history of philosophy-第62部分

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the　representation。　But　this　is　of　course　only　an　indefinite　word；　a　formal　distinction；　it　indicates
that　consciousness　is　the　very　thing　that　constitutes　the　distinction　of　the　undistinguished；　and　that
distinction　constitutes　the　determination　of　consciousness。　Leibnitz　more　particularly　defined　the
distinction　of　man　as　that　“he　is　capable　of　the　knowledge　of　necessary　and　eternal　truths；〃　—　or
that　he　conceives　the　universal　on　the　one　hand；　and　on　the　other　what　is　connected　with　it；　the
nature　and　essence　of　self…consciousness　lies　in　the　universality　of　the　Notions。　“These　eternal
truths　rest　on　two　maxims；　the　one　is　that　of　contradiction；　the　other　is　that　of　sufficient　reason。”
The　former　of　these　is　unity　expressed　in　useless　fashion　as　a　maxim；　the　distinction　of　the
undistinguishable；　A=A；　it　is　the　definition　of　thinking；　but　not　a　maxim　which　could　contain　a　truth
as　content；　or　it　does　not　express　the　Notion　of　distinction　as　such。　The　other　important　principle
was；　on　the　other　hand：　What　is　not　distinguished　in　thought　is　not　distinguished　（p。　333）。　“The
maxim　of　the　reason　is　that　everything　has　its　reason；”（19）　—　the　particular　has　the　universal　as　its
essential　reality。　Necessary　truth　must　have　its　reason　in　itself　in　such　a　manner　that　it　is　found　by
analysis；　i。e。　through　that　very　maxim　of　identity。　For　analysis　is　the　very　favourite　plan　of　resolving
into　simple　ideas　and　principles：　a　resolution　which　annihilates　their　relation；　and　which　therefore　in
fact　forms　a　transition　into　the　opposite；　though　it　does　not　have　the　consciousness　of　the　same；
and　on　that　account　also　excludes　the　Notion；　for　every　opposite　it　lays　hold　of　only　in　its　identity。
Sufficient　reason　seems　to　be　a　pleonasm；　but　Leibnitz　understood　by　this　aims；　final　causes
（caus？　finales）；　the　difference　between　which　and　the　causal　nexus　or　the　efficient　cause　he　here
brings　under　discussion。（20）

c。　The　universal　itself；　absolute　essence；　which　with　Leibnitz　is　something　quite　different　from　the
monads；　separates　itself　also　into　two　sides；　namely　universal　Being　and　Being　as　the　unity　of
opposites。

That　universal　is　God；　as　the　cause　of　the　world；　to　the　consciousness　of　whom　the　above
principle　of　sufficient　reason　certainly　forms　the　transition。　The　existence　of　God　is　only　an
inference　from　eternal　truths；　for　these　must　as　the　laws　of　nature　have　a　universal　sufficient　reason
which　determines　itself　as　none　other　than　God。　Eternal　truth　is　therefore　the　consciousness　of　the
universal　and　absolute　in　and　for　itself；　and　this　universal　and　absolute　is　God；　who；　as　one　with
Himself；　the　monad　of　monads；　is　the　absolute　Monad。　Here　we　again　have　the　wearisome　proof
of　His　existence：　He　is　the　fountain　of　eternal　truths　and　Notions；　and　without　Him　no　potentiality
would　have　actuality；　He　has　the　prerogative　of　existing　immediately　in　His　potentiality。（21）　God　is
here　also　the　unity　of　potentiality　and　actuality；　but　in　an　uncomprehending　manner；　what　is
necessary；　but　not　comprehended；　is　transferred　to　Him。　Thus　God　is　at　first　comprehended
chiefly　as　universal；　but　already　in　the　aspect　of　the　relation　of　opposites。

As　regards　this　second　aspect；　the　absolute　relation　of　opposites；　it　occurs　in　the　first　place　in　the
form　of　absolute　opposites　of　thought；　the　good　and　the　evil。　“God　is　the　Author　of　the　world；”
says　Leibnitz；　that　refers　directly　to　evil。　It　is　round　this　relation　that　philosophy　specially　revolves；
but　to　the　unity　of　which　it　did　not　then　attain；　the　evil　in　the　world　was　not　comprehended；
because　no　advance　was　made　beyond　the　fixed　opposition。　The　result　of　Leibnitz's　Théodicée　is
an　optimism　supported　on　the　lame　and　wearisome　thought　that　God；　since　a　world　had　to　be
brought　into　existence；　chose　out　of　infinitely　many　possible　worlds　the　best　possible　—　the　most
perfect；　so　far　as　it　could　be　perfect；　considering　the　finite　element　which　it　was　to　contain。（22）
This　may　very　well　be　said　in　a　general　way；　but　this　perfection　is　no　determined　thought；　but　a
loose　popular　expression；　a　sort　of　babble　respecting　an　imaginary　or　fanciful　potentiality；　Voltaire
made　merry　over　it。　Nor　is　the　nature　of　the　finite　therein　defined。　Because　the　world；　it　is　said；　has
to　be　the　epitome　of　finite　Beings；　evil　could　not　be　separated　from　it；　since　evil　is　negation；
finitude。（23）　Reality　and　negation　remain　standing　in　opposition　to　one　another　exactly　in　the　same
way　as　before。　That　is　the　principal　conception　in　the　Théodicée。　But　something　very　like　this　can
be　said　in　every　day　life。　If　I　have　some　goods　brought　to　me　in　the　market　at　some　town；　and　say
that　they　are　certainly　not　perfect；　but　the　best　that　are　to　be　got；　this　is　quite　a　good　reason　why　I
should　content　myself　with　them。　But　comprehension　is　a　very　different　thing　from　this。　Leibnitz
says　nothing　further　than　that　the　world　is　good；　but　there　is　also　evil　in　it；　the　matter　remains　just
the　same　as　it　was　before。　“Because　it　had　to　be　finite”　is　then　a　mere　arbitrary　choice　on　the　part
of　God。　The　next　question　would　be：　Why　and　how　is　there　finitude　in　the　Absolute　and　His
decrees？　And　only　then　should　there　be　deduced　from　the　determination　of　finitude　the　evil　which
no　doubt　exists　therein。

It　is　true　that　Leibnitz　has　a　reply　to　the　above　question：　〃God　does　not　will　what　is　evil；　evil　comes
only　indirectly　into　the　results”　（blind）；　“because　oftentimes　the　greater　good　could　not　be
achieved　if　evils　were　not　present。　Therefore　they　are　means　to　a　good　end。〃　But　why　does　not
God　employ　other　means？　They　are　always　external；　not　in　and　for　themselves。　“A　moral　evil　may
not　be　regarded　as　a　means；　nor　must　we；　as　the　apostle　says；　do　evil　that　good　may　come；　yet　it
has　often　the　relation　of　a　conditio　sine　qua　non　of　the　good。　Evil　is　in　God　only　the　object　of　a
permissive　will　（voluntatis　permissiv？）；”　but　everything　that　is　wrong　would　be　such。　“God　has
therefore　among　the　objects　of　His　will　the　best　possible　as　the　ultimate　object；　but　the　good　as　a
matter　of　choice　（qualemcunque）；　also　as　subordinate；　and　things　indifferent　and　evils　often　as
means。　Evil　is；　however；　an　object　of　His　will　only　as　the　condition　of　something　otherwise
necessary　（rei　alioqui　debit？）；　which　without　it　could　not　exist；　in　which　sense　Christ　said　it　must
needs　be　that　offences　come。”（24）

In　a　general　sense　we　are　satisfied　with　the　answer：　“In　accordance　with　the　wisdom　of　God　we
must　accept　it　as　a　fact　that　the　laws　of　nature　are　the　best　possible；”　but　this　answer　does　not
suffice　for　a　definite　question。　What　one　wishes　to　know　is　the　goodness　of　this　or　that　particular
law；　and　to　that　no　answer　is　given。　If；　for　example；　it　is　said　that　“The　law　of　falling　bodies；　in
which　the　relation　of　time　and　space　is　the　square；　is　the　best　possible；”　one　might　employ；　as　far
as　mathematics　are　concerned；　any　other　power　whatever。　When　Leibnitz　answers：　“God　made　it
so；”　this　is　no　answer　at　all。　We　wish　to　know　the　definite　reason　of　this　law；　such　general
determinations　sound　pious；　but　are　not　satisfying。

He　goes　on　to　say　that　the　sufficient　reason　has　reference　to　the　representation　of　the　monads。　The
principles　of　things　are　monads；　of　which　each　is　for　itself；　without　having　influence　on　the　others。　If
now　the　Monad　of　monads；　God；　is　the　absolute　substance；　and　individual　monads　are　created
through　His　will；　their　substantiality　comes　to　an　end。　There　is　therefore　a　contradiction　present；
which　remains　unsolved　in　itself　—　that　is　between　the　one　substantial　monad　and　the　many
monads　for　which　independence　is　claimed；　because　their　essence　consists　in　their　standing　in　no
relation　to　one　another。　Yet　at　the　same　time；　in　order　to　show　the　harmony　that　exists　in　the
world；　Leibnitz　understands　the　relation　of　monads　to　monads　more　generally　as　the　unity　of
contrasted　existences；　namely　of　soul　and　body。　This　unity　he　represents　as　a　relation　without
difference；　and　notionless；　i。e。　as　a　pre…established　harmony。（25）　Leibnitz　uses　here　the　illustration
of　two　clocks；　which　are　set　to　the　same　hour；　and　keep　the　same　time；（26）　in　the　same　way　the
movement　of　the　kingdom　of　thought　goes　on；　determined　in　accordance　with　ends；　and　the
movement　onward　of　the　corporeal　kingdom　which　corresponds　with　it；　proceeds　according　to　a
general　casual　connection。（27）　The　case　is　the　same　as　with　Spinoza；　that　these　two　sides　of　the
universe　have　no　connection　with　each　other；　the　one　does　not　influence　the　other；　but　both　are
entirely　indifferent　to　one　another；　it　is　really　the　differentiating　relation　of　the　Notion　that　is　lacking。
In　abstract　thought　that　is　without　Notion；　that　determination　now　receives　the　form　of　simplicity；
of　implicitude；　of　indifference　with　regard　to　what　is　other；　of　a　self…reflection　that　has　no
movement：　in　this　way　red　in　the　abstract　is　in　a　position　of　indifference　as　regards　blue；　&c。　Here；
as　before；　Leibnitz　forsakes　his　principle　of　individuation；　it　has　only　the　sense　of　being　exclusively
one；　and　of　not　reaching　to　and　including　what　is　other；　or　it　is　only　a　unity　of　the　popular
conception；　not　the　Notion　of　unity。　The　soul　has　thus　a　series　of　conceptions　and　ideas　which　are
developed　from　within　it；　and　this　series　is　from　the　very　first　placed　within　the　soul　at　its　creation；
i。e。；　the　soul　is　in　all　immediacy　this　implicit　determination；　determination　is；　however；　not　implicit；
but　the　reflected　unfolding　of　this　determination　in　the　ordinary　conception　is　its　outward　existence。
Parallel　with　this　series　of　differentiated　conceptions；　there　now　runs　a　series　of　motions　of　the
body；　or　of　what　is　external　to　the　soul。（28）　Both　are　essential　moments　of　reality；　they　are
mutually　indifferent；　but　they　have　also　an　essential　relation　of　difference。

Since　now　every　monad；　as　shut　up　within　itself；　has　no　influence　upon　the　body　and　its
movements；　and　yet　the　infinite　multitude　of　their　atoms　correspond　with　one　another；　Leibnitz
places　this　harmony　in　God；　a　better　definition　of　the　relation　and　the　activity　of　the　Monad　of
monads　is　therefore　that　it　is　what　pre…establishes　harmony　in　the　changes　of　the　mona