the path of empire-第31部分

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opportunity　to　sit　on　the　bank　of　the　world's　great　highway　should　slip　into　the　hands　of　their　rivals　of　Nicaragua；　had　urged　earnestly　the　acceptance　of　the　terms。　The　majority　of　the　Colombians　probably　expected　to　grant　the　American　requests　in　time　but　were　determined　to　force　the　last　penny　from　the　United　States。　As　Hay　wrote：　〃The　Isthmus　is　looked　upon　as　a　financial　cow　to　be　milked　for　the　benefit　of　the　country　at　large。　This　difficulty　might　be　overcome　by　diplomacy　and　money。〃

President　Roosevelt　at　this　point　took　the　negotiations　into　his　own　hands。　Knowing　that　the　price　offered　was　more　than　just；　he　decided　to　depend　no　longer　on　bartering。　He　ordered　the　American　minister　to　leave　Colombia；　and　he　prepared　a　message　to　Congress　proposing　that　the　Americans　proceed　to　dig　the　canal　under　authority　which　he　claimed　to　find　in　the　Treaty　of　1846。　It　was；　however；　doubtful　if　Congress　would　find　it　there；　particularly　as　so　many　Congressmen　preferred　the　Nicaragua　route。　The　President　therefore　listened　with　pleased　attention　to　the　rumors　of　a　revolution　planned　to　separate　Panama　from　Colombia。　Most　picturesquely　this　information　was　brought　by　M。　Philippe　Bunau…Varilla；　a　former　engineer　of　the　De　Lesseps　company；　who　glowed　with　the　excitement　of　coming　events。　Roosevelt；　however；　relied　more　upon　the　information　furnished　by　two　American　officers；　who　reported　〃that　various　revolutionary　movements　were　being　inaugurated。〃

On　October　10；　1903；　the　President　wrote　to　Dr。　Albert　Shaw；　of　the　〃Review　of　Reviews〃：

〃I　enclose　you；　purely　for　your　own　information；　a　copy　of　a　letter　of　September　5th；　from　our　minister　to　Colombia。　I　think　it　might　interest　you　to　see　that　there　was　absolutely　not　the　slightest　chance　of　securing　by　treaty　any　more　than　we　endeavored　to　secure。　The　alternatives　were　to　go　to　Nicaragua　against　the　advice　of　the　great　majority　of　competent　engineers　some　of　the　most　competent　saying　that　we　had　better　have　no　canal　at　this　time　than　go　thereor　else　to　take　the　territory　by　force　without　any　attempt　at　getting　a　treaty。　I　cast　aside　the　proposition　made　at　the　time　to　foment　the　secession　of　Panama。　Whatever　other　governments　can　do；　the　United　States　cannot　go　into　the　securing；　by　such　underhand　means；　the　cession。　Privately；　I　freely　say　to　you　that　I　should　be　delighted　if　Panama　were　an　independent　state；　or　if　it　made　itself　so　at　this　moment；　but　for　me　to　say　so　publicly　would　amount　to　an　instigation　of　a　revolt；　and　therefore　I　cannot　say　it。〃

Nothing；　however；　prevented　the　President　from　keeping　an　attentive　eye　on　the　situation。　On　the　16th　of　October　he　directed　the　Navy　Department　to　send　ships　to　the　Isthmus　to　protect　American　interests　in　case　of　a　revolutionary　outbreak。　On　the　2d　of　November；　he　ordered　the　squadron　to　〃maintain　free　and　uninterrupted　transit。。。。　Prevent　the　landing　of　any　armed　force　with　hostile　intent；　either　government　or　insurgent；　at　any　point　within　fifty　miles　of　Panama。〃　At　3：40　P。M。；　on　the　3d　of　November；　the　acting　Secretary　of　State　telegraphed　to　the　Isthmus　for　confirmation　of　a　report　to　the　effect　that　an　uprising　was　in　progress。　A　reply　dated　8：15　P。M。　stated　that　there　had　been　none　as　yet；　but　that　it　was　rumored　one　would　take　place　during　the　night。　On　the　4th　of　November　independence　was　proclaimed。　The　only　fatality　was　a　Chinaman　killed　in　the　City　of　Panama　by　a　shell　from　the　Colombian　gunboat　Bogota。　Its　commander　was　warned　not　to　fire　again。　On　the　6th　of　November；　Secretary　Hay　instructed　our　consul　to　recognize　the　new　republic；　and　on　the　13th　of　November；　President　Roosevelt　received　Bunau…Varilla　as　its　representative　at　Washington。

This　prompt　recognition　of　a　new　state；　without　waiting　to　allow　the　parent　Government　time　to　assert　itself；　was　contrary　to　American　practice。　The　United　States　had　regarded　as　a　most　unfriendly　act　Great　Britain's　mere　recognition　of　the　belligerency　of　the　Southern　Confederacy。　The　right　of　the　United　States　to　preserve　the　neutrality　of　the　isthmus；　as　provided　by　the　Treaty　of　1846；　certainly　did　not　involve　the　right　to　intervene　between　the　Government　and　revolutionists。　On　the　other　hand；　the　guarantee　of　possession　which　the　United　States　had　given　to　Colombia　did　involve　supporting　her　Government　to　a　reasonable　extent；　yet　there　could　be　little　doubt　that　it　was　the　presence　of　American　ships　which　had　made　the　revolution　successful。

The　possible　implications　of　these　glaring　facts　were　cleverly　met　by　President　Roosevelt　in　his　message　to　Congress　and　by　the　Secretary　of　State　in　the　correspondence　growing　out　of　the　affair。　The　Government　really　relied　for　its　justification；　however；　not　upon　these　technical　pleas　but　upon　the　broad　grounds　of　equity。　America　has　learned　in　the　last　few　years　how　important　it　is　for　its　safety　that　〃scraps　of　paper〃　be　held　sacred　and　how　dangerous　is　the　doctrine　of　necessity。　Nevertheless　it　is　well　to　observe　that　if　the　United　States　did；　in　the　case　of　Panama；　depart　somewhat　from　that　strict　observance　of　obligations　which　it　has　been　accustomed　to　maintain；　it　did　not　seek　any　object　which　was　not　just　as　useful　to　the　world　at　large　as　to　itself；　that　the　situation　had　been　created　not　by　a　conflict　of　opposing　interests　but　by　what　the　Government　had　good　reason　to　believe　was　the　bad　faith　of　Colombia；　and　that　the　separation　of　Panama　was　the　act　of　its　own　people；　justly　incensed　at　the　disregard　of　their　interests　by　their　compatriots。　This　revolution　created　no　tyrannized　subject　population　but　rather　liberated　from　a　galling　bond　a　people　who　had；　in　fact；　long　desired　separation。

With　the　new　republic　negotiation　went　on　pleasantly　and　rapidly；　and　as　early　as　November　18；　1903；　a　convention　was　drawn　up；　in　which　the　United　States　guaranteed　the　independence　of　Panama　and　in　return　received　in　perpetuity　a　grant　of　a　zone　ten　miles　wide　within　which　to　construct　a　canal　from　ocean　to　ocean。



CHAPTER　XVI。　Problems　Of　The　Caribbean

As　the　acquisition　of　the　Philippines　made　all　Far　Eastern　questions　of　importance　to　the　United　States；　so　the　investment　of　American　millions　in　a　canal　across　the　Isthmus　of　Panama　increased　popular　interest　in　the　problems　of　the　Caribbean。　That　fascinating　sheet　of　water；　about　six　hundred　miles　from　north　to　south　by　about　fifteen　hundred　from　east　to　west；　is　ringed　around　by　the　possessions　of　many　powers。　In　1898　its　mainland　shores　were　occupied　by　Mexico；　British　Honduras；　Guatemala；　Honduras；　Nicaragua；　Costa　Rica；　Colombia；　and　Venezuela；　its　islands　were　possessed　by　the　negro　states　of　Hayti　and　the　Dominican　Republic；　and　by　Spain；　France；　Great　Britain；　Holland；　and　Denmark。　In　the　Caribbean　had　been　fought　some　of　the　greatest　and　most　significant　naval　battles　of　the　eighteenth　century　and；　when　the　canal　was　opened；　across　its　waters　would　plough　a　great　share　of　the　commerce　of　the　world。　As　owner　of　the　canal　and　professed　guardian　of　its　use；　the　United　States　was　bound　to　consider　its　own　strategic　relation　to　this　sea　into　which　the　canal　opened。

Gradually　the　situation　which　existed　in　1898　has　changed。　Spain　has　been　removed　from　the　Caribbean。　Of　her　former　possessions　the　United　States　holds　Porto　Rico；　Cuba　is　independent；　but　is　in　a　way　under　the　protection　of　the　United　States；　which　possesses　on　her　coast　the　naval　station　of　Guantanamo。　The　American　treaty　with　the　new　republic　of　Panama　practically　created　another　American　protectorate；　and　the　fortification　of　the　canal　gave　the　United　States　another　strategic　position。　The　negotiation　for　the　purchase　of　the　Danish　islands　has　been　completed　successfully。　But　these　obvious　footholds　are　of　less　importance　than　the　more　indirect　relationships　which　the　United　States　has　been　steadily　establishing；　through　successive　Administrations；　with　the　various　other　powers　located　on　the　borders　of　the　Caribbean。

The　Spanish　War　did　not　lull　the　suspicions　of　the　United　States　regarding　the　dangerous　influence　which　would　be　exerted　should　the　ambitions　of　European　powers　be　allowed　a　field　of　action　in　the　American　continents；　and　the　United　States　remained　as　intent　as　ever　on　preventing　any　opportunity　for　their　gaining　admittance。　One　such　contingency；　though　perhaps　a　remote　one；　was　the　possibility　of　a　rival　canal；　for　there　are　other　isthmuses　than　that　of　Panama　which　might　be　pierced　with　the　aid　of　modern　resources　of　capital　and　genius。　To　prevent　any　such　action　was　not　selfish　on　the　part　of　the　United　States；　for　the　American　canal　was　to　have　an　open　door；　and　there　was　no　economic　justification　for　another　seaway　from　the　Atlantic　to　the　Pacific。

There　might；　however；　be　some　temptation　in　the　political　and　military　influence　which　such　a　prospective　second　canal　could　exert。　Negotiations　were　begun；　therefore；　with　all　the　transcontinental　powers　of　Central　America；　offering　liberal　compensation　for　the　control　of　all　possible　canal　routes。　These　negotiations　have　been　long　drawn　out　and　are　only　lately　coming　to　fruition。　They　have　served；　however；　to　taboo　all　projects　by　other　nations；　and　one　of　these　treaties　negotiated　with　Colombia；　but　not　yet　ratified；　holds　out　the　prospect　of　winning　back　her　friendship　which　was　so　seriously　alienated　by　the　recognition　of　the　republic　of　Panama　by　the　United　States。

In　one　respect　the　changing　world　has　rendered　quite　obsolete　the　pronouncements　of　President　Monroe。　In　the　case　of　Japan　there　has　grown　up　a　great　power　which　is　neither　European　nor　American。　American　policy　in　the　Far　East　has　made　it　abundantly　evident　that　the　United　States　does　not　regard　the　self…imposed　limitations　upon　its　activity　as　extending　to　Asia。　In　her　case　there　is　lacking　the　quid　pro　quo　by　which　the　United　States　has　justified　its　demand　that　European　powers　refrain　from　interfering　in　America。　By　no　means；　however；　has　the　Government　admitted　the　right　of　Asia　to　impinge　on　the　American　continents。

In　1912　Washington　heard　that　Japan　was　negotiating　with　Mexico　for　a　concession　on　Magdalena　Bay。　Senator　Lodge　promptly　introduced　a　resolution　in　the　Senate；　declaring　that　〃when　any　harbor　or　other　place　in　the　American　continents　is　so　situat