the　actual　essence　of　the　thing；　and　involves　only　indefinite　time；
when　referred　exclusively　to　mind；　it　is　termed　will；　when　referred　to　both　mind　and　body　together；
it　is　called　desire。　Determination　of　the　will　（volitio）　and　Idea　are　one　and　the　same　thing。　The
sense　of　liberty　rests　on　this；　that　men　do　not　know　the　determining　causes　of　their　actions。　The
affection　is　a　confused　Idea；　the　more　clearly　and　distinctly；　therefore；　we　know　the　affection；　the
more　it　is　under　our　control。”（11）　The　influence　of　the　affections；　as　confused　and　limited
（inadequate）　ideas；　upon　human　action；　constitutes　therefore；　according　to　Spinoza；　human
slavery；　of　the　passionate　affections　the　principal　are　joy　and　sorrow；　we　are　in　suffering　and
slavery　in　so　far　as　we　relate　ourselves　as　a　part。（12）

“Our　happiness　and　liberty　consist　in　an　enduring　and　eternal　love　to　God；　this　intellectual　love
follows　from　the　nature　of　mind　in　so　far　as　it　is　regarded　as　eternal　truth　through　the　nature　of
God。　The　more　a　man　recognizes　God's　existence　and　loves　Him；　the　less　does　he　suffer　from　evil
affections　and　the　less　is　his　fear　of　death。”（13）　Spinoza　requires　in　addition　the　true　kind　of
knowledge。　There　are；　according　to　him；　three　kinds　of　knowledge；　in　the　first；　which　he　calls
opinion　and　imagination；　he　includes　the　knowledge　which　we　obtain　from　an　individual　object
through　the　senses　—　a　knowledge　fragmentary　and　ill…arranged　—　also　knowledge　drawn　from
signs；　pictorial　conceptions　and　memory。　The　second　kind　of　knowledge　is　for　Spinoza　that　which
we　derive　from　general　conceptions　and　adequate　ideas　of　the　properties　of　things。　The　third　is
intuitive　knowledge　（scientia　intuitiva）　which　rises　from　the　adequate　idea　of　the　formal　essence
of　certain　attributes　of　God　to　the　adequate　knowledge　of　the　essence　of　things。”（14）　Regarding
this　last　he　then　says：　“The　nature　of　reason　is　not　to　contemplate　things　as　contingent；　but　as
necessary　。　。　。　to　think　of　all　things　under　a　certain　form　of　eternity　（sub　quadam　specie
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