history of philosophy-第79部分

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e。g。　in　those　of　cause　and　effect；　the　capacity　of　themselves　to　bind　together　the　differences　which
are　present　in　that　material。　Kant　considers　thought　as　in　great　measure　a　synthetic　activity；　and
hence　he　represents　the　main　question　of　Philosophy　to　be　this；　“How　are　synthetic　judgments　a
priori　possible？”（4）　Judgment　signifies　the　combination　of　thought…determinations　as　subject　and
predicate。　Synthetic　judgments　a　priori　are　nothing　else　than　a　connection　of　opposites　through
themselves；　or　the　absolute　Notion；　i。e。　the　relations　of　different　determinations　such　as　those　of
cause　and　effect；　given　not　through　experience　but　through　thought。　Space　and　time　likewise　form
the　connecting　element；　they　are　thus　a　priori；　i。e。　in　self…consciousness。　Since　Kant　shows　that
thought　has　synthetic　judgments　a　priori　which　are　not　derived　from　perception；　he　shows　that
thought　is　so　to　speak　concrete　in　itself。　The　idea　which　is　present　here　is　a　great　one；　but；　on　the
other　hand；　quite　an　ordinary　signification　is　given　it；　for　it　is　worked　out　from　points　of　view　which
are　inherently　rude　and　empirical；　and　a　scientific　form　is　the　last　thing　that　can　be　claimed　for　it。　In
the　presentation　of　it　there　is　a　lack　of　philosophical　abstraction；　and　it　is　expressed　in　the　most
commonplace　way；　to　say　nothing　more　of　the　barbarous　terminology；　Kant　remains　restricted　and
confined　by　his　psychological　point　of　view　and　empirical　methods。

To　mention　one　example　only　of　big　barbarous　expressions；　Kant　calls　his　philosophy　（Kritik　der
reinen　Vernunft；　p。　19）　a　Transcendental　philosophy；　i。e。　a　system　of　principles　of　pure　reason
which　demonstrate　the　universal　and　necessary　elements　in　the　self…conscious　understanding；
without　occupying　themselves　with　objects　or　inquiring　what　universality　and　necessity　are；　this　last
would　be　transcendent。　Transcendent　and　transcendental　have　accordingly　to　be　clearly
distinguished。　Transcendent　mathematics　signifies　the　mathematics　in　which　the　determination　of
infinitude　is　made　use　of　in　a　preeminent　degree：　in　this　sphere　of　mathematics　we　say；　for　instance；
that　the　circle　consists　of　an　infinitude　of　straight　lines；　the　periphery　is　represented　as　straight；　and
since　the　curve　is　represented　as　straight　this　passes　beyond　the　geometric　category　and　is
consequently　transcendent。　Kant；　on　the　contrary；　defines　the　transcendental　philosophy　as　not　a
philosophy　which　by　means　of　categories　passes　beyond　its　own　sphere；　but　one　which　points　out
in　subjective　thought；　in　consciousness；　the　sources　of　what　may　become　transcendent。　Thought
would　thus　be　transcendent　if　the　categories　of　universality；　of　cause　and　effect；　were　predicated
of　the　object；　for　in　this　way　men　would　from　the　subjective　element　‘transcend’　into　another
sphere。　We　are　not　justified　in　so　doing　as　regards　the　result　nor　even　to　begin　with；　since　we
merely　contemplate　thought　within　thought　itself。　Thus　we　do　not　desire　to　consider　the　categories
in　their　objective　sense；　but　in　so　far　as　thought　is　the　source　of　such　synthetic　relationships；　the
necessary　and　universal　thus　here　receive　the　significance　of　resting　in　our　faculties　of　knowledge。
But　from　this　faculty　of　knowledge　Kant　still　separates　the　implicit；　the　thing…in…itself；　so　that　the
universality　and　necessity　are　all　the　time　a　subjective　conditionment　of　knowledge　merely；　and
reason　with　its　universality　and　necessity　does　not　attain　to　a　knowledge　of　the　truth。（5）　For　it
requires　perception　and　experience；　a　material　empirically　given　in　order；　as　subjectivity；　to　attain
to　knowledge。　As　Kant　says；　these　form　its　“constituent　parts”；　one　part　it　has　in　itself；　but　the
other　is　empirically　given。（6）　When　reason　desires　to　be　independent；　to　exist　in　itself　and　to　derive
truth　from　itself；　it　becomes　transcendent；　it　transcends　experience　because　it　lacks　the　other
constituent；　and　then　creates　mere　hallucinations　of　the　brain。　It　is　hence　not　constitutive　in
knowledge　but　only　regulative；　it　is　the　unity　and　rule　for　the　sensuous　manifold。　But　this　unity　on　its
own　account　is　the　unconditioned；　which；　transcending　experience；　merely　arrives　at
contradictions。　In　the　practical　sphere　alone　is　reason　constitutive。　The　critique　of　reason　is
consequently　not　the　knowing　of　objects；　but　of　knowledge　and　its　principles；　its　range　and
limitations；　so　that　it　does　not　become　transcendent。（7）　This　is　an　extremely　general　account　of
what　we　shall　now　consider　in　its　separate　details。

In　dealing　with　this　matter　Kant　adopts　the　plan　of　first　considering　theoretic　reason；　the
knowledge　which　relates　to　outward　objects。　In　the　second　place　he　investigates　the　will　as
self…actualization；　and；　in　the　third　place；　the　faculty　of　judgment；　the　special　consideration　of　the
unity　of　the　universal　and　individual；　how　far　he　gets　in　this　matter　we　shall　likewise　see。　But　the
critique　of　the　faculty　of　knowledge　is　the　matter　of　main　importance。





1。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft　（sixth　edition；　Leipzig；　1818）；　pp。　4；　11；　13；　93。

2。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft；　pp。　3…5。

3。　Ibidem；　Preface；　pp。　xviii。；　xix。

4。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft；　pp。　8；　9；　75；　77；　15。

5。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft；　pp。　255；　256。

6。　Ibidem；　p。　107。

7。　Ibidem；　pp。　497；　498；　Kritik　der　prakt。　Vernunft　（fourth　edition；　Riga；　1797）；　p。　254；　Kritik
der　Urtheilskraft　（third　edition；　Berlin；　1799）；　Preface；　p。　v。




Section　Three：　Recent　German　Philosophy
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　C。　Fichte。

Fichte　created　a　great　sensation　in　his　time；　his　philosophy　is　the　Kantian　philosophy　in　its
completion；　and；　as　we　must　specially　notice；　it　is　set　forth　in　a　more　logical　way。　He　does　not
pass　beyond　the　fundamentals　of　Kant's　philosophy；　and　at　first　regarded　his　own　philosophy　as
no　more　than　a　systematic　working　out　of　the　other。（1）　In　addition　to　these　systems　of
philosophies；　and　that　of　Schelling；　there　are　none。　Any　that　pretend　to　be　such　merely　pick　out
something　from　these；　and　over　this　they　fight　and　wrangle　among　themselves。　Ils　se　sont　battus
les　flanes；　pour　être　de　grands　hommes。　For　in　those　times　there　were　in　Germany　many
systems　of　philosophy；　such　as　those　of　Reinhold；　Krug；　Bouterweck；　Fries；　Schulze；　&c。；　but　in
them　there　is　only　an　extremely　limited　point　of　view；　combined　with　boastfulness　—　a　strange
medley　of　stray　thoughts　and　conceptions　or　facts　which　I　find　within　me。　But　their　thoughts　are　all
derived　from　Fichte；　Kant；　or　Schelling　—　that　is　in　so　far　as　there　are　thoughts　there　present　at　all。
Or　else　some　slight　modification　is　added；　and　this　for　the　most　part　merely　consists　in　making　the
great　principles　barren；　what　points　in　them　were　living　are　destroyed；　or　else　subordinate　forms
are　changed；　whereby　another　principle　is　said　to　be　set　forth；　though　when　we　look　closer　we
find　that　these　principles　are　but　the　principles　of　one　of　those　philosophies　that　have　gone　before。
This　may　serve　as　a　justification　for　my　not　speaking　further　of　all　these　philosophies；　any
exposition　of　them　would　be　no　more　than　a　demonstration　that　everything　in　them　is　taken　from
Kant；　Fichte；　or　Schelling；　and　that　the　modification　in　form　is　only　the　semblance　of　a　change；
while　really　it　indicates　a　deterioration　in　the　principles　of　those　philosophies。

Johann　Gottlieb　Fichte　was　born　on　the　19th　of　May；　1762；　at　Rammenau；　near　Bischoffswerda；
in　Upper　Lusatia。　He　studied　at　Jena；　and　for　some　time　was　a　private　tutor　in　Switzerland。　He
wrote　a　treatise　on　Religion；　termed　a　“Critique　of　all　Revelation；”　where　the　Kantian　phraseology
is　employed　throughout　—　so　much　so　that　it　was　thought　to　be　the　work　of　Kant。　After　this　he
was　in　1793　summoned　to　Jena　by　Goethe　as　Professor　of　Philosophy；　which　appointment　he；
however；　resigned　in　the　year　1799；　on　account　of　an　unpleasantness　which　had　arisen　through　his
essay　“On　the　ground　of　our　Belief　in　a　Divine　Government　of　the　World。”　For　Fichte　published　a
journal　in　Jena；　and　a　paper　in　it　which　was　by　someone　else　was　regarded　as　atheistical。　Fichte
might　have　kept　silence；　but　he　published　the　above…mentioned　essay　as　an　introduction　to　the
article。　The　authorities　wished　an　investigation　to　be　made　into　the　matter。　Then　Fichte　wrote　a
letter　which　contained　threats；　and　respecting　it　Goethe　said　that　a　Government　ought　not　to　allow
itself　to　be　threatened。　Fichte　now　taught　privately　for　some　time　in　Berlin；　in　1805　he　became
professor　at　Erlangen；　and　in　1809　at　Berlin；　at　which　place　he　died　on　the　27th　January；　1814。（2）
We　cannot　here　deal　more　particularly　with　the　details　of　his　life。

In　what　is　termed　the　philosophy　of　Fichte　a　distinction　must　be　made　between　his
properly…speaking　speculative　philosophy；　in　which　the　argument　is　most　consistently　worked　out；
and　which　is　less　well　known；　and　his　popular　philosophy；　to　which　belong　the　lectures　delivered　in
Berlin　before　a　mixed　audience；　and；　for　example；　the　work　termed　a　“Guidance　to　a　Blessed
Life。”　These　last　have　much　in　them　that　is　affecting　and　edifying　—　many　who　call　themselves　the
disciples　of　Fichte　know　this　side　alone　—　and　they　are　expressed　in　language　most　impressive　to　a
cultured；　religious　temperament。　In　the　history　of　Philosophy；　however；　such　cannot　be　taken　into
consideration；　although　through　their　matter　they　may　have　the　highest　possible　value；　the　content
has　to　be　speculatively　developed；　and　that　is　done　in　Fichte's　earlier　philosophic　works　alone。（3）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　The　First　Principles　of　Fichte's　Philosophy。

As　we　mentioned　above　（p。　478）；　the　shortcoming　in　the　Kantian　philosophy　was　its　unthinking
inconsistency；　through　which　speculative　unity　was　lacking　to　the　whole　system；　and　this
shortcoming　was　removed　by　Fichte。　It　is　the　absolute　form　which　Fichte　laid　hold　of；　or　in　other
words；　the　absolute　form　is　just　the　absolute　Being…for…self；　absolute　negativity；　not　individuality；
but　the　Notion　of　individuality；　and　thereby　the　Notion　of　actuality；　Fichte's　philosophy　is　thus　the
development　of　form　in　itself。　He　maintained　the　ego　to　be　the　absolute　principle；　so　that　from　it；
the　direct　and　im