the path of empire-第6部分

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America　was　so　remote　from　the　center　of　Russian　power　that　it　could　be　neither　enjoyed　nor　protected。　As　Napoleon　in　1803　preferred　to　see　Louisiana　in　the　hands　of　the　United　States　rather　than　in　those　of　his　rival　England；　so　Russia　preferred　Alaska　to　fall　to　the　United　States　rather　than　to　Canada；　especially　as　she　could　by　peaceful　cession　obtain　money　into　the　bargain。

Seward　was　delighted　with　the　opportunity；　but　diplomatically　concealed　his　satisfaction　and　bargained　closely。　Stoeckl　asked　ten　million　dollars；　Seward　offered　five。　Stoeckl　proposed　to　split　the　difference；　Seward　agreed；　if　Stoeckl　would　knock　off　the　odd　half　million。　Stoeckl　accepted；　on　condition　that　Seward　add　two　hundred　thousand　as　special　compensation　to　the　Russian　American　Company。　It　was　midnight　of　the　29th　of　March　when　7；200；000　was　made　the　price。　Seward　roused　Sumner　from　bed；　and　the　three　worked　upon　the　form　of　a　treaty　until　four　o'clock　in　the　morning。　No　captains　of　industry　could　show　greater　decision。

The　treaty；　however；　was　not　yet　a　fact。　The　Senate　must　approve；　and　its　approval　could　not　be　taken　for　granted。　The　temper　of　the　majority　of　Americans　toward　expansion　had　changed。　The　experiences　of　the　later　fifties　had　caused　many　to　look　upon　expansion　as　a　Southern　heresy。　Carl　Schurz　a　little　later　argued　that　we　had　already　taken　in　all　those　regions　the　climate　of　which　would　allow　healthy　self…government　and　that　we　should　annex　no　tropics。　Hamilton　Fish；　then　Secretary　of　State；　wrote　in　1873　that　popular　sentiment　was；　for　the　time　being；　against　all　expansion。　In　fact；　among　the　people　of　the　United　States　the　idea　was　developing　that　expansion　was　contrary　to　their　national　policy；　and　their　indisposition　to　expand　became　almost　a　passion。　They　rejected　Santo　Domingo　and　the　Danish　Islands　and　would　not　press　any　negotiations　for　Canada。

What　saved　the　Alaska　Treaty　from　a　similar　disapproval　was　not　any　conviction　that　Alaska　was　worth　seven　million　dollars；　although　Sumner　convinced　those　who　took　the　trouble　to　read；　that　the　financial　bargain　was　not　a　bad　one。　The　chief　factor　in　the　purchase　of　Alaska　was　almost　pure　sentiment。　Throughout　American　history　there　has　been　a　powerful　tradition　of　friendliness　between　Russia　and　the　United　States；　yet　surely　no　two　political　systems　have　been　in　the　past　more　diametrically　opposed。　The　chief　ground　for　friendship　has　doubtless　been　the　great　intervening　distance　which　has　reduced　intercourse　to　a　minimum。　Some　slight　basis　for　congeniality　existed　in　the　fact　that　the　interests　of　both　countries　favored　a　similar　policy　of　freedom　upon　the　high　seas。　What　chiefly　influenced　the　public　mind；　however；　was　the　attitude　which　Russia　had　taken　during　the　Civil　War。　When　the　Grand　Duke　Alexis　visited　the　United　States　in　1871；　Oliver　Wendell　Holmes　greeted　him　with　the　lines：

Bleak　are　our　coasts　with　the　blasts　of　December；　Thrilling　and　warm　are　the　hearts　that　remember　Who　was　our　friend　when　the　world　was　our　foe。

This　Russian　friendship　had　presented　itself　dramatically　to　the　public　at　a　time　when　American　relations　with　Great　Britain　were　strained；　for　Russian　fleets　had　in　1863　suddenly　appeared　in　the　harbors　of　New　York　and　San　Francisco。　These　visits　were　actually　made　with　a　sole　regard　for　Russian　interests　and　in　anticipation　of　the　outbreak　of　a　general　European　war；　which　the　Czar　then　feared。　The　appearance　of　the　fleets；　however；　was　for　many　years　popularly　supposed　to　signify　sympathy　with　the　Union　and　a　willingness　to　defend　it　from　attack　by　Great　Britain　and　France。　Many　conceived　the　ingenuous　idea　that　the　purchase　price　of　Alaska　was　really　the　American　half　of　a　secret　bargain　of　which　the　fleets　were　the　Russian　part。　Public　opinion；　therefore；　regarded　the　purchase　of　Alaska　in　the　light　of　a　favor　to　Russia　and　demanded　that　the　favor　be　granted。

Thus　of　all　the　schemes　of　expansion　in　the　fifty　years　between　the　Mexican　and　the　Spanish　wars；　for　the　Gadsden　Purchase　of　1853　was　really　only　a　rectification　of　boundary；　this　alone　came　to　fruition。　Seward　could　well　congratulate　himself　on　his　alertness　in　seizing　an　opportunity　and　on　his　management　of　the　delicate　political　aspects　of　the　purchase。　Without　his　promptness　the　golden　opportunity　might　have　passed　and　never　recurred。　Yet　he　could　never　have　saved　this　fragment　of　his　policy　had　not　the　American　people　cherished　for　Russia　a　sentimental　friendship　which　was　intensified　at　the　moment　by　anger　at　the　supposed　sympathy　of　Great　Britain　for　the　South。

If　Russia　hoped　by　ceding　Alaska　to　involve　the　United　States　in　difficulties　with　her　rival　Great　Britain；　her　desire　was　on　one　occasion　nearly　gratified。　The　only　profit　which　the　United　States　derived　from　this　new　possession　was　for　many　years　drawn　from　the　seal　fishery。　The　same　generation　of　Americans　which　allowed　the　extermination　of　the　buffalo　for　lap　robes　found　in　the　sealskin　sack　the　hall　mark　of　wealth　and　fashion。　While；　however；　the　killing　of　the　buffalo　was　allowed　to　go　on　without　official　check；　the　Government　in　1870　inaugurated　a　system　to　preserve　the　seal　herds　which　was　perhaps　the　earliest　step　in　a　national　conservation　policy。　The　sole　right　of　killing　was　given　to　the　Alaska　Commercial　Company　with　restrictions　under　which　it　was　believed　that　the　herds　would　remain　undiminished。　The　catch　was　limited　to　one　hundred　thousand　a　year；　it　was　to　include　only　male　seals；　and　it　was　to　be　limited　to　the　breeding　grounds　on　the　Pribilof　Islands。

The　seals；　however；　did　not　confine　themselves　to　American　territory。　During　the　breeding　season　they　ranged　far　and　wide　within　a　hundred　miles　of　their　islands；　and　during　a　great　part　of　the　year　they　were　to　be　found　far　out　in　the　Pacific。　The　value　of　their　skins　attracted　the　adventurous　of　many　lands；　but　particularly　Canadians；　and　Vancouver　became　the　greatest　center　for　deep…sea　sealing。　The　Americans　saw　the　development　of　the　industry　with　anger　and　alarm。　Considering　the　seals　as　their　own；　they　naturally　resented　this　unlimited　exploitation　by　outsiders　when　Americans　themselves　were　so　strictly　limited　by　law。　They　also　believed　that　the　steady　diminution　of　the　herds　was　due　to　the　reckless　methods　of　their　rivals；　particularly　the　use　of　explosives　which　destroyed　many　animals　to　secure　a　few　perfect　skins。

Public　opinion　on　the　Pacific　coast　sought　a　remedy　and　soon　found　one　in　the　terms　of　the　treaty　of　purchase。　That　document；　in　dividing　Alaska　from　Siberia；　described　a　line　of　division　running　through　Bering　Sea；　and　in　1881　the　Acting　Secretary　of　the　Treasury　propounded　the　theory　that　this　line　divided　not　merely　the　islands　but　the　water　as　well。　There　was　a　widespread　feeling　that　all　Bering　Sea　within　this　line　was　American　territory　and　that　all　intruders　from　other　nations　were　poachers。　In　accordance　with　this　theory；　the　revenue　cutter　Corwin　in　1886　seized　three　British　vessels　and　hauled　their　skippers　before　the　United　States　District　Court　of　Sitka。　Thomas　F。　Bayard；　then　Secretary　of　State　under　President　Cleveland；　did　not　recognize　this　theory　of　interpreting　the　treaty；　but　endeavored　to　right　the　grievance　by　a　joint　agreement　with　France；　Germany；　Japan；　Russia；　and　Great　Britain；　the　sealing　nations；　〃for　the　better　protection　of　the　fur　seal　fisheries　in　Bering　Sea。〃

A　solution　had　been　almost　reached；　when　Canada　interposed。　Lord　Morley　has　remarked；　in　his　〃Recollections；〃　how　the　voice　of　Canada　fetters　Great　Britain　in　her　negotiations　with　the　United　States。　While　Bayard　was　negotiating　an　agreement　concerning　Bering　Sea　which　was　on　the　whole　to　the　advantage　of　the　United　States；　he　completed　a　similar　convention　on　the　more　complicated　question　of　the　northeastern　or　Atlantic　fisheries　which　was　more　important　to　Canada。　This　latter　convention　was　unfavorably　reported　by　the　Senate　Committee　on　Foreign　Affairs；　which　foreshadowed　rejection。　Thereupon；　in　May；　1888；　Lord　Salisbury；　the　British　Foreign　Minister；　withdrew　from　the　Bering　Sea　negotiation。

At　this　critical　moment　Cleveland　gave　place　to　Harrison；　and　Bayard　was　succeeded　by　James　G。　Blaine；　the　most　interesting　figure　in　our　diplomatic　activities　of　the　eighties。　These　years　marked　the　lowest　point　in　the　whole　history　of　our　relations　with　other　countries；　both　in　the　character　of　our　agents　and　in　the　nature　of　the　public　opinion　to　which　they　appealed。　Blaine　was　undoubtedly　the　most　ill…informed　of　our　great　diplomats；　yet　a　trace　of　greatness　lingers　about　him。　The　exact　reverse　of　John　Quincy　Adams；　he　knew　neither　law　nor　history；　and　he　did　not　always　inspire　others　with　confidence　in　his　integrity。　On　the　other　hand；　the　magnetic　charm　of　his　personality　won　many　to　a　devotion　such　as　none　of　our　great　men　except　Clay　has　received。　Blaine　saw；　moreover；　though　through　a　glass　darkly；　farther　along　the　path　which　the　United　States　was　to　take　than　did　any　of　his　contemporaries。　It　was　his　fate　to　deal　chiefly　in　controversy　with　those　accomplished　diplomats；　Lord　Salisbury　and　Lord　Granville；　and　it　must　have　been　among　the　relaxations　of　their　office　to　point　out　tactfully　the　defects　and　errors　in　his　dispatches。　Nevertheless　when　he　did　not　misread　history　or　misquote　precedents　but　wielded　the　broadsword　of　equity；　he　often　caught　the　public　conscience；　and　then　he　was　not　an　opponent　to　be　despised。

Blaine　at　once　undertook　the　defense　of　the　contention　that　Bering　Sea　was　〃closed〃　and　the　exclusive　property　of　the　United　States；　in　spite　of　the　fact　that　this　position　was　opposed　to　the　whole　trend　of　American　opinion；　which　from　the　days　of　the　Revolution　had　always　stood　for　freedom　of　the　high　seas　and　the　limitation　of　the　water　rights　of　particular　nations　to　the　narrowest　limits。　The　United　States　and　Great　Britain　had　jointly　protested　against　the　Czar's　ukase　of　1821；　which　had　asserted　Russia's　claim　to　Bering　Sea　as　territorial　waters；　and　if　Russia　had　not　possessed　it　in　1821；　we　certainly　could　not　have　bought　it　in　1867。　In　the　face　of　Canadian　opinion；　Great　Britain　could　never　consent；　even　for　the　sake　of　peace；　to　a　position　as　unsound　as　it　was　disadvantageous　to　Canadian　industry。　Nor　did　Blai