gorgias-第7部分

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　and　burned　alive；　will　he　be　happier　than　if　he　escape　and　become　a　tyrant；　and　continue　all　through　life　doing　what　he　likes　and　holding　the　reins　of　government；　the　envy　and　admiration　both　of　citizens　and　strangers？　Is　that　the　paradox　which；　as　you　say；　cannot　be　refuted？　　　Soc。　There　again；　noble　Polus；　you　are　raising　hobgoblins　instead　of　refuting　me；　just　now　you　were　calling　witnesses　against　me。　But　please　to　refresh　my　memory　a　little；　did　you　say…〃in　an　unjust　attempt　to　make　himself　a　tyrant〃？　　　Pol。　Yes；　I　did。　　　Soc。　Then　I　say　that　neither　of　them　will　be　happier　than　the　other…neither　he　who　unjustly　acquires　a　tyranny；　nor　he　who　suffers　in　the　attempt；　for　of　two　miserables　one　cannot　be　the　happier；　but　that　he　who　escapes　and　becomes　a　tyrant　is　the　more　miserable　of　the　two。　Do　you　laugh；　Polus？　Well；　this　is　a　new　kind　of　refutation…when　any　one　says　anything；　instead　of　refuting　him　to　laugh　at　him。　　　Pol。　But　do　you　not　think；　Socrates；　that　you　have　been　sufficiently　refuted；　when　you　say　that　which　no　human　being　will　allow？　Ask　the　company。　　　Soc。　O　Polus；　I　am　not　a　public　man；　and　only　last　year；　when　my　tribe　were　serving　as　Prytanes；　and　it　became　my　duty　as　their　president　to　take　the　votes；　there　was　a　laugh　at　me；　because　I　was　unable　to　take　them。　And　as　I　failed　then；　you　must　not　ask　me　to　count　the　suffrages　of　the　company　now；　but　if；　as　I　was　saying；　you　have　no　better　argument　than　numbers；　let　me　have　a　turn；　and　do　you　make　trial　of　the　sort　of　proof　which；　as　I　think；　is　required；　for　I　shall　produce　one　witness　only　of　the　truth　of　my　words；　and　he　is　the　person　with　whom　I　am　arguing；　his　suffrage　I　know　how　to　take；　but　with　the　many　I　have　nothing　to　do；　and　do　not　even　address　myself　to　them。　May　I　ask　then　whether　you　will　answer　in　turn　and　have　your　words　put　to　the　proof？　For　I　certainly　think　that　I　and　you　and　every　man　do　really　believe；　that　to　do　is　a　greater　evil　than　to　suffer　injustice：　and　not　to　be　punished　than　to　be　punished。　　　Pol。　And　I　should　say　neither　I；　nor　any　man：　would　you　yourself；　for　example；　suffer　rather　than　do　injustice？　　　Soc。　Yes；　and　you；　too；　I　or　any　man　would。　　　Pol。　Quite　the　reverse；　neither　you；　nor　I；　nor　any　man。　　　Soc。　But　will　you　answer？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure；　I　will…for　I　am　curious　to　hear　what　you　can　have　to　say。　　　Soc。　Tell　me；　then；　and　you　will　know；　and　let　us　suppose　that　I　am　beginning　at　the　beginning：　which　of　the　two；　Polus；　in　your　opinion；　is　the　worst？…to　do　injustice　or　to　suffer？　　　Pol。　I　should　say　that　suffering　was　worst。　　　Soc。　And　which　is　the　greater　disgrace？…Answer。　　　Pol。　To　do。　　　Soc。　And　the　greater　disgrace　is　the　greater　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　I　understand　you　to　say；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；　that　the　honourable　is　not　the　same　as　the　good；　or　the　disgraceful　as　the　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　Let　me　ask　a　question　of　you：　When　you　speak　of　beautiful　things；　such　as　bodies；　colours；　figures；　sounds；　institutions；　do　you　not　call　them　beautiful　in　reference　to　some　standard：　bodies；　for　example；　are　beautiful　in　proportion　as　they　are　useful；　or　as　the　sight　of　them　gives　pleasure　to　the　spectators；　can　you　give　any　other　account　of　personal　beauty？　　　Pol。　I　cannot。　　　Soc。　And　you　would　say　of　figures　or　colours　generally　that　they　were　beautiful；　either　by　reason　of　the　pleasure　which　they　give；　or　of　their　use；　or　both？　　　Pol。　Yes；　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　you　would　call　sounds　and　music　beautiful　for　the　same　reason？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　Laws　and　institutions　also　have　no　beauty　in　them　except　in　so　far　as　they　are　useful　or　pleasant　or　both？　　　Pol。　I　think　not。　　　Soc。　And　may　not　the　same　be　said　of　the　beauty　of　knowledge？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure；　Socrates；　and　I　very　much　approve　of　your　measuring　beauty　by　the　standard　of　pleasure　and　utility。　　　Soc。　And　deformity　or　disgrace　may　be　equally　measured　by　the　opposite　standard　of　pain　and　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　when　of　two　beautiful　things　one　exceeds　in　beauty；　the　measure　of　the　excess　is　to　be　taken　in　one　or　both　of　these；　that　is　to　say；　in　pleasure　or　utility　or　both？　　　Pol。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　And　of　two　deformed　things；　that　which　exceeds　in　deformity　or　disgrace；　exceeds　either　in　pain　or　evil…must　it　not　be　so？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　then　again；　what　was　the　observation　which　you　just　now　made；　about　doing　and　suffering　wrong？　Did　you　not　say；　that　suffering　wrong　was　more　evil；　and　doing　wrong　more　disgraceful？　　　Pol。　I　did。　　　Soc。　Then；　if　doing　wrong　is　more　disgraceful　than　suffering；　the　more　disgraceful　must　be　more　painful　and　must　exceed　in　pain　or　in　evil　or　both：　does　not　that　also　follow？　　　Pol。　Of　course。　　　Soc。　First；　then；　let　us　consider　whether　the　doing　of　injustice　exceeds　the　suffering　in　the　consequent　pain：　Do　the　injurers　suffer　more　than　the　injured？　　　Pol。　No；　Socrates；　certainly　not。　　　Soc。　Then　they　do　not　exceed　in　pain？　　　Pol。　No。　　　Soc。　But　if　not　in　pain；　then　not　in　both？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　Then　they　can　only　exceed　in　the　other？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　That　is　to　say；　in　evil？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　Then　doing　injustice　will　have　an　excess　of　evil；　and　will　therefore　be　a　greater　evil　than　suffering　injustice？　　　Pol。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　But　have　not　you　and　the　world　already　agreed　that　to　do　injustice　is　more　disgraceful　than　to　suffer？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　that　is　now　discovered　to　be　more　evil？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　prefer　a　greater　evil　or　a　greater　dishonour　to　a　less　one？　Answer；　Polus；　and　fear　not；　for　you　will　come　to　no　harm　if　you　nobly　resign　yourself　into　the　healing　hand　of　the　argument　as　to　a　physician　without　shrinking；　and　either　say　〃Yes〃　or　〃No〃　to　me。　　　Pol。　I　should　say　〃No。〃　　　Soc。　Would　any　other　man　prefer　a　greater　to　a　less　evil？　　　Pol。　No；　not　according　to　this　way　of　putting　the　case；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　Then　I　said　truly；　Polus　that　neither　you；　nor　I；　nor　any　man；　would　rather；　do　than　suffer　injustice；　for　to　do　injustice　is　the　greater　evil　of　the　two。　　　Pol。　That　is　the　conclusion。　　　Soc。　You　see；　Polus；　when　you　compare　the　two　kinds　of　refutations；　how　unlike　they　are。　All　men；　with　the　exception　of　myself；　are　of　your　way　of　thinking；　but　your　single　assent　and　witness　are　enough　for　me…I　have　no　need　of　any　other；　I　take　your　suffrage；　and　am　regardless　of　the　rest。　Enough　of　this；　and　now　let　us　proceed　to　the　next　question；　which　is；　Whether　the　greatest　of　evils　to　a　guilty　man　is　to　suffer　punishment；　as　you　supposed；　or　whether　to　escape　punishment　is　not　a　greater　evil；　as　I　supposed。　Consider：…You　would　say　that　to　suffer　punishment　is　another　name　for　being　justly　corrected　when　you　do　wrong？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　not　allow　that　all　just　things　are　honourable　in　so　far　as　they　are　just？　Please　to　reflect；　and；　tell　me　your　opinion。　　　Pol。　Yes；　Socrates；　I　think　that　they　are。　　　Soc。　Consider　again：…Where　there　is　an　agent；　must　there　not　also　be　a　patient？　　　Pol。　I　should　say　so。　　　Soc。　And　will　not　the　patient　suffer　that　which　the　agent　does；　and　will　not　the　suffering　have　the　quality　of　the　action？　I　mean；　for　example；　that　if　a　man　strikes；　there　must　be　something　which　is　stricken？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　the　striker　strikes　violently　or　quickly；　that　which　is　struck　will　he　struck　violently　or　quickly？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　the　suffering　to　him　who　is　stricken　is　of　the　same　nature　as　the　act　of　him　who　strikes？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　a　man　burns；　there　is　something　which　is　burned？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　if　he　burns　in　excess　or　so　as　to　cause　pain；　the　thing　burned　will　be　burned　in　the　same　way？　　　Pol。　Truly。　　　Soc。　And　if　he　cuts；　the　same　argument　holds…there　will　be　something　cut？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　the　cutting　be　great　or　deep　or　such　as　will　cause　pain；　the　cut　will　be　of　the　same　nature？　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　Then　you　would　agree　generally　to　the　universal　proposition　which　I　was　just　now　asserting：　that　the　affection　of　the　patient　answers　to　the　affection　of　the　agent？　　　Pol。　I　agree。　　　Soc。　Then；　as　this　is　admitted；　let　me　ask　whether　being　punished　is　suffering　or　acting？　　　Pol。　Suffering；　Socrates；　there　can　be　no　doubt　of　that。　　　Soc。　And　suffering　implies　an　agent？　　　Pol。　Certainly；　Socrates；　and　he　is　the　punisher。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　punishes　rightly；　punishes　justly？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　therefore　he　acts　justly？　　　Pol。　Justly。　　　Soc。　Then　he　who　is　punished　and　suffers　retribution；　suffers　justly？　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　And　that　which　is　just　has　been　admitted　to　be　honourable？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　the　punisher　does　what　is　honourable；　and　the　punished　suffers　what　is　honourable？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　if　what　is　honourable；　then　what　is　good；　for　the　honourable　is　either　pleasant　or　useful？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　he　who　is　punished　suffers　what　is　good？　　　Pol。　That　is　true。　　　Soc。　Then　he　is　benefited？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Do　I　understand　you　to　mean　what　I　mean　by　the　term　〃benefited〃？　I　mean；　that　if　he　be　justly　punished　his　soul　is　improved。　　　Pol。　Surely。　　　Soc。　Then　he　who　is　punished　is　delivered　from　the　evil　of　his　soul？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　is　he　not　then　delivered　from　the　greatest　evil？　Look　at　the　matter　in　this　way：…In　respect　of　a　man's　estate；　do　you　see　any　greater　evil　than　poverty？　　　Pol。　There　is　no　greater　evil。　　　Soc。　Again；　in　a　man's　bodily　frame；　you　would　say　that　the　evil　is　weakness　and　disease　and　deformity？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　do　you　not　imagine　that　the　soul　likewise　has　some　evil　of　her　own？　　　Pol。　Of　course。　　　Soc。　And　this　you　would　call　injustice　and　ignorance　and　cowardice；　and　the　like？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　So　then；　in　mind；　body；　and　estate；　which　are　three；　you　have　pointed　out　three　corresponding　evils…injustice；　disease；　poverty？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　which　of　the　evils　is　the　most　disgraceful？…Is　not　the　most　disgraceful　of　them　injustice；　and　in　general　the　evil　of　the　soul？　　　Pol。　By　far　the　most。　　　Soc。　And　if　the　most　disgraceful；　then　also　the　worst？　　　Pol。　What　do　you　mean；　Socrates？　　　Soc。　I　mean　to　say；　that　is　most　disgraceful　has　been　already　admitted　to　be　most　painful　or　hurtful；　or　both。　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　now　injustice　and　all　evil　in　the　soul　has　been　admitted　by　to　be　most　d