phenomenology of mind-第113部分

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maintenance　of　himself　and　family；　and　no　less　ensure　the　possibility　of　his　being　serviceable　to　his
neighbours　and　of　doing　good　to　those　standing　in　need。　The　individual　is　aware　that　this　is　a　duty；
for　this　content　is　directly　contained　in　the　certainty　he　has　of　himself。　He　perceives；　further；　that　he
fulfils　this　particular　duty　in　this　particular　case。　Other　people　possibly　consider　the　specific　way　he
adopts　as　fraud：　they　hold　by　other　sides　of　the　concrete　case　presented；　while　he　holds　firmly　to
this　particular　side　of　it　by　the　fact　of　his　being　conscious　that　the　increase　of　property　is　a　pure
and　absolute　duty。

In　the　same　way　there　is　fulfilled　by　the　individual；　as　a　duty；　what　other　people　call　violence　and
wrong…doing　—　the　duty　of　asserting　one's　independence　against　others：　and；　again；　the　duty　of
preserving　one's　life；　and　the　possibility　of　being　useful　to　one's　neighbours。　Others　call　this
cowardice；　but　what　they　call　courage　really　violates　both　these　duties。　But　cowardice　must　not　be
so　stupid　and　clumsy　as　not　to　know　that　the　maintenance　of　life　and　the　possibility　of　being　useful
to　others　are　duties　—　so　inept　as　not　to　be　convinced　of　the　dutifulness　of　its　action；　and　not　to
know　that　dutifulness　consists　in　knowledge。　Otherwise　it　would　commit　the　stupidity　of　being
immoral。　Since　morality　lies　in　the　consciousness　of　having　fulfilled　one's　duty；　this　will　not　be
lacking　when　the　action　is　what　is　called　cowardice　any　more　than　when　it　is　what　is　called
courage。　As　the　abstraction　called　〃duty〃　is　capable　of　every　content；　it　is　quite　equal　to　that　of
cowardice。　The　agent　knows　what　he　does　to　be　duty；　and　since　he　knows　this；　and　conviction　as
to　duty　is　just　dutifulness；　he　is　thus　recognized　and　acknowledged　by　others。　The　act　thereby
becomes　accepted　as　valid　and　has　actual　existence。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（1）　The　Universality　of　Conscience

It　is　of　no　avail　to　object　to　this　freedom　—　which　puts　any　and　every　kind　of　content　into　this
universal　inert　receptacle　of　pure　duty　and　pure　knowledge　—　by　asserting　that　another　content
ought　to　have　been　put　there。　For　whatever　the　content　be；　each　content　has　upon　it　the　stain　of
determinateness　from　which　pure　knowledge　is　free；　which　pure　knowledge　can　despise　just　as
readily　as　it　can　take　up　every　determinateness　in　turn。　Every　content；　through　its　being
determinate；　stands　on　the　same　footing　with　every　other；　even　though　it　seems　to　have　precisely
the　character　that　the　particularity　in　the　content　is　cancelled。　It　may　well　seem　—　since　in　concrete
cases　duty　breaks　regularly　into　opposition；　and；　by　doing　so；　sunders　the　opposites　individuality
and　universality　—　that　the　duty；　whose　content　is　the　universal　as　such；　contains　on　that　account；
ipso　facto；　the　nature　of　pure　duty；　and　that　thus　form　and　content　are　here　entirely　in　accord。　On
this　view；　it　might　seem　that；　e。g。　acting　for　the　universal　good；　for　what　is　the　best　for　all；　is　to　be
preferred　to　acting　for　what　is　the　best　for　the　individual。　But　this　universal　duty　is　precisely　what　is
present　as　self…contained　actual　substance；　in　the　form　of　＇established＇　law　and　right；　and　holds
good　independently　of　the　individual's　knowledge　and　conviction　as　well　as　of　his　immediate
interest。　It　is　thus　precisely　that　against　the　form　of　which　morality　as　a　whole　is　directed。　As
regards　its　content；　however；　this　too　is　determinate　in　character；　in　so　far　as　the　〃universally　best〃
is　opposed　to　the　〃individual　best〃。　Consequently；　its　law　is　one　from　which　conscience　knows
itself　to　be　absolutely　free；　and　it　gives　itself　the　absolute　privilege　to　add　and　pare；　to　neglect　as
well　as　fulfil　it。

Then；　again；　the　above　distinction　of　duty　towards　the　individual　and　duty　towards　the　universal　is
not　something　fixed　and　final；　when　we　look　at　the　nature　of　the　opposition　in　question。　On　the
contrary；　what　the　individual　does　for　himself　is　to　the　advantage　of　the　universal　as　well。　The　more
he　looks　after　his　own　good；　not　only　is　there　the　greater　possibility　of　his　usefulness　to　others：　his
very　reality　consists　merely　in　his　living　and　existing　in　connexion　with　others。　His　individual
enjoyment　means　ultimately　and　essentially　putting　what　is　his　own　at　the　disposal　of　others；　and
helping　them　to　secure　their　enjoyment。　In　fulfilling　duty　to　individuals；　and　hence　duty　to　self；　duty
to　the　general　thus　also　gets　fulfilled。　Weighing；　considering；　comparing　duties；　should　this　appear
here；　would　take　the　line　of　calculating　the　advantage　which　the　general　would　get　from　any　given
action。　But　there　can　be　no　such　process；　partly　because　morality　would　thereby　be　handed　over
to　the　inevitable　contingency　characteristic　of　mere　〃insight〃；　partly　because　it　is　precisely　the
nature　of　conscience　to　have　done　with　all　this　calculating　and　weighing　of　duties；　and　to　decide
directly　from　itself　without　any　such　reasons。

In　this　way；　then；　conscience　acts　and　maintains　itself　in　the　unity　of　its　essential　being　and　its
objective　existence　for　itself；　in　the　unity　of　pure　thought　and　individuality：　it　is　spirit　certain　of　itself；
which　inherently　possesses　its　own　truth；　within　itself；　in　its　knowledge；　a　knowledge　in　the　sense
of　knowledge　of　its　duty。　It　maintains　its　being　therein　by　the　fact　that　the　positive　element　in　the
act；　the　content　as　well　as　form　of　duty　and　the　knowledge　of　duty；　belong　to　the　self；　to　the
certainty　of　itself。　What；　however；　seeks　to　come　before　the　self　with　an　inherent　being　of　its　own
is　held　to　be　not　truly　real；　merely　a　transcended　element；　only　a　moment。　Consequently；　it　is　not
universal　knowledge　in　general　that　has　a　value；　but　what　is　known　of　the　circumstances。　It　puts
into　duty；　which　is　the　universal　immanent　essence；　the　content　which　it　derives　from　its　natural
individuality；　for　the　content　is　one　that　is　present　in　its　own　being。　This　content；　in　virtue　of　the
universal　medium　wherein　it　exists；　becomes　the　duty　which　it　carries　out；　and　empty　pure　duty　is；
through　this　very　fact；　affirmed　to　be　something　transcended；　a　moment。　This　content　is　its
emptiness；　transcended　and　cancelled；　i。e。　is　the　fulfilling　of　pure　duty。

But　at　the　same　time　conscience　is　detached　from　every　possible　content。　It　absolves　itself　from
every　specific　duty；　which　would　try　to　pass　for　a　law。　In　the　strength　of　its　certainty　of　itself；　it　has
the　majesty　of　absolute　self…sufficiency；　of　absolute　a　rpkla　to　bind　or　to　loose。　This
self…determination　is　at　once；　therefore；　absolute　conformity　to　duty。　Duty　is　the　knowledge　itself；
this　pure　and　simple　selfhood；　however；　is　the　immanent　principle　and　essence；　for　this　inherent
principle　is　pure　self…identity；　and　self…identity　lies　in　this　consciousness。

This　pure　knowledge　is　immediately　objective；　is　existence…for…another；　for；　qua　pure　self…identity；
it　is　immediacy；　it　is　objective　being。　This　being；　however；　is　at　the　same　time　pure　universality；　the
selfhood　of　all：　in　other　words；　action　is　acknowledged；　and　hence　actual。　This　being　forms　the
element　by　which　conscience　directly　stands　on　a　footing　of　equality　with　every　self…consciousness；
and　this　relation　means　not　an　abstract　impersonal　law；　but　the　self　of　conscience。

In　that　this　right　which　conscience　does　is　at　the　same　time；　however；　a　fact　for　others；　a　disparity
seems　to　affect　conscience。　The　duty　which　it　fulfils　is　a　determinate　content；　that　content　is；　no
doubt；　the　self　of　consciousness；　and　so　its　knowledge　of　itself；　its　identity　with　its　self。　But　when
fulfilled；　when　planted　in　the　general　element　of　existence；　this　identity　is　no　longer　knowledge；　no
longer　this　process　of　distinction　which　directly　and　at　the　same　time　does　away　with　its
distinctions。　Rather；　in　the　sphere　of　he　distinction　is　set　up　as　subsistent；　and　the　act　is　a
determinate　specific　one；　not　identical　with　the　element　of　everybody's　self…consciousness；　and
hence　not　necessarily　acknowledged　and　recognized。　Both　aspects；　conscience　qua　acting；　and
the　general　consciousness　acknowledging　this　act　to　be　duty；　stand　equally　loose　from　the　specific
character　belonging　to　this　deed。　On　account　of　this　freedom　and　detachment；　the　relation　of　the
two　within　the　common　medium　of　their　connexion　is　rather　a　relationship　of　complete　disparity　—
as　a　result　of　which；　the　consciousness；　which　is　aware　of　the　act；　finds　itself　in　complete
uncertainty　regarding　the　spirit　which　does　the　act　and　is　〃certain　of　itself〃。　This　spirit　acts　and
places　in　existence　a　determinate　characteristic；　others　hold　to　this　existence；　as　its　truth；　and　are
therein　certain　of　this　spirit；　it　has　therein　expressed　what　it　takes　to　be　its　duty。　But　it　is　detached
and　free　from　any　specific　duty；　it　has；　therefore；　left　the　point　where　other　people　think　it　actually
to　be；　and　this　very　medium　of　existence　and　duty　as　inherently　existing　are　held　by　it　to　be　merely
transitory　moments。　What　it　thus　places　before　them；　it　also　〃displaces〃　again；　or　rather　has；　eo
ipso；　immediately　〃displaced〃。　For　its　reality　is；　for　it；　not　the　duty　and　determinate　content　thus　put
forward；　but　rather　is　the　reality　which　it　has　in　its　absolute　certainty　of　itself。

The　other　self…consciousnesses　do　not　know；　then；　whether　this　particular　conscience　is　morally
good　or　is　wicked；　or；　rather；　not　merely　can　they　not　know　this　conscience；　but　they　must　take　it
to　be　also　wicked。　For　just　as　it　stands　loose　to　the　determinate　content　of　duty；　and　detached
from　duty　as　inherently　existing；　so　do　they　likewise。　What　it　places　before　them；　they　themselves
know　how　to　〃displace〃　or　dissemble：　it　is　something　expressing　merely　the　self　of　another
individual；　not　their　own：　they　do　not　merely　know　themselves　to　be　detached　and　free　from　it；　but
have　to　resolve　and　analyse　it　within　their　own　consciousness；　reduce　it　to　nothingness　by
judgments　and　explanations　in　order　to　preserve　their　own　self。

But　the　act　of　conscience　is　not　merely　this　determination　of　existence；　a　determinate　content
forsaken　by　the　pure　self。　What　is　to　be　binding　and　to　be　recognized　as　duty；　only　is　so　through
knowledge　and　conviction　as　to　its　being