phenomenology of mind-第110部分

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significance；　which；　for　the　moral　consciousness；　i。e。　in　itself；　has　none。

If　the　sacred　being　was　postulated；　in　order　that　duty　might　have　binding　validity　within　the　moral
consciousness；　not　qua　pure　duty；　but　as　a　plurality　of　specific　duties；　then　this　must　again　be
dissembled　and　this　other　being　must　be　solely　sacred　in　so　far　as　only　pure　duty　has　binding
validity　within　it。　Pure　duty　has　also；　in　point　of　fact；　binding　validity　only　in　another　being；　not　in
the　moral　consciousness。　Although；　within　the　latter；　pure　morality　seems　alone　to　hold　good；　still
this　must　be　put　in　another　form；　for　it　is；　at　the　same　time；　a　natural　consciousness。　Morality　is；　in
it；　affected　and　conditioned　by　sensibility；　and　thus　is　not　something　substantial；　but　a　contingent
result　of　free　will；　in　it；　however；　qua　pure　will；　morality　is　a　contingency　of　knowledge。　Taken　by
itself；　therefore；　morality　is　in　another　being；　is　self…complete　only　in　another　reality　than　the　actual
moral　consciousness。

This　other　being；　then；　is　here　absolutely　complete　morality；　because　in　it　morality　does　not　stand
in　relation　to　nature　and　sensibility。　Yet　the　reality　of　pure　duty　is　its　actualization　in　nature　and
sensibility。　The　moral　consciousness　accounts　for　its　incompleteness　by　the　fact　that　morality；　in　its
case；　has　a　positive　relation　to　nature　and　sensibility；　since　it　holds　that　an　essential　moment　of
morality　is　that　morality　should　have　simply　and　solely　a　negative　relation　towards　nature　and
sensibility。　The　pure　moral　being；　on　the　other　hand；　because　far　above　the　struggle　with　nature
and　sense；　does　not　stand　in　a　negative　relation　to　them。　Thus；　in　point　of　fact；　the　positive　relation
to　them　alone　remains　in　its　case；　i。e。　there　remains　just　what　a　moment　ago　passed　for　the
incomplete；　for　what　was　not　moral。　Pure　morality；　however；　entirely　cut　off　from　actual　reality　so
as　likewise　to　be　even　without　positive　relation　to　reality；　would　be　an　unconscious　unreal
abstraction；　where　the　very　notion　of　morality；　which　consists　in　thinking　of　pure　duty　and　in　willing
and　doing；　would　be　absolutely　done　away　with。　This　other　being；　so　purely　and　entirely　moral；　is
again；　therefore；　mere　dissemblance　of　the　actual　fact；　and　has　to　be　given　up。

In　this　purely　moral　being；　however；　the　moments　of　the　contradiction；　in　which　this　synthetic
imaginative　process　is　carried　on；　come　closer　together。　So；　likewise；　do　the　opposites　taken　up
alternately；　now　this　and　also　that；　and　also　the　other；　opposites　which　are　allowed　to　follow　one
after　the　other；　the　one　being　constantly　supplanted　by　the　other；　without　these　ideas　being　brought
together。　So　close　do　they　come；　that　consciousness　here　has　to　give　up　its　moral　view　of　the
world　and　retreat　within　itself。

It　knows　its　morality　as　incomplete　because　it　is　affected　by　an　opposing　sensibility　and　nature；
which　partly　perturb　morality　as　such；　and　partly　give　rise　to　a　plurality　of　duties；　by　which；　in
concrete　cases　of　real　action；　consciousness　finds　itself　embarrassed。　For　each　case　is　the
concrete　focus　of　many　moral　relations；　just　as　an　object　of　perception　in　general　is　a　thing　with
many　qualities。　And　since　the　determinate　duty　is　its　purpose；　it　has　a　content；　its　content　is　a　part
of　the　purpose；　and　so　morality　is　not　pure　morality。　This　latter；　then；　has　its　real　existence　in　some
other　being。　But　such　reality　means　nothing　else　than　that　morality　is　here　self…complete；　in　itself
and　for　itselffor　itself；　i。e。　is　morality　of　a　consciousness：　in　itself；　i。e。　has　existence　and
actuality。

In　that　first　incomplete　consciousness；　morality　is　not　realized　and　carried　out。　It　is　there　something
immanent　and　implicit；　in　the　sense　of　a　mere　thought…entity；　for　it　is　associated　with　nature　and
sensibility；　with　the　actuality　of　＇external＇　existence　and　conscious　life；　which　constitutes　its　content；
and　nature　and　sensibility　are　morally　nothing。　In　the　second；　morality　is　present　as　completed；　and
not　in　the　form　of　an　unrealized　thought…element。　But　this　completion　consists　just　in　the　fact　that
morality　has　reality　in　a　consciousness；　as　well　as　free　reality；　objective　existence　in　general；　is　not
something　empty；　but　filled　out；　full　of　content。　That　is　to　say；　the　completion　of　morality　is　placed
in　this；　that　what　a　moment　ago　was　characterized　as　morally　nothing　is　found　present　in　morality
and　inherent　in　it。　It　is　at　one　time　to　have　validity　simply　and　solely　as　the　unrealized
thought…element；　a　product　of　pure　abstraction；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　is　just　as　certainly　to　have
in　this　form　no　validity　at　all：　its　true　nature　is　to　consist　in　being　opposed　to　reality；　detached
altogether　therefrom；　and　empty；　and　then　again　to　consist　in　being　actual　reality。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（3）　The　Truth　of　Moral　Self…Consciousness

The　syncretism；　or　fusion；　of　these　contradictions；　which　is　expressed　in　extenso　in　the　moral
attitude　of　experience；　collapses　internally；　since　the　distinction　on　which　it　rests；viz。　the
conception　of　something　which　must　be　thought　and　posited　as　necessary；　and　is　yet　at　the　same
time　not　essentialpasses　into　one　which　does　not　any　longer　exist　even　in　words。　What；　at　the
end；　is　affirmed　to　be　something　with　different　aspects；　both　to　be　nothing　and　also　real；　is　one　and
the　very　sameexistence　and　reality。　And　what　is　to　be　absolute　only　as　something　beyond　actual
existence　and　actual　consciousness；　and　at　the　same　time　to　be　only　in　consciousness　and　so；　qua
beyond；　nothing　at　allthis　absolute　is　pure　duty　and　the　knowledge　that　pure　duty　is　the
essentially　real。　The　consciousness；　which　makes　this　distinction　that　is　no　distinction；　which
announces　actuality　to　be　at　once　what　is　nothing　and　what　is　real；　pronounces　pure　morality　to　be
both　the　ultimate　truth　and　also　to　be　devoid　of　all　true　reality　…　such　a　consciousness　expresses
together　in　one　and　the　same　breath　ideas　which　it　formerly　separated；　and　itself　proclaims　that　it　is
not　in　earnest　with　this　characterization　and　separation　of　the　moments　of　self　and　inherent　reality。
It　shows；　on　the　contrary；　that；　what　it　announces　as　absolute　existence　apart　from　consciousness；
it　really　keeps　enclosed　within　the　self　of　self…consciousness；　and　that；　what　it　gives　out　as　the
absolute　object　of　thought　or　absolutely　inherent　and　implicit；　it　just　for　that　reason　takes　to　be
something　which　has　no　truth　at　all。

It　becomes　clear　to　consciousness　that　placing　these　moments　apart　from　each　other　is
〃dis…placing〃　them；　is　a　dissemblance；　and　it　would　be　hypocrisy　were　it　really　to　keep　to　this。
But；　being　pure　moral　self…consciousness；　it　flees　from　this　discordance　between　its　way　of
imagining　and　what　constitutes　its　essential　nature；　flees　from　this　untruth；　which　gives　out　as　true
what　it　holds　to　be　untrue；　and；　turning　away　with　abhorrence；　it　hastens　back　into　itself。　The
consciousness；　which　scorns　such　a　moral　idea　of　the　world；　is　pure　Conscience　（Gewissen）：　it　is；
in　its　inmost　being；　simply　spirit　consciously　assured　or　〃certain〃　（gewiss）　of　itself；　spirit　which　acts
directly　in　the　light　of　this　assurance；　which　acts　conscientiously　（gewissenhaft）；　without　the
intervention　of　those　ideas；　and　finds　its　true　nature　in　this　direct　immediacy。

While；　however；　this　sphere　of　dissemblance　is　nothing　else　than　the　development　of　moral
self…consciousness　in　its　various　moments　and　is　consequently　its　reality；　so　too　this
self…consciousness；　by　returning　into　itself；　will　become；　in　its　inmost　nature；　nothing　else。　This
returning　into　itself；　indeed；　simply　means　that　it　has　come　to　be　conscious　that　its　truth　is　a
pretended　truth；　a　mere　pretence。　As　returning　into　itself　it　would　have　to　be　always　giving　out　this
pretended　truth　as　its　real　truth；　for　it　would　have　to　express　and　display　itself　as　an　objective　idea；
but　it　would　know　all　the　same　that　this　is　merely　a　dissemblance。　It　would　consequently　be；　in
point　of　fact；　hypocrisy；　and　its　abhorrence　of　such　dissemblance　would　be　itself　the　first
expression　of　hypocrisy。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　Verstellung：　It　is　not　possible　to　bring　out　exactly　by　an　English　word　the　verbal　play　involved
in　Hegel's　interpretation　of　the　state　of　mind　here　discussed。　Hegel　has；　in　the　course　of　his
analysis；　used　the　meaning　implied　in　the　general　term　〃stellen〃　to　explain　by　contrast　the　specific
nuance　of　the　purely　moral　attitude　conveyed　by　the　term　verstellen。　

2。　An　expression　used　by　Kant　of　the　〃cosmological　proof〃。　




c
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conscience：
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　“Beautiful　Soul”：
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Evil　and　the　Forgiveness　of　it　

The　antinomy　in　the　moral　view　of　the　world　—　viz。　that　there　is　a　moral　consciousness　and　that
there　is　none；　or　that　the　validity；　the　bindingness　of　duty　has　its　ground　beyond　consciousness；
and　conversely　only　takes　effect　in　consciousness　—　these　contradictory　elements　had　been
combined　in　the　idea；　in　which　the　non…moral　consciousness　is　to　pass　for　moral；　its　contingent
knowledge　and　will　to　be　accepted　as　fully　sufficing；　and　happiness　to　be　its　lot　as　a　matter　of
grace。　Moral　self　consciousness　took　this　self…contradictory　idea　not　upon　itself；　but　transferred　it
to　another　being。　But　this　putting　outside　itself　of　what　it　must　think　as　necessary　is　as　much　a
contradiction　in　form　as　the　other　was　in　content。　But　that　which　appears　as　contradictory；　and
that　in　the　division　and　resolution　of　which　lies　the　round　of　activity　peculiar　to　the　moral　attitude；
are　inherently　the　same：　for　pure　duty　qua　pure　knowledge　is　nothing　else　than　the　self　of
consciousness；　and　the　self　of　consciousness　is　existence　and　actuality；　and；　in　the　same　way；　what
is　to　be　beyond　actual　consciousness　is　nothing　else　than　pure　thought；　is；　in　fact；　the　self。　Because
this　is　so；　self…consciousness；　for　us　or　per　se；　passes　back　into　itself；　and　becomes　aware　that
that　being　is　its　self；　in　which　the　actual　is　at　once　pure　knowledge　and　pure　duty。　It　takes　itself　to
be　absolutely　valid　in　its　contingency；　to　be　that　which　knows　its　immediate　individual　being　as
pure　knowledge　and　act