history of philosophy-第78部分

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mystics　and　enthusiasts　can　experience　many　things　in　themselves；　and　amongst　these　God；　i。e。　the
Infinite。　On　the　other　hand　Kant　argues　to　prove　the　existence　of　God；　who　is　to　him　an　hypothesis
necessary　for　the　explanation　of　things；　a　postulate　of　practical　reason。　But　in　this　connection
another　French　astronomer　made　the　following　reply　to　the　Emperor　Napoleon：　“Je　n’ai　pas　eu
besoin　de　cette　hypothèse。”　According　to　this　the　truth　underlying　the　Kantian　philosophy　is　the
recognition　of　freedom。　Even　Rousseau　represented　the　absolute　to　be　found　in　freedom；　Kant　has
the　same　principle；　but　taken　rather　from　the　theoretic　side。　The　French　regard　it　from　the　side　of
will；　which　is　represented　in　their　proverb：　〃Il　a　la　tête　près　du　bonnet。”　France　possesses　the
sense　of　actuality；　of　promptitude；　because　in　that　country　conception　passes　more　immediately
into　action；　men　have　there　applied　themselves　more　practically　to　the　affairs　of　actuality。　But
however　much　freedom　may　be　in　itself　concrete；　it　was　as　undeveloped　and　in　its　abstraction　that
it　was　there　applied　to　actuality；　and　to　make　abstractions　hold　good　in　actuality　means　to　destroy
actuality。　The　fanaticism　which　characterized　the　freedom　which　was　put　into　the　hands　of　the
people　was　frightful。　In　Germany　the　same　principle　asserted　the　rights　of　consciousness　on　its
own　account；　but　it　has　been　worked　out　in　a　merely　theoretic　way。　We　have　commotions　of
every　kind　within　us　and　around　us；　but　through　them　all　the　German　head　quietly　keeps　its
nightcap　on　and　silently　carries　on　its　operations　beneath　it。

Immanuel　Kant　was　born　at　K？nigsberg　in　1724；　and　there　studied　theology　to　begin　with；　in　the
year　1755　he　entered　upon　his　work　as　an　academic　teacher；　in　1770　he　became　professor　of
logic；　and　in　1801　he　died　at　K？nigsberg　on　the　12th　of　February；　having　almost　attained　his
eightieth　year　（Tennemann’s　Grundriss　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie　by　Wendt；　§　380；　pp。
465；　466）；　without　ever　having　left　his　native　town。

While　to　Wolff　thought　as　thought　was　merely　positive　self…identity　and　grasped　itself　as　such；　we
saw　the　negative　self…moving　thought；　the　absolute　Notion；　appear　in　all　its　power　in　France；　and
in　the　Aufkl？rung　it　likewise　made　its　way　to　Germany　in　such　a　manner　that　all　existence；　all
action；　was　called　upon　to　serve　a　useful　purpose；　i。e。　the　implicit　was　done　away　with　and
everything　had　to　be　for　another；　and　that　for　which　everything　had　to　be　is　man；
self…consciousness；　taken；　however；　as　signifying　all　men　generally。　The　consciousness　of　this
action　in　abstract　form　is　the　Kantian　philosophy。　It　is　thus　the　self…thinking　absolute　Notion　that
passes　into　itself　which　we　see　making　its　appearance　in　Germany　through　this　philosophy；　in　such
a　way　that　all　reality　falls　within　self…consciousness；　it　is　the　idealism　which　vindicates　all　moments
of　the　implicit　to　self…consciousness；　but　which　at　first　itself　remains　subject　to　a　contradiction；
inasmuch　as　it　still　separates　this　implicit　from　itself。　In　other　words　the　Kantian　philosophy　no
doubt　leads　reality　back　to　self…consciousness；　but　it　can　supply　no　reality　to　this　essence　of
self…consciousness；　or　to　this　pure　self…consciousness；　nor　can　it　demonstrate　Being　in　the　same。　It
apprehends　simple　thought　as　having　difference　in　itself；　but　does　not　yet　apprehend　that　all　reality
rests　on　this　difference；　it　does　not　know　how　to　obtain　mastery　over　the　individuality　of
self…consciousness；　and　although　it　describes　reason　very　well；　it　does　this　in　an　unthinking　empiric
way　which　again　robs　it　of　the　truth　it　has。　Theoretically　the　Kantian　philosophy　is　the
“Illumination”　or　Aufkl？rung　reduced　to　method；　it　states　that　nothing　true　can　be　known；　but
only　the　phenomenal；　it　leads　knowledge　into　consciousness　and　self…consciousness；　but　from　this
standpoint　maintains　it　to　be　a　subjective　and　finite　knowledge。　Thus　although　it　deals　with　the
infinite　Idea；　expressing　its　formal　categories　and　arriving　at　its　concrete　claims；　it　yet　again　denies
this　to　be　the　truth；　making　it　a　simple　subjective；　because　it　has　once　for　all　accepted　finite
knowledge　as　the　fixed　and　ultimate　standpoint。　This　philosophy　made　an　end　of　the　metaphysic　of
the　understanding　as　an　objective　dogmatism；　but　in　fact　it　merely　transformed　it　into　a　subjective
dogmatism；　i。e。　into　a　consciousness　in　which　these　same　finite　determinations　of　the　understanding
persist；　and　the　question　of　what　is　true　in　and　for　itself　has　been　abandoned。　Its　study　is　made
difficult　by　its　diffuseness　and　prolixity；　and　by　the　peculiar　terminology　found　in　it。　Nevertheless
this　diffuseness　has　one　advantage；　that　inasmuch　as　the　same　thing　is　often　repeated；　the　main
points　are　kept　before　us；　and　those　cannot　easily　be　lost　from　view。

We　shall　endeavour　to　trace　the　lines　which　Kant　pursued。　The　philosophy　of　Kant　has　in　the　first
place　a　direct　relation　to　that　of　Hume　as　stated　above　（p。　370）。　That　is　to　say；　the　significance　of
the　Kantian　philosophy；　generally　expressed；　is　from　the　very　beginning　to　allow　that
determinations　such　as　those　of　universality　and　necessity　are　not　to　be　met　with　in　perception；　and
this　Hume　has　already　shown　in　relation　to　Locke。　But　while　Hume　attacks　the　universality　and
necessity　of　the　categories　generally；　and　Jacobi　their　finitude；　Kant　merely　argues　against　their
objectivity　in　so　far　as　they　are　present　in　external　things　themselves；　while　maintaining　them　to　be
objective　in　the　sense　of　holding　good　as　universal　and　necessary；　as　they　do；　for　instance；　in
mathematics　and　natural　science。（1）　The　fact　that　we　crave　for　universality　and　necessity　as　that
which　first　constitutes　the　objective；　Kant　thus　undoubtedly　allows。　But　if　universality　and　necessity
do　not　exist　in　external　things；　the　question　arises　“Where　are　they　to　be　found？”　To　this　Kant；　as
against　Hume；　maintains　that　they　must　be　a　priori；　i。e。　that　they　must　rest　on　reason　itself；　and　on
thought　as　self…conscious　reason；　their　source　is　the　subject；　“I”　in　my　self…consciousness。（2）
This；　simply　expressed；　is　the　main　point　in　the　Kantian　philosophy。

In　the　second　place　the　philosophy　of　Kant　is　likewise　called　a　critical　philosophy　because　its　aim；
says　Kant；　is　first　of　all　to　supply　a　criticism　of　our　faculties　of　knowledge；　for　before　obtaining
knowledge　we　must　inquire　into　the　faculties　of　knowledge。　To　the　healthy　human　understanding
that　is　plausible；　and　to　it　this　has　been　a　great　discovery。　Knowledge　is　thereby　represented　as　an
instrument；　as　a　method　and　means　whereby　we　endeavour　to　possess　ourselves　of　the　truth。　Thus
before　men　can　make　their　way　to　the　truth　itself　they　must　know　the　nature　and　function　of　their
instrument。　They　must　see　whether　it　is　capable　of　supplying　what　is　demanded　of　it　—　of　seizing
upon　the　object；　they　must　know　what　the　alterations　it　makes　in　the　object　are；　in　order　that　these
alterations　may　not　be　mixed　up　with　the　determinations　of　the　object　itself。（3）　This　would　appear
as　though　men　could　set　forth　upon　the　search　for　truth　with　spears　and　staves。　And　a　further　claim
is　made　when　it　is　said　that　we　must　know　the　faculty　of　knowledge　before　we　can　know。　For　to
investigate　the　faculties　of　knowledge　means　to　know　them；　but　how　we　are　to　know　without
knowing；　how　we　are　to　apprehend　the　truth　before　the　truth；　it　is　impossible　to　say。　It　is　the　old
story　of　the　who　would　not　go　into　the　water　till　he　could　swim。　Thus　since　the　investigation　of　the
faculties　of　knowledge　is　itself　knowing；　it　cannot　in　Kant　attain　to　what　it　aims　at　because　it　is　that
already　—　it　cannot　come　to　itself　because　it　is　already　with　itself；　the　same　thing　happens　as
happened　with　the　Jews；　the　Spirit　passes　through　the　midst　of　them　and　they　know　it　not。　At　the
same　time　the　step　taken　by　Kant　is　a　great　and　important　one　—　that　is；　the　fact　that　he　has　made
knowledge　the　subject　of　his　consideration。

On　the　one　hand　this　critique　of　knowledge　applies　to　the　empirical　knowledge　of　Locke；　which
asserts　itself　to　be　grounded　on　experience；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　it　also　deals　with　what　claims
to　be　on　the　whole　a　more　metaphysical　kind　of　philosophy　—　the　Wolffian　and　German　—　which
had　also　taken　up　the　line　of　proceeding　on　the　more　empiric　method　which　has　been　depicted。
But　this　last　has　at　the　same　time　kept　itself　separate　from　the　merely　empiric　method；　inasmuch　as
its　main　efforts　have　been　directed　towards　making　such　categories　of　thought　as　those　of
potentiality；　actuality；　God；　&c。；　have　as　their　foundation　categories　of　the　understanding；　and　then
reasoning　from　them。　The　Kantian　philosophy　is　in　the　first　instance　directed　against　both。　Kant
takes　away　the　objective　significance　of　the　determinations　of　the　Wolffian　metaphysics；　and
shows　how　they　must　be　ascribed　to　subjective　thought　alone。　At　the　same　time　Jacobi　likewise
declared　himself　against　this　metaphysic；　but　since　he　started　more　especially　from　the　standpoint
of　the　French　and　Germans；　his　point　of　view　was　different：　he　asserts　that　our　finite　thought　can
set　forth　finite　determinations　alone；　and　thus　can　only　consider　God　and　Spirit　in　accordance　with
finite　relationships。　On　the　practical　side　there　reigned　at　that　time　the　so…called　happiness　theory；
since　man’s　inherent　Notion　and　the　way　to　realize　this　Notion　was　apprehended　in　morality　as　a
satisfaction　of　his　desires。　As　against　this　Kant　has　very　rightly　shown　that　it　involves　a　heteronomy
and　not　an　autonomy　of　reason　—　a　determination　through　nature　and　consequently　an　absence　of
freedom。　But　because　the　rational　principle　of　Kant　was　formal；　and　his　successors　could　not
make　any　further　progress　with　reason；　and　yet　morality　had　to　receive　a　content；　Fries　and　others
must　still　be　called　Hedonists　though　they　avoid　giving　themselves　the　name。

In　the　third　place；　as　regards　the　relation　of　the　categories　to　the　material　which　is　given　through
experience；　there　is　according　to　Kant　already　inherent　in　the　subjective　determinations　of　thought；
e。g。　in　those　of　cause　and　effect；　the　capacity　of　themselves　to　bind　together　the　differences　which
a