gorgias-第15部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


im　which　a　man　ought　to　have；　and　towards　which　he　ought　to　direct　all　the　energies　both　of　himself　and　of　the　state；　acting　so　that　he　may　have　temperance　and　justice　present　with　him　and　be　happy；　not　suffering　his　lusts　to　be　unrestrained；　and　in　the　never…ending　desire　satisfy　them　leading　a　robber's　life。　Such；　one　is　the　friend　neither　of　God　nor　man；　for　he　is　incapable　of　communion；　and　he　who　is　incapable　of　communion　is　also　incapable　of　friendship。　And　philosophers　tell　us；　Callicles；　that　communion　and　friendship　and　orderliness　and　temperance　and　justice　bind　together　heaven　and　earth　and　gods　and　men；　and　that　this　universe　is　therefore　called　Cosmos　or　order；　not　disorder　or　misrule；　my　friend。　But　although　you　are　a　philosopher　you　seem　to　me　never　to　have　observed　that　geometrical　equality　is　mighty；　both　among　gods　and　men；　you　think　that　you　ought　to　cultivate　inequality　or　excess；　and　do　not　care　about　geometry。…Well；　then；　either　the　principle　that　the　happy　are　made　happy　by　the　possession　of　justice　and　temperance；　and　the　miserable　the　possession　of　vice；　must　be　refuted；　or；　if　it　is　granted；　what　will　be　the　consequences？　All　the　consequences　which　I　drew　before；　Callicles；　and　about　which　you　asked　me　whether　I　was　in　earnest　when　I　said　that　a　man　ought　to　accuse　himself　and　his　son　and　his　friend　if　he　did　anything　wrong；　and　that　to　this　end　he　should　use　his　rhetoric…all　those　consequences　are　true。　And　that　which　you　thought　that　Polus　was　led　to　admit　out　of　modesty　is　true；　viz。；　that；　to　do　injustice；　if　more　disgraceful　than　to　suffer；　is　in　that　degree　worse；　and　the　other　position；　which；　according　to　Polus；　Gorgias　admitted　out　of　modesty；　that　he　who　would　truly　be　a　rhetorician　ought　to　be　just　and　have　a　knowledge　of　justice；　has　also　turned　out　to　be　true。　　　And　now；　these　things　being　as　we　have　said；　let　us　proceed　in　the　next　place　to　consider　whether　you　are　right　in　throwing　in　my　teeth　that　I　am　unable　to　help　myself　or　any　of　my　friends　or　kinsmen；　or　to　save　them　in　the　extremity　of　danger；　and　that　I　am　in　the　power　of　another　like　an　outlaw　to　whom　anyone　may　do　what　he　likes…he　may　box　my　ears；　which　was　a　brave　saying　of　yours；　or　take　away　my　goods　or　banish　me；　or　even　do　his　worst　and　kill　me；　a　condition　which；　as　you　say；　is　the　height　of　disgrace。　My　answer　to　you　is　one　which　has　been　already　often　repeated；　but　may　as　well　be　repeated　once　more。　I　tell　you；　Callicles；　that　to　be　boxed　on　the　ears　wrongfully　is　not　the　worst　evil　which　can　befall　a　man；　nor　to　have　my　purse　or　my　body　cut　open；　but　that　to　smite　and　slay　me　and　mine　wrongfully　is　far　more　disgraceful　and　more　evil；　aye；　and　to　despoil　and　enslave　and　pillage；　or　in　any　way　at　all　to　wrong　me　and　mine；　is　far　more　disgraceful　and　evil　to　the　doer　of　the　wrong　than　to　me　who　am　the　sufferer。　These　truths；　which　have　been　already　set　forth　as　I　state　them　in　the　previous　discussion；　would　seem　now　to　have　been　fixed　and　riveted　by　us；　if　I　may　use　an　expression　which　is　certainly　bold；　in　words　which　are　like　bonds　of　iron　and　adamant；　and　unless　you　or　some　other　still　more　enterprising　hero　shall　break　them；　there　is　no　possibility　of　denying　what　I　say。　For　my　position　has　always　been；　that　I　myself　am　ignorant　how　these　things　are；　but　that　I　have　never　met　any　one　who　could　say　otherwise；　any　more　than　you　can；　and　not　appear　ridiculous。　This　is　my　position　still；　and　if　what　I　am　saying　is　true；　and　injustice　is　the　greatest　of　evils　to　the　doer　of　injustice；　and　yet　there　is　if　possible　a　greater　than　this　greatest　of　evils；　in　an　unjust　man　not　suffering　retribution；　what　is　that　defence　of　which　the　want　will　make　a　man　truly　ridiculous？　Must　not　the　defence　be　one　which　will　avert　the　greatest　of　human　evils？　And　will　not　worst　of　all　defences　be　that　with　which　a　man　is　unable　to　defend　himself　or　his　family　or　his　friends？…and　next　will　come　that　which　is　unable　to　avert　the　next　greatest　evil；　thirdly　that　which　is　unable　to　avert　the　third　greatest　evil；　and　so　of　other　evils。　As　is　the　greatness　of　evil　so　is　the　honour　of　being　able　to　avert　them　in　their　several　degrees；　and　the　disgrace　of　not　being　able　to　avert　them。　Am　I　not　right　Callicles？　　　Cal。　Yes；　quite　right。　　　Soc。　Seeing　then　that　there　are　these　two　evils；　the　doing　injustice　and　the　suffering　injustice…and　we　affirm　that　to　do　injustice　is　a　greater；　and　to　suffer　injustice　a　lesser　evil…by　what　devices　can　a　man　succeed　in　obtaining　the　two　advantages；　the　one　of　not　doing　and　the　other　of　not　suffering　injustice？　must　he　have　the　power；　or　only　the　will　to　obtain　them？　I　mean　to　ask　whether　a　man　will　escape　injustice　if　he　has　only　the　will　to　escape；　or　must　he　have　provided　himself　with　the　power？　　　Cal。　He　must　have　provided　himself　with　the　power；　that　is　clear。　　　Soc。　And　what　do　you　say　of　doing　injustice？　Is　the　will　only　sufficient；　and　will　that　prevent　him　from　doing　injustice；　or　must　he　have　provided　himself　with　power　and　art；　and　if　he　has　not　studied　and　practised；　will　he　be　unjust　still？　Surely　you　might　say；　Callicles；　whether　you　think　that　Polus　and　I　were　right　in　admitting　the　conclusion　that　no　one　does　wrong　voluntarily；　but　that　all　do　wrong　against　their　will？　　　Cal。　Granted；　Socrates；　if　you　will　only　have　done。　　　Soc。　Then；　as　would　appear；　power　and　art　have　to　be　provided　in　order　that　we　may　do　no　injustice？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　what　art　will　protect　us　from　suffering　injustice；　if　not　wholly；　yet　as　far　as　possible？　I　want　to　know　whether　you　agree　with　me；　for　I　think　that　such　an　art　is　the　art　of　one　who　is　either　a　ruler　or　even　tyrant　himself；　or　the　equal　and　companion　of　the　ruling　power。　　　Cal。　Well　said；　Socrates；　and　please　to　observe　how　ready　I　am　to　praise　you　when　you　talk　sense。　　　Soc。　Think　and　tell　me　whether　you　would　approve　of　another　view　of　mine：　To　me　every　man　appears　to　be　most　the　friend　of　him　who　is　most　like　to　him…like　to　like；　as　ancient　sages　say：　Would　you　not　agree　to　this？　　　Cal。　I　should。　　　Soc。　But　when　the　tyrant　is　rude　and　uneducated；　he　may　be　expected　to　fear　any　one　who　is　his　superior　in　virtue；　and　will　never　be　able　to　be　perfectly　friendly　with　him。　　　Cal。　That　is　true。　　　Soc。　Neither　will　he　be　the　friend　of　any　one　who　greatly　his　inferior；　for　the　tyrant　will　despise　him；　and　will　never　seriously　regard　him　as　a　friend。　　　Cal。　That　again　is　true。　　　Soc。　Then　the　only　friend　worth　mentioning；　whom　the　tyrant　can　have；　will　be　one　who　is　of　the　same　character；　and　has　the　same　likes　and　dislikes；　and　is　at　the　same　time　willing　to　be　subject　and　subservient　to　him；　he　is　the　man　who　will　have　power　in　the　state；　and　no　one　will　injure　him　with　impunity：…is　not　that　so？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　a　young　man　begins　to　ask　how　he　may　become　great　and　formidable；　this　would　seem　to　be　the　way…he　will　accustom　himself；　from　his　youth　upward；　to　feel　sorrow　and　joy　on；　the　same　occasions　as　his　master；　and　will　contrive　to　be　as　like　him　as　possible？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　in　this　way　he　will　have　accomplished；　as　you　and　your　friends　would。　say；　the　end　of　becoming　a　great　man　and　not　suffering　injury？　　　Cal。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　But　will　he　also　escape　from　doing　injury？　Must　not　the　very　opposite　be　true；…if　he　is　to　be　like　the　tyrant　in　his　injustice；　and　to　have　influence　with　him？　Will　he　not　rather　contrive　to　do　as　much　wrong　as　possible；　and　not　be　punished？　　　Cal。　True。　　　Soc。　And　by　the　imitation　of　his　master　and　by　the　power　which　he　thus　acquires　will　not　his　soul　become　bad　and　corrupted；　and　will　not　this　be　the　greatest　evil　to　him？　　　Cal。　You　always　contrive　somehow　or　other；　Socrates；　to　invert　everything：　do　you　not　know　that　he　who　imitates　the　tyrant　will；　if　he　has　a　mind；　kill　him　who　does　not　imitate　him　and　take　away　his　goods？　　　Soc。　Excellent　Callicles；　I　am　not　deaf；　and　I　have　heard　that　a　great　many　times　from　you　and　from　Polus　and　from　nearly　every　man　in　the　city；　but　I　wish　that　you　would　hear　me　too。　I　dare　say　that　he　will　kill　him　if　he　has　a　mind…the　bad　man　will　kill　the　good　and　true。　　　Cal。　And　is　not　that　just　the　provoking　thing？　　　Soc。　Nay；　not　to　a　man　of　sense；　as　the　argument　shows：　do　you　think　that　all　our　cares　should　be　directed　to　prolonging　life　to　the　uttermost；　and　to　the　study　of　those　arts　which　secure　us　from　danger　always；　like　that　art　of　rhetoric　which　saves　men　in　courts　of　law；　and　which　you　advise　me　to　cultivate？　　　Cal。　Yes；　truly；　and　very　good　advice　too。　　　Soc。　Well；　my　friend；　but　what　do　you　think　of　swimming；　is　that　an　art　of　any　great　pretensions？　　　Cal。　No；　indeed。　　　Soc。　And　yet　surely　swimming　saves　a　man　from　death；　there　are　occasions　on　which　he　must　know　how　to　swim。　And　if　you　despise　the　swimmers；　I　will　tell　you　of　another　and　greater　art；　the　art　of　the　pilot；　who　not　only　saves　the　souls　of　men；　but　also　their　bodies　and　properties　from　the　extremity　of　danger；　just　like　rhetoric。　Yet　his　art　is　modest　and　unpresuming：　it　has　no　airs　or　pretences　of　doing　anything　extraordinary；　and；　in　return　for　the　same　salvation　which　is　given　by　the　pleader；　demands　only　two　obols；　if　he　brings　us　from　Aegina　to　Athens；　or　for　the　longer　voyage　from　Pontus　or　Egypt；　at　the　utmost　two　drachmae；　when　he　has　saved；　as　I　was　just　now　saying；　the　passenger　and　his　wife　and　children　and　goods；　and　safely　disembarked　them　at　the　Piraeus　…this　is　the　payment　which　he　asks　in　return　for　so　great　a　boon；　and　he　who　is　the　master　of　the　art；　and　has　done　all　this；　gets　out　and　walks　about　on　the　sea…shore　by　his　ship　in　an　unassuming　way。　For　he　is　able　to　reflect　and　is　aware　that　he　cannot　tell　which　of　his　fellow…passengers　he　has　benefited；　and　which　of　them　he　has　injured　in　not　allowing　them　to　be　drowned。　He　knows　that　they　are　just　the　same　when　he　has　disembarked　them　as　when　they　embarked；　and　not　a　whit　better　either　in　their　bodies　or　in　their　souls；　and　he　considers　that　if　a　man　who　is　afflicted　by　great　and　incurable　bodily　diseases　is　only　to　be　pitied　for　having　escaped；　and　is　in　no　way　benefited　by　him　in　having　been　saved　from　drowning；　much　less　he　who　has　great　and　incurable　diseases；　not　of　the　body；　but　of　the　soul；　which　is　the　more　valuable　part　of　him；　neither　is　lif