history of philosophy-第67部分

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good　as　something　relative；　thus　were　extension　and　movement　to　be　inherent　or　implicit；　they
could　not　be　either　large　or　small；　quick　or　slow；　that　is；　they　could　not　be；　for　these
determinations　rest　in　the　conception（3）　of　such　qualities。　In　Berkeley　the　relation　of　things　to
consciousness　is　alone　dealt　with；　and　beyond　this　relationship　they　do　not　in　his　view　come。　From
this　it　follows　that　it　is　only　self…consciousness　that　possesses　them；　for　a　perception　which　is　not　in
a　conceiving　mind　is　nothing：　it　is　a　direct　contradiction。　There　can　be　no　substance；　he　says；　which
neither　conceives　nor　perceives；　and　which　is　yet　the　substratum　of　perceptions　and　conceptions。
If　it　is　represented　that　there　is　something　outside　of　consciousness　which　is　similar　to　the
conceptions；　this　is　likewise　contradictory；　a　conception　can　alone　be　similar　to　a　conception；　the
idea　to　the　idea　alone。（4）

Thus；　while　Locke's　ultimate　point　is　abstract　substance；　Being　generally　with　the　real
determination　of　a　substratum　of　accidents；　Berkeley　declares　this　substance　to　be　the　most
incomprehensible　assumption　of　all；　but　the　incomprehensibility　does　not　make　this　Being　into　an
absolute　nullity；　nor　does　it　make　it　in　itself　incomprehensible。（5）　For　Berkeley　brings　forward
against　the　present　existence　of　external　objects　only　the　inconceivability　of　the　relation　of　a　Being
to　mind。　This　inconceivability；　however；　is　destroyed　in　the　Notion；　for　the　Notion　is　the　negative
of　things；　and　this　moved　Berkeley　and　Leibnitz　to　shut　up　the　two　sides　in　themselves。　There
nevertheless　remains　a　relationship　of　what　is　“other”　to　us；　these　feelings　do　not　develop　from　us
as　Leibnitz　represents；　but　are　determined　through　somewhat　else。　When　Leibnitz　speaks　of
development　within　the　monads；　it　is　nothing　but　empty　talk；　for　the　monads　as　they　follow　in
succession　have　no　inward　connection。　Each　individual　is　thus　determined　through　another；　and　not
through　us；　and　it　does　not　matter　what　this　external　is；　since　it　remains　a　contingent。　Now　in
relation　to　the　two　sides　of　Leibnitz　which　are　indifferent　to　one　another；　Berkeley　says　that　such
an　“other”　is　quite　superfluous。　Berkeley　calls　the　other　the　objects；　but　these；　he　says；　cannot　be
what　we　call　matter；　for　spirit　and　matter　cannot　come　together。（6）　But　the　necessity　of
conceptions　directly　contradicts　this　Being…within…self　of　the　conceiver；　for　the　Being…within…self　is
the　freedom　of　the　conceiver；　the　latter　does　not；　however；　produce　the　conceptions　with
freedom；　they　have　for　him　the　form　and　determinateness　of　an　independent　“other。”　Berkeley
likewise　does　not　accept　idealism　in　the　subjective　sense；　but　only　in　respect　that　there　are　spirits
which　impart　themselves　（in　the　other　case　the　subject　forms　his　own　conceptions）；　and
consequently；　that　it　is　God　alone　who　brings　to　pass　such　conceptions；　thus　the　imaginations　or
conceptions　which　are　produced　by　us　with　our　individual　activity　remain　separate　from　these
others；（7）　i。e。　from　the　implicit。

This　conception　gives　an　instance　of　the　difficulties　which　appear　in　regard　to　these　questions；　and
which　Berkeley　wished　to　escape　from　in　a　quite　original　way。　The　inconsistency　in　this　system
God　has　again　to　make　good；　He　has　to　bear　it　all　away；　to　Him　the　solution　of　the　contradiction　is
left。　In　this　idealism；　in　short；　the　common　sensuous　view　of　the　universe　and　the　separation　of
actuality；　as　also　the　system　of　thought；　of　judgments　devoid　of　Notion；　remain　exactly　as　before；
plainly　nothing　in　the　content　is　altered　but　the　abstract　form　that　all　things　are　perceptions　only。（8）
Such　idealism　deals　with　the　opposition　between　consciousness　and　its　object　merely；　and　leaves
the　extension　of　the　conceptions　and　the　antagonisms　of　the　empirical　and　manifold　content　quite
untouched；　and　if　we　ask　what　then　is　the　truth　of　these　perceptions　and　conceptions；　as　we　asked
formerly　of　things；　no　answer　is　forthcoming。　It　is　pretty　much　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　we
believe　in　things　or　in　perceptions；　if　self…consciousness　remains　possessed　entirely　by　finalities；　it
receives　the　content　in　the　ordinary　way；　and　that　content　is　of　the　ordinary　kind。　In　its　individuality
it　stumbles　about　amid　the　conceptions　of　an　entirely　empirical　existence；　without　knowing　and
understanding　anything　else　about　the　content：　that　is　to　say　in　this　formal　idealism　reason　has　no
content　of　its　own。

As　to　what　Berkeley　further　states　in　respect　of　the　empirical　content；　where　the　object　of　his
investigation　becomes　entirely　psychological；　it　relates　in　the　main　to　finding　out　the　difference
between　the　sensations　of　sight　and　feeling；　and　to　discovering　which　kind　of　sensations　belong　to
the　one　and　which　to　the　other。　This　kind　of　investigation　keeps　entirely　to　the　phenomenal；　and
only　therein　distinguishes　the　various　sorts　of　phenomena；　or　comprehension　only　reaches　as　far　as
to　distinctions。　The　only　point　of　interest　is　that　these　investigations　have　in　their　course　chiefly
lighted　on　space；　and　a　dispute　is　carried　on　as　to　whether　we　obtain　the　conception　of　distance
and　so　on；　in　short　all　the　conceptions　relating　to　space；　through　sight　or　feeling。　Space　is　just　this
sensuous　universal；　the　universal　in　individuality　itself；　which　in　the　empirical　consideration　of
empirical　multiplicity　invites　and　leads　us　on　to　thought　（for　it　itself　is　thought）；　and　by　it　this　very
sensuous　perception　and　reasoning　respecting　perception　is　in　its　action　confused。　And　since　here
perception　finds　an　objective　thought；　it　really　would　be　led　on　to　thought　or　to　the　possession　of　a
thought；　but　at　the　same　time　it　cannot　arrive　at　thought　in　its　completion；　since　thought　or　the
Notion　are　not　in　question；　and　it　clearly　cannot　come　to　the　consciousness　of　true　reality。　Nothing
is　thought　in　the　form　of　thought；　but　only　as　an　external；　as　something　foreign　to　thought。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　David　Hume　（next　section）　—　Contents



1。　Nachrichten　von　dem　Leben　und　den　Schriften　des　Bischofs　Berkeley　（in　Berkeley's　philosph。
Werk。　Pt。　I。　Leipzig；　1781）；　pp。　1；　45；　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；
pp。　86…90。
2。　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　pp。　90；　91；　The　Works　of　George　Berkeley；
Prof。　Fraser's　edition　（Dialogues　between　Hylas　and　Philonous）；　Vol。　I。　p。　264；　seq。　et　passim。
3。　Buhle；　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　92；　93；　The　Works　of　George
Berkeley；　Vol。　I。　p。　279　seq。
4。　Buhle；　ibidem；　pp。　91；　92；　Berkeley；　ibidem；　pp。　288　seq。；　300　seq。　et　passim。
5。　Buhle；　ibidem；　pp。　93；　94；　Berkeley；　ibidem；　pp。　289；　308。　seq。
6。　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　94；　95；　The　Works　of　George
Berkeley；　Vol。　I。　pp。　308；　335。
7。　Buhle；　ibidem；　pp。　96…99；　Berkeley；　ibidem；　p。　325；　seq。　et　passim。
8。　Cf。　Berkeley；　ibidem；　passim。



Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　II。　—　Transition　Period；　A　Idealism　&　Scepticism
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2。　HUME。

We　must　add　to　what　has　preceded　an　account　of　the　Scepticism　of　Hume；　which　has　been　given
a　more　important　place　in　history　than　it　deserves　from　its　intrinsic　nature；　its　historic　importance　is
due　to　the　fact　that　Kant　really　derives　the　starting　point　of　his　philosophy　from　Hume。

David　Hume　was　born　in　1711　at　Edinburgh　and　died　there　in　1776。　He　held　a　librarian's　post　in
that　town　for　some　time；　then　he　became　secretary　to　the　Embassy　in　Paris；　for　quite　a　long
period；　indeed；　he　moved　in　diplomatic　circles。　In　Paris　he　came　to　know　Jean　Jacques　Rousseau
and　invited　him　to　England；　but　Rousseau's　terribly　distrustful　and　suspicious　nature　very　soon
estranged　the　two。　（1）　Hume　is　more　celebrated　as　a　writer　of　history　than　through　his　philosophic
works。　He　wrote：　“A　Treatise　of　human　nature；”　3　vols。；　1739；　translated　into　German　by　Jacob；
Halle；　1790；　8vo；　likewise　“Essays　and　Treatises　on　several　subjects；”　2　vols。　（Vol。　1。　containing
“Essays　moral；　political　and　literary；”　printed　for　the　first　time　in　Edinburgh；　1742；　Vol。　II。
containing　an　“Inquiry　concerning　human　understanding”　a　further　development　of　the　Treatise；
and　first　printed　separately　in　London；　1748；　8vo）。　In　his　“Essays；”　which　contributed　most　to　his
fame　as　far　as　the　philosophic　side　is　concerned；　he　treated　philosophic　subjects　as　an　educated；
thoughtful　man　of　the　world　would　do　—　not　in　a　systematic　connection；　nor　showing　the　wide
range　which　his　thoughts　should　properly　have　been　able　to　attain；　in　fact　in　some　of　his　treatises
he　merely　dealt　with　particular　points　of　view。

We　must　shortly　deal　with　the　main　aspects　of　Hume's　philosophy。　He　starts　directly　from　the
philosophic　standpoint　of　Locke　and　Bacon；　which　derives　our　conceptions　from　experience；　and
his　scepticism　has　the　idealism　of　Berkeley　as　its　object。　The　sequence　of　thought　is　this：　Berkeley
allows　all　ideas　to　hold　good　as　they　are；　in　Hume　the　antithesis　of　the　sensuous　and　universal　has
cleared　and　more　sharply　defined　itself；　sense　being　pronounced　by　him　to　be　devoid　of
universality。　Berkeley　does　not　make　any　distinction　as　to　whether　in　his　sensations　there　is　a
necessary　connection　or　not。　Formerly　experience　was　a　mixture　of　the　two　elements。　Hume　tells
us　that　all　perceptions　of　the　mind　may　be　divided　into　two　classes　or　species；　that　of　impressions；
i。e。　sensuous　perceptions；　and　thoughts　or　ideas；　the　latter　are　similar　in　content　to　the　former；　but
less　forcible　and　lively。　All　objects　of　reason　are　consequently　either　relations　of　thoughts　such　as
mathematical　axioms；　or　facts　of　experience。　（2）　Since　Hume　makes　these　into　the　content　he
naturally　rejects　innate　ideas。　（3）

Now　when　Hume　goes　on　to　consider　more　closely　what　is　subsumed　under　experience；　he　finds
categories　of　the　understanding　present　there；　and　more　especially　the　determination　of　the
universal　and　of　universal　necessity；　he　took　under　his　consideration　more　particularly　the　category
of　cause　and　effect；　and　in　it　set　forth　the　rational　element；　inasmuch　as　in　this　causal　relationship
necessity　is　especially　contained。　Here　Hume　re