prior analytics-第6部分

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continuous　for　ever；　although　if　a　man　does　exist；　it　comes　about



either　necessarily　or　generally）。　In　another　sense　the　expression



means　the　indefinite；　which　can　be　both　thus　and　not　thus；　e。g。　an



animal's　walking　or　an　earthquake's　taking　place　while　it　is



walking；　or　generally　what　happens　by　chance：　for　none　of　these



inclines　by　nature　in　the　one　way　more　than　in　the　opposite。



　　That　which　is　possible　in　each　of　its　two　senses　is　convertible　into



its　opposite；　not　however　in　the　same　way：　but　what　is　natural　is



convertible　because　it　does　not　necessarily　belong　（for　in　this



sense　it　is　possible　that　a　man　should　not　grow　grey）　and　what　is



indefinite　is　convertible　because　it　inclines　this　way　no　more　than



that。　Science　and　demonstrative　syllogism　are　not　concerned　with



things　which　are　indefinite；　because　the　middle　term　is　uncertain；　but



they　are　concerned　with　things　that　are　natural；　and　as　a　rule



arguments　and　inquiries　are　made　about　things　which　are　possible　in



this　sense。　Syllogisms　indeed　can　be　made　about　the　former；　but　it



is　unusual　at　any　rate　to　inquire　about　them。



　　These　matters　will　be　treated　more　definitely　in　the　sequel；　our



business　at　present　is　to　state　the　moods　and　nature　of　the



syllogism　made　from　possible　premisses。　The　expression　'it　is　possible



for　this　to　belong　to　that'　may　be　understood　in　two　senses：　'that'



may　mean　either　that　to　which　'that'　belongs　or　that　to　which　it　may



belong；　for　the　expression　'A　is　possible　of　the　subject　of　B'　means



that　it　is　possible　either　of　that　of　which　B　is　stated　or　of　that



of　which　B　may　possibly　be　stated。　It　makes　no　difference　whether　we



say；　A　is　possible　of　the　subject　of　B；　or　all　B　admits　of　A。　It　is



clear　then　that　the　expression　'A　may　possibly　belong　to　all　B'



might　be　used　in　two　senses。　First　then　we　must　state　the　nature　and



characteristics　of　the　syllogism　which　arises　if　B　is　possible　of



the　subject　of　C；　and　A　is　possible　of　the　subject　of　B。　For　thus　both



premisses　are　assumed　in　the　mode　of　possibility；　but　whenever　A　is



possible　of　that　of　which　B　is　true；　one　premiss　is　a　simple



assertion；　the　other　a　problematic。　Consequently　we　must　start　from



premisses　which　are　similar　in　form；　as　in　the　other　cases。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　14







　　Whenever　A　may　possibly　belong　to　all　B；　and　B　to　all　C；　there



will　be　a　perfect　syllogism　to　prove　that　A　may　possibly　belong　to　all



C。　This　is　clear　from　the　definition：　for　it　was　in　this　way　that　we



explained　'to　be　possible　for　one　term　to　belong　to　all　of　another'。



Similarly　if　it　is　possible　for　A　to　belong　no　B；　and　for　B　to



belong　to　all　C；　then　it　is　possible　for　A　to　belong　to　no　C。　For



the　statement　that　it　is　possible　for　A　not　to　belong　to　that　of　which



B　may　be　true　means　（as　we　saw）　that　none　of　those　things　which　can



possibly　fall　under　the　term　B　is　left　out　of　account。　But　whenever



A　may　belong　to　all　B；　and　B　may　belong　to　no　C；　then　indeed　no



syllogism　results　from　the　premisses　assumed；　but　if　the　premiss　BC　is



converted　after　the　manner　of　problematic　propositions；　the　same



syllogism　results　as　before。　For　since　it　is　possible　that　B　should



belong　to　no　C；　it　is　possible　also　that　it　should　belong　to　all　C。



This　has　been　stated　above。　Consequently　if　B　is　possible　for　all　C；



and　A　is　possible　for　all　B；　the　same　syllogism　again　results。



Similarly　if　in　both　the　premisses　the　negative　is　joined　with　'it



is　possible'：　e。g。　if　A　may　belong　to　none　of　the　Bs；　and　B　to　none　of



the　Cs。　No　syllogism　results　from　the　assumed　premisses；　but　if　they



are　converted　we　shall　have　the　same　syllogism　as　before。　It　is



clear　then　that　if　the　minor　premiss　is　negative；　or　if　both　premisses



are　negative；　either　no　syllogism　results；　or　if　one　it　is　not



perfect。　For　the　necessity　results　from　the　conversion。



　　But　if　one　of　the　premisses　is　universal；　the　other　particular；　when



the　major　premiss　is　universal　there　will　be　a　perfect　syllogism。



For　if　A　is　possible　for　all　B；　and　B　for　some　C；　then　A　is　possible



for　some　C。　This　is　clear　from　the　definition　of　being　possible。　Again



if　A　may　belong　to　no　B；　and　B　may　belong　to　some　of　the　Cs；　it　is



necessary　that　A　may　possibly　not　belong　to　some　of　the　Cs。　The



proof　is　the　same　as　above。　But　if　the　particular　premiss　is　negative；



and　the　universal　is　affirmative；　the　major　still　being　universal



and　the　minor　particular；　e。g。　A　is　possible　for　all　B；　B　may　possibly



not　belong　to　some　C；　then　a　clear　syllogism　does　not　result　from



the　assumed　premisses；　but　if　the　particular　premiss　is　converted



and　it　is　laid　down　that　B　possibly　may　belong　to　some　C；　we　shall



have　the　same　conclusion　as　before；　as　in　the　cases　given　at　the



beginning。



　　But　if　the　major　premiss　is　the　minor　universal；　whether　both　are



affirmative；　or　negative；　or　different　in　quality；　or　if　both　are



indefinite　or　particular；　in　no　way　will　a　syllogism　be　possible。



For　nothing　prevents　B　from　reaching　beyond　A；　so　that　as　predicates



cover　unequal　areas。　Let　C　be　that　by　which　B　extends　beyond　A。　To　C



it　is　not　possible　that　A　should　belong…either　to　all　or　to　none　or　to



some　or　not　to　some；　since　premisses　in　the　mode　of　possibility　are



convertible　and　it　is　possible　for　B　to　belong　to　more　things　than　A



can。　Further；　this　is　obvious　if　we　take　terms；　for　if　the　premisses



are　as　assumed；　the　major　term　is　both　possible　for　none　of　the



minor　and　must　belong　to　all　of　it。　Take　as　terms　common　to　all　the



cases　under　consideration　'animal'…'white'…'man'；　where　the　major



belongs　necessarily　to　the　minor；　'animal'…'white'…'garment'；　where　it



is　not　possible　that　the　major　should　belong　to　the　minor。　It　is　clear



then　that　if　the　terms　are　related　in　this　manner；　no　syllogism



results。　For　every　syllogism　proves　that　something　belongs　either



simply　or　necessarily　or　possibly。　It　is　clear　that　there　is　no



proof　of　the　first　or　of　the　second。　For　the　affirmative　is



destroyed　by　the　negative；　and　the　negative　by　the　affirmative。



There　remains　the　proof　of　possibility。　But　this　is　impossible。　For　it



has　been　proved　that　if　the　terms　are　related　in　this　manner　it　is



both　necessary　that　the　major　should　belong　to　all　the　minor　and　not



possible　that　it　should　belong　to　any。　Consequently　there　cannot　be



a　syllogism　to　prove　the　possibility；　for　the　necessary　（as　we　stated）



is　not　possible。



　　It　is　clear　that　if　the　terms　are　universal　in　possible　premisses



a　syllogism　always　results　in　the　first　figure；　whether　they　are



affirmative　or　negative；　only　a　perfect　syllogism　results　in　the　first



case；　an　imperfect　in　the　second。　But　possibility　must　be　understood



according　to　the　definition　laid　down；　not　as　covering　necessity。　This



is　sometimes　forgotten。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　15







　　If　one　premiss　is　a　simple　proposition；　the　other　a　problematic；



whenever　the　major　premiss　indicates　possibility　all　the　syllogisms



will　be　perfect　and　establish　possibility　in　the　sense　defined；　but



whenever　the　minor　premiss　indicates　possibility　all　the　syllogisms



will　be　imperfect；　and　those　which　are　negative　will　establish　not



possibility　according　to　the　definition；　but　that　the　major　does　not



necessarily　belong　to　any；　or　to　all；　of　the　minor。　For　if　this　is　so；



we　say　it　is　possible　that　it　should　belong　to　none　or　not　to　all。　Let



A　be　possible　for　all　B；　and　let　B　belong　to　all　C。　Since　C　falls



under　B；　and　A　is　possible　for　all　B；　clearly　it　is　possible　for　all　C



also。　So　a　perfect　syllogism　results。　Likewise　if　the　premiss　AB　is



negative；　and　the　premiss　BC　is　affirmative；　the　former　stating



possible；　the　latter　simple　attribution；　a　perfect　syllogism　results



proving　that　A　possibly　belongs　to　no　C。



　　It　is　clear　that　perfect　syllogisms　result　if　the　minor　premiss



states　simple　belonging：　but　that　syllogisms　will　result　if　the



modality　of　the　premisses　is　reversed；　must　be　proved　per　impossibile。



At　the　same　time　it　will　be　evident　that　they　are　imperfect：　for　the



proof　proceeds　not　from　the　premisses　assumed。　First　we　must　state



that　if　B's　being　follows　necessarily　from　A's　being；　B's



possibility　will　follow　necessarily　from　A's　possibility。　Suppose；　the



terms　being　so　related；　that　A　is　possible；　and　B　is　impossible。　If



then　that　which　is　possible；　when　it　is　possible　for　it　to　be；　might



happen；　and　if　that　which　is　impossible；　when　it　is　impossible；



could　not　happen；　and　if　at　the　same　time　A　is　possible　and　B



impossible；　it　would　be　possible　for　A　to　happen　without　B；　and　if



to　happen；　then　to　be。　For　that　which　has　happened；　when　it　has



happened；　is。　But　we　must　take　the　impossible　and　the　possible　not



only　in　the　sphere　of　becoming；　but　also　in　the　spheres　of　truth　and



predicability；　and　the　various　other　spheres　in　which　we　speak　of



the　possible：　for　it　will　be　alike　in　all。　Further　we　must



understand　the　statement　that　B's　being　depends　on　A's　being；　not　as



meaning　that　if　some　single　thing　A　is；　B　will　be：　for　nothing　follows



of　necessity　from　the　being　of　some　one　thing；　but　from　two　at



least；　i。e。　when　the　premisses　are　related　in　the　manner　stated　to



be　that　of　the　syllogism。　For　if　C　is　predicated　of　D；　and　D　of　F；



then　C　is　necessarily　predicated　of　F。　And　if　each　is　possible；　the



conclusion　also　is　possible。　If　then；　for　example；　one　should　indicate



the　premisses　by　A；　and　the　conclusion　by　B；