history of philosophy-第6部分

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immediately　contradicted　by　the　very　fact　that　there　are　such　histories。　But　in　order　to　get　a　better
understanding　of　this　apparent　contradiction；　we　must　distinguish　between　the　outward　history　of　a
religion　or　a　science　and　the　history　of　the　subject　itself。　And　then　we　must　take　into　account　that
the　history　of　Philosophy　because　of　the　special　nature　of　its　subject…matter；　is　different　from　other
histories。　It　is　at　once　evident　that　the　contradiction　in　question　could　not　refer　to　the　outward
history；　but　merely　to　the　inward；　or　that　of　the　content　itself。　There　is　a　history　of　the　spread　of
Christianity　and　of　the　lives　of　those　who　have　avowed　it；　and　its　existence　has　formed　itself　into
that　of　a　Church。　This　in　itself　constitutes　an　external　existence　such　that　being　brought　into　contact
with　temporal　affairs　of　the　most　diverse　kind；　its　lot　is　a　varied　one；　and　it　essentially　possesses　a
history。　And　of　the　Christian　doctrine　it　is　true　that　it；　too；　has　its　history；　but　it　necessarily　soon
reached　its　full　development　and　attained　to　its　appointed　powers。　And　this　old　creed　has　been　an
acknowledged　influence　to　every　age；　and　will　still　be　acknowledged　unchanged　as　the　Truth；　even
though　this　acknowledgment　were　become　no　more　than　a　pretence；　and　the　words　an　empty
form。　But　the　history　of　this　doctrine　in　its　wider　sense　includes　two　elements：　first　the　various
additions　to　and　deviations　from　the　truth　formerly　established；　and　secondly　the　combating　of
these　errors；　the　purification　of　the　principles　that　remain　from　such　additions；　and　a　consequent
return　to　their　first　simplicity。　

The　other　sciences；　including　Philosophy；　have　also　an　external　history　like　Religion。　Philosophy
has　a　history　of　its　origin；　diffusion；　maturity；　decay；　revival；　a　history　of　its　teachers；　promoters；
and　of　its　opponents…often　too；　of　an　outward　relation　to　religion　and　occasionally　to　the　State。
This　side　of　its　history　likewise　gives　occasion　to　interesting　questions。　Amongst　other　such；　it　is
asked　why　Philosophy；　the　doctrine　of　absolute　Truth；　seems　to　have　revealed　itself　on　the　whole
to　a　small　number　of　individuals；　to　special　nations；　and　how　it　has　limited　itself　to　particular
periods　of　time。　Similarly　with　respect　to　Christianity；　to　the　Truth　in　a　much　more　universal　form
than　the　philosophical；　a　difficulty　has　been　encountered　in　respect　to　the　question　whether　there　is
a　contradiction　in　the　fact　that　this　religion　should　have　appeared　so　late　in　time；　and　that　it　should
have　remained　so　long　and　should　still　remain　limited　to　special　races　of　men。　But　these　and　other
similar　questions　are　too　much　a　matter　of　detail　to　depend　merely　on　the　general　conflict　referred
to；　and　when　we　have　further　touched　upon　the　peculiar　character　of　philosophic　knowledge；　we
may　go　more　specially　into　the　aspects　which　relate　to　the　external　existence　and　external　history
of　Philosophy。　

But　as　regards　the　comparison　between　the　history　of　Religion　and　that　of　Philosophy　as　to　inner
content；　there　is　not　in　the　latter　as　there　is　in　Religion　a　fixed　and　fundamental　truth　which；　as
unchangeable；　is　apart　from　history。　The　content　of　Christianity；　which　is　Truth；　has；　however；
remained　unaltered　as　such；　and　has　therefore　little　history　or　as　good　as　none。　（2）　Hence　in
Religion；　on　account　of　its　very　nature　as　Christianity；　the　conflict　referred　to　disappears。　The
errors　and　additions　constitute　no　difficulty。　They　are　transitory　and　altogether　historical　in
character。　

The　other　sciences；　indeed；　have　also　according　to　their　content　a　History；　a　part　of　which　relates
to　alterations；　and　the　renunciation　of　tenets　which　were　formerly　current。　But　a　great；　perhaps　the
greater；　part　of　the　history　relates　to　what　has　proved　permanent；　so　that　what　was　new；　was　not
an　alteration　on　earlier　acquisitions；　but　an　addition　to　them。　These　sciences　progress　through　a
process　of　juxtaposition。　It　is　true　that　in　Botany；　Mineralogy；　and　so　on；　much　is　dependent　on
what　was　previously　known；　but　by　far　the　greatest　part　remains　stationary　and　by　means　of　fresh
matter　is　merely　added　to　without　itself　being　affected　by　the　addition。　With　a　science　like
Mathematics；　history　has；　in　the　main；　only　the　pleasing　task　of　recording　further　additions。　Thus　to
take　an　example；　elementary　geometry　in　so　far　as　it　was　created　by　Euclid；　may　from　his　time　on
be　regarded　as　having　no　further　history。　

The　history　of　Philosophy；　on　the　other　hand；　shows　neither　the　motionlessness　of　a　complete；
simple　content；　nor　altogether　the　onward　movement　of　a　peaceful　addition　of　new　treasures　to
those　already　acquired。　It　seems　merely　to　afford　the　spectacle　of　ever…recurring　changes　in　the
whole；　such　as　finally　are　no　longer　even　connected　by　the　common　aim。　

1。　COMMON　IDEAS　REGARDING　THE　HISTORY　OF　PHILOSOPHY。

At　this　point　appear　these　ordinary　superficial　ideas　regarding　the　history　of　Philosophy　which　have
to　be　referred　to　and　corrected。　As　regards　these　very　current　views；　which　are　doubtless　known
to　you；　gentlemen；　for　indeed　they　are　the　reflections　most　likely　to　occur　in　one's　first　crude
thoughts　on　a　history　of　Philosophy；　I　will　shortly　explain　what　requires　explanation；　and　the
explanation　of　the　differences　in　philosophies　will　lead　us　further　into　the　matter　itself。　

a。　The　History　of　Philosophy　as　an　accumulation　of　Opinions。

History；　at　the　first　glance；　includes　in　its　aim　the　narration　of　the　accidental　circumstances　of　times；
of　races；　and　of　individuals；　treated　impartially　partly　as　regards　their　relation　in　time；　and　partly　as
to　their　content。　The　appearance　of　contingency　in　time…succession　is　to　be　dealt　with　later　on。　It　is
contingency　of　content　which　is　the　idea　with　which　we　have　first　to　deal…the　idea　of　contingent
actions。　But　thoughts　and　not　external　actions；　or　griefs；　or　joys；　form　the　content　of　Philosophy。
Contingent　thoughts；　however；　are　nothing　but　opinions；　and　philosophical　opinions　are　opinions
relating　to　the　more　special　content　of　Philosophy；　regarding　God；　Nature　and　Spirit。　

Thus　we　now　meet　the　view　very　usually　taken　of　the　history　of　Philosophy　which　ascribes　to　it　the
narration　of　a　number　of　philosophical　opinions　as　they　have　arisen　and　manifested　themselves　in
time。　This　kind　of　matter　is　in　courtesy　called　opinions；　those　who　think　themselves　more　capable
of　judging　rightly；　call　such　a　history　a　display　of　senseless　follies；　or　at　least　of　errors　made　by
men　engrossed　in　thought　and　in　mere　ideas。　This　view　is　not　only　held　by　those　who　recognize
their　ignorance　of　Philosophy。　Those　who　do　this；　acknowledge　it；　because　that　ignorance　is；　in
common　estimation；　held　to　be　no　obstacle　to　giving　judgment　upon　what　has　to　do　with　the
subject；　for　it　is　thought　that　anybody　can　form　a　judgment　on　its　character　and　value　without　any
comprehension　of　it　whatever。　But　the　same　view　is　even　held　by　those　who　write　or　have　written
on　the　history　of　Philosophy。　This　history；　considered　only　as　the　enumeration　of　various　opinions；
thus　becomes　an　idle　tale；　or；　if　you　will；　an　erudite　investigation。　For　erudition　is；　in　the　main；
acquaintance　with　a　number　of　useless　things；　that　is　to　say；　with　that　which　has　no　intrinsic　interest
or　value　further　than　being　known。　Yet　it　is　thought　that　profit　is　to　be　derived　from　learning　the
various　opinions　and　reflections　of　other　men。　It　stimulates　the　powers　of　thought　and　also　leads　to
many　excellent　reflections；　this　signifies　that　now　and　then　it　occasions　an　idea　and　its　art　thus
consists　in　the　spinning　one　opinion　out　of　the　other。　

If　the　history　of　Philosophy　merely　represented　various　opinions　in　array；　whether　they　be　of　God
or　of　natural　and　spiritual　things　existent；　it　would　be　a　most　superfluous　and　tiresome　science；　no
matter　what　advantage　might　be　brought　forward　as　derived　from　such　thought…activity　and
learning。　What　can　be　more　useless　than　to　learn　a　string　of　bald　opinions；　and　what　more
unimportant？　Literary　works；　being　histories　of　Philosophy　in　the　sense　that　they　produce　and　treat
the　ideas　of　Philosophy　as　if　they　were　opinions；　need　be　only　superficially　glanced　at　to　find　how
dry　and　destitute　of　interest　everything　about　them　is。　

An　opinion　is　a　subjective　conception；　an　uncontrolled　thought；　an　idea　which　may　occur　to　me　in
one　direction　or　in　another：　an　opinion　is　mine；　（3）　it　is　in　itself　a　universal　thought　which　is　existent
in　and　for　itself。　But　Philosophy　possesses　no　opinions；　for　there　is　no　such　thing　as　philosophical
opinions。　When　we　hear　a　man　speaking　of　philosophical　opinions；　even　though　he　be　an　historian
of　philosophy　itself；　we　detect　at　once　this　want　of　fundamental　education。　Philosophy　is　the
objective　science　of　truth；　it　is　science　of　necessity；　conceiving　knowledge；　and　neither　opinion　nor
the　spinning　out　of　opinions。　

The　more　precise　significance　of　this　idea　is　that　we　get　to　know　opinions　only；　thus　laying
emphasis　upon　the　word　Opinion。　Now　the　direct　opposite　of　opinion　is　the　Truth；　it　is　Truth
before　which　mere　opinion　pales。　Those　who　in　the　history　of　Philosophy　seek　mere　theories；　or
who　suppose　that　on　the　whole　only　such　are　to　be　found　within　it；　also　turn　aside　when　that　word
Truth　confronts　them。　Philosophy　here　encounters　opposition　from　two　different　sides。　On　the　one
hand　piety　openly　declares　Reason　or　Thought　to　be　incapable　of　apprehending　what　is　true；　and
to　lead　only　to　the　abyss　of　doubt；　it　declares　that　independent　thought　must　be　renounced；　and
reason　held　in　bounds　by　faith　in　blind　authority；　if　Truth　is　to　be　reached。　Of　the　relation　existing
between　Religion　and　Philosophy　and　of　its　history；　we　shall　deal　later　on。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is
known　just　as　well；　that　so…called　reason　has　maintained　its　rights；　abandoning　faith　in　mere
authority；　and　has　endeavoured　to　make　Christianity　rational；　so　that　throughout　it　is　only　my
personal　insight　and　conviction　which　obliges　me　to　make　any　admissions。　But　this　affirmation　of
the　right　of　reason　is　turned　round　in　an　astonishing　manner；　so　that　it　results　in　making　knowledge
of　the　truth　through　reason　an　impossibility。　Thi