phenomenology of mind-第18部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


ego　takes　the　place　of　that　subject　and　is　the　function　of　knitting　or　combining　the　predicates　one
with　another；　and　is　the　subject　holding　them　fast。　But　since　the　former　subject　enters　into　the
determinate　constituents　themselves；　and　is　their　very　life；　the　subject　in　the　second　case　—　viz。　the
knowing　subject…finds　that　the　former；　which　it　is　supposed　to　be　done　with　and　which　it　wants　to
transcend；　in　order　to　return　into　itself；　—　is　still　there　in　the　predicate：　and　instead　of　being　able　to
be　the　determining　agency　in　the　process　of　resolving　the　predicate…reflectively　deciding　whether
this　or　that　predicate　should　be　attached　to　the　former　subject　—　it　has　really　to　deal　with　the　self
of　the　content；　is　not　allowed　to　be　something　on　its　own　account　（für　sich）；　but　has　to　exist　along
with　this　content。　

What　has　been　said　can　be　expressed　in　a　formal　manner　by　saying　that　the　nature　of　judgment　or
the　proposition　in　general；　which　involves　the　distinction　of　subject　and　predicate；　is　subverted　and
destroyed　by　the　speculative　judgment；　and　the　identical　proposition；　which　the　former　becomes
＇by　uniting　subject　and　predicate＇；　implies　the　rejection　and　repudiation　of　the　above　relation
between　subject　and　predicate。　This　conflict　between　the　form　of　a　proposition　in　general　and　the
unity　of　the　notion　which　destroys　that　form；　is　similar　to　what　we　find　between　metre　and　accent
in　the　case　of　rhythm。　Rhythm　is　the　result　of　what　hovers　between　and　unites　both。　So　in　the　case
of　the　speculative　or　philosophical　judgment；　the　identity　of　subject　and　predicate　is　not　intended
to　destroy　their　distinction；　as　expressed　in　propositional　form；　their　unity　is　to　arise　as　a　harmony
of　the　elements。　The　form　of　the　judgment　is　the　way　the　specific　sense　appears；　or　is　made
manifest；　the　accent　which　differentiates　the　meaning　it　contains：　that　the　predicate　expresses　the
substance；　and　the　subject　itself　falls　within　the　universal；　is　however　the　unity　wherein　that　accent
dies　away。　

To　explain　what　has　been　said　by　examples　let　us　take　the　proposition　God　is　Being。　The
predicate　is　〃being〃：　it　has　substantive　significance；　and　thus　absorbs　the　meaning　of　the　subject
within　it。　Being　is　meant　to　be　here　not　predicate　but　the　essential　nature。　Thereby；　God　seems　to
cease　to　be　what　he　was　when　the　proposition　was　put　forward；　viz。　a　fixed　subject。　Thinking　＇i。e。
ordinary　reflection＇；　instead　of　getting　any　farther　with　the　transition　from　subject　to　predicate；　in
reality　finds　its　activity　checked　through　the　loss　of　the　subject；　and　it　is　thrown　back　on　the
thought　of　the　subject　because　it　misses　this　subject。　Or　again；　since　the　predicate　has　itself　been
pronounced　to　be　a　subject；　to　be　the　being；　to　be　the　essential　reality；　which　exhausts　the　nature
of　the　subject；　thinking　finds　the　subject　directly　present　in　the　predicate　too：　and　now；　instead　of
having；　in　the　predicate；　gone　into　itself；　and　preserved　the　freedom　characteristic　of　ratiocination；
it　is　absorbed　in　the　content　all　the　while；　or；　at　any　rate　is　required　to　be　so。

Similarly　when　it　is　said：　〃the　real　is　the　universal〃；　the　real；　qua　subject；　passes　away　in　its
predicate。　The　universal　is　not　only　meant　to　have　the　significance　of　a　predicate；　as　if　the
proposition　stated　that　the　real　is　universal：　the　universal　is　meant　to　express　the　essential　nature　of
the　real。　Thinking　therefore　loses　that　fixed　objective　basis　which　it　had　in　the　subject；　just　as　much
as　in　the　predicate　it　is　thrown　back　on　the　subject；　and　therein　returns　not　into　itself　but　into　the
subject　underlying　the　content。

This　unaccustomed　restraint　imposed　upon　thought　is　for　the　most　part　the　cause　of　the　complaints
concerning　the　unintelligibility　of　philosophical　writings；　when　otherwise　the　individual　has　in　him　the
requisite　mental　cultivation　for　understanding　them。　In　what　has　been　said　we　see　the　reason　for
the　specific　charge　often　made　against　them；　that　a　good　deal　has　to　be　read　repeatedly　before　it
can　be　understood　—　an　accusation　which　is　meant　to　convey　something　improper　in　the　extreme；
and　one　which　if　granted　to　be　sound　admits　of　no　further　reply。　It　is　obvious　from　the　above　what
is　the　state　of　the　case　here。　The　philosophical　proposition；　being　a　proposition；　calls　up　the
accepted　view　of　the　usual　relation　of　subject　and　predicate；　and　suggests　the　idea　of　the
customary　procedure　which　takes　place　in　knowledge。　Its　philosophical　content　destroys　this　way
of　proceeding　and　the　ordinary　view　taken　of　this　process。　The　common　view　discovers　that　the
statement　is　intended　in　another　sense　than　it　is　thinking　of；　and　this　correction　of　its　opinion
compels　knowledge　to　recur　to　the　proposition　and　take　it　now　in　some　other　sense。　

There　is　a　difficulty　which　might　well　be　avoided。　It　consists　in　mixing　up　the　methods　of　procedure
followed　by　speculation　and　ratiocination；　when　what　is　said　of　the　subject　has　at　one　time　the
significance　of　its　conceptual　principle；　and　at　another　time　the　meaning　of　its　predicate　or
accidental　quality。　The　one　mode　of　thinking　invalidates　the　other；　and　only　that　philosophical
exposition　can　manage　to　become　plastic　in　character　which　resolutely　sets　aside　and　has　nothing
to　do　with　the　ordinary　way　of　relating　the　parts　of　a　proposition。

As　a　matter　of　fact；　non…speculative　thinking　has　its　rights　too；　which　are　justifiable；　but　are
disregarded　in　the　speculative　way　of　stating　a　proposition。　Abolishing　the　form　of　the　proposition
must　not　take　place　only　in　an　immediate　manner；　through　the　mere　content　of　the　proposition。　On
the　contrary；　we　must　give　explicit　expression　to　this　cancelling　process；　it　must　be　not　only　that
internal　restraining　and　confining　of　thought　within　its　own　substance；　this　turning　of　the　conception
back　into　itself　has　to　be　expressly　brought　out　and　stated。　This　process；　which　constitutes　what
formerly　had　to　be　accomplished　by　proof；　is　the　internal　dialectical　movement　of　the　proposition
itself。　This　alone　is　the　concrete　speculative　element；　and　only　the　explicit　expression　of　this　is　a
speculative　systematic　exposition。　Qua　proposition；　the　speculative　aspect　is　merely　the　internal
restriction　of　thought　within　its　own　substance　where　the　return　of　the　essential　principle　into　itself
is　not　yet　brought　out。　Hence　we　often　find　philosophical　expositions　referring　us　to　the　inner
intuition；　and　thus　dispensing　with　the　systematic　statement　of　the　dialectical　movement　of　the
proposition；　which　is　what　we　wanted　all　the　while。　The　proposition　ought　to　express　what　the
truth　is：　in　its　essential　nature　the　truth　is　subject：　being　so；　it　is　merely　the　dialectical　movement；　this
self…producing　course　of　activity；　maintaining；　its　advance　by　returning　back　into　itself。　In　the　case
of　knowledge　in　other　spheres　this　aspect　of　expressly　stating　the　internal　nature　of　the　content　is
constituted　by　proof。　When　dialectic；　however；　has　been　separated　from　proof；　the　idea　of
philosophical　demonstration　as　a　matter　of　fact　has　vanished　altogether。

On　this　point　it　may　be　mentioned　that　the　dialectical　process　likewise　consists　of　parts　or　elements
which　are　propositions。　The　difficulty　indicated　seems　therefore　to　recur　continually；　and　seems　to
be　a　difficulty　inherent　in　the　nature　of　the　case。　This　is　like　what　happens　in　the　ordinary　process
of　proving　anything；　the　grounds　it　makes　use　of　need　themselves　to　be　based　on　other　grounds
again；　and　so　on　ad　inflnitum。　This　manner　of　furnishing　grounds　and　conditions；　however；
concerns　that　type　of　proof　from　which　the　dialectical　movement　is　distinct　and　hence　belongs　to
the　process　of　external　knowledge。　As　to　what　this　movement　is；　its　element　is　the　bare　concept；
this　furnishes　a　content　which　is　through　and　through　subject　impliciter　and　per　se。　There　is　to　be
found；　therefore；　no　sort　of　content　standing　in　a　relation；　as　it　were；　to　an　underlying　subject；　and
getting　its　significance　by　being　attached　to　this　as　a　predicate。　The　proposition　as　it　appears　is　a
mere　empty　form。　

Apart　from　the　sensuously　apprehended　or　ideally　presented　（vorgestellten）　self；　it　is　in　the　main
the　mere　name　qua　name　which　denotes　the　subject　pure　and　simple；　the　empty　unit　without　any
conceptual　character。　For　this　reason　it　would　e。g。　be　expedient　to　avoid　the　name　〃God〃；
because　this　word　is　not　in　its　primary　use　a　conception　as　well；　but　the　special　name　of　an
underlying　subject；　its　fixed　resting…place；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　being　or　the　one；　singleness；
subject；　etc。；　themselves　directly　indicate　conceptions。　Furthermore；　if　speculative　truths　are　stated
about　that　subject　＇God＇；　even　then　their　content　is　devoid　of　the　immanent　notion；　because　that
content　is　merely　present　in　the　form　of　a　passive　subject；　and　owing　to　this　the　speculative　truths
easily　take　on　the　character　of　mere　edification。　From　this　side；　too；　the　obstacle；　arising　from　the
habit　of　putting　the　speculative　predicate　in　the　form　of　a　proposition；　instead　of　taking　it　as　an
inherent　essential　conception；　is　capable　of　being　made　greater　or　less　by　the　mere　way
philosophical　truths　are　put　forward。　Philosophical　exposition；　faithfully　following　its　insight　into　the
nature　of　speculative　truth；　must　retain　the　dialectical　form；　and　exclude　everything　which　is　not
grasped　conceptually　and　is　conception。

Just　as　much　as　in　the　procedure　of　ratiocination；　the　study　of　philosophy　finds　obstruction；　too；　in
the　unreasoning　conceit　that　builds　itself　on　well…established　truths；　which　the　possessor　considers
he　has　no　need　to　return　upon　and　reconsider；　but　rather　takes　to　be　fundamental；　and　thinks　he
can　by　means　thereof　propound　as　well　as　decide　and　pass　sentence。　In　this　regard；　it　is　especially
needful　to　make　once　again　a　serious　business　of　philosophy。　In　all　spheres　of　science；　art；　skill；
and　handicraft　it　is　never　doubted　that；　in　order　to　master　them；　a　considerable　amount　of　trouble
must　be　spent　in　learning　and　in　being　trained。　As　regards　philosophy；　on　the　contrary；　there　seems
still　an　assumption　prevalent　that；　though　every　one　with　eyes　and　fingers　is　not　on　that　account　in　a