history of philosophy-第76部分

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and　to　construct　this　last　in　order　to　be　able　to　comprehend　it；　is　what　we　undertake　when　we
endeavour　to　make　nature　an　existence　comprehensible　to　us；　i。e。　a　merely　natural　existence；　and
to　bring　the　mechanism　of　the　principle　of　mechanism　into　the　light　of　day。　For　if　everything　which
can　be　said　to　arise　and　be　present　in　a　way　comprehensible　to　us；　must　arise　and　be　present　in　a
conditioned　way；　we　remain；　so　long　as　we　continue　to　comprehend；　in　a　chain　of　conditioned
conditions。　Where　this　chain　breaks　off；　we　cease　to　comprehend；　and　there　the　connection　which
we　call　nature　likewise　ceases。　The　conception　of　the　possibility　of　the　outward　existence　of　nature
would　thus　be　the　conception　of　an　absolute　beginning　or　origin　of　nature；　it　would　be　the
conception　of　the　unconditioned　itself　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　conditioning　of　nature　not　naturally
connected；　i。e。　a　conditioning　of　nature　unconnected　and　unconditioned　for　us。　Now　should　a
conception　of　what　is　thus　unconditioned　and　unconnected；　and　consequently　supernatural；　be
possible；　the　unconditioned　must　cease　to　be　unconditioned；　it　must　itself　receive　conditions；　and
absolute　necessity　must　commence　to　be　possibility　in　order　that　it　may　allow　itself　to　be
constructed。〃（8）　This　is　contradictory。

Jacobi　then　passes　on　from　this　point　to　the　second　of　his　main　propositions；　“The　unconditioned
is　called　the　supernatural。　Now　since　everything　which　lies　outside　the　connection　of　what　is
conditioned；　of　what　is　naturally　mediated；　also　lies　outside　the　sphere　of　our　clear　and　certain
knowledge；　and　cannot　be　understood　through　conceptions；　the　supernatural　cannot　be　accepted
in　any　other　way　by　us　than　that　in　which　it　is　given　to　us　—　namely　as　a　fact。　It　is！　This
supernatural；　this　essence　of　all　essence；　all　tongues　join　in　proclaiming　to　be　God。〃（9）　God　as　the
universal；　the　true；　is　here　taken　in　the　sense　of　a　spiritual　generally；　in　the　sense　of　power；
wisdom；　&c。　That　God　is；　however；　is　to　Jacobi　not　absolutely　true；　for　to　knowledge　pertains　His
objective　absolute　existence；　but　He　cannot　be　said　to　be　known。　It　is　thus　merely　a　fact　of　my
consciousness　that　God　exists　independently　apart　from　my　consciousness；　this；　however；　is　itself
maintained　through　my　consciousness；　the　subjective　attitude　of　thought　is　thus　to　Jacobi　the
element　of　most　importance。　The　consciousness　of　God；　which　is　in　our　consciousness；　is；
however；　of　such　a　nature　that　along　with　the　thought　of　God　we　have　immediately　associated　the
fact　that　He　is。　The　existence　of　the　supernatural　and　super…sensuous；　to　which　the　thought　of　man
regarding　the　natural　and　finite　passes　on；　is　just　as　certain　to　Jacobi　as　he　is　himself。　This　certainty
is　identical　with　his　self…consciousness；　as　certainly　as　I　am；　so　certainly　is　God　（Jacobi's　Werke；
Vol。　III。　p。　35）。　Since　he　thus　passes　back　into　self…consciousness；　the　unconditioned　is　only　for　us
in　an　immediate　way；　this　immediate　knowledge　Jacobi　calls　Faith；　inward　revelation　（Werke；　Vol。
II。　pp。　3；　4）；　to　this　appeal　can　be　made　in　man。　God；　the　absolute；　the　unconditioned；　cannot；
according；　to　Jacobi；　be　proved。　For　proof；　comprehension；　means　to　discover　conditions　for
something；　to　derive　it　from　conditions；　but　a　derived　absolute；　God；　&c。；　would　thus　not　be
absolute　at　all；　would　not　be　unconditioned；　would　not　be　God　（Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　III。　p。　7）。
This　immediate　knowledge　of　God　is　then　the　point　which　is　maintained　in　the　philosophy　of
Jacobi。　The　faith　of　Kant　and　of　Jacobi　are；　however；　different。　To　Kant　it　is　a　postulate　of　reason；
it　is　the　demand　for　the　solution　of　the　contradiction　between　the　world　and　goodness；　to　Jacobi　it
is　represented　on　its　immediate　knowledge。

Everything　which　has　been　written　upon　God　since　Jacobi's　time；　by　philosophers　such　as　Fries
and　by　theologians；　rests　on　this　conception　of　immediate　intellectual　knowledge；　and　men　even
call　this　revelation；　though　in　another　sense　than　the　revelation　of　theology。　Revelation　as
immediate　knowledge　is　in　ourselves；　while　the　Church　holds　revelation　to　be　something　imparted
from　without。（10）　In　the　theological　sense；　faith　is　faith　in　something　which　is　given　to　us　through
teaching。　It　is　a　sort　of　deception　when　faith　and　revelation　are　spoken　of　and　represented　as　if
faith　and　revelation　in　the　theological　sense　were　here　in　question；　for　the　sense　in　which　they　are
used；　and　which　may　be　termed　philosophic；　is　quite　a　different　one；　however　pious　an　air　may　be
assumed　in　using　the　terms。　This　is　Jacobi's　standpoint；　and　whatever　is　by　philosophers　and
theologians　said　against　it；　this　teaching　is　eagerly　accepted　and　disseminated。　And　nowhere　is
there　anything　to　be　found　but　reflections　originating　from　Jacobi；　whereby　immediate　knowledge
is　opposed　to　philosophic　knowledge　and　to　reason；　and　people　speak　of　reason；　philosophy；
&c。；　as　a　blind　man　speaks　of　colours。　It　is；　indeed；　allowed　that　a　man　cannot　make　shoes　unless
he　is　a　shoemaker；　even　although　he　have　the　measure　and　foot；　and　also　the　hands。　But　when
Philosophy　is　concerned；　immediate　knowledge　signifies　that　every　man　as　he　walks　and　stand　is　a
philosopher；　that　he　can　dogmatize　as　he　chooses；　and　that　he　is　completely　acquainted　with
Philosophy。

By　reason；　however；　mediate　knowledge　merely　is　on　the　one　hand　understood；　and　on　the　other
the　intellectual　perception　which　speaks　of　facts　（supra；　pp。　413…415）。　In　this　respect　it　is　true　that
reason　is　the　knowledge　and　revelation　of　absolute　truth；　since　the　understanding　is　the　revelation
of　the　finite　（Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　II。　pp。　8…14；　101）。　“We　maintained　that　two　different　powers　of
perception　in　man　have　to　be　accepted：　a　power　of　perception　through　visible　and　tangible　and
consequently　corporeal　organs　of　perception；　and　another　kind　of　power；　viz。　through　an　invisible
organ　which　in　no　way　represents　itself　to　the　outward　senses；　and　whose　existence　is　made
known　to　us　through　feeling　alone。　This　organ；　a　spiritual　eye　for　spiritual　objects；　has　been　called
by　men　—　generally　speaking　—　reason。　He　whom　the　pure　feelings　of　the　beautiful　and　good；　of
admiration　and　love；　of　respect　and　awe；　do　not　convince　that　in　and　with　these　feelings　he
perceives　something　to　be　present　which　is　independent　of　them；　and　which　is　unattainable　by　the
outward　senses　or　by　an　understanding　directed　upon　their　perceptions　alone　—　such　an　one
cannot　be　argued　with”　（Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　II。　pp。　74；　76）。　But　by　faith　Jacobi　likewise
understands　all　that　has　immediacy　of　Being　for　me：　“Through　faith　we　know　that　we　have　a　body；
we　become　aware　of　other　actual　things；　and　that　indeed　with　the　same　certainty　with　which　we
are　aware　of　ourselves。　We　obtain　all　conceptions　through　the　qualities　which　we　receive　and
accept；　and　there　is　no　other　way　of　attaining　real　knowledge；　for　reason；　when　it　begets　objects；
begets　phantoms　of　the　brain。　Thus　we　have　a　revelation　of　nature。〃（11）　Hence　the　expression
faith；　which　had　a　deep　significance　in　religion；　is　made　use　of　for　different　contents　of　every　kind；
this　in　our　own　time　is　the　point　of　view　most　commonly　adopted。

Jacobi　here　brings　faith　into　opposition　with　thought。　Let　us　compare　the　two；　and　discover
whether　they　are　separated　by　so　great　a　chasm　as　those　who　thus　oppose　them　think。　On　the　one
hand　absolute　existence　is　to　faith　immediate；　believing　consciousness　feels　itself　penetrated　by　this
as　by　its　essence：　that　existence　is　its　life；　believing　consciousness　asserts　itself　to　be　in　direct　unity
with　it。　Thought　thinks　the　absolute　existence；　such　existence　is　to　it　absolute　thought；　absolute
understanding；　pure　thought；　but　that　signifies　that　it　is　likewise　immediate　itself。　On　the　other　hand
to　faith　the　immediacy　of　absolute　existence　has　also　the　significance　of　a　Being：　it　is；　and　is
another　than　'I。'　And　the　same　is　true　of　the　thinker；　to　him　it　is　absolute　Being；　actual　in　itself；　and
different　from　self…consciousness　or　thought　as　finite　understanding；　to　use　the　common　term。　Now
what　is　the　reason　that　faith　and　thought　do　not　understand　one　another；　and　each　recognize　itself
in　the　other？　In　the　first　place　faith　has　no　consciousness　of　being　a　thought；　inasmuch　as　it　asserts
absolute　consciousness　to　be　identical　with　it　as　self…consciousness；　and　has　direct　inward
knowledge　of　the　same。　But　it　expresses　this　simple　unity；　in　its　consciousness　it　is　only　immediacy
so　to　speak　in　the　signification　of　Being；　a　unity　of　its　unconscious　substance。　In　the　second　place
Being…for…self　is　contained　in　thought；　to　this　faith　opposes　the　immediacy　of　Being。　Thought；　on
the　contrary；　has　the　immediate　as　absolute　potentiality；　as　absolutely　a　thing　of　thought：　and　the
immediacy　belonging　to　this　thing　of　thought　is　without　the　determination　of　Being；　of　life。　On　the
heights　of　this　abstraction　the　two　stand　opposed　to　each　other；　as　the　Aufkl？rung　which　asserts
absolute　existence　to　be　a　Beyond　of　self…consciousness；　and　as　the　materialism　which　makes　it　so
to　speak　present　matter　（supra；　pp。　382；　383）。　In　the　one　case　it　is　in　faith　and　thought　as　positive
existence　or　thought；　and　in　the　other　it　is　the　negative　of　self…consciousness；　which　is　thus　either
only　determined　as　negative；　as　a　Beyond；　or　likewise　as　existent　for　self…consciousness。　Hence
faith　and　thought　are　both　of　them　knowledge。　We　call　universal　knowledge　thought；　particular
knowledge　we　call　sensuous　perception；　and　we　term　the　introduction　of　external　determinations
understanding。　The　universal　element　in　man　is　thought；　but　to　it　likewise　appertains　religious
feeling　for　instance；　the　animal　does　not　possess　it；　for　it　has　no　human　feeling；　and　in　so　far　as　this
feeling　is　religious；　it　is　the　feeling　of　a　thinker；　and　what　determines　this　feeling　is　not　the
determination　of　natural　desire；　&c。；　but　a　universal　determination。　Thus　God；　even　though　He　is
only　felt　and　believed　in；　is　yet　the　universal　taken　quite　abstractly　—　even　in　His　personality　He　is
the　absolutely　universal　personality。

As　thought　and　faith　are　thus　one；　the　same　is　true　of　the　antithesis　between　mediated　and
immediate　knowledge。　We　must；　it