phenomenology of mind-第111部分

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be　absolutely　valid　in　its　contingency；　to　be　that　which　knows　its　immediate　individual　being　as
pure　knowledge　and　action；　as　the　true　objective　reality　and　harmony。

This　self　of　Conscience；　the　mode　of　spirit　immediately　certain　of　itself　as　absolute　truth　and
objective　being；　is　the　third　type　of　spiritual　self。　It　is　the　outcome　of　the　third　sphere　of　the　spiritual
world；（1）　and　may　be　shortly　compared　with　the　two　former　types　of　self。

The　totality　or　actuality　which　is　revealed　as　the　truth　of　the　ethical　world；　the　world　of　the　social
order；　is　the　self　of　a　Person　＇the　legal　self＇：　its　existence　lies　in　being　recognized　and
acknowledged。　As　the　person　is　the　self　devoid　of　substance；　this　its　existence　is　abstract　reality
too。　The　person　has　a　definite　standing；　and　that　directly　and　immediately：　its　self　is　the　point　in　the
sphere　of　its　existence　which　is　immediately　at　rest。　That　point　is　not　torn　away　from　its
universality；　the　two　＇the　particular　focus　and　its　universality＇　are　therefore　not　in　a　relational
process　with　regard　to　one　another：　the　universal　is　in　it　without　distinction；　and　is　neither　the
content　of　the　self；　nor　is　the　self　filled　by　itself　。

The　second　self　is　the　truth　and　outcome　of　the　world　of　culture；　is　spirit　that　has　recovered　itself
after　and　through　disruption；　is　absolute　freedom。　In　this　self；　the　former　immediate　unity　of
individual　existence　and　universality　breaks　up　into　its　component　elements。　The　universal；　which
remains　at　the　same　time　a　purely　spiritual　entity；　the　state　of　recognition　or　universal　will　and
universal　knowledge　—　the　universal　is　object　and　content　of　the　self；　and　its　universal　actuality。
But　the　universal　has　not　there　the　form　of　existence　detached　from　the　self：　in　this　mode　of　self　it
therefore　gets　no　filling；　no　positive　content；　no　world。

Moral　self…consciousness；　indeed；　lets　its　universal　aspect　get　detached；　so　that　this　aspect
becomes　a　nature　of　its　own；　and　at　the　same　time　it　retains　this　universality　within　itself　in　a
superseded　form。　But　it　is　merely　a　game　of　dissembling；　it　constantly　interchanges　these　two
characteristics。　In　the　form　of　Conscience；　with　its　certainty　of　itself；　it　first　finds　the　content　to　fill
the　former　emptiness　of　duty　as　well　as　the　emptiness　of　right　and　the　empty　universal　will。　And
because　this　certainty　of　self　is　at　the　same　time　immediacy；　it　finds　in　conscience　definite
existence。

Having　reached　this　level　of　its　truth；　moral　self…consciousness　then　leaves；　or　rather　supersedes；
this　state　of　internal　division　and　self…separation；　whence　arose　〃dissemblance〃　—　the　separation　of
its　inherent　being　from　the　self；　of　pure　duty；　qua　pure　purpose；　from　reality　qua　a　nature　and　a
sensibility　opposed　to　pure　purpose。　It　is；　when　thus　returned　into　itself；　concrete　moral　spirit；
which　does　not　make　for　itself　a　bare　abstract　standard　out　of　the　consciousness　of　pure　duty；　a
standard　to　be　set　up　against　actual　conscious　life；　on　the　contrary；　pure　duty；　as　also　the　sensuous
nature　opposed　to　pure　duty；　are　superseded　moments。　This　mode　of　spirit；　in　its　immediate　unity；
is　a　moral　being　making　itself　actual；　and　an　act　is　immediately　a　concrete　embodiment　of　morality。

Given　a　case　of　action；　it　is　an　objective　reality　for　the　knowing　mind。　The　latter；　qua　conscience；
knows　it　in　a　direct　concrete　manner；　and　at　the　same　time　it　is　merely　as　conscience　knows　it　to
be。　When　knowledge　is　something　other　than　its　object；　it　is　contingent　in　character。　Spirit；
however；　which　is　sure　of　its　self；　is　no　longer　an　accidental　knowledge　of　that　kind；　is　not　a　way
of　producing　inside　its　own　being　ideas　from　which　reality　is　divorced。　On　the　contrary；　since　the
separation　between　what　is　essential　and　self　has　been　given　up；　a　case　of　moral　action　falls；　just
as　it　is　essentially；　directly　within　immediate　conscious　certainty；　the　sensible　＇feeling＇　form　of
knowledge；　and　it　is　essentially　only　as　it　is　in　this　form　of　knowledge。

Action；　then；　qua　realization；　is　in　this　way　the　pure　form　of　will　—　the　bare　conversion　of　reality　in
the　sense　of　a　given　case；　into　a　reality　that　is　enacted；　the　conversion　of　the　bare　state　of　objective
knowledge　into　one　of　knowledge　about　reality　as　something　produced　and　brought　about　by
consciousness。　Just　as　sensuous　certainty　is　directly　taken　up；　or　rather　converted；　into　the
essential　life　and　substance　of　spirit；　this　other　transformation　is　also　simple　and　unmediated；　a
transition　made　through　the　pure　conception　without　changing　the　content；　the　content　being
conditioned　by　some　interest　on　the　part　of　the　consciousness　knowing　it。

Further　conscience　does　not　break　up　the　circumstances　of　the　case　into　a　variety　of　duties。　It
does　not　operate　as　the　positive　general　medium；　in　which　the　manifold　duties；　each　for　itself；
would　acquire　immovable　substantial　existence。　If　it　did　so；　either　no　action　could　take　place　at
all；　because　each　concrete　case　involves　opposition　in　general；　and；　in　the　specific　case　of
morality；　opposition　of　duties　—　and　hence　there　would　always　be　one　side　injured；　one　duty
violated；　by　the　very　nature　of　concrete　action：　or　else；　if　action　does　take　place；　the　violation　of
one　of　the　conflicting　duties　would　be　the　actual　result　brought　about。　Conscience　is　rather　the
negative　single　unity；　it　is　the　absolute　self；　which　does　away　with　this　variety　of　substantial　moral
constituents。　It　is　simple　action　in　accordance　with　duty；　action　which　does　not　fulfil　this　or　that
duty；　but　knows　and　does　what　is　concretely　right。　It　is；　therefore；　in　general；　and　for　the　first　time
in　moral　experience；　moral　action　as　action；　and　into　this　the　previous　stage　of　mere　consciousness
of　morality　without　action　has　passed。

The　concrete　shape　which　the　act　takes　may　be　analysed　by　a　conscious　process　of　distinction
into　a　variety　of　properties；　i。e。　in　this　case　into　a　variety　of　moral　relationships；　and　these　may
either　be　each　expressly　held　to　be　absolute　（as　each　must　be　if　it　is　to　be　duty）　or；　again；
subjected　to　comparison　and　criticism。　In　the　simple　moral　action　arising　from　conscience；　duties
are　so　piled　and　commingled　that　the　isolated　independence　of　all　these　separate　entities　is
immediately　destroyed；　and　the　process　of　critically　considering　and　worrying　about　what　our　duty
is《　finds　no　place　at　all　in　the　unshaken　certainty　of　conscience。

Just　as　little；　again；　do　we　find　in　conscience　that　fluctuating　uncertainty　of　mind；　which　puts　now
so…called　〃pure〃　morality　away　from　itself；　assigning　it　to　some　other　holy　being；　and　takes　itself　to
be　unholy；　and　then　again；　on　the　other　hand；　puts　this　moral　purity　within　itself；　and　places　in　that
other　the　connexion　of　the　sensuous　with　the　moral　element。

It　renounces　all　these　semblances　and　dissemblances　（Stellungen　und　Verstellungen）
characteristic　of　the　moral　point　of　view；　when　it　gives　up　thinking　that　there　is　a　contradiction
between　duty　and　actual　reality。　According　to　this　latter　state　of　mind；　I　act　morally　when　I　am
conscious　of　performing　merely　pure　duty　and　nothing　else　but　that：　i。e。　in　fact；　when　I　do　not　act。
When；　however；　I　really　act；　I　am　conscious　of　an　〃other〃；　of　a　reality　which　is　there　before　me；
and　one　which　I　want　to　bring　about；　I　have　a　definite　end　and　fulfil　a　definite　duty。　There　is
something　else　therein　than　the　pure　duty；　which　alone　was　supposed　to　be　kept　in　view。

Conscience；　on　the　other　hand；　is　the　sense　that；　when　the　moral　consciousness　declares　pure　duty
to　be　the　essence　of　its　action；　this　pure　purpose　is　a　dissemblance　of　the　actual　fact。　For　the　real
fact　is　that　pure　duty　consists　in　the　empty　abstraction　of　pure　thought；　and　finds　its　reality　and
content　solely　in　some　definite　actual　existence；　an　actuality　which　is　actuality　of　consciousness
itself　—　not　of　consciousness　in　the　sense　of　a　thought…entity；　but　as　an　individual。　Conscience　for
its　own　part；　finds　its　truth　to　lie　in　the　direct　certainty　of　itself。　This　immediate　concrete　certainty　of
itself　is　the　real　essence。　Looking　at　this　certainty　from　the　point　of　view　of　the　opposition　which
consciousness　involves；　the　agent's　own　immediate　individuality　constitutes　the　content　of　moral
action；　and　the　form　of　moral　action　is　just　this　very　self　as　a　pure　process；　viz。　as　the　process　of
knowing；　in　other　words；　is　private　individual　conviction。

Looking　more　closely　at　the　unity　and　the　significance　of　the　moments　of　this　stage；　we　find　that
moral　consciousness　conceived　itself　merely　in　the　form　of　the　inherent　principle；　or　as　ultimate
essence；　qua　conscience；　however；　it　lays　hold　of　its　explicit　individual　self…existence
（Fürsichseyn）；　or　its　self。　The　contradiction　involved　in　the　moral　point　of　view　is　resolved；　i。e。　the
distinction；　which　lay　at　the　basis　of　its　peculiar　attitude；　proves　to　be　no　distinction；　and　melts　into
the　process　of　pure　negativity。　This　process　of　negativity　is；　however；　just　the　self：　a　single　simple
self　which　is　at　once　pure　knowledge　and　knowledge　of　itself　as　this　individual　conscious　life。　This
self　constitutes；　therefore；　the　content　of　what　formerly　was　the　empty　essence；　for　it　is　something
actual　and　concrete；　which　no　longer　has　the　significance　of　being　a　nature　alien　to　the　ultimate
essence；　a　nature　independent　and　with　laws　of　its　own。　As　the　negative　element；　it　introduces
distinction　into　the　pure　essence；　a　definite　content；　and　one；　too；　which　has　a　value　in　its　own　right
as　it　stands。

Further；　this　self　is；　qua　pure　self　…identical　knowledge；　the　universal　without　qualification；　so　that
just　this　knowledge；　being　its　very　own　knowledge；　being　conviction；　constitutes　duty。　Duty　is　no
longer　the　universal　appearing　over　against　and　opposed　to　the　self；　duty　is　known　to　have　in　this
condition　of　separation　no　validity。　It　is　now　the　law　which　exists　for　the　sake　of　the　self；　and　not
the　law　for　the　sake　of　which　the　self　exists。　The　law　and　duty；　however；　have　for　that　reason　not
only　the　significance　of　existing　on　their　own　account；　but　also　of　being　inherent　and　essential；　for
this　knowledge　is；　in　virtue　of　its　identity　with　itself；　jus