phenomenology of mind-第106部分

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takes　up　towards　this　otherness　a　perfectly　free　and　detached　attitude；　and　the　existence　of　this
other　is；　therefore；　an　existence　completely　set　free　from　self…consciousness；　and　in　like　manner
relating　itself　merely　to　itself。　The　freer　self…consciousness　becomes；　the　freer　also　is　the　negative
object　of　its　consciousness。　The　object　is　thus　a　complete　world　within　itself；　with　an　individuality
of　its　own；　an　independent　whole　of　laws　peculiar　to　itself；　as　well　as　an　independent　procedure
and　an　unfettered　active　realization　of　those　laws。　It　is　a　nature　in　general；　a　nature　whose　laws
and　also　whose　action　belong　to　itself　as　a　being　which　is　not　disturbed　about　the　moral
self…consciousness；　just　as　the　latter　is　not　troubled　about　it。

Starting　with　a　specific　character　of　this　sort；　there　is　formed　and　established　a　moral　outlook　on
the　world　which　consists　in　a　process　of　relating　the　implicit　aspect　of　morality　（moralisches
Ansichseyn）　and　the　explicit　aspect　（moralisches　Fürsichseyn）。　This　relation　presupposes　both
thorough　reciprocal　indifference　and　specific　independence　as　between　nature　and　moral　purposes
and　activity；　and　also；　on　the　other　side；　a　conscious　sense　of　duty　as　the　sole　essential　fact；　and　of
nature　as　entirely　devoid　of　independence　and　essential　significance　of　its　own。　The　moral　view　of
the　world；　the　moral　attitude；　consists　in　the　development　of　the　moments　which　are　found　present
in　this　relation　of　such　entirely　antithetic　and　conflicting　presuppositions。

To　begin　with；　then；　the　moral　consciousness　in　general　is　presupposed。　It　takes　duty　to　be　the
essential　reality：　itself　is　actual　and　active；　and　in　its　actuality　and　action　fulfils　duty。　But　this　moral
consciousness；　at　the　same　time；　finds　before　it　the　assumed　freedom　of　nature：　it　learns　by
experience　that　nature　is　not　concerned　about　giving　consciousness　a　sense　of　the　unity　of　its
reality　with　that　of　nature；　and　hence　discovers　that　nature　may　let　it　become　happy；　but　perhaps
also　may　not。　The　non…moral　consciousness　on　the　other　hand　finds；　by　chance　perhaps；　its
realization　where　the　moral　consciousness　sees　merely　an　occasion　for　acting；　but　does　not　see
itself　obtaining　through　its　action　the　happiness　of　performance　and　of　the　enjoyment　of
achievement。　It　therefore　finds　reason　for　bewailing　a　situation　where　there　is　no　correspondence
between　itself　and　existence；　and　lamenting　the　injustice　which　confines　it　to　having　its　object
merely　in　the　form　of　pure　duty；　but　refuses　to　let　it　see　this　object　and　itself　actually　realized。

The　moral　consciousness　cannot　renounce　happiness　and　drop　this　element　out　of　its　absolute
purpose。　The　purpose；　which　is　expressed　as　pure　duty；。　essentially　implies　retention　of　individual
self…consciousness　and　maintenance　of　its　claims。　Individual　conviction　and　knowledge　thereof
constituted　a　fundamental　element　in　morality。　This　moment　in　the　objectified　purpose；　in　duty
fulfilled；　is　the　individual　consciousness　seeing　itself　as　actually　realized。　In　other　words；　this
moment　is　that　of　enjoyment；　which　thus　lies　in　the　very　principle　of　morality；　not　indeed　of
morality　immediately　in　the　sense　of　a　frame　of　mind；　but　in　the　principle　of　the　actualization　of
morality。　Owing　to　this；　however；　enjoyment　is　also　involved　in　morality；　as　a　mood；　for　morality
seeks；　not　to　remain　a　frame　of　mind　as　opposed　to　action；　but　to　act　or　realize　itself。　Thus　the
purpose；　expressed　as　a　whole　along　with　the　consciousness　of　its　elements　or　moments；　is　that
duty　fulfilled　shall　be　both　a　purely　moral　act　and　a　realized　individuality；　and　that　nature；　the
aspect　of　individuality　in　contrast　with　abstract　purpose；　shall　be　one　with　this　purpose。

While　experience　must　necessarily　bring　to　light　the　disharmony　between　the　two　aspects；　seeing
that　nature　is　detached　and　free　nevertheless　duty　is　alone　the　essential　fact　and　nature　by　contrast
is　devoid　of　self…hood。　That　purpose　in　its　entirety；　which　the　harmony　of　the　two　constitutes；
contains　within　it　actuality　itself。　It　is；　at　the　same　time；　the　thought　of　actuality。　The　harmony　of
morality　and　nature；　or…seeing　that　nature　is　taken　account　of　merely　so　far　as　consciousness　finds
out　nature's　unity　with　it　—　the　harmony　of　morality　and　happiness；　is　thought　of　as　necessarily
existing；　it　is　postulated。　For　to　postulate　or　demand　means　that　something　is　thought　as　being
which　is　not　yet　actual　—　a　necessity　affecting；　not　the　conception　qua　conception；　but　existence。
But　necessity　is　at　the　same　time　essentially　relation　through　the　conception。　The　postulated
existence　thus　is　not　something　that　concerns　the　imagination　of　some　chance　individual
consciousness；　but　is　implied　in　the　very　notion　of　morality　itself；　whose　true　content　is　the　unity　of
pure　with　individual　consciousness。　It　falls　to　the　individual　consciousness　to　see　that　this　unity　is；
for　it；　an　actuality：　—　which　means　happiness　as　regards　the　content　of　the　purpose；　and　existence
in　general　as　regards　its　form。　The　existence　thus　demanded…the　unity　of　both　—　is　therefore　not　a
wish；　nor；　looked　at　qua　purpose；　is　it　of　such　a　kind　as　to　be　still　uncertain　of　attainment；　the
purpose　is　rather　a　demand　of　reason；　or　an　immediate　certainty　and　presupposition　of　reason。

The　first　experience　above　referred　to　and　this　postulate　are　not　the　only　experience　and　postulate；
a　whole　round　of　postulates　comes　to　light。　For　nature　is　not　merely　this　completely　free　external
mode　in　which；　as　a　bare　pure　object；　consciousness　has　to　realize　its　purpose。　Consciousness　is
per　se　essentially　something　for　which　this　other　detached　reality　exists；　i。e。　it　is　itself　something
contingent　and　natural。　This　nature；　which　is　properly　its　own；　is　sensibility；　which；　taking　the　form
of　volition；　in　the　shape　of　Impulses　and　Inclinations；　has　by　itself　a　determinate　essential　being　of
its　own；　i。e。　has　specific　single　purposes；　and　thus　is　opposed　to　pure　will　with　its　pure　purpose。　In
contrast　with　this　opposition；　however；　pure　consciousness　rather　takes　the　relation　of　sensibility　to
it；　the　absolute　unity　of　sensibility　with　it；　to　be　the　essential　fact。　Both　of　these；　pure　thought　and
sensibility；　are　essentially　and　inherently　one　consciousness；　and　pure　thought　is　just　that　for　which
and　in　which　this　pure　unity　exists；　but　for　it　qua　consciousness　the　opposition　between　itself　and
its　impulses　holds。　In　this　conflict　between　reason　and　sensibility；　the　essential　thing　for　reason　is
that　the　conflict　should　be　resolved；　and　that　the　unity　of　both　should　come　out　as　a　result：　not　the
original　unity　which　consisted　in　both　the　opposites　being　in　one　individual；　but　a　unity　which　arises
out　of　the　known　opposition　of　the　two。　So　attained；　such　a　unity　is　then　actual　morality；　for　in　it　is
contained　the　opposition　through　which　the　self　is　a　consciousness；　or　first　becomes　concrete　and
in　actual　fact　self；　and　at　the　same　time　universal。　In　other　words；　we　find　there　expressed　that
process　of　mediation　which；　as　we　see；　is　essential　to　morality。

Since；　of　the　two　factors　in　opposition；　sensibility　is　otherness　out　and　out；　is　the　negative；　while；
on　the　other　hand；　pure　thought　of　duty　is　the　ultimate　essence　which　cannot　possibly　be
surrendered　in　any　respect；　it　seems　as　if　the　unity　produced　can　be　brought　about　only　by　doing
away　with　sensibility。　But　since　sensibility　is　itself　a　moment　of　this　process　of　producing　the　unity；
is　the　moment　of　actuality；　we　have；　in　the　first　instance；　to　be　content　to　express　the　unity　in　this
form　—　sensibility　should　be　in　conformity　with　morality。

This　unity　is　likewise　a　postulated　existence；　it　is　not　there　as　a　fact；　for　what　is　there　is
consciousness；　or　the　opposition　of　sensibility　and　pure　consciousness。　All　the　same；　the　unity　is
not　a　something　per　se　like　the　first　postulate；　in　which　free　external　nature　constitutes　an　aspect
and　the　harmony　of　nature　with　moral　consciousness　in　consequence　falls　outside　the　latter。
Rather；　nature　is　here　that　which　lies　within　consciousness；　and　we　have　here　to　deal　with　morality
（Moralit？t）　as　such；　with　a　harmony　which　is　the　active　self's　very　own。　Consciousness　has；
therefore；　of　itself　to　bring　about　this　harmonious　unity；　and　〃to　be　always　making　progress　in
morality〃。　The　completion　of　this　result；　however；　has　to　be　pushed　away　into　the　remote　infinite；
because　if　it　actually　entered　the　life　of　consciousness　as　an　actual　fact；　the　moral　consciousness
would　be　done　away　with。　For　morality　is　only　moral　consciousness　qua　negative　force；　sensibility
has　merely　a　negative　significance　for　the　consciousness　of　pure　duty；　it　is　something　merely　〃not　in
conformity　with〃　duty。　By　attaining　that　harmony；　however；　morality　qua　consciousness；　i。e。　its
actuality；　passes　away；　just　as　in　the　moral　consciousness　or　actuality　its　harmony　vanishes。　The
completion　is；　therefore；　not　to　be　reached　as　an　actual　fact；　it　is　to　be　thought　of　merely　as　an
absolute　task　or　problem；　i。e。　one　which　remains　a　problem　pure　and　simple。　Nevertheless；　its
content　has　to　be　thought　as　something　which　unquestionably　has　to　be；　and　must　not　remain　a
problem：　whether　we　imagine　the　moral　consciousness　quite　cancelled　in　the　attainment　of　this
goal；　or　riot。　Which　of　these　exactly　is　the　case；　can　no　longer　be　clearly　distinguished　in　the　dim
distance　of　infinitude；　to　which　the　attainment　of　the　end　has　to　be　postponed；　just　because　we
cannot　decide　the　point。　We　shall　be；　strictly　speaking；　bound　to　say　that　a　definite　idea　on　the
matter　ought　to　be　of　no　interest　and　ought　not　to　be　sought　for；　because　this　leads　to
contradictions　—　the　contradiction　involved　in　an　undertaking　that　at　once　ought　to　remain　an
undertaking　and　yet　ought　to　be　carried　out；　and　the　conttradiction　involved　in　the　morality　which
is　to　be　no　longer　consciousness；　i。e。　no　longer　actual。　By　adopting　the　view；　however；　that
morality　when　completed　would　contain　a　contradiction；　the　sacredness　of　moral　truth　would　be
seriously　affected；　and　the　unconditional　duty　would　appear　something　unreal。

The　first　postulate　was　the　harmony　of　morality　and　objective　nature…the　fi