history of philosophy-第58部分

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Testament；　by　such　stories　as　those　of　Saul　and　David。　Criminal　and　marriage　laws；　too；　for　long
derived　their　character　from　the　Mosaic　laws；　or；　speaking　generally；　from　those　the　provisions　of
which　possessed　their　value　by　the　fact　of　being　established　by　express　divine　command。　On　the
other　hand　we　have　in　the　second　place　the　reasoning　wherein　we　ourselves　are　the　determining
agents；　and　which　was　called　sound　reason。　In　the　movement　which　Cromwell　made　use　of　there
was　allied　with　this　a　fanaticism；　which　from　the　written　letter　drew　opposite　conclusions　to　the
above；　and　this　we　see　exemplified　in　the　equality　of　property；　for　instance。　Hobbes；　it　is　true；
likewise　maintained　passive　obedience；　the　absolute　freedom　of　the　royal　will　and　power；　but　at
the　same　time　he　sought　to　derive　the　principles　of　monarchical　power；　etc。；　from　universal
determinations。　The　views　that　he　adopts　are　shallow　and　empirical；　but　the　reasons　he　gives　for
them；　and　the　propositions　he　makes　respecting　them；　are　original　in　character；　inasmuch　as　they
are　derived　from　natural　necessities　and　wants。

Hobbes　maintained　that　“The　origin　of　all　society　is　to　be　found　in　the　mutual　fear　of　all　its
members；”　it　is　hence　a　phenomenon　in　consciousness。　“Each　association　is　thus　formed　in　its
own　interest　or　for　its　own　renown；　that　is；　from　selfish　motives。”　All　such　matters　as　security　of
life；　property；　and　enjoyment；　are　not　to　be　found　outside　it。　“But　men　have　in　all　dissimilarity　of
strength　a　natural　similarity　as　well。”　This　Hobbes　proves　by　a　characteristic　reason；　viz。　that
“each　individual　can　make　away　with　the　other；”　each　is　the　ultimate　power　over　the　others。
“Each　can　be　supreme。”（6）　Thus　their　similarity　is　not　derived　from　the　greatest　strength；　it　is　not；
as　in　modern　times；　founded　on　the　freedom　of　the　spirit；　or　on　an　equality　of　merit　and
independence；　but　on　the　equal　weakness　of　mankind；　each　man　is　weak　as　regards　others。

b。　Hobbes　further　takes　up　the　position　that　this　natural　condition　is　of　such　a　nature　that　all
possess　the　desire　to　rule　over　one　another。　“All　in　their　natural　condition　are　possessed　of　the　will
to　injure　others；”　to　tyrannize　over　other　men；　each　has　thus　to　fear　the　other。　Hobbes　looks　at
this　condition　in　its　true　light；　and　we　find　in　him　no　idle　talk　about　a　state　of　natural　goodness；　the
natural　condition　is　really　far　more　like　that　of　the　animals　—　a　condition　in　which　there　is　an
unsubdued　individual　will。　All　thus　wish　to　“secure　themselves　against　the　pretensions　of　others；　to
acquire　for　themselves　advantages　and　superior　rights。　Opinions；　religions；　desires；　arouse　strife；
the　stronger　bears　away　the　victory。　The　natural　condition　is　consequently　a　condition　of　mistrust
on　the　part　of　all　toward　all；　it　is　a　war　of　all　against　all　（bellum　omnium　in　omnes）；”　and　the
endeavour　of　one　to　overreach　another。　The　expression　nature　has　a　double　significance：　In　the
first　place　the　nature　of　man　signifies　his　spiritual　and　rational　Being；　but　his　natural　condition
indicates　quite　another　condition；　wherein　man　conducts　himself　according　to　his　natural　impulses。
In　this　way　he　conducts　himself　in　conformity　with　his　desires　and　inclinations；　while　the　rational；　on
the　contrary；　is　the　obtaining　supremacy　over　the　immediately　natural。　“In　the　condition　of　nature　a
certain　irresistible　power　grants　the　right　to　rule　over　those　who　cannot　resist；　it　is　absurd　to　leave
those　whom　we　have　in　our　power　to　become　free　and　strong　again。”

From　this　Hobbes　draws　the　conclusion　that　“man　must　go　forth　from　the　natural　condition。”（7）
This　is　true；　the　natural　condition　is　not　what　it　should　be；　and　must　hence　be　cast　off。

c。　Hobbes　finally　passes　to　the　laws　of　reason　which　preserve　tranquillity。　This　condition　of　law　is
the　subjection　of　the　natural；　particular　will　of　the　individual　to　the　universal　will；　which；　however；　is
not　that　of　all　individuals；　but　is　the　will　of　the　ruler；　this　is　consequently　not　responsible　to
individuals；　but　is　directed　against　this　private　will；　and　to　it　all　must　be　obedient。（8）　Thus　the
whole　matter　is　now　placed　on　quite　another　footing。　But　because　the　universal　will　is　made　to
reside　in　the　will　of　one　monarch；　there　nevertheless　proceeds　from　this　point　of　view；　which　is
really　correct；　a　condition　of　absolute　rule；　of　perfect　despotism。　The　condition　of　law　does　not；
however；　mean　that　the　arbitrary　will　of　one　man　constitutes　absolute　law；　for　the　universal　will　is
no　despotism；　being　rational；　inasmuch　as　it　is　consistently　expressed　and　determined　in　laws。

Rixner　（Handbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　p。　30）　says：　“Law　to　him　is　nothing
but　the　sum　of　the　conditions　of　peace　extorted　by　iron　necessity　from　the　original　wickedness　of
mankind。”　We　might　add　that　in　Hobbes　we　at　least　find　this；　that　the　nature　and　organism　of　the
State　is　established　on　the　principle　of　human　nature；　human　desire；　&c。　The　English　concerned
themselves　greatly　with　that　principle　of　passive　obedience；　in　accordance　with　which　it　is　said　that
kings　receive　their　power　from　God。　This；　in　one　aspect；　is　quite　true；　but　in　another　it　is　falsely
taken　to　mean　that　they　have　no　responsibility；　that　their　blind　desires；　their　merely　subjective　will；
is　what　must　be　obeyed。



　　B　4。　CUDWORTH。　　　CLARKE。　　　WOLLASTON。

Cudworth　wished　to　revive　Plato　in　England；　but　to　do　this　after　the　manner　of　the　demonstrations
which　we　met　with　in　Descartes；　and　through　a　trivial　metaphysic　of　the　understanding。　He　wrote　a
celebrated　work：　“The　true　intellectual　System　of　the　Universe；”　but　the　Platonic　ideas　expressed
are　often　in　a　clumsy　form　and　mingled　with　the　Christian　conceptions　of　God　and　angels　—　all
regarded　as　particular　existent　things。　What　in　Plato　is　mythical；　is　here　taken　as　reality　in　the　form
of　existence；　this　is　reasoned　about　just　as　we　reason　respecting　a　matter　of　ordinary　fact；　such　as
whether　it　is　probable　that　the　French　seek　to　effect　a　landing　in　England；　and　if　so；　whether　they
will　successfully　accomplish　it。　The　Christian　intellectual　world　is　dragged　down　to　the　form　of
ordinary　actuality　and　consequently　it　is　ruined。

The　name　of　Clarke　is　likewise　famous　in　connection　with　his　proof　of　the　existence　of　God。　There
were　quite　a　number　of　other　English　philosophers；　whom　we　do　not；　however；　require　to　notice；
for　Clarke；　Wollaston；　and　others　carry　on　their　speculations　within　forms　such　as　belong　to　a　very
commonplace　metaphysic　of　the　understanding。　The　manifold　systems　of　moral　philosophy　which
we　find　taking　their　rise　in　England　are　drawn　up　from　this　same　mental　standpoint；　in　them　the
implicitude　of　mind　appears　in　a　form　of　natural　existence；　namely；　of　desires　and　feelings。　Their
principles　are　found　in　moral　sentiments；　benevolent　desires；　sympathy；　&c。　That　form　alone　is
worthy　of　notice　which；　on　the　one　hand；　represents　duty　as　something　which　is　not　foreign；　given；
commanded；　but　as　clearly　belonging　to　self…consciousness；　even　while；　on　the　other　hand；　it
represents　this　property　as　a　natural；　unconscious；　unspiritual；　and　irrational　existence。　Impulse　is
blind；　a　solid　existence　which　cannot　get　beyond　itself　like　thinking　self…consciousness。　It　is　indeed
true　of　impulse　that　its　pure　activity　or　its　process；　and　the　content；　are；　as　in　thought；　immediately
posited　as　the　same；　it　has　its　content　in　itself；　and　this　is　not　dead　and　passive；　but　self…acting　and
impelling。　But　that　unity　has　the　form　of　immediacy　only　as　existent；　in　the　first　place　it　is　not　a
knowledge；　it　is　not　necessary；　for　it　is　only　taken　from　inward　perception；　in　the　second　place；　it
is　a　determinate　which　does　not　abrogate　itself；　beyond　which　we　cannot　get；　and　which　thus　is　not
a　universal。　Impulse　is　no　more　an　infinite　than　is　the　fixed　category　of　force。　Such　reasoning　takes
the　impulses　in　their　determinate　character　from　experience；　and　expresses　the　appearance　of
necessity　in　the　same　as　an　inward　existence；　as　a　force。　For　instance；　the　social　instinct　is　a
moment　which　is　found　in　experience；　because　man　derives　all　manner　of　utility　from　society。
Wherein　does　the　necessity　of　the　State；　of　society；　find　its　basis？　In　a　social　desire。　This　is　cause；
just　as　in　the　physical　world　a　formal　interpretation　such　as　this　is　always　to　be　found。　The
necessity　of　any　existent　fact；　such　as　what　pertains　to　electrical　phenomena；　finds　its　basis　in　a
force　which　brings　it　forth；　it　is　merely　the　form　of　returning　from　the　external　to　an　inward；　of
passing　from　the　existent　to　what　is　thought；　which　is　again　in　turn　represented　as　an　existent。
Force　is　necessitated　by　reason　of　the　manifestation；　we　must　argue　from　the　latter　to　the　former。
On　the　other　hand；　the　manifestation　takes　place　through　the　force；　for　it　is　the　cause　of　the
manifestation；　we　hence　have　force　in　one　place　as　reason；　and　in　another　as　cause。　But　in　all　this
there　is　no　realization　of　the　fact　that　in　respect　of　form　there　is　a　transition　from　the　Notion　into
Being　and　the　other　way；　while　in　respect　of　content　there　is　a　perfect　contingency　of
manifestation；　we　look　at　electricity　in　the　same　way　as　we　look　at　the　fact　that　men　have　social
instincts；　sympathetic　inclinations；　and　so　on。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B　5。　PUFFENDORF。

In　the　struggle　to　give　to　just　and　equitable　relations　in　the　State　an　independent　basis　of　their　own；
and　to　found　a　judicial　system　of　government；　reflective　thought　put　forth　its　efforts；　and　this
became　to　it　a　real　interest　and　concern。　And；　as　in　the　case　of　Grotius；　it　was　also　true　of
Puffendorf；　that　the　instinct　of　mankind　—　that　is；　the　social　instinct；　&c。　—　was　made　the　principle。
Samuel　von　Puffendorf　was　born　in　1632　in　Saxony；　he　studied　public　law；　philosophy；　and
mathematics　at　Leipzig　and　Jena；　in　1661；　as　a　professor　at　Heidelberg；　he　made　natural　and　civil
law　for　the　first　time　academic　studies；　in　1668　he　became　tutor　in　a　Swedish　family；　which　office
he　later　on　exchanged　for　the　service　of　the　House　of　Brandenburg；　and　in　1694　he　died　at　Berlin
as　a　privy　councillor。　He　wrote　several　works　on　political　law　and　hi